Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

It has been a little while, but as I recall NoGo is a stand-alone operation, to be completed a month or so in advance of the opening of our offensive in the Southern Resource Area.

Do we have reliable French forces available? It appears that the New Caledonians largely support the de Gaulle puppet regime. Although the governor was pro-Vichy, the governing council voted unanimously to join the "Free French". I assume our French allies would come from Indochina? If they are willing to participate, it would be appropriate to use them, preferably transported in their own ships as Noka-san suggests. There are also several French warships including the cruiser Lamotte-Picquet in Indochina, although for some reason our people there have ordered them disarmed.

The Australians supported the assertion of Free French control in September 1940, to the extent of delivering the Gaullist governor in their cruiser Adelaide, which also prevented the Vichy warship Dumont d'Uberville from intervening. So they have some vested interest in protecting the Gaullist regime there. It is therefore possible that our move might provoke hostilities earlier than planned or cause Australian/British forces to increase their preparations for war.

 

So we are attacking the US held Philippines Islands then?

 

Unless the Americans declare war upon us or fire the first shot, I see no reason to provoke them directly until we are forced to or until we have achieved most if not all our other objectives first.

 

No reason to provoke them directly???

What do you think we are doing with this proposed operation to invade New Caledonia? We are most assuredly provoking them into premature action before our attacks on the SRA have even begun, let alone have been completed.

How do you think the Americans will react with a full fledged Japanese fleet consisting of four aircraft carriers and four battleships goes steaming all over the Pacific well outside our "sphere of influence" and well inside theirs and the Australians? After all, we are planning to capture one of their direct links to the Philippines and Australia. Further more, how many American and British merchant ships are we prepared to sink to guarantee that the fleet arrives at New Caledonia undetected? The long circular track crosses several well known and heavily traveled shipping lanes and an air route or two. Judging by the intended track, it appears that we are directly goading the Americans into war, rather than the other way around.

Finally, with such a heavy handed thrust into established American/Australian territory, the outcome can only ensure that our thrust on the SRA will be that much more difficult when it falls some time later. As the Allies will almost certainly rush extra forces into these areas to beef up their rather anemic defenses.

 

is it possible we could wait until the move south starts and then work with the Pro Vichy government elements to be invited in?

 

There are no remaining pro Vichy elements on New Caledonia, most left of their own accord when the Free-French took over, and the rest were deported shortly there after. An "invitation" by the pro-Vichy government in French Indo-China and/or France would be relatively meaningless, given that a full-blown war was going on. Further, the Americans have already been courting the Free French government now in control of New Caledonia. Finally, our occupation of Vichy Indo-China has likely destroyed any "good will" that may have been harbored by New Caledonia's populace, Vichy or otherwise.

 

Big things have been happening at work and I've been away from the forum for a couple of weeks. Glad to see this thread has fired back up!

As to the Noumea Operation, if memory serves me correctly, initially it was rejected. This was the version that had the pre-SRA operation date. I was always a proponent for a Noumea Operation due to it's strategic location. As I mentioned early in the thread, I've played the Allied side many times, but never the Japanese. I know how critical Noumea is from an Allied perspective and do not believe that the Allies are strong enough, prior to the end of 1943 to retake it. As Japan it can be a very important strategic block, even if we've lost our carriers. With our carriers it will be incredibly hard to retake, and will additionally, allow us to control most of the Coral Sea. With long range sea planes (H6K Mavis and H8K Emily) and long range, land based, torpedo carrying bombers like the G4M, plus submarines and surface raiders based out of Noumea Harbor, we can put a hurting on Australia's supply lines. The US for political reasons (to keep Australia in the war to help Britain in the Europe, North Africa and the Med) will have to try and remove the threat to Australia. As long as we can maintain that threat, we hold the initiative and we can use the time gained to strengthen our defensive perimeter in other areas, train more pilots, produce more and better aircraft, possibly resolve the China problem, etc. In this case, time is our best ally. The longer we delay the Americans, the stronger we can make our defenses, and that will mean more casualties for them and the possibility of them tiring of the human cost of defeating us. An intact Kido Butai, operating behind or under a land based air umbrella, based in Noumea and the surrounding islands and counter striking the US when the opportunity presents itself, makes us even more lethal.
During later discussions, the subject was broached again, and IIRC, I added the additional reason for the operation as our need for the strategic metal, nickel. Kone and Thio, on New Caledonia, currently produce, 4400 tons of nickel per year, each (8800 tons total) and that area has one of the richest nickel ore deposits in the world, offering the possibility that we could expand the mining operations there even further. Other nickel resource areas I have included in our plans as part of the SRA operation is Pomalaa and Soroaka in the Celebes. According to my notes I modified the plan at that time to coincide with the SRA operations, in order to get council approval. I do not believe any final decision has been reached.

Takao wrote: . .

No sir we are not. We will station a formidable operational reserve in Formosa in case the United States attacks us, but they will have to fire the first shot. We do not wish to give Roosevelt sufficient cause to swing US public opinion from opposition to support for going to war with us. The public will not support a war in the Pacific if it as seen as primarily to protect British and Dutch colonial holdings.

That depends. The US recognizes the Vichy government but not the Free French. Britain recognizes the Free French but not the Vichy-France government. Britain and Free France have attacked and in a number of cases, seized Vichy territory and forces. Roosevelt personally despises DeGaulle. The US is focussed on Europe and already has operatives working to try and get the Vichy French in North Africa to remain neutral during a potential allied invasion there, if and when America goes to war with Germany.

Our proposal was for the Honorable Prime Minister to send a delegation to Germany to obtain their assistance in pressuring the Vichy government into filing formal diplomatic protests, with the US and other nations, against British and Free French actions. To be persistent enough to keep their cause (the return of their soverign territories) before the eyes of the American public. To have Vichy French operatives that are in communication with US operatives in North Africa, let the US know that ignoring the issue could lead to a refusal to cooperate in North Africa. Then when the SRA operation kicks off, we can invade New Caledonia in conjunction with Vichy French forces from Indo-China and spin it as returning the islands to Vichy control. The US would then be faced with the situation that in order to act militarily, they would have to withdraw recognition of Vichy France, lose any hope of obtaining French neutrality in North Africa and potentially push French territories in the western hemisphere into the Axis camp. I think we can pull it off. As for New Caledonia's populace, if we insist upon the re-installed Vichy French government adopting liberal policies with regards to the rights, freedoms and treatment of the indigenous population, and respecting the property rights of all, they won't really care which government is over them, especially if we can re-establish some of their national pride.

 

I'm at work today and was going to try and go through some of what I've missed, but at 13 pages of new things since I last logged on, that ain't gonna happen. Starting to get busy again so I'll need to go, but next chance I get i'll try to answer some more of your questions. I have been "sandbox" testing our scenario for the last couple months and correcting bugs. It's really doing what I hoped it would do. I'll try and report more on that later and some things I've learned that we will need to know and some revisions to our plans we'll need to make.

Later BP.

 

Good Admiral Takao raises a troubling question about the Noumea Operation. If we undertake this at the same time as our primary objectives, then the commitment of two carrier divisions, two battleship divisions and their attendant escorts to this operation would call into serious doubt our ability to seize our vital targets rapidly and undamaged.

If there is a miscommunication and the above mentioned assets would be employed only if we act ahead of our scheduled SRA operation then I still must question the deployment plan as proposed, though I am loathe to interject myself too deeply into operational planning as I consider this a prerogative of those actually tasked with their completion.

That being said, Admiral Takao's observation that employing nearly half of our finest battle units on what is intended to be a low profile endeavor with significant political overtones, especially those designed to play to a specific segment of the pro peace elements within America seem particularly cogent. Further would not the impression this was a legitimate issue between Vichy and Free France, and where we were merely offering "logistical" support, be exposed as the illusion we know it to be to even the most deluded person? This does not factor the rather significant expenditure of fuel oil by so large a fleet for a useful, though not absolutely critical objective compared to those oil production sites we must secure intact and with dispatch.

Is it not possible for us to execute this operation with both discretion and economy? Could not we employ say a pair of Heavy Cruisers and a Destroyer squadron to act as both escort and muscle (if needed)? Is the expected resistance by the Free French too great for this force? Certainly should Americans act to intervene, a force of this size could return to our waters without too great a loss of face and better elude their detection until a fate acompli has been reached.

 

Gentlemen of the council,

I most humbly apologize for any misunderstanding that I might have caused. The plan that I have put forward is not intended to be a final plan, or even a late draft of one. It is merely intended as a suggestion for what one plan might resemble. It is incomplete at best, and there are no doubt many errors in it that will need revision if we choose to adopt an early execution date of something along the lines of NoGo.

To clarify a few points: this plan is not intended to be used simultaneously with our SRA invasion, though I suspect we probably have the capacity to make such a thing work, since the canceled Pearl Harbor strike would have used an even larger portion of our offensive fleet assets and the canceled Philippine assault would have required more of our amphibious forces. I do not envision this as simultaneous with our opening war moves, but as preliminary to them. That said, it might be wise to have assets in place for simultaneous moves into the Dutch East Indies should they fail to meet our demands and to respond to any British attacks that might develop.

As to goading the Americans, I hope not to do so any more than we already have. I have plotted the course to give as wide a berth as possible to American and British possessions as possible. I see no way to completely avoid busy shipping routes, since our target is so close to Australia. My next best solution was simply to stay as far from land as possible. I had hoped that aerial scouting might aid us in keeping similar distance from any shipping we might happen across. I do not like the route. It is long and torturous. If Admiral Takao or anyone else has a better suggestion I will be the most ardent supporter. With my own meager abilities I am unable to see it, but I hope that others are smarter and wiser than I.

Lastly, our neighbors and former allies are already arming and massing against us. I fail to see how our actions will materially change the situation. The number of our ships is known even to our enemies. They are unlikely to get a very good estimate of our abilities from an operation at such a remote base as New Caledonia. I don't believe the Americans or British will devote too many of their resources to defending the Indies, as doing so would weaken their defenses of their own positions in the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, and their other possessions in East Asia and the Pacific. They are already sending substantial forces to the above, so I don't see any dramatic change. Whatever they send I feel we can compensate. I believe the single most vital objective is the oil. So long as the Americans and British continue to reinforce Manila and Singapore rather than Lembang and Tarakan I am not overly concerned about their increased efforts. It can't occur in a vacuum. Even the United States hasn't yet the resources to be strong everywhere. I don't think we can avoid provoking the British and Australians. I merely wish to avoid battle with the Americans. And if the Yankees will not go to war to defend the French in Saigon and Nha Trang I doubt they will do so to defend a smaller number in Noumea.

Again, please forgive any misunderstanding I have caused. I wish to promote discussion and to keep us focused on the task of defending our sacred homeland. I know better than anything the limitations in my own thinking and I beg the members of our august council to help me to learn better ways to accomplish our sacred duty.

Sincerely,
R. Adm. Noka Shijin, IJN, Interim Imperial High Council

 

No need to apologize Admiral Noka. When you put forth the tentative operational plan for Noumea, we were still discussing it as a stand alone operation. Heavier forces were required because of the possibility of British/Australian intervention, and our desire to use strength as a deterrent to either of these initiating all out war.

Mr. Prime Minister,
The United States, in my opinion, cannot react too strongly to our assisting the Vichy French with retaking Noumea. How is this any different than British support of the Free French in attacks on neutral Vichy France?
03 July 1940, the British Fleet attacks the French Fleet in the French territory of Algeria at Mers El Kebir, killing over 1,000 French sailors.
September 1940, British and Free French forces attempt to take Dakar.
July to November 1940, Free French supported by the British take French Equatorial Africa. To include the French territories of French Congo, Gabon, Oubangui-Chari, Chad and French Cameroon.

Vichy France is recognized, diplomatically, by the United States as the legitimate government of France. How can they allow this seizure of sovereign French territory by Britain and DeGaulle, yet complain when the Vichy Government fights to recover territory illegally seized?

 

we need to take Rabaul first. We would need the anchorage and base capacity in case thereis some fighting. The key to Noumea would be if the French would resist or not and if they would ask for help. If it was just a matter of landing troops unopposed we could use some AMC' s since they have some fighting capacity. The immediate threat would be the RAN and their heavy cruisers. A second consideration is how quickly we could land a air base force and air assets of fighters and DB's or TB's.

 

I had also suggested a heavier than necessary strike to test our theories and give our troops some experience, not merely as a deterrent. You will note that CarDiv 5 is the aviation backbone of the operation. CarDiv 4 is there principally to backstop them with more experienced aviators. The amphibious assault itself is to include our first assault force, a new force built in part around the Army's lovely new assault ship. I think it would be useful to learn to coordinate between assault troops and naval artillery, and I think the older BatDivs would make ideas artillery support units, so I have also included them. It will also give a good test of underway replensihment, since the Hawaiian operation has been canceled. Think of this as almost as much live-fire test as invasion plan. If there were a way to include our paratroopers I would. We will need to use all these units soon enough. High time we begin to test the newest ones.

 

The Roosevelt regime does not seem to hampered by any concerns of fairness. They have declared half the Atlantic Ocean a "neutral zone" in which one side can operate freely and the other is subject to being shot on sight. They are shipping war materials to belligerents, escorting them with their navy, and they still have the gall to complain when one of their destroyers - a sister ship of the fifty they gave to the British - comes under attack. They consider themselves entitled to impose crippling embargoes on us for pursuing our legitimate destiny in China, and to pressure other countries into joining the embargo. They ship arms to the criminal Chiang Kai-Shek regime and recently forced the British to reopen the Burma Road for this traffic.

As for French territory specifically, the United States has made no objection to any of the British or Free French actions enumerated above, or to the recent invasion of Syria, or to the takeover of New Caledonia. Indeed their continually increasing support of the Allied cause suggests at least tacit approval of those actions, relations with Vichy notwithstanding.

 

You are correct sir, but it is my intention to play to the administration's opposition and to the American public as a whole. Roosevelt has been walking a tight rope in trying to support Britain without pushing too far. The recent (11 March) signing of the so called "Lend-Lease" legislation has removed much of the illusion of neutrality that the US has been attempting to maintain. However, only a little over half (54%) of the American public supported Lend-Lease without qualification. One of the most common comments by poll respondents was that they saw it as a defensive measure to keep the US out of war. Isolationist sympathies are still strong in the US. Will the American public support a declaration of war against us when it appears that it is to maintain the overseas colonies of Britain and the Netherlands? I don't think so. Especially if we provide an opposing view to opposition newspapers, in order to get our perspective before the American public. Even if we fail, it will probably take a week before Roosevelt could finagle a declaration of war, and even then it would take additional time to assemble a fleet train, assemble troops and transport and mount an offensive reply. If we are careful and avoid attacks on US territories, personnel and ships, a declaration of war will be a hard sell for the administration. Then ask yourself if Roosevelt would even seek one? It seems the Americans are focused on the war in Europe. Would the administration provoke war with us before the US has mobilized? It is doubtful.
But, for the sake of argument lets say we fail and a week after we commence hostilities the US does declare war on us. What would the situation be? We would have Noumea and be across Australia's supply lines. We will have seized all the key oil/refinery locations. We will be well on our way to reducing British defenses on the Malay peninsula and be pressing Singapore. We will have released our carriers and they will be heading towards Truk to counter a US naval response. We will be in a good position for fighting a war.

 

Gentlemen, I fear I have become lost in the undergrowth here in the proposed Noumea Operation, and perhaps I am not alone in this.

I acknowledge that in the interval where we first discussed the topic, the period of time in which we tabled the matter for further consideration and now that we again are considering Admiral Noka's proposed operational plan, some drift may have occurred between what we had found common ground on and that which needed further clarification.

My understanding of the proposed action was as follows. The operation would need limited Imperial assets, basically support, logistics and a small covering force, due to the limited Free French military presence at New Caledonia and only a slight potential of interference by Commonwealth forces due to their commitments to the European war. This being so because the nearest RN capital ships are in the Indian Ocean at present and nothing larger than a Light Cruiser available to the RN anywhere near our proposed operational route or target. Air and ground forces of similar stature in the area as well.

That we intended to conduct this operation with a low enough profile that it would not be seen as overly provocative diplomatically, especially within the United States, and that we could accomplish this without any interference or hazard with seizing the Dutch East Indies and other vital oil production sites.

Admiral Noka's commendable desire to offer real operational training to CarDiv 5, and support from CarDiv 4 (and battleships) should we meet serious opposition (presumably from the US Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor) seems at odds with several objectives to which have considered sacrosanct.

One, That in any engagement with the USN that may include Carrier aviation, or its battle line, we would strive to engage them with the Kido Butai intact so as to insure our early success as much as possible. Two, we would go out of our way not to fire the first shot in any confrontation with US military assets, which might include aborting a attack at a SRA target if a US warship is present and might be struck by accident. Third, that we would insure (with no American targets included in our initial objectives) that we focus the bulk of our assets to seize SRA targets before the Dutch and Commonwealth forces could greatly damage or destroy them.

If we encounter any opposition from either US or Commonwealth military forces at Noumea, some weeks before our primary movement, will that not place us in a state of war between one or both and the Empire, well before we are prepared to strike at the Oil production areas and with perhaps half our capitol ships out of position to prevent the Dutch and British from waging a scorched earth policy?

 

I've been under the impression that we were going to undertake the Noumea Operation, simultaneous with the SRA Operation. That is what I have been planning for. I was under the impression that the earlier date was one of the factors that led to the initial rejection of the plan. Admiral Noka's operational plan, I believe, came after the initial rejection, but before we agreed to consider an invasion of Noumea.
As for the military situation, there are no significant allied air assets capable of intervening. The garrison consists of only the Free French New Caledonia detachment, according to our agents. This detachment consists of approximately one (1) battalion of Free French Militia, ill trained and ill equipped, 4 x 65mm guns, 2 x 37mm AA guns, four (4) 3" mortars and two (2) 6" Mk V/VII guns for shore defense. The additional targets on the main island of La Foa and Koumac are basically undefended. Intervention by elements of the RAN are possible, but are likely to be too late as they will have to react to our surprise attack, to be made in conjunction with initiating operations in Malaya and the SRA.
In developing an operational plan I intended to seize Ontong Java atoll, approximately 250mi NNE of Tulagi, immediately after our delivery of a declaration of war, with a small detachment of sailors. An AV, AO, AD, protected by two destroyers and two patrol boats would anchor here to serve as a forward resupply point for the task forces. There are only local indigenous natives here so no resistence is expected. Next morning a squadron of H6K Mavis patrol aircraft would fly in from Truk, marry up with the AV, and provide aerial search to the south and south southwest, providing early warning of enemy ship movements. The Noumea/La Foa/Koumac invasion force would be in position to make the run in to their targets in order to begin landing operations six hours later, a small task force including the Hosho (plus minimal escorts) would be following in trace 12 hours back. I intended to use Hosho as an aircraft ferry to launch a small contingent of aircraft to land at the Noumea airfield, once captured during the initial assault. These aircraft would be launched at long range to minimize the risk to Hosho. A SNLF battalion would be tasked with the assault on Noumea, a Vichy French, Indo-China battalion would be the reserve force and be landed to undertake occupation duties. A naval/aviation base/defense force would be landed to provide security and operation of the port and airfield once the objective is secured. An SNLF company would land by APD's north of Noumea at La Foa, to seize that objective and to block a retreat by Free French forces up the island. An SNLF base force would also land at Koumac to secure that end of the island. Once the base force was established at Koumac, the H6K's at Ontong Java would deploy forward to Koumac and provide search coverage to the sea lanes where an Australian naval response was most likely. We will have an AV carrying F1M "Pete's" accompanying the Koumac invasion force and they will use their aircraft to provide local air cover for this operation, and will off-load the aircraft for use at the base before retiring. The invasion force would have three task forces, Noumea, La Foa and Koumac. They would sail as a group until approximately 120 miles west of Efate in the New Hebrides, then split and each proceed to their individual objectives. All task forces will retire once personnel, equipment and supplies are off loaded, in any case no later than 48 hours after H-hour. One large cruiser, two light cruisers, six destroyers, two minesweepers, and the minimum required logistical shipping required to move the force, it's supplies and equipment will comprise the Noumea task force. Sufficient APD's to land an SNLF company in the La Foa force, one light cruiser, two destroyers, two patrol boats, one AV and sufficient transport/cargo vessels to transport the personnel, equipment and supplies for the Koumac task force. The covering force for the Noumea task force would serve as the reaction force if a surface engagement becomes necessary (1 x CA, 1 x CL and four of the destroyers), one CL, the other two destroyers and the minesweepers would remain as close protection for the logistics vessels.

As for the carriers of Kido Butai, I had planned for Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku to serve as the Northern strike force and attack airfields and enemy naval combatants in support of the Malaya/North Borneo segment of the SRA operation. As soon as enemy air strength has been sufficiently suppressed and forward air bases secured to transfer land based air forward, they will retire to either Cam Rahn Bay or Takao, Formosa to refuel and then sail to Truk to await a potential US response.

Soryu, Hiryu, and the light carriers, CVL-02 Ryujo, and CVL-03 Zuiho will comprise the carrier element for the Southern Strike Force. I have not assigned the CVE-02 Taiyo, which entered service on 02 September of this year, to any task forces as of yet. The conversion from Kasuga Maru was rapid and relatively straight forward. I would like to do the same with Yawata Maru and Nitta Maru, as soon as possible. I feel they would be invaluable as training carriers and aircraft ferries.

 

the only question is we need the S and H for later and I don't want to lose them or too many of theirs crews. Why not use a small group of the Hosho, Zuiho and Ryuho(?) (I know one of the two is available) There are no air assets to worry about the Australians only have Hudsons and Wirraways. There a couple of CA of the RAN and two CL of the RNZN so we do need some escort capacity until the air base is ready. We can use either an CS or AV for additional recon

 

Bobimoto-san, please refresh my memory, what is the proposed role for the Southern Strike Force comprising Hiryu etc.?

The small carrier currently in service is Ryujo. Ryuho is proposed name for the converted submarine depot ship Taigei. I had proposed earlier, and I do not recall any objection, cancelling this conversion. It is unusually expensive due to the need to re-engine the ship to increase her speed, and even if successful will provide only a mediocre carrier.

I don't believe we currently have an air group assigned to Taiyo; we will have to see if we have available aircraft and aircrew. She and some of the other small carriers may have to use older aircraft like B4Ys or A5Ms. These may also be more suitable for shorter flight decks or lower speeds.

Conducting the Noumea operation simultaneously with the main offensive will at least avoid alerting our enemies prematurely, but it will also undermine the pretense of the French reasserting their legitimate authority. To the rest of the world, Noumea will just be one of many places the Japanese attacked on X day.

It is our hope that America will stay out of the war. The primary value of Noumea is to cut off supply lines to Australia from.....America. If they stay completely out, Noumea is irrelevant. If they ship their "Lend-Lease" to Australia, all we can do with Noumea is create a provocation. If they come in, Noumea will initially hinder their attempt to support their allies, but it will also become a likely first objective as soon as they gather sufficient force. In order to maintain effective combat forces on Noumea, we will need to secure intermediate points as steve mentioned. There might also be an opportunity to lure American forces into an early battle on terms favorable to us.

 

Of course Admiral, I apologize. I am not sure how much we reached final agreement on and how much is from my proposed operational plan. I will outline it and can provide a detailed OPs order when we come to agreement on the details.

There will be three prongs to the initial operation, a Northern force, a southern force, and a Noumea force. We will be giving Britain and the Netherlands our declaration of war at 6pm London time, Friday 28 November, 1941. That will equate to 01:30am, Saturday 29 November, Singapore time. Landings will commence as soon as possible after dawn. Land based air strikes will attempt to suppress all allied airfields within range of the landing forces. Carrier based air will attempt to suppress or aid in the suppression of major airfields or secondary airfields outside the range of our land based air. I intend to keep the carriers only until we can move our land air assets forward, or until enemy air capability has been sufficiently suppressed/attritted to the point that they do not pose a serious risk to our forces. They will then be released, move to a friendly port refuel and head for Truk, where they will stand by to counter any US attempt to intervene. I am very confident that the US will not mount this type of response without first getting a declaration of war from their congress.
The Northern Force will be based out of Cam Rahn Bay, French Indo-China and be responsible for the Malay Peninsula landings, and landings on the north coast of Borneo. The key objectives are the defeat of Commonwealth Forces and seizure of their bases, on the Malay peninsula, with the end goal of the capture of Singapore. In north Borneo the key targets are Miri and Brunei (1600tons daily oil production/refinery capacity for 1350tons output refined product). We should have them secured first day and the small airfield at Miri operational the following day (D+1). D+2 we should be landing near Djambi and Palembang, Sumatra (11500ton oil per day/9180ton finished product). These are our #1 and #3 most important objectives and their seizure makes us oil/fuel self-sufficient. I am still trying to figure out a possible way to drop paratroops to secure the oil/airfield facilities at these two locations in order to prevent sabotage or damage before we can get ship borne forces there.

The Southern Force is responsible for Southern Borneo, northern Celebes and northern Java. The forces will be based out of the Palaus. At 0200 Saturday 29 November, we will make an administrative landing at Talaud-eilanden, 120 miles or so directly south of the southern tip on Mindanao, Philippines. We will station an AV there to support long range search aircraft, to be flown in on D-Day. They will provide intell in US ship movements to the north in the Celebes and Sulu Seas. At dawn on D-Day we will make separate landings to seize Morotai in the Moluccas and Manado in the Celebes. These two locations have decent port potential and the terrain will support decent sized airfields to isolate the southern Philippines. A medium sized airfield is already in existence at Manado, we can quickly ferry in land based aircraft there to support operations. On D+1 we should be able to land at Balikpaupan and Samarinda, located next to each other, on the southeast coast of Borneo. Both have medium sized airfields with good terrain to allow for expansion, plus they have a combined oil output of 4000tons daily and a refinery capacity of 2700tons per day of finished product. On D+3 we should be able to land a large force between Tjepoe and Soerbaja on the east Java coast. These forces will contain mechanized elements and tanks to help clear the coast northwest to Batavia and secure the city of Soerbaja. Soerbaja and Tjepoe have a combined oil output of 2250tons per day and the refining capacity to produce 1800tons of finished product per day. The majority of Dutch naval assets are centered on Soerbaja and Batavia. If we can get them to come out and fight we can destroy them.

In support of the operation I recommend that we deploy two submarine squadrons to close the Strait of Malacca and isolate the battle area. They would patrol the narrow areas around Georgetown and a second line at the narrower point around Tandjoengbali. An additional squadron will be deployed at Batavia and one at Soerbaja. They will be in place prior to the commencement of hostilities and be prepared to intercept enemy shipping as of dawn 29 November in order not to tip off the enemy. An additional squadron should be stationed off Manila/Cavite in the Philippines to observe and shadow US ships and report on their movements.

Medan, Sumatra, the fourth most important oil location does present a problem. I can drop paratroops there on D-Day by launching out of Patani. The problem is reinforcing them by some method other than air until they can be relieved. I had toyed with prepositioning a supply task force at Phuket, Thailand pre-invasion, but am a bit leery of doing so for fear of tipping off the British to our intentions.

Hope this answers your question.