NIGHT COMBAT BY RUSSIAN CAVALRY

JCFalkenbergIII · #1 (**permalink**) February 23rd, 2008, 06:36 AM

"Night Combat by Russian Cavalry" from Intelligence Bulletin

[Intelligence Bulletin Cover] A short intelligence report on night raids by Russian cavalry, from the Intelligence Bulletin, October 1942.

[Editor's Note: The following article is wartime information on enemy tactics and equipment published for Allied soldiers. In most cases, more accurate data is available in postwar publications.]

NIGHT COMBAT BY RUSSIAN CAVALRY

1. GENERAL

The Russians have proved that there is a definite place for horse cavalry in battle, despite the wide use of mechanized forces and airplanes in modern warfare. By operating at night, cavalry avoids attack by aircraft, and moves, dismounts, and strikes with much more surprise than during daylight hours.

2. METHODS OF ATTACK

The success of a night attack depends largely upon careful reconnaissance of the enemy positions. A commander's reconnaissance includes the approaches to the enemy's positions and the location of his firing points and outposts. Before nightfall, all steps have been taken to provide absolute secrecy of movement. The plan of every assault group is worked out in detail. Units are designated to seize outposts and guards, and deal with the automatic riflemen, the machine-gun crews, and the tank crews when they come out of bivouac.

In moving to the point from which the attack is to be made, the Russians do not fire a shot, unless the Germans open fire. In this case all Russian fire power is put into action.

Experience has taught the Russians that it is difficult for cavalry to use artillery in night operations, except while on the defensive. Normally, the cavalry regiments and squadrons take along their heavy machine guns in carts. The machine guns are capable of accomplishing the mission usually assigned to artillery. Antitank units are equipped with antitank weapons, grenades, and bottles of gasoline ("Molotov cocktails").

All equipment is carefully inspected before the cavalry leaves for the attack. Stirrups are wrapped with felt or straw. At a point about 3 to 5 miles from the enemy positions, the machine-gun carts are left in he open and the guns and mortars are carried in pack. The troops dismount again in open areas near the enemy outposts, and the horse-holders hide the horses.

If the mission is to seize a particular point, machine guns and mortars support the action without a let-up until the point is taken. If the mission is to destroy an enemy unit, the troops return when the mission has been accomplished. In this case the machine guns and mortars are placed in positions where they can also provide fire for the withdrawal of the units, in addition to supporting the attack.

These night attacks are planned so as to be completed 2 or 3 hours before daybreak. The Russians need this time interval in order to return to their original positions without being exposed to air attacks.

3. EXAMPLE OF TYPICAL ATTACK

The following is quoted from a Russian report as an example of typical cavalry night operations against a village:

"Two days were required to prepare this attack. The village was 22 kilometers (about 14 miles) from our division position. A troop had been sent out on reconnaissance. It went out on the highway, concealed itself in the forest, and observed road movements; it determined the enemy strength, location of outposts, and location both of tank parks and night bivouacs, as well as the headquarters and rear elements.

"The approaches to the town were important. West and south were two ravines too rough for tanks. The decision was to attack from the north and east. These directions would permit cutting off any attempt of the Germans to withdraw along the highway which ran north of the city. They would catch the enemy under crossfires and at the same time avoid danger of firing on our own troops. Since one regiment attacked from north and the other from east to west, this danger was averted.

"The division moved out in two columns at 1900; at 2400 it assembled 3 kilometers (about 2 miles) from the town, dismounted at once; and went into action. To insure surprise, the attack was made without the use of signals. The outguards were jumped without noise, and the units advanced on the bridge in the town. Here three German guards opened fire, but it was too late. Our troops threw grenades into the houses used as quarters, the assault groups attacked the firing positions, and 15 tanks were put out of action. The remaining tanks moved to the highway, but our engineer units had blown up the bridge. The fight ended at 0500, and from then until daylight (in December, about 0800) the troops returned to their position unnoticed by enemy aircraft.

"Our missions are usually for the purpose of opening the way for the infantry.

"As a result of these attacks, the Germans are now posting strong outguards, and even more careful reconnaissance is required.

"During such night attacks the Germans try to capture our horse-holders."

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Sloniksp · #2 (**permalink**) February 23rd, 2008, 06:04 PM

Sounds like a lot of partisans tactics which I have read about.

JCFalkenbergIII · #3 (**permalink**) February 23rd, 2008, 07:48 PM

Yes it does and it shows how much the Horse was still valuable and widely used by the Soviets and the Wehrmacht.

TA152 · #4 (**permalink**) February 24th, 2008, 12:21 AM

Years ago I read a book written by a German artillary officer and he saw all the blitzkrieg news reels showing the mechinized attacks so he joined up and was dissappointed to find that 3/4ths of the German army was horse drawn.
He was sent to Russia and when the winter came they had to eat the horses for food !
He was lucky to survive as he was not released by the Russians until 1955.
He talked of having eye balls and skull and hair in his soup alot during those years.

JCFalkenbergIII · #5 (**permalink**) February 24th, 2008, 12:31 AM

"German Horse Cavalry and Transport" from Intelligence Bulletin
Intelligence report on the German use of cavalry and horse transport in WWII including Waffen-SS, from the Intelligence Bulletin, March 1946.
[Editor's Note: The following article is wartime information on foreign units and tactics published for Allied soldiers. In many cases, more accurate data on the German military is available in later postwar publications.]

GERMAN HORSE CAVALRY AND TRANSPORT

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Despite highly ballyhooed emphasis on employment of mechanized forces and on rapid movement, the bulk of German combat divisions were horse drawn throughout World War II. Early in the war it was the common belief of the American public that the German Siegfrieds of Hitler's Blitz rode forth to battle on swift tanks and motor vehicles. But the notion of the mechanized might of the German Wehrmacht was largely a glamorized myth born in the fertile brains of newspapermen. Actually, the lowly horse played a most important part in enabling the German Army to move about Europe.

Public opinion to the contrary, so great was the dependence of the Nazi Blitzkrieg upon the horse that the numerical strength of German Army horses maintained during the entire war period averaged around 1,100,000. Of the 322 German Army and SS divisions extant in November 1943, only 52 were armored or motorized. Of the November 1944 total of 264 combat divisions, only 42 were armored or motorized. The great bulk of the German combat strength-the old-type infantry divisions-marched into battle on foot, with their weapons and supply trains propelled almost entirely by four-legged horsepower. The light and mountain divisions had an even greater proportion of animals, and the cavalry divisions were naturally mainly dependent on the horse.

The old-type German infantry division had approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 950 motor vehicles, and 430 motorcycles. In 1943, due to the great difficulties in supply and upkeep of motor vehicles in the wide stretches of the Eastern Front, the allotment to divisions in that theater was reduced to approximately 400 motor vehicles and 400 motorcycles, and the number of horses was increased to some 6,300. The 1944-type divisions had about 4,600 horses, 1,400 horse-drawn vehicles, 600 motor vehicles, and 150 motorcycles.

The only fully motorized unit in the old-type infantry division was the antitank battalion. Most of the divisional supply trains were horse drawn, motor vehicles being used chiefly to transport fuel and for the workshop company. A far greater degree of motorization existed among German GHQ troops, the supply units of which were mostly motorized. Motorization of GHQ troops was to a large degree a necessity, since these units included such types of outfits as heavy artillery, for which horse draft would have been a practical impossibility. These motorized GHQ units were assigned to armies, corps, and divisions as originally required.

and,

SUMMARY

"It is clear that the bulk of the German Army would have continued to be horse drawn unless much more bountiful sources of liquid fuel had become available than the Germans expected, even with full control of the Caucasus oil fields. Automotive production capacity would also have affected the degree of German motorization, even without the impact of war to complicate the procurement picture. Certainly, in an economy like the German, provision of motor vehicles on a U.S. scale was impossible. Extensive mass production of vehicles-with its corollary rapid quantity production at low unit cost-did not exist in Germany to the extent common in the United States.

Economic factors, aggravated by the effects of air bombardment, also played a part in the revival of independent horse cavalry toward the end of the war. The horse re-entered the picture, if for no other reason than that he provided a mode of transport not suffering from related procurement shortages other than that of fodder.

Just how largely tactical usefulness weighed in the decision to re-emphasize cavalry remains an open question. The dissolution of the cavalry school, the failure to train new cavalry officers to any significant extent, and the virtual abandonment of GHQ horse cavalry during Germany's victorious surge-all suggest the trend at that time to drop the independent unit altogether. Later developments may have caused the Germans to reconsider their position. Soviet cavalry, which had suffered from some initial reverses during the early campaigns, quickly adjusted its doctrine, tactics, and technique to warfare as fought on the Eastern Front. German forces also found advantages in the employment of independent cavalry, particularly in rough terrain where partisans usually operated.

Himmler, in a confidential speech in October 1943, implied that "mobile frontier" would be established as far cast as possible at the cessation of open hostilities, German youth was to be trained and toughened in policing the native population and the "barbarians beyond." Such a situation might call for the extensive use of cavalry on the enormous trackless wastes of the steppes: Himmler probably believed, also, that the horse was a better "youth-toughener" than the effete motor vehicle. Evidently, Himmler intended to use cavalry for pacification purposes, as opposed to cavalry in full-scale combat against units comprising all arms and services.

The German lesson on the horse in transport and in cavalry units appears to be simple. If horsed units exist, they form a nucleus which can be rapidly expanded should economic and terrain conditions call for extensive use of animals. There seems to be no hard and set rule as to when an army is likely to feel the need for horsed units, since that need is based upon estimates of economic and terrain conditions and of the capabilities of the troops. From the experience of the Germans and of other foreign armies, it is evident that the horse has yet to be supplanted under all conditions.

Should Germany ever be permitted to build up any army of its own again, it is probable that it would include a horse cavalry element-if only to preserve the proud tradition of German cavalry with its motto "Paradise on earth is on the backs of horses" (Das Paradies der Erde liegt auf den Rucken der Pferda)."

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