Anti-Tank Ditches

i didn't say he dug them, just that they used them to effect

FNG

 

Panzer Division Gross Deustchland was supposed to be the main effort of the left of AG South's attack on the big day.

But there was a little problem.


GD jumped off on schedule after 40 minutes of arty preparation,
and by 0530 its infantry and an advance panzer group from the GD
Pz Regt (under Col Strachwitz) had reached the AT ditch and
ravine E of Beresowyj. In front of the ravine the Soviets had
laid deep minefields and strung barbed wire. The div expected
difficulty crossing the ravine and ditch because they were full
of water, and the division's panzer regiment had already lost a
considerable number of tanks in the minefields N of 229.8.

At 0640 the GD Gren Regt crossed the ravine E of Beresowyj. The
dismounted infantry attacked without tanks, which could not cross
the ravine, but with the support of all heavier weapons, and
captured the hilly ground hetween 237.8 and 239.3 from the
entrenched Soviets there. They then fended off a counterattack
from the N and another from the Kolchos area, at the W edge of
Tscherkasskoje. Strong flanking fire from Tscherkasskoje and
Korowino made it impossible to advance further without the tanks.
Units of the GD Fus Regt were reported to have crossed the ravine
too.

At 0645 the Panther Bde, assembled in the depression N of
Moschenjoje, was attached to GD, but was only to be committed
after the GD Pz Regt had crossed the ravine at Beresowyj
(expected to be around 0730). At 0655 GD reported that advance of
the GD Pz Regt across the boggy and heavily mined ravine was
getting more and more difficult.

The infantry, meanwhile, continued to advance toward
Tscherkasskoje, despite an attack along the whole Corps front by
Il-2 ground attack planes at 0705. At 0800 the 160 tanks of the
Panther Bde moved out of their assembly area and headed toward
Beresowyj, and at 0815 crossed the RR track. By 0945 only a few
tanks of the GD Pz Regt had crossed the Beresowyj ravine; one
Tiger broke down in the middle of the ravine and halted the
entire crossing. Engineers were working feverishly to construct a
new crossing, but the construction material kept sinking in the
deep mud.

At 0945 the Panther Bde was still S of 229.8, and div admitted that the crossing would take more time than anticipated.

At 0950 the Red Air Force attacked the tempting concentration of
tanks at the Beresowyj crossing. There were heavy losses, esp.
among the officers. The GD's CP took a direct hit, killing the GD
Gren Regt adjutant and 2 other officers.

At 0955 despite heavy Soviet fire the GD Gren Regt took the hills W of 237.8.

At 1005 the first tanks of the GD Pz Regt finally advanced across
the Beresowyj ravine. Even while this was happening the Corps CO
was discussing with his Chief of Staff the problem of getting the
tanks across the ravine. The CO wondered whether both panzer
units should be shifted to the right to try to break through near
Tscherkasskoje. The CoS commented that Tscherkasskoje had a
well-prepared defense system and would require a whole new
offensive plan. GD's commander reported that he believed a breach
had already been made and advised waiting until two crossings
could be built. At 1105 he reported that the second crossing was
ready and that 10 panzers were already across.

Soviet forces to the N were counterattacking the elms of the GD
Fus and Gren Regts that were already across. Col Khassnitz, CO of
the Fus Regt, and the CO of the I/GD Pz Regt, were severely
wounded.

By 1210 one complete bn of the GD Pz Regt was across the ravine
and advancing toward Hill 210.7. By 1300, however, only 5 more
tanks had crossed, and none of the 15 were Panthers. The Corps CO
agreed to let the div's attack plan stand, but ordered the GD CO
to investigate having his div's panzer elements follow behind 3d
PzD, where the ground was better, but this would have blocked the
advance of the 3d PzD's follow-on forces.

At 1335 elements of the GD Recon Bn scouting E of Beresowyj in
search of a way to bypass the ravine found the area heavily
mined. Engineers were dispatched to clear the mines. By 1600 GD
had 30 Panthers, 15 Mk IVs, four infantry bns, and one AT unit
across the ravine, and the tanks were advancing toward the NW
corner of Tscherkasskoje. The div was under heavy Soviet arty and
AT fire. Most of the area was heavily mined. It was expected to
take all night to get the rest of the division across the ravine.

Not bad for a hole in the ground...

 

What about Anti tank ditches lined with liquid soap?

 

If ever you have a picture of a British WW1 tank and it has a sodding great lump of what appears to be a rolled up hedge on it, then that is a fascine and when dropped in an anti tank ditch might permit the tank to cross over it. Similarly, these tanks were often fitted with large baulks of timber. These were for use when the tank became grounded on piece of uneven ground. Chains would link the timber to the tracks which would then pull the timber under the tank thereby giving it some purchase on the ground.
BG

 

Indeed! Thanks for the excellent post. Where did you get the information?

It should be noted from the combat report above that it wasn't just the ditch itself that halted the German advance, but the ditch played a very important part. Like minefields and air interdiction, it cannot actually stop an army, but it can slow one down to the piont where its role in operations on a strategic level becomes meaningless. Especially when, as in this case, what was actually used was a combination of mines, ditches, well-located defensive positions and air and artillery interdiction.