The pilots of the Schlactgeschwaderen became more and more involved in the air war over the Crimea, to the point that they scored 40% of the 600 German victories against Russian aircraft in the final six months before they retreated from the area. More amazing, one pilot of II/SG2, Leutnant August Lambert, accounted for 70 of these in just three weeks, scoring as many as 12, 14 and 17 kills in a day!!

They were flying FW-190F-2s I think then. I wonder why the kill ratios was so high there? Can anyone give some more info on this? Hopefully some of our air experts can help.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Repost sorry LOL.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Many reasons here. Fistly German experience and good aircrafts. It took the russianns time to get good pilots and better aircrafts (Yack vs Rata). Secondly some Germans units could fly ove rthe Black sea and take less risks than crossing Russian lines on land. Thirdly the Russians relied on a high concentration of material to launch major attacks. This of course led them to take risks by exposing some of their aircraft at vulnerable spots. Fourthly the Crimean Peninsula was easy to recognize from the sky and would avoid nasty surprises of flying over unknown territory. By patrolling over Crimea over and over again, pilots knew exactly where and when to go to get the best scores .

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Being out numbered would explain some of the kills LOL. But the question about the Soviets pilot training is interesting. Were the pilots that poorly trained at that point in the war? Or was it a combination of aircraft, pilot skill and experiance that acounted for some many kills?

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Stalin killed off most of his good officers in the 1930's so if you wanted to stay healthy and alive you kept a low profile and did not rock the boat with new ideas and tactics.

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I do believe it is a combination of these factors and probably more.

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This was later in the war and I think that he was more open to new ideas and tactics at that time.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Oh goodie, a thread to call home.

The Soviet Klimov engine at that time was roughly equivalent to an Allison, whilst the Fw-190F was as fast at sea level carrying a full bomb load as a Thunderbolt is flying clean. In terms of interceptor performance flying a Yak or LaGG against one is like flying a Warhawk. Actually except for turn and climb performance the Soviet fighters until the late war period are very much equivalent to something like a Warhawk. You need an La-5FN to take on a Fw-190F with and then you should hope he isn't equipped with boost or you'll never catch him.

But the higher proportion of German victories in the Crimea of course came from the Me-109G flying overhead, flown by such aces as Erich Hartmann. I'm sure there would have been some degree of tag team tactics involved in protecting the schlachtstaffeln.
The thing German schlacht attack fighters could do which was a departure from close support doctrine was they were still high performance fighters once their load was delivered, and often served as their own escorts. This effectively means you have at least two fighter groups operating if you have one of jagd and one of schlacht (staffeln) in the vicinity.

Finally Soviet training and doctrines had only just recently undergone reorganisation from the prewar period, where indeed there was a great reluctance to develop new flying and tactical skills to due totalitarian imposed fear. Late in 42 the Soviet air forces were reorganised into a series of air armies and for the first time, radios were mentioned as necessary to be used. Previously this relatively mundane technology was considered somewhat of an oddity, although fitted regularly in fighters since 1940 (poor quality sets however).
Generally speaking, according to anecdote Soviet aerial equipment and tactics only achieved parity with extended Luftwaffe forces at the Kuban in 43. Then of course you have to consider the more experienced veterans and aces, of which the Soviets had much fewer. New "aces schools" had been set up to develop Luftwaffe skills even further.

In Kursk, I like one field commander's remarks about the aerial battles above. The Soviets he said, seemed to have no regard for the fact the Luftwaffe had total air supriority. German fighters continued to shoot down Soviet ones, whilst their attack aircraft continued to bear down on Wehrmacht formations anyway. He thought it was heroic.

I was wondering if the Russians used or had ground radar during the war ? If so how early on in the war, also did they ever have aircraft with air to air or air to sea radar during the war ? I have never read if it being use but Russian information is hard to come by. Seems like they could have copied it from the Germans or the B-29's interned late in the war.

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As far as I know Soviet radar was a non-entity until after the war. The Fronts moved along pretty quickly towards Germany from Kursk and production realities and the sheer size of the combined Soviet air armies actually meant the majority of aircraft flying over the Reich were built in 1943, just after the major types had been sorted out, let alone featured new technologies. They also concentrated on a strategic air arm once again only after the cessation of hostilities.

I do know they implemented a system of radio navigation stations from late-42 probably as part of the reorganisation of their air arms. But I think that's about as far as it went.

For an example of Soviet wartime technologies, the typical communications doctrine for artillery and armoured regiments in 1941 was to pull up at a civilian telegraph station and use that. Most of course were severed by the initial German artillery bombardment across the continent.
Then when reconnaissance and spotter planes were sent, of course they never returned. This was one of the factors which contributed to the dramatic German superiority of the battlefield in those early stages, and the tremendous victory scores of Luftwaffe pilots. Nearly a third of front line units were equipped with spanking new MiGs, but neither did the Soviets know how to pilot them, nor did they have any idea just what was coming.

They were having enough trouble in reverse enginnering the B-29 that I think radar at that time were too far advanced for them to copy.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman