BATTLE OF BRITAIN: NO BLITZ?

@Hop: Excellent post, and well explained. However, I disagree with some of your sources. From what I've read (read Matthew Cooper, "The German Army, 1933-1945"), Rommel was cheated from supplies at the very start! Mr Cooper explains in quite explicit detail how it was possible in 1943, a losing year for Germany, to reinforce Tunis with a vastly bigger Afrikakorps, and to simultaneously supply that huge force with a reduced-from-1940 italian shipping capacity, in the face of much more organized and larger array of Allied forces. Rommel was not given high-priority, it is well-known that North Africa was a very very very very very neglegted theater of war. Yes, some German generals said that to supply another panzer division or 2 was unmanageable, but this was shown false in the years to come. If the OKW had truly wanted to prosecute a vigorous campaign in the Med, it could have done so. The fact is, the Eastern front had FAR more priority, in every aspect. Rommel, as brilliant as he was, was not the 'diplomat', and failed to open the eyes of his High Command to his troubles.

Regarding the Battle of France, and the performance of the Luftwaffe, I quote:

"The Luftwaffe virtually destroyed the Armée de l'Air during the campaign and inflicted heavy losses to the RAF contingent that was deployed. It is estimated the French lost 1,274 aircraft destroyed during the campaign, the British suffered losses of 959 (477 fighters).[54] The battle for France had cost the Luftwaffe 28% of its front line strength, some 1,428 aircraft destroyed. A further 488 were damaged, making a total of 36% of the Luftwaffe strength negatively affected.[55] The campaign had been a spectacular success for the German air-arm. The Luftwaffe had effectively destroyed three Allied air forces and inflicted heavy losses to a fourth"

Well, that's not a bad result is it? The French and Brits had MONTHS to prepare, the German offensive was NO suprise, it was completely expected. From everything I've read, the Brits and French were quite outclassed by the Luftwaffe. Yes, they didn't plan for a long war, but after such a victory, everyone but Hitler thought the war was over anyways! Again, I say, IF (this is a what-if forum) the Germans/Hitler had begun to make plans after the fall of France for a long air/sea campaign against the forces of Great Britain, wherever they may be, then the UK would have lost by 42 at the latest. The 'ethos' you speak of is something that could have been changed in relatively short order. Only the entry of the USA or USSR could have saved them.

 

A requirement for a well constructed what if in my opinion.

The question is when do they do this and how? Are you suggesting that they concentrate on Britain after the fall of France? Way to late in my opinion. Or after the fall of Poland? Still probably too late. If not when and what do they do?

While not precisly a zero sum game the German economy was not in good shape prior to WWII. Where was Hitler to get the resouces to do this? Note also that the Germans had a lot of problems when they tried mass producing U-boats.

If it starts at the end of 40 you will see few benefits before the middle of 41 and Britain is also ramping up at that point. Remember Britain isn't just England. The British Commonwealth is larger in population, resources, economy and economic potential than Germany. Furthermore they have the advantages that come with fighting a defenive battle at least as far as the air war goes.

 

Whereas I do not intend to enter into the detailed discussion surrounding the title of the thread, I do feel the need to correct T. A. Gardner's incorrect points.

1. Erprobungsgruppe 210 were not the only 'Jabo' unit operating in the Battle of Britain. Towards the end of the Battle, II./LG 2 operated 109 Es in the Jabo role also. Otto Hintze's 3./Erpr. Gr. 210 was attached to this unit to fly high level bombing missions from October 1940 onwards. Also, there were Jabo Staffeln in each Jagdgeschwader flying fighter-bomber missions towards the end of the Battle.

2. Erprobungsgruppe 210 did not operate the Bf 110 C-3. It used Bf 110 C-6s (mounting the 30 mm. MG 101 Kanone, not bomb racks); Bf 110 D-0/Bs, and towards the end of the Battle started using the Bf 110 E variant.

3. I think you need to do a bit more digging on the missions of Erprobungsgruppe 210 - their impact on the main phases of the Battle was not minimal, and was certainly not carried out as single aircraft or a single flight. That came in 1941 when they were carrying out dusk missions prior to moving east for the forthcoming Russian campaign. In 1940 a lot of missions were carried out in Gruppe strength.

Hope this clarifies matters.

 

That last item is the wild card. For some reason most folks are unaware that Britian initiated the A bomb development. Its usuall assumed this started with Einstiens letter to Rossevelt or something. The reality is Britian had the technical expertise assembled in 1941, and had started the long hard work of collecting and refining the Uranium. Exactly how long it would take Britian to build a usefull number of bombs I cant say. Sooner than is good for the Germans I would guess.

A second point is the entry of the USSR into the war is inevitable. The thinking of Hitler and Stalin leads towards war between the two by 1942 or 1943 at the latest.