A German "Brown Water" Navy

What if the Kriegsmarine had decided that fighting an open ocean war was both unproductive and beyond their means? Instead, they accept that Germany is a land power and decide to augment that power with a powerful Brown Water navy for littorial combat in the Baltic, near North Sea, and Channel.

I propose that the Germans starting in mid to late 1936 begin building such a navy as follows with these ships complete by late 1939. Of course, more would be in construction, but I am looking initially at what they would have at the onset of war.

They build 30 large destroyers of 2,000 to 2,200 tons armed with 6 12.8cm DP guns in twin mounts with a fire control system roughly equivalent to a US Mk 33 or 38 director. These ships would also have 16 torpedo tubes in four quadruple mounts, 4 3.7cm AA guns and be capable of between 34 and 36 knots. Range would be 2,000 to 3,000 nm max.
The build rate would be 2 per month taking about 18 to 20 months each to complete.

Next they simultaneously build 50 small destroyers of 1,000 to 1,200 tons armed with half the above armament and that are also capable of acting as minelayers. These they build at 3 per month taking 15 to 18 months to complete.

They also build 30 small escort ships with 2 x 10.5cm DP guns, 3 TT, a simple fire control director system, and a speed of 20 to 24 knots with the same range.

The only heavier ships the Germans complete are their Panzerschiffe. But, they build three additional ones with about three to five thousand tons more weight mostly in added armor and hull displacement.

The U-boat production would remain the same as historical.

S-Boat production would be doubled giving four squadrons on the outbreak of war.

I will also go so far as to include a fleet air arm for the KM. The Marineluft (ML) is fought for over Göring's protests with the implicit agreement that the ML not interfer with Luftwaffe production. To that end the ML builds 3 Gruppen of torpedo planes using He 115 float planes. They also build 3 gruppen of dive bombers using Hs 123 aircraft. By 1940, they are looking at replacing the He 115 with the He 219 (no longer to be a nightfighter) and adding 3 Gruppen of long range fighters to their inventory.
In addition, they inherit the various coastal patrol and rescue squadrons of sea and float planes as their maritime patrol aircraft.
Göring puts together a rival maritime patrol / attack unit based on long range land based bombers once the war begins (eg., something like what became FleigerführerAtlantik) not wanting the navy to have all the glory.
But, with the ML basing their aircraft on Arado, Henkel, Henschel and, Dornier the Luftwaffe is largely content to concentrate their production on their "favorites" seeing the ML as not cutting into their production much if at all.

The questions that arise from this are:

1. Would this naval picture be beneficial to the Norway campaign?
2. Could the Germans now pull off a Seelöwe even not foreseeing such a campaign pre-war but given the change in naval production and strategy?
3. Would this sort of navy give the Allies more challenges at sea?

 

Eh? No monitors? No landing craft, or amphib support ships? No river gunboats?

 

why not an expressed program of building marine and air transports for the invasion of both norway and britain? i mean, if the germans need to develop a navy and airforce, it has to be offensive. but coastal defenses for a land power???

building panes may be faster but ferrying troops and heavy weapons by armed ships across the channel is more feasible. the worst thing to prepare for during an invasion of britain would be that the german navy is destroyed somewhere along the way and the airforce has to take over; either to continue ferrying men and material or, for a pull-out.

 

Because in 1936 neither Norway or Britain are high on the list of countries Germany is planning military action against. Hitler at that point was still trying to keep Britain out of any possible war. The object of creating a navy as proposed in 1936 is so that by 1939 it is strong enough to defend the near waters to Germany and dominate the Baltic Sea. The intent in 1936 is not to have to fight the British.
It is also capable of tackling the French in the Channel and North Sea.

Question 2 I posed is based on the above pre-war notion of what the KM would do and then what the contengencies of the war wrought by 1940. Given a much stronger escorting force could the Germans improvise an invasion fleet and force the Channel?

 

could the germans force a guadalcanal accross the channel? if they play play it smart from the initial planning phase, they could. it doesn't matter that the british had overwhelming ship-borne firepower as of 1940. the toehold at lunga held because the americans wanted to badly, whereas the japanese didn't really know what to make of it at the start. and ching lee's battleships didn't really clear the slot. what's two battleships lost (old ones) for the japanese at that point? not something to scream about.

so, assuming your pre-war naval preparation, and if the germans were willing to land into a meat grinder in southern england in 1940, they would have held it long enough for their navy or the luftwaffe to get is act together (whichever came first.) that's what i thought.

 

1. I think such a naval force would be useful for Germany in the Norway campaign. Assuming that Denmark would be based for the German navy's air arm, I think the Germans might be able to match to a limited extent the sea power that Britain could deploy in the Norwegian campaign.
I say limited because the German navy would still be outgunned eventually if the campaign takes too long for the Germans to complete.
The Germans would have the initial advantage of dictating the terms of the fight since they initiated fight in Norway.
2. As for Sea Lion, I highly doubt it, especially if the operation is mounted after the Norway campaign where in all probability (whether the Germans are successful or not), the German navy wouldn't be in a position to seriously challenge the British for control of the Channel because of the losses the Germans would suffer in terms of ships damaged/sunk and naval aircraft lost. Now, if the Germans aim first for England instead of Norway, the Germans might have a chance of crossing the Channel. They can alway gather up whatever ship or launch is on hand and mount Sea Lion given enough determination.
However, I seriously doubt they would be able to keep a toehold in any landing they manage to make. Any German units that manage to land on England would probably be on its own because I believe the British would move heaven and earth to take control of the Channel back. And the British could do so with their massive fleet.
3. In certain areas such as the Baltic, most probably. In the Atlantic, I seriously doubt it. The types of ships in this hypothetical German fleet would have "short legs" and would be very dependent on their bases for support and resupply. Conceived as a Brown Water Navy, the Germans wouldn't see the need of having many replenishment type ships. That's what I think.
I look forward to learning what others think about this what if.

 

This is an interesting proposition to what is, essentially, the issue of what kind of navy force structure would have been most useful to the Germans in WW II. I personally believe the German navy would have gotten far more use out of a destroyer-oriented fleet than the cruiser/battleship force they built historically. However, I don't think anything they might have done differently with their navy really would have made a lot of difference in the eventual outcome of the war.

In my opinion the answers to these specific questions are, respectively; no, no, and no. I will elaborate.

1. From the German perspective, the biggest problem they had in Norway was transporting the assault troops and heavy equipment to Norway. To solve this problem, they used mostly cruisers and destroyers. But this was only a marginally adequate solution because it was difficult to carry enough troops and adequate heavy weapons and awkward to unload them, not to mention coordination of large scale military movements. An across the beach assault would have been impossible. Fortunately, for the Germans, they were not facing heavy organized resistance or an opponent with tanks and artillery. If they had been forced to use only destroyers for the assault elements, the invasion might still have been pulled off, but the problems would have been multipled because of the smaller troop capacity of each destroyer. As it was, the KM suffered heavily in lost naval units and it's difficult to see how this would have been avoide using only destroyer size ships.

2.

No, Guadalcanal worked because the Japanese were not able to bring overwhelming naval and/or air assets to bear on the decisive point. Guadalcanal was at the very edge of effective Japanese air coverage which meant that the Americans had ample warning of air attack and could take defensive measures; a German landing on British beaches would have been right into the teeth of British air power. The Japanese at Guadalcanal could not move troop reinforcements and supplies, except in very small increments in fast destroyers or other ships, without incurring air attack; any attempt by the Germans to reinforce or resupply a beachhead in Britain would be attacked not only by naval units but by air assets, and would suffer from the same problems as the Japanese encountered. The initial landings at Guadalcanal caught the Japanese by surprise; they believed that it was simply a recconnaisance in force, and in any case, had no major troop units with which they could respond in a timely manner. This would not be the case with the British. They would know exactly what was happening, probably before the first German troops stepped ashore, and they would have large numbers of troops with which to oppose the landings. At Guadalcanal, it mattered not whether the US battleship's "cleared the Slot" (which was NOT where the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal took place) because the Japanese realized they had lost the logistical battle; it was the destruction of the Japanese TRANSPORTS which counted, not the battleships.

Would more German destroyers make Operation Sealion practical for the Germans? Not really. The problem would be one of establishing and supplying the beachhead, more destroyers doesn't make this any more feasible for the Germans. They still lack the specialized landing craft and transports needed, and river barges cannot substitute for the LST's, LCT's, and LCI's they need to pull off a landing. Nor can the Luftwaffe, or any combination of naval aircraft provide the heavy lift capacity required to support an assault landing on the scale of required to be successful against the British.


3. Given the very short range of the proposed German destroyers and the apparent lack of any German replenishment ships, it's difficult to see how this German fleet could even operate more than a few hundred miles from a German controlled coast, let alone threaten Allied control of the high seas. The Allies would be able to field cruiser/destroyer hunter-killer groups to track down and destroy formations of German destroyers. Accompanied by escort carriers, these same hunter-killer groups could launch air attacks on German destroyers if they ventured very far from their umbrella of land-based air cover, so that the KM would be limited to true coastal defense operations in good weather. The German navy would be limited to operations at sea only in bad weather which would limit their effectiveness severely. In any case, the KM could not build enough destroyers to outnumber Allied destroyers, let alone cruisers and battleships; the Allies would still enjoy overwhelming naval superiority.

In my opinion, the KM would get more use out of their destroyers if they weren't tied to the heavier German naval units, and this means more activity for the lighter Allied naval units, but it really doesn't affect the course of the war, nor make land operations any easier for the Germans

 

Good posting I like the way you have come up with a soud senario.

Your second paragraph would have to include the scrapping of the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau plus the cancellation of the Graf Zeppilin, Bismarck and Tirpitz (if they ever get ordered in the first place).

I would increase the number of large destroyers to 50. And i would increase the small destroyers to at least 90. And on the escorts you need at least 100. This could be achieved with the scrapping of the large capital fleet of ships.

With the Panzerschiffs i would have at least 10 and i agree they would have to be at least 15,000 tonnes. But i would also invest in building a dedicated Landing Barge programme a minimum of 2,500. Hitler must assume for sake of an argument that war with Britain is assured and has the landing equipment to launch an amphibious assualt on Britain.

Also i would have a dedicated German Marine Corps of the OKM specializing in amphibious landings.

Now onto your Fleet Air Arm, great idea, Goring is isolated and has no say so i like your make-up but i would add a strategic heavy torpedo bomber into the mix, i would have a modified version of the He-177 i would have the He-277 STB Schwertorpedobombardieren, this can carry up to four 21 inch torpedoes two internally and two on wing hardpoints, also to make this effective Hitler must forbid Goring to create his own version of a Marineluft.

1, So blending your version and mine we can have a much larger naval in Norway and that the RN would be less effective trying to overcome the KM and Marineluft meaning to oppose this the Royal Navy might suffer far bigger losses especially in the way of destroyers, vital for future invasion interdiction.

2, If you were to include the 2,500 landing craft and the German Marine Corps and a far greater presence of the KM with protection of the ML and OKL acting as flying artillery then i cant see why the Germans could quickly deploy at least 4 o 5 division on British soil and effectively supply them. And the risk for the RN is that with all those dedicated torpedo bombers interdicting the interdiction fleets they would lose significant amount of ships

3, If they are confined to the areas of the Channel, North Sea and Arctic Ocean then yes it may give the RN a run for it's money, but to defeat the RN on a global scale then no it wont it would still be outclassed.

It is doable.

v.R

 

before i answer the post below, i'd like to ask TA how battleships would fare in a channel battle? if guadalcanal, surigao strait and samar island taught me something, it's that battleships don't work effectively in close-in engagements (except for some instances maybe.) a german cruiser-destroyer fleet has a fighting chance of keeping a cross-channel supply line open, IMO,

also no. the japanese DID not bring their air and naval power to bear when they should have. it would have been easy for them to counter-invade at a spot 300 miles away, put up a bomber field and engage henderson in a prolonged air war. how fit would henderson be to fight off an amphibious invasion by then? the japanese could have transferred their lae and part of their rabaul air forces. in the open sea, the americans ended up with just one operational carrier on two occasions. at the right moment, the japanese could have openly attack lunga with at least 3 battleships and a swarm of transports.

so to say that the japanese were at their end right at the start of the landing may be correct, but they had the resurces to rectify the situation.

 

The supposition is that the German Navy limits itself to building a large number of two classes of destroyers, as well as smaller patrol and escort vessels, thus it will not have cruisers available in any Channel battle. Furthermore, your assertion that battleships do not do well in "close-in engagements" does not hold up to scrutiny. The American battleships at Surigao Strait did quite well, primarily because they were able to choose a very advantageous position against their Japanese opponents and maintain it throughout the battle.

Again, at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the American battleships did very well; it was the Japanese cruiser/destroyer formation that failed to inflict any decisive damage, except on the escorting American destroyers. At the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese Battleships did quite well against the American cruiser/destroyer formation although they did not complete their bombardment mission as a result of the stiff resistance.

At the Battle of Samar the Japanese battleship/cruiser/destroyer force was turned back, not so much by the American destroyers and destroyer-escorts, but by concentrated air attack. But it could also be fairly argued that the Japanese commander's realization that it was far to late for any chance of accomplishing his main mission that was the primary reason for the failure of the Japanese surface force.

However, I have never argued that the RN would win a Channel battle because of it's superiority in battleships; that is apparently your assumption. The RN would defeat the KM in any Channel battle because it would have overwhelming numerical superiority in every category of combatant ship, because, unlike most of the Pacific War sea battles, the RN could keep the KM under surveillance practically 24 hours a day, and thus would be aware of any sorties by the German ships, because the RAF would be able to attack the German ships in force, not only at sea, but in their ports and bases, and finally, it would win because the Germans lacked sufficient logistical shipping to maintain support for a beachhead in the British Isles, in the face of the severe attrition any such attempt would entail.

The Japanese did not have sufficient resources to take Guadalcanal back once American airpower had been established there. They DID "counter-invade" in an attempt to engage in an extended air war; in November 1942 they had built an airfield at Munda Point on New Georgia as an advance base to support the Guadalcanal fighting. The airstrip, less than 180 nautical miles from Guadalcanal, had become operational in December 1942. Another strip was started shortly thereafter at Vila, on the nearby island of Kolombangara. However, they found it was far from "easy" to counter Allied airpower on Guadalcanal, and the forward bases were quickly overwhelmed by growing Allied air power. The Japanese stripped their carrier air groups in an attempt to reinforce their air assets in the Solomons, but found that it accomplished nothing but to make their carriers ineffectual. That's why they weren't able to take advantage of the lack of American carriers in the Southwest Pacific in late 1942-early 1943.

As for "openly attacking Lunga Point with three battleships and a swarm of transports", that was precisely what the Japanese tried to do in mid-November, 1942 (Although they only managed to muster two battleships due to lack of fuel). They were sent packing with their tail between their legs. The loss of most of their transports on that occasion was what decided the Japanese IGHQ that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.

If the Japanese had the resources to "rectify the situation" at Guadalcanal, they certainly did an excellent job of concealing them from historical scrutiny. In fact, the Japanese lacked sufficient air power, and sufficient logistical shipping, to do anything about Guadalcanal after the airstrip there became operational. Foolishly, they engaged in a battle of attrition that could only have one outcome, and which left them unable to cope with the later Allied onslaught in the Pacific.

If you want the details on the destruction of Japanese airpower in the Solomons, I refer you to Eric Bergerud's excellent "Fire In The Sky"

Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the ... - Google Book Search

 

re: your surigao strait explanation

right example, wrong instance. i wasn'r referring to the morning engagement wherein the yamashiro emerged from the strait into the open where the american BBs were already in line formation, ready to broadside the approaching japanese. that IS the right way for battleships to fight. i'm referring to the night crossing of the strait by the japanese, wherein they were harassed first by PT boats who radiod to the 7th the japanese approach, followed by torpedo attacks by destroyers, which led to the sinking of the fuso.

but you're right in my basic assumptions. again, we are talking about conditions prevailing at around 1940 and what might have been done before that. but like guadalcanal, weapons and material build-up as the campaign progressed often has a more telling effect than anything preceding the battle.

 

Surigao Strait was, effectively, one action in one place. My point was that, despite Surigao Strait being a "close engagement", the AMERICAN battleships did well because they were properly screened and possessed good tactical intelligence enabling them to position themselves well, act prudently, and engage effectively. Any naval battle is lkely to have a winning side and a losing side, but that doesn't mean that it can, or should be, cited as a valid argument that the ship types on the losing side will always do poorly in that type of engagement; it is more frequently the case that the ships on that side were simply poorly handled, as at Surigao Strait.

In any case, the Guadalcanal campaign is a poor analogy for determining what might transpire in an attempted cross-channel invasion of Britain; the geography is very different, the disparity of forces much less than in the Channel situation, and reversed in favor of the defender, the intelligence picture much simplified for the defender, and the logistical situation completely different. Any conclusions drawn from the results of the Guadalcanal campaign simply cannot confidently be applied to predict the likely outcome of Operation Sealion.

 

the american battleships of the 7th did well because the japanese had purposed them to rush south and let the northern japanese battleship force sneak in among the escort carriers and transports, much as ozawa's decoy fleet farther to the north had purposed to draw halsey's third away altogether. so the "losing" side of surigao strait had a more important mission and in that they succeeded.

i'm not claiming palm trees and bananas can be grown at dover beach. but since any historical comparison/model will break down as the qualifications increase in detail, i'll leave you to complete your littany of un-differences between guadalcanal and the mythical seelowe operation.

 

Mac, DA, thanks for sharing your ideas.
In principle, it's usually a good idea to look at one operation and apply its lessons to a new operation being planned or proposed, in this case the lessons of Guadalcanal and Sealion.
However, I have to side with devilsadvocate. Though Guadalcanal and Sealion has similarities, the differences are too huge that whatever similarities exist are negated.
In my opinion, the one main difference that negates whatever similarities there may be between the two is this: the geography and location of the operation, as pointed out by devilsadvocate.
The two adversaries in Sea Lion are just a stone's throw away from each other and could hardly hide what they intend to do.

Going back to the main topic, can a German "Brown Water" Navy do better than the historical setup of the German Navy?
Hmmm, I'm tempted to say no. But in war, there are many variables. If the Germans keep there surface naval operations within range of their landbased air cover, then maybe they might have a limited impact. However, this would mean that the Allies would have relative freedom to roam the Atlantic and would just have to deal with a one-dimensional threat (U-boats.)
A few more additional questions that I hope the knowledgeable guys out there could answer.
Would a Brown Water Navy be more survivable force than the historical German Navy? I ask this because this alternate history German force would conceivably use less fuel for its operations and have the advantage of being under air cover.
And if this force (or surviving elements of this force) could be fielded against the D-Day landings, how would the German Brown Water Navy fare? Personally, against such a concentration of Allied naval firepower, I don't think the Germans could've done anything. I still ask the question because maybe someone out there might have other ideas.

 

I've heard this preposterous claim before and it's based on ignorance of the geography of Surigao Strait and Leyte Gulf. Take a good look at a chart of the battle area and you will find that the American battle line was disposed
in an East-West line across the northern end of Surigao Strait where it enters Leyte Gulf. This line was approximately ten miles (about 30 minutes steaming) from the Eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf which was the entrance that Admiral Kurita would have to use to get at the few American transports (approximately three out of over one hundred, plus a handful of LST's) still left in Leyte Gulf. At no time did the American battleships venture south of this line. The retreating remnants of Nishimura's force was pursued by a few cruisers and destroyers which were quickly recalled after completing their mission.

Furthermore, a perusal of paragraph 2B of the West Virginia's Action Report USS West Virginia (BB-48) Action Report: Leyte Gulf/Surigao Straits will reveal that Admiral Oldendorf was well aware of the approach of Kurita's force from the north and placed his ships in a position to be able to intercept both enemy forces and stop them from entering Leyte Gulf. It's erroneous to claim that Nishimura intended to, or was successful, in pulling Oldendorf's battleships out of position to protect Leyte Gulf.

 

I do think that if the Germans built the destroyers described they could have been reasonably successful at sea denial in the littorial waters of the North Sea and in the Channel. I chose the design criteria carefully with this in mind.

Note how I specified a 3 axis computing director for each destroyer. The US had these at the time, the only navy actually mounting such a system. This means that German destroyers with such a fire control system could accurately pummel a ship out to about 10,000 yards. It would also give them a real AA capacity that their opponets lacked.

The British at this point had a very basic three man director on their destroyers. It didn't even incorporate the rangefinder, that was seperate. For surface gunfire it was just barely adequite.

The inclusion of 16 torpedo tubes was done purposefully. This gives the Germans the same sort of torpedo firepower as the Japanese to about 10,000 yards. In a fight with four such destroyers versus three or four crusiers and three or four destroyers starting at 10,000 yards the destroyer cruiser line will suffer about 50% casualties (damaged or sunk) from a 64 torpedo barrage. In the North Sea given the weather 10,000 yards is doable alot of the time as an opening range for battles. In many cases it would be less.

Night likewise would favor destroyer actions. The Japanese proved very adept until radar got advanced enough to overcome the cover darkness provided. But, in 1939 and 40 the British are not there so night is still favorable conditions for torpedo actions.
Even at Second Savo (Washington and South Dakota) the US got extremely lucky for once. The Japanese put upwards of 50 torpedoes in the water. None hit the South Dakota even when she was the target. Had three or four hit that ship the battle would have been a draw. The South Dakota would have been crippled and left stranded likely DIW or in serious need of help.

For a Seelöwe, the Germans stand a slightly better chance having more escorts. But, it is still a virtual certainty that the RN would disrupt the invasion so seriously it would fail.

 

While I agree that your proposed design would produce a very powerful destroyer for the late 1930's, I think 16 tubes and three twin turrets on a 2,000 ton vessel is a bit of a stretch. Four quadruple torpedo tubes almost certainly could not all be placed on the centerline, in any case. World War II German destroyer torpedoes had variable speed/range settings of 6,560 yards @ 44 knots, 8,750 yards @ 40 knots, and 15,300 yards @30 knots. The 44 knot speed, however, overloaded the engine and was rarely used. That left the 40 knot setting for a range of 8,750 yards or the 30 knot setting which was way too slow for use against warships at anything over a few thousand yards. I doubt very seriously that the German destroyers you propose would have anything like the Japanese torpedo firepower or range even with 16 tubes. Furthermore, any vessel with radar would detect them long before they got within 9,000 yards and could take
evasive action. Your destroyers would be dangerous opponents in any cruiser/destroyer melee, but certainly less so than the Japanese destroyers.

As for gun power, the five inch guns in twin turrets would have only marginally more firepower than WW II British destroyers unless some sort of shell/powder handling system similar to the US 5"/38 base ring mount was developed. A 5" base ring mount in a twin turret configuration would be pushing the envelop of a 2,000 ton destroyer, especially if you had three of them in the same vessel.

As for the the FC system, it's questionable whether the German navy would be willing to spend the time, money, and effort, or would even have the capacity, to develop a system as sophisticated as the US Mark 33 or Mark 37 simply for a coast defense ships. Don't forget the USN developed the Mark 33/37 for use in every kind of combatant ship from destroyers on up. Without such an FC system the AA capability would be only comparable to the British destroyers.

 

no matter how much they claim that, history will just ram maps and books at both halsey's and olendorf's throats for putting their battleships NOT where they should have been. can you even scale out ten miles in the map below? see those grey rectangles? they represent different areas in the country WHERE I WAS BORN AND GREW UP IN.



keep them coming.

 

Well, if you can't argue the facts, you can always spout irrelevancies and try to confuse people. If you were indeed born and raised in the Philippines, you should be aware of the geography of Leyte Island and the surrounding waterways. If you would read the West Virginia's Action Report you would realize the absurdity of your assertion;

"The mission of the combatant vessels on the night of 24-25 October was to protect our forces and shipping by denying entrance of enemy forces into Leyte Gulf, and to destroy any enemy forces encountered. The doctrine, as expressed by the O.T.C. (CTG 77.2), was to engage the enemy at medium ranges of about 20,000 yards. The Task Group Commander's plan was to patrol across the north entrance to Surigao Straits in battle disposition in the vicinity of Latitude 10°-40' N prepared to engage any force attempting to enter Leyte Gulf. Two groups of enemy forces were approaching the Leyte Gulf area -- one from the South consisting of 2 BB's, 2 Cruisers and several DD's via Southern Surigao Straits -- and one consisting of BB's, CA's and DD's approaching from the North via San Bernardino Straits. it was calculated that these two s would arrive in Leyte Gulf about dawn on October 25, 1944. Apparently CTG 77.2 deployed his forces to protect the gulf against the enemy southern force, at the same time being not far from the eastern entrance to the gulf in case the enemy northern force was not stopped by the Third Fleet and our light carrier forces in that vicinity."

It's beyond dispute that Admiral Oldendorf was exactly where he should have been during, and after, the Surigao Strait battle. regardless of where Halsey's forces were, Oldendorf was blocking both the southern and eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf and was NEVER drawn out of position.

If you can't find a map in the proper scale, try this link; http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/NWC-5.pdf This US Naval War College Analysis of the Battle of Surigao Strait has all the small scale charts you need to figure it out, as well as a complete and detailed narrative of the battle.

Now that you have asserted that Oldendorf's battleships were "out of position" to counter an attack on the transports in Leyte Gulf, perhaps you woill be able to cite a book or chart that supports that conclusion?

 

i see, JUST leyte gulf where you have your transports. obviously, they didn't think the battle of samar was that catastrophic in reality wherein losses were at a minimum. through sheer luck or sheer guts, the yamato might have waded right into leyte gulf itself and the report would say something like, "we took the calculated risk of sending the BBs to the mouth of the strait to block the southern japanese force while the northern force managed a minor incursion in the landing area but was beaten back with minimal losses to us."

why was there no one guarding san bernardino? light carrier forces were expected to guard that passage?

it's sounding more ridiculous, really.