Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

No :Hahn does not mention that his ammunition figures concern only artillery ammunition .It is the opposite : from what he writes on P 188 one can conclude that his figures include also small arms and artillery .

And, I expected that every one knew that Waffen und Geheimwaffen concerned only the Army ,as is indicated in the title of the book :waffen und geheimwaffen des deutschen heeres .

 

2 times wrong :

1)sickle cut did not strike where the enemy was weakest and did not expect an attack .Besides Guderian had only a subordinate role in sickle cut

2) the Germans did not attack where they were expected : the Stavka was thinking on a schwertepunkt in the Ukraine .

 

Explain how the Germans get 750 tanks, tens of thousands of other vehicles, hundreds of artillery pieces, 150k troops plus Luftwaffe forces and huge supply dumps to Finland.
Explain how they do it without the Soviets detecting the buildup and jump off positions.

The initial phases of Barbarossa were successful due to surprise, your scenario apparently lacks that if using Finland is so important.

No thoughts on road capacity and the resupply rate? I've been analyzing Barbarossa for 20 years, I'm looking forward to your creative and fool proof solutions.

 

Spot on!

It is interesting to note that in Operation Barbarossa Germans employed 150 divisions vs. 135 utilized during the battle for France. As Black6 has explained, sending more troops doesn't increase the speed of advance and time was the critical factor for the Germans in Russia. Employing more troops just adds to the casualty rate. Should the Germans have send 300 divisions to Russia in 1941, the war would have ended in summer 1943 with the Red Banner on Reichstag and Russians in Calais.
It is also worthy to mention that Paulus has foreseen in his study that "the army would arrive at the gates of Moscow depleted of reserves, and in addition, resupply would be almost impossible". So don't blame it all on the bellboy. He was the only reasonable, but silenced.

 

OTL Manstein placed the heaviest concentration of armor in the Ardennes (because Guderian assured him that it presented no problem for his Panzers), which the French and Belgians deemed impassable for armor and defended only with 2 weak divisions and no armor. Guderian led the strongest part of the armor which entered through the Ardennes in 10 days to the sea (the sickle cut). He also had the densests, most continuous air support in history (a fra cry from the weaker, sporadic support in Barbarossa). So the bulk of the armor and planes (the essentials for Blitkrieg) was concentrated in the weakest area.

OTL Kleist smashed precisely against the strongest armor in the front in Brody, on his way to Kiev, the most fortified city after Sevastopol at the time and the largest troop concentration in the USSR at the time (which was further reinforced for months before it fell).
Belorussia also had stronger fortifications and forces (Bialystok, Brest, Minsk, etc, and after these, there was even stronger Smolesnk in Russia) than the Baltic or the Black Sea coasts, So Barbarossa certainly did not attack where the Soviets were weak (not a single Panzer division attacked from coastal Romania) nor with adequate force concentration nor where the enemy could be incapacitated).
Barbarossa did not even attack in the first weeks 2 cities where tanks were being made: Leningrad and Kharkov (which was not reached until October, during Typhoon, by which time the equipment had been relocated by train to the Urals). ATL, the fast advance along the Black Sea and then from Maryupol and Nikolaev to Kharkov denies the Soviets time to relocate the equipment. The best the Soviets can do is destroy it in the first 2 weeks of the war, losing that production indefinitely. The same goes for several other iportant plants in Kharkov and Leningrad.

Kiev and Minsk were among the few important industrial centers and large cities which were heavily defended, could be easily bombed from German Poland. Kiev was not in the route to Moscow. Kiev and Minsk controlled limited RR traffic west of them, so capturing them early in Barbarossa made much less sense than capturing Odessa, Nikolaev, Maryupol, Leningrad, Murmansk and Kharkov (5 invaluable ports and a vital industrial city on the way to Moscow and an important RR hub to Stalingrad, the Urals and far east, Kiev, Moscow, the north, etc,) in the first weeks.

The formidable forces which Kleist fought with a weak force, the ridiculous replacements he received, the distance he was forced to cover by Hitler (Poland, Brody-Kiev-Nikolaev-Lokhvitsa- Black Sea in little over 3 months of almost continuous heavy fighting is surreal, a tribute to Hitler's glaring strategic incompetence. The same goes for every other Panzer army commander in Barbarossa

 

That's odd...

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=193292&start=375#p1900510

Soooo...Which is it?

 

I liked the account of the initial stages of Crimea in this page
http://historum.com/war-military-history/28122-battle-crimea-october-1941-july-1942-a.html

Note that in Sept Manstein had no air support and only a motorized division (which he lost to AGS before entering the Crimea) and a small Romanian force covering his flanks, which was nearly penetrated by 10 Soviet divisions. He was only saved when AGS's Panzers moved south to encircle the attacking Soviets. Note that 300,000 Soviets were evacuated from Odessa (after killing 27,000 Romanians there during months) by sea to Crimea (to fight the Germans & Romanians), only because of lack of planes, torpedo boats and warships to sink them.

Just capturing the 6 km wide Isthmus of Perekop to access the Crimea, without strong air or Panzer support, Manstein lost 2,600 men and wasted days. He would receive sporadic and meager air support over the 9 month offensive.

Many of the men fighting in Odessa and Crimea were sailors, marines, navy training, manitenance, supplies or office personnel, etc, and were transported by sea over months to Odessa and then to Crimea from Novorossisk, etc, to be used as infantry.

ATL The strong air and Panzer force isolates Odessa and Crimea completely on the first day, and bombs Odessa on subsequent days, so artillery and infantry can capture it rapidly, the same occurs days later in Crimea. Several troop transports are sunk trying to reinforce or evacuate both areas. Breaking through Perekop with heavy air and Panzer support is accomplished in a day and it costs a few hundred men.

 

Another example of Manstein attacking were the enemy least expected it and was therefore vulnerable:
In the final stage of the siege of Sevastopol, axis forces needed to take the Sapun heights. The only accessible approaches by land were heavily defended. He ordered infantry to cross the narrow Severnaya Bay by boat. When some officers objected, arguing that it was impossible, for they would be cut to pieces, Manstein retorted that if the enemy also thinks it is impossible, then the Germans have to attack there. The crossing took the Soviets completely by surprise and incurred low casualties.

He used a similar tactic against Timoshenko's offensive to liberate Kharkov. He withdrew, stretching the Soviet supply lines and weakening the vangard and when Timoshenko thought he had defeated Manstein, the latter struck back at the weakest point and trounced the Soviets.

Therefore, I think he would have liked this plan, which strikes precisely where the Soviets and most in this thread think it impossible.

OTL there can hardly be worse waste than:
a) Keeping million of men for weeks or months marching extremely long distances and thousands of guns and hundreds of thousands of rounds of shells behind a horse, instead of in the front. Consuming a heavy tonnage of grain, etc, and wasting good weather without performing any service.

B) Engaging large forces for a long time during good weather reducing pockets or laying siege in dozens of well defended places and taking heavy casualties, while tanks roam around thousands of km, making supplies a nightmare.

c) Losing a hundreds of tanks per week when only about 5o are being maid every week and then keeping these in Germany! and releasing them when the rasputitsa begins.

d) Separating the strongest Panzer force poised to strike at Moscow from nearby Smolensk, in good weather with with supply lines nearly established, in order to send half of them north and half of them south (both away from Moscow) to experience a lot of wear and more losses, while the Soviets reinforce Moscow. Then have them return to prepare to strike in the rasputitsa.

e) Sending several divisions, 150 planes, dozens of tanks, 3 destroyers and several supply ships to attack a fortified port and to block the RR in extremely difficult terrain, while paratroopers are being used as infantry in the west. So single final objective is attained in any area during Barbarossa.

 

Wrong :
5 of the 10 German PzD were committed south of the Meuse : south of the Meuse is not the Ardennes .The biggest "tank battle" was not in the Ardennes,but in Hannut .
The weakest Allied sector was north of the Meuse, that's why most French mobile divisions were committed in that sector .
The Ardennes were NOT considered as inpenetrable .If they were, there was no need for the French to have fortifications on the Meuse . The role of the Ardennes was to delay a German advance ,and this advance was delayed .

It was deemed that the sector north of the Meuse was more important and dangerous,because the Germans would attack there with the bulk of their forces (which they did) ,because without reinforcements, this sector could not be held and because a German victory in that sector would result in the fall of Paris .

The sector south of the Meuse would have to do with what remained,the Germans would be stopped at the Meuse in France .

 

c can be debunked, because it ignores the reasons why these tanks did not go to the east :was transport available ? what about drivers, ammunition, spare parts, fuel ? And there is no proof that it would help the Germans .100 tanks will not go faster than 50 tanks .

d: Smolensk is NOT nearby to Moscow .: 368 km (as the crow flies) is NOT nearby :it is as Brussels-Paris,and no one will say that Brussels is nearby Paris .And there is no proof that they were poised to strike at Moscow,there is also no proof that they could advance to Moscow, that they could capture Moscow .

It tool the Germans in the OTL almost 2 months to go from Smolensk to Moscow, there is no reason that they could go faster in the ATL .

 

The point of good strategy is precisely to avoid big tank battles against superior tanks, by passing heavy enemy armor concentration to strke weak areas using heavy air cocnetration to penetrate deeply.

Hannut was a completely futile enterprise. Had enemy tanks and heavy AT concentrations been bypassed there, Panzer losses would have been much lower and strategic damage to the enemy much greater.

The Panzers south of the Meuse received almost no air support and were mauled in Stone. Guderian's Panzers (the main and strongest thrust of the operation, the other thrusts being distractions) received the densest and most continuous and prolonged air support in history from Sedan to hte coast.

 

The only reason for those tanks not going to the front during the decisive months was Hitler's order to retain not only the tanks, but also the spare parts (engines, etc,) coming out of production. So that there were only 22,000 tons of spares and when these dwindled and as engines failed, etc, many tanks were cannibalized, wasting a lot of resources. Even track pins were in short supply in August and they broke often.

Guderian's forces were beyond Smolensk, when he was ordered south. But even 400 km is a short distance, compared to 670 km to Lokhvitsa and then 760 km from Lokhvitsa to Moscow in late Sept, 1941 (with a short time before the rasputitsa and with fewer and worn tanks).
Does it make more sense to advance 400 km fighting toward Moscow with nearly established supply lines, with few defending forces remaining or to advance 670 km to Lokhvitsa with new supply lines, while providing time to fortify and reinforce the area around Moscow and then have to advance 760 km to heavily defended Moscow? 400 or 1,430 km?

Look at the logistics. Supply both Hoth And Guderian 400 km to Moscow or supply Guderian 670 south to Lokhvitsa and Hoth 750 km north to Leningrad, along new lines with an exposed flank all the way and two exposed flanks part of the way. It's a no brainer.

 

Irrelevant : there is no proof (and everything suggests the opposite) that an attack direction Moscow was possible before october.Besides, the advance on Moscow was not depending on Guderian and Hoth but on the infantry divisions and the tanks could only advance successfully at the speed of the infantry .

 

There were extremely weak Soviet forces left and defensive positions were weak between Guderian and Moscow when he was ordered south. In contrast, when he returned from his Odissey (the distance and the territory and enemy forces on the advance to Lokhvitsa were stronger than toward Moscow), Moscow had been strengthened considerably and the roads were mud, his men exhausted, the tanks worn. When the offensive was finally restarted as the gorund froze, the advance was quite fast, despite much stronger defenses. The Moscow are are had all the time of Guderian's Oddisey and the rasputitsa to fortify itself, deploy troops, etc, and yet it gave way against the worn Panzers (which took heavy losses, but continued advancing).

Moreover, In early Sept in the Yelnya salient, poorly supplied infantry forces left to guard the front while the Panzers were in the south were trounced and pushed back by Siberian divisions (among the first to enter combat), incurring extremely heavy losses and these experienced men and their euipment and the lost terrain were missed during the thrust to Moscow in October.

Hitler made the worst possible strategic mistakes.
Kleist was ordered to attack Kiev (a mistake), but he had not been able to attack Kiev in strength, before it was reinforced, because Hitler ordered him to rush from Kiev to Uman then to Nikolaev. Having broken though the strong defenses and penetrated deep, Hitler ordered him back to Kiev (against the strong forces it had bypassed and which were now reinforced!). Simultaneuosly, after Guderian broke through the strongest forces in Smolensk Hitler ordered him south to the strong positions in Kiev.
A good strategist bypasses strong forces and smashes through weak forces. Hitler rushed his forces from weak areas to strong areas and traveling long distances. He then attacked the areas which had been reinforced over months.

 

Yeah, the Soviet forces were surprised by flank attack by Guderian which started a couple of days early, so one surprise element won while forces lost. Ever thought the Germans fought with the same forces and losses since June 22nd and even with massive losses the Soviet forces were practically always fresh because they were always new even if without proprer training.

 

OTL Besides destroying large axis forces, the victorious Soviet counter offensives in Moscow and Rostov (where the weakened Panzers of Kleist had also been halted by the rasputitsa and pushed back by strong forces and where much of the infantry was Romanian and italian) seriously damaged axis and boosted Soviet morale, despite the success in important Kharkov (which was reached without a strong Panzer thrust:12 bloody STUG! but was weakly defended): Kharkov is an excellent example of the importance of capturing important, poorly defended positions, incurring reasonable losses, which Hitler seldom did. Choosing instead to capture millions of men in huge pockets, which cost him dearly to reduce (in men and time with good weather). Kharkov was as important industrially as Kiev, it was on the way to Moscow and controlled must of the RR flow to the west and south, yet it was weakly defended (it was captured in a few days), so it makes much more sense to attack there than to waste entire divisions and months reducing fortified Kiev, Smolensk, etc, just to capture millions.

ATL the early obliteration of the navy and air force and fall of Murmansk, Odessa, Nikolaev, Tallin, Kronstadt, Leningrad, Kharkov etc, and thrusts on Moscow from Leningrad, Latvia & Kharkov, while the bulk of the Soviet armor and artillery are either attacking the central border unsuccessfully with heavy losses or redeploying long distances (not being able to fight for days or weeks, tanks breaking down along the way and being attacked by air) to counter attack, ruins Soviet and boosts German morale at a critical time. Most importantly, The early loss of Kharkov makes supplies to or transport of forces from Kiev to the north by RR very difficult. Likewise RR transport between Moscow and Stalingrad or Tankograd-Magnitograd or the Caucasus is impaired.

 

You can reiterate your statements 'til you are blue in the face, but no one believes them credible, because you have as yet done nothing to provide a single shred of evidence that it is remotely feasible. You just handwave again and restate your position. You have resolved none of the issues repeated by multiple posters..

The lack of detail is just astounding, especially considering the amount of text you have posted.

Just handwave the Steam-powered space ship and be done with it.

 

I think I have proved that destroying 3 weak fleets with much stronger planes than in PH flying many more sorties, specifying plane type, bomb load, number of planes, number of missions, etc, is a piece of cake.

Similarly, I have proved that advancing rapidly along the Baltic coast from two staging areas, instead of one and with much stronger air and Panzer forces is a piece of cake.

Likewise, I have proved that advancing from Leningrad and Latvia to Moscow is much easier than advancing through Minsk, smolensk, and then either to Lokhvitsa or Leningrad and back to Moscow.

I have also proved that advancing along the weak Black Sea coast from Romania to Kharkov, bypassing Brody, Kiev, etc, is much easier than smashing through these fortified areas to arrive in weak Kharkov months later.

Finally, I have also proved that with 300 warplanes, paratroopers, more men, tanks, warships and transport planes, Silberfuchs dominates the air and hence the sea, so Kandalatsha and Murmansk fall, making a huge difference.

Just like Manstein could not convince any top leaders, except Hitler and Guderian about the obvious virtues of the sickle cut or like Guderian, Bok and Halder could not convince Hitler about the obvious advantages of heading for Moscow in good weather, instead of diverging to Kiev and Leningrad, I am not surprised that you cannot sea the advantages and the fact that this plan implies much simpler logistcs, much lower losses, much less time than OTL Barbarossa, but it results in success. I cannot make the bilnd see.