Battle of Kolombangara - July 1943

After the inconclusive Battle of Kula Gulf, RADM Ainsworth was eager to again engage the Japanese, thinking he had put a serious hurt on them. The Japanese would only make him wait a week. The American campaign to take Vila was not going particularly well, and a Tokyo Express run threatened to tip the balance in favor of the Japanese. Ainsworth had since been reinforced to compensate for lost and damaged ships and his Force now consisted of the light cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, and HMNZS Leander, and destroyers Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins, Radford, Ralph Talbot, Buchanan, Maury, Woodworth, and Gwin

On the night of 12-13 July the Japanese where on there way to reinforce Vila. The Japanese force, led by RADM Izaki, consisted of two parts. The Transport group, consisting of destroyers Satsuki, Minazuki, Yunagi, and Matsukaze, and the Support Group consisting of light cruiser Jintsu and destroyers Mikazuki, Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami, and Yugure. The Japanese also had a new invention that would debut in the battle. A brand new radar-location devise would allow the Japanese to see where the Americans where by sensing the electronic impulses created by radar.

At 0036 a PBY Catalina spotted the Japanese column some 26 miles distant from the task force moving southwest. Ainsworth deployed the force in a single column with half the destroyers in the van and half in the rear of his cruisers.
Detecting the Japanese on radar at 0100 with visual contact a mere three minutes later, Ainsworth once again believed he had achieved complete surprise on the Japanese force. Once again he was dead wrong, as the new radar-detection devise apparently had a range much greater than the radar itself. Izaki had actually known of the Allied presence for nearly two hours. Ainsworth turned his cruisers 30 degrees stb and ordered the van destroyers to increase speed for torpedo attack.

Izaki was able to use the new device to accurately plot the approach of the Allied ships. The Japanese began to launch torpedoes at 0108 followed by the US destroyers at 0110 with a range of 10.000 yards. As the torpedoes got underway, Jintsu turned on her searchlights and opened fire. The Allied cruisers replied by 0112 and just five minutes later Jintsu was already dead in the water at the time she was struck by an American torpedo. By 0130 Jintsu would be on the receiving end of close to 3000 shells fired her way (of course not all hit her).

Around the time Jintsu was being hit by a torpedo, Ainsworth ordered his force to move south. Leander would make the turn wide and at 0122 suffered severe damage at the hands of a Japanese long lance. Radford and Jenkins would escort her away from the battle to safety.

Mikazuki stayed with Jintsu while the other four destroyers of the support group sped north to reload the torpedo tubes. Reloading was completed by 0140 and the Japanese turned back south to catch the remaining allied ships. Ainsworth had sent Nicholas, O’Bannon, and Taylor to chase the Japanese and at around 0140 they finished off the sinking Jintsu with a few more fish.

The battle should have ended here with the remaining forces heading in opposite directions but both turned back towards each other. Ainsworth had once again assumed a great victory and turned back north to finish of any cripples. At 0156 Honolulu detected a group of ships on radar. Ainsworth, not knowing the exact location of his own destroyers, attempted to identify the ships o no avail. Finally, to assist in the identification, Ainsworth ordered the ships lit up with star shells. At 0205 the ships where illuminated and it was observed that they where turning north in a way that made it appear like they had just launched torpedoes. The Allied task force was ordered to turn so the ships guns could fire.

Before any shots could be fired St Louis was struck in the bow by a torpedo as well as Honolulu in the same location. In addition Honolulu was hit in the stern with a dud. Gwin took one amidships, and Buchanan collided with Woodworth in an attempt to comb the torpedoes. Gwin would be scuttled the next day.

Overall the battle was a huge Allied defeat. The Japanese where able to land another 1200 troops on Villa with the loss of one cruiser, While the Allies suffered three heavily damaged cruisers and one sunk destroyer. Other than the Jintsu all other Japanese ships escaped without damage. However, the allies did achieve the result of preventing KulaGulf from being used again by the Japanese to resupply Munda setting up the future battle of VellaGulf.

 

Another pic of the USS Honolulu. this from the side


Just curious. does anyone read these obscure battle posts? I will keep writing anyways because the men who fought them deserve to be remembered. As I said just curious.

 

I don't know about any others, but I read them. To me the Battle of Kolombangara is not obscure, any more than First or Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal. There is an excellent eyewitness account of the Battle of Kolombangara by the Executive Officer of the Maury DD-401 in the book "South Pacific Destroyer" by Russell Crenshaw. Crenshaw started out as gunnery officer of the Maury and served through much of the Solomon's campaign. His version differs a bit from yours, but only in a few details which is understandable The USN/RAN forces suffered from poor communications during the battle which accounts for much of the confusion apparent on the Allied side.

 

Been a while but I enjoyed this little story from the Destroyer History webpage.

Two Great Ships: Nicholas and O'Bannon

 

Last year for the 65th anniversary of this battle, I posted the preliminary action report from Adm. Ainsworth to CINCPAC.

http://www.ww2f.com/war-pacific/24923-naval-battle-kolombangara-action-report.html#post302644

 

I tried to Edit the origional post, but for some reason I don't seem to have that option. Anyway, I have expanded and revised the above essay, so here is version 2.0

The Battle of Kolombangara
By Michael Batzel​

Immediately after the inconclusive Battle of Kula Gulf, RADM Ainsworth was eager to again engage the IJN, thinking he had sunk the entire Japanese destroyer force that had been against him to the loss the cruiser Helena. The loss of Helena had been made up for with the addition of HMNZS Leander into Ainsworth’s Task Force. A Leander class light cruiser she was slightly more powerful then the old Omaha class cruisers of the USN, with the biggest difference being her 8 torpedo tubes.

On the Afternoon of 12 July 1943 “Pug” Ainsworth received word from ADM Halsey that he was being reinforced with the 6 destroyers (one of which was a replacement for the sunken USS Strong) of Desron 12 under Captain Ryan, and that he was to take his force to patrol up “the Slot”. The American campaign to take Vila was not going particularly well at the time, and a Tokyo Express run threatened to tip the balance in favor of the Japanese.

At 0530 on 12 July a strong force, including the storied Japanese Desron 2, had departed Rabaul. The Japanese force, led by RADM Shunji Izaki, consisted of two parts. The Transport group, consisting of destroyers Satsuki, Minazuki, Yunagi, and Matsukaze and carrying 1200 troops, and the Support Group consisting of light cruiser Jintsu and destroyers Mikazuki, Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami, and Yugure. The Japanese also had a new invention to debut in the battle, a brand new radar-location device that would allow the Japanese to see the allied ships by sensing the electronic impulses created by radar.

Ainsworth’s Task force departed Tulagi at 1700 and rendezvoused with the remainder of Ryan’s squadron off Santa IsabelIsland before heading up the slot. TF 18 now consisted of the light cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, and Leander, and destroyers Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins, Radford, Ralph Talbot, Buchanan, Maury, Woodworth, and Gwin. Hugging the Santa Isabel coast to protect his force from Japanese reconnaissance planes, Ainsworth lead his ships up the slot and towards the Japanese.



At 0036 a PBY Catalina Black Cat, launched from the Honolulu earlier, spotted the Japanese some 26 miles distant from Ainsworth’s task force, and moving southwest with a composition of one cruiser and five destroyers. Ainsworth deployed his force in a single column with half the destroyers in the van and half in the rear of his cruisers and increases his speed to 28 knots. This proved to be a difficult task for Ryan’s destroyers. Many of them had never worked together before and they became confused while forming up. The formation pushed forward nonetheless.

Honolulu picked up the Japanese force at 0100 with visual contact a mere three minutes later coming from Nicholas. Ainsworth orders his van destroyers to make a torpedo attack. Moments later he orders his cruisers to change course 30 degree to starboard, bringing his cruisers guns to bear on the Japanese column off his starboard beam.

Izaki had actually known of the Allied presence for nearly two hours, as the new radar-detection device apparently had a range much greater than the radar itself, and he was able to use the new device to accurately plot the approach of the Allied ships. The Japanese began to launch torpedoes at 0108 followed by the US destroyers at 0110 at a range of under 10.000 yards. As the torpedoes got underway, Jintsu turned on her searchlights and opened fire. The three allied cruisers chose the largest blip on their screens and replied at 0112. Within five minutes they tossed 2630 rounds at Jintsu leaving her dead in the water. Shortly after, and to add insult to injury, Jintsu took a torpedo. Either this hit or another hit by a torpedo, between 0140 – 0145 left Jintsu in two, with both halves of the ship burning furiously and drifting apart. ADM Izaki, the captain, and 482 sailors went down with their ship.

While the cruisers pounded Jintsu with 6” shells, the rear destroyers could now enter the fray. Badly bunched up in their formation, Maury, Buchanan, and Gwin, along with the cruiser Leander launched torpedoes toward the Japanese ships. Combined with the van destroyer’s fish, it was the largest torpedo barrage launched by the allies so far in the war.

Around the time Jintsu was being hit by the first torpedo, Ainsworth ordered his force to move south. Due to an issue with Honolulu’s radio, Leander would make the turn wide and at 0122 suffered severe damage at the hands of a Japanese long lance. Radford and Jenkins would escort her away from the battle to safety after dodging a few torpedoes themselves.

Mikazuki stayed with Jintsu while the other four destroyers of the support group sped north to reload the torpedo tubes. At this time the PBY overhead reported 4 destroyer retiring north at high speed. Ainsworth ordered the three remaining ships of Desron 21 under Captain McInerney to give chase. The battle had become very confusing by this time. Lookouts and radar estimated that between 3 and 6 Japanese ships burning and sinking, and the PBY modified its report from four to two destroyers heading north.

The battle should have ended here with the remaining forces heading in opposite directions but both turned back towards each other. The Japanese had completed the reloading by 0140, a remarkably fast 18 minutes. The Japanese ships turned back south to catch the remaining allied ships. Ainsworth had once again assumed a great victory and turned back north to finish off any cripples. At 0156 Honolulu detected a group of ships on radar. Ainsworth, not knowing the exact location of his own destroyers, attempted to identify the ships to no avail. Finally, to assist in the identification, Ainsworth ordered the ships lit up with star shells. At 0205 the ships where illuminated and it was observed that they where countermarching. Deciding they were the enemy, Ainsworth ordered his formation 60 degrees to starboard then ordered them to open fire.


Before any shots could be fired St Louis was struck in the bow by a torpedo. Honolulu steered violently to evade four or five torpedoes before getting hit herself in the bow. In addition Honolulu was hit in the stern with a dud. Gwin, just ahead of Honolulu, took one amidships, and Buchanan and Woodworth collided in an attempt to comb the torpedoes. Gwin would be scuttled around 0930 in the morning.

Overall the battle was a huge Allied defeat. The Japanese where able to land another 1200 troops on Villa with the loss of one cruiser, while the Allies suffered three heavily damaged cruisers and one sunk destroyer. Other than the Jintsu all other Japanese ships escaped without damage. In a message to Admiral Nimitz, Ainsworth would later state “Looking over one’s shoulder, one can always see how we should have done differently, and no one knows the fallacy of chasing Jap destroyers with cruisers better than I.”


Sources:
America’s Fighting Admirals: Winning the War at Sea in World War II by William Tuohy
The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War by Samuel Eliot Morison
The U.S. Navy against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941-1945 by Vincent P. O’Hare
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. 6: Breaking the Bismark Barrier by Samuel Eliot Morison

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/kolombangara.htm
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/kula_gulf.htm

 

Let's look on the positive side here. Although the battle for Kolombangara was a Naval disaster for us, it did dramatically slow down Japan's aid to their forces on New Georgia. The miserable battle for New Georgia was taking place at the same time as Kolombangara and Munda Air Field was finally secured three weeks later on 5 Aug 43. Taking Munda was highly advantageous. Munda Air Field became the main hub for many air squadrons and its acquisition allowed us to continue our move northward to Rabaul and Truk. We were making progress in spite of horrendous losses at sea.

 

I think Morison said it best when he wrote "a string of such victories would inevitably bring defeat"

By the way, welcome to the forum.

 

I have waded through some of Morison's books and will have to do so again to learn more. But one gets a sense of gloom for our Naval battles off Guadalcanal and Kolombangara. My interest lays in the land battle for New Georgia and Munda Air Field. My dad arrived the same day the air field was secured to start organizing CASU 14. For a former pilot, being land based at Munda was not at all pleasant for several months! The Japanese did not give up easily and continued strafing and bombing the field for about four months. I would say that the battle for Munda was just as nasty as Guadalcanal, but not as lengthy. Anything you can find regarding Munda would be most appreciated!

 

You got that right. The army and marines discovered that when the Japanese dug in to be on the defensive from the start, they could make anyone pay to go root them out.

Of course the Aussies (and US troops) already knew that up in Papua, but those lessons hadn't filtered out too widely.

 

My dad, Rex Edward Wood (16 June 1924-30 December 1973) was a young seaman aboard HMNZS Leander and took part in this battle. He said that the watertight doors had to be closed after his ship was torpedoed, even though his mates were still alive and trying to escape from the engine room. He had the sad job of helping to remove the bodies when the ship returned to Auckland.

 

Mike,

As an old member who has just recently returned I am extremely pleased to see that the Pacific Theater has grown in interest here since I departed almost 3 years ago. I am also pleased to see these threads and have been reading them over the last couple of days in an attempt to get up to speed. I am looking forward to reading more from you in the future, keep up the great work!!!

 

Thanks for the warm reception. I don't intend to go away again but like last time, sometimes life has a way of interupting one's plans.

 

Mikebatzel wrote:

I'm a newer member and I really enjoy the posts. Please keep them up.

NAREEVES wrote:

IMHO, reading Morison is a must to understand the US Navy in WWII. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War by Samuel Eliot Morison makes for a strong foundation and then go to his 15-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II for more indepth reading on what interests you.

 

While there's no denying that this was a huge defeat for the allies, but at the same time, in terms of tonnage sunk and personnel lost, it still seemed to have been a costlier battle for the Japanese, as they lost the 5,000+ ton CL Jintsu vs. the 1,600+ ton Gwin, while the 3 allied CLs were able to limp home(Shame that Leander' wartime career was effectively over), as well as losing almost 500 men vs. the allies 89, and we still prevented them from threatening the Marines at Rice Anchorage. That being said though, still got to give the IJN their due credit in accomplishing their reinforcement mission while also inflicting heavy damage to the Allied TF sent to intercept them.