Best tank gun of WW2???

Not really at least as far as the gun is concerned. See:
T29 Heavy Tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
and
T28 Super Heavy Tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Then there's this one.
T30 Heavy Tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the latter case pilots weren't produced until after the war but I'm not sure when the test models were produced or how many.

I'd agree with you here although there might be something obscure I'm not familiar with.

Again you need to be a bit more careful. Even ignoring the fact that ships are vehicles there are some self propelled artillery pieces that might be in the compettition here. Especially if you consider a train a vehicle.

 

The 105mm T5 for tanks & 105mm T8 for use as a towed AT gun were both developed from the 105 mm M3 which was a pre-war design. The T8 development was started in mid 1943 with a few guns ready by late 44/early 45 however development wasn't pushed so it probably could have been made availiable much sooner. The T5 which came along earlier , but again it's development wasn't pushed, however at a MV of 2800 FPS out-penetrated the 8.8cm/71. while the T8 had an even higher MV of 3100 FPS. The T5 penetrated 210mm @ 100 yards while the 8.8cm/71 penetrated 202 mm at 100 yards. The 120mm M1 was first proposed to be developed as a tank gun in early '45 but doubtless could have been developed into an tank/SP gun much sooner if need be it had a MV of 3100 FPS. The PAK44 12.8cm had a MV of 3281 FPS .

Now would it have feasible to mount either the 105mm T5,105mm T8 or 120mm say on M4 or M6 or T20-T26 chasis like the Germans did with all Stug/Jagd Panzer series? I'm thinking the M4 which mounted a 155mm in the SP artillery role or the M26 which mounted both the 8" rifle/240mm howitzer in the same role could be used.

 

This is turning into some argument over maths. Much like the poor people that had to convince the senate that this new weapon is needed. Everything is revolving on numbers.

I don't see practical application along with doctrine, nor the discussion of ordinary and extraordinary force.

For some this seems ok since a lot of the thinking and doctrine that prevailed was atrittion oriented, (especially cold war era) but if anyone asked my lads to use strength against strength or symetrical arms (say tanks vs tanks) they would reject it.

Try reading up on something else than just statistics. Doctrinal papers and theories are in abundance.

 

Momentum? We're talking kinetic energy here, not momentum, two different things. Momentum you're going to look at when figuring out recoil, Kinetic Energy is what you look at when figuring out penetration power. Furthermore momentum isn't measured in Joules, it's kg/ms.

To help you understand: http://www.batesville.k12.in.us/physics/phynet/mechanics/Energy/KENOTMomentum.html

The BR-412D APBC has in terms of total KE at 887 m/s a value of 6246 KJ, which is 1046 KJ more than the PzGr.39/43, but the BR-412D also has a much larger area to disperse that energy across. And this is what matters, cause like I've already explained it takes more energy/force to achieve the same penetration the larger the object you're trying to achieve that penetration with is. (See: Bottle vs Needle explanation again)

8.8cm KwK/Pak43:
Projectile: 10.4 kg PzGr.39/43 APCBC
MV: 1,000 m/s
Total KE = 5200 KJ
KE concentration = 85.49 KJ pr. cm^2

10cm D10:
Projectile: 15.88 kg BR-412D APBC
MV: 887 m/s
Total KE = 6246 KJ
KE concentration = 79.52 KJ pr. cm^2

So with similar AP projectiles the 8.8cm KwK/PaK43 L/71 is going to be on average 8.8% more effective. Problems with wartime Soviet projectiles however meant that during WW2 the difference was in the area of 30% as evident in actual armour penetration tests.

 

Only problem is Manteuffel never claimed anything of the sort Triple C. Manteuffel's opinion on the JS-2 was that it had robust tracks and good armour, but it was too slow, too unmaneuverable and too cramped. In Manteuffels opinion the Panther was the best tank of the war by far.

Here are some words by Manteuffel himself on the issue from the book The Other Side of the Hill:

"Fire-power, armour protection, speed and cross-country performance are the essentials, and the best type of tank is that which combines these conflicting requirements with most success. In my opinion the German Panzer V, the 'Panther', was the most satisfactory of all, and would have been close to the ideal had it been possible to design with a lower silhouette."

Manteuffel also mentions his first encounter with the JS-2 tank at Targul Frumos in May 1944: (The Tiger Ausf.E was the heaviest German tank to take part in that battle):
"It was at Târgu Frumos that I first met the Stalin tanks. It was a shock to find that, although my Tigers began to hit them at a range of 3,000 metres, our shells bounced off, and did not penetrate them until we had closed to half that distance. But I was able to counter the Russians' superiority in numbers by manoeuvre and mobility, in making the best use of ground cover."

 

1.all of the american heavy tanks you mentioned were developed during the war, but were developed too late to see combat in europe. If were talking experimental tanks, then the maus is easily the most powerful, with the pak 44 and more than 25cm of frontal and side armor.

2. By vehicles i mean AFV's. and the pak 44 was the most powerful gun put onto an AFV during world war 2. While its caliber was not the biggest, it fired a 62 ib (30 kg) shell more than 900 meters per second. while there were guns that fired heavier shells, none of those guns (like the 152mm on the SU and ISU-52) had anywhere near the velocity of the pak 44, which makes it the most powerful gun put on an AFV during world war 2.

 

The Soviets had more tanks in the east than the Germans had already in 1941 Triple C. The war in the east was a numbers game, and the Allies had won that game nearly from the start.

Only problem is who decides when you're defending or attacking Triple C ? I never said which side was attacking and which was defending. I described two equally sized forces clashing into each other, one equipped with tanks ideal for dealing with infantry but poor for dealing with enemy tanks, while the other side had tanks ideal for dealing with enemy tanks while also being effective enough in the Anti-personnel role. If both sides play their cards as best as possible the end result is always gonna be the same, cause one side has the better tank, which is the one which can take on other tanks and still be effective against infantry.

In other words the ability to take on enemy tanks effectively has to be priority no.1 when designing a main tank because if you can't then, in the case of no artillery & air support being available, you're forcing your infantry into having to deal with the enemy tanks & infantry alone with no support while at the same time your tanks are reduced to gunfodder. There's a reason the Allies relied so much on artillery & air support during the war, cause without it they simply just couldn't cope with the German tanks, and that because the German tanks were simply much better suited for tank vs tank warfare.

At Kursk the Soviets were defending and yet they still got a bad beating, suffering far higher losses than the Germans. The only difference was that the Soviets could replace their losses, while the Germans couldn't replace theirs.

The war in the east was one of attrition, which I believe has been mentioned already. It didn't matter who had the best men & equipment, just who had the most.

In the situation that two completely equal forces in every way were to fight each other, the ones defending would be the ones with the advantage. That's clear. When attacking you need an advantage in either the quality of your men & equipment or the amount you possess, otherwise you're doomed from the onset to lose.

 

Numerical superiority of the Red Army was more than offeset by its inadequate leadership, lack of training, woeful leadership and non-existence of logistics. Their armor couldn't stand a straight-up fight to Wehrmacht panzers until after Kursk, and even than there were cases of Soviet tanks being stopped cold.

AT tank guns and mines are far more treacherous weapons for tanks than other tanks. Btw, how you play your cards are far more important than what those cards are. "You don't play you cards, you play the man across the table".

When you have no arty and air support, it's time to sue for peace.

To a lesser extent of the American Army during Cold War. Air-Land Battle, i.e. modern mechanized warfare, emphasized the efficiency of the system as whole more than any single weapons platform. And have you understood how much your have just undermined your own statement?

That is the very military definition for victory in attrition warfare.

That's a theoretical land that had never and will never bear relevance to warfare as it is fought, as you must be aware of.

 

Triple C,

When designing a new main tank the firepower and armour protection come first, they do. And for the simple reason that without adequate amounts of either you're likely to be in serious trouble once met with enemy tanks and/or enemy AT teams on the battlefield. And for that reason the tanks main job is still taking on other tanks, so the capability to take on other tanks effectively (i.e. the AT performance of the main armament) is the no.1 requirement of any modern main battle tank design. The Germans were the first to understand this in WW2. But this in no way makes all other requirements needed in a tank unimportant and/or redundant in anyway as already explained. Because a tank with an excellent AT gun but with insufficient armour protection, inefficient anti-personnel capability, low mobility etc etc is not a good tank at all, just an AT gun on tracks.

To have a good tank you need sufficient amounts of the following:
1. Firepower
2. Armour protection
3. Mobility

The above is also the order in which a tank designer thinks today when designing a new main tank (for the reasons already stated), and it was the Germans who started with this line of thinking, the W. Allies quickly following suit after the war. Now after these three requirements have been met the rest needs to be taken into consideration (reliability, producability, range etc etc), and if you can strike gold in all departments then you've achieved making a great main tank. But picking what to concentrate on first is crucial.

Having a tank with good armour & mobility and a large caliber low velocity gun with a good HE capability for effective anti-personnel use, is likely going to prove very effective as an infantry support vehicle. But it is going to struggle once faced with enemy armour, and thus relies more heavily on artillery & air-support. Furthermore it will even prove inadequate in the role of infantry support itself once faced with enemy armour as it simply can't deal with it, which is bad cause enemy armour is the biggest threat to your infantry units to begin with. In short the inability to deal with enemy armour is also an inability to protect the infantry around you. So a tank with a gun capable of taking on other tanks effectively is none other than crucial.

During WW2 the Germans better understood this, i.e. which roles came before another when designing new tanks. They understood that a tanks main job was to take on enemy tanks, and that in order also to be effective in the infantry support role. It was/is a case of one thing simply demanding the other for the vehicle to become an effective one.

It wasn't WW1 anymore where tanks had been strictly used in very limited numbers solely for infantry support. In the following decades tanks quickly became faster, longer ranged, better armed and better armoured, and a lot more in numbers. Tanks had become a key ingredient to victories on land, and the main weapon used to achieve this. Tanks now spearheaded attacks, breached the enemy lines and isolated the enemy into pockets. Thus infantry was going to face tanks frequently on the battlefield, and the firepower, protection and mobility of a tank made it the most devastating weapon against infantry imaginable. The 2nd World War started and ran its' course with these things holding very much true throughout, however with the introduction of weapons such as Panzerfaust near the end of the war the tank had suddenly gained a threat far more deadly to it than ever. AT guns had always been a threat, but careful observation of the battlefield was an effective way of dealing with this. Against scattered well hidden infantry armed with RPGs however, a tank was suddenly more vulnerable than ever. And in the decades after WW2 new AT weapons such as guided AT missiles have put the tanks spot as king of the battlefield and land warfares deciding weapon into question amongst some experts. But the tank still remains the most effective weapon with which you can destroy another tank, and thus this is still its' main role amongst the other important roles it has to carry out. The new lightweight, handheld AT weapons developed after war has made tanks more vulnerable and more dependant on infantry as a support itself, as well as the mandatory artillery & airsupport. And as such tanks today operate more so in teams alongside other arms for mutual support than ever before, and that is the key difference between tank warfare in WW2 and now.

 

Yes the scenario is very much theoretical, but that's only because we haven't ever seen two completely equal army's in every way ever square off But that doesn't make the rules it teaches us any less true. It's all math really. You see the quality of your men & equipment and the number you have available not only bears relevance to warfare, it directly influences how it is fought, and that because warfare is based on it. Have you read Sun Tzu?

If everything is equal, the number of men & equipment and the quality of men & equipment (which includes leadership), then the aware defender will always have the advantage;

The advantage of suprise is going to help the attacker initially and probably allow for local success. But the situation now turns around and the aware defender will now possess the tactical advantage because he doesn't have to cover any ground, he doesn't have to create any new supply routes, and he now has to only wait and counter any move made by the attacker. And the only way for the attacker to overcome this advantage then is if he possesses one of the following:

1. Superior men & equipment (Training, Technology or Leadership [Men lead])
2. Superior numbers of men & equipment
3. Element of surprise

But if both sides are completely equal in these areas, as they are in our very much theoritical scenario, and war is already a known possibility by both parties or already in process, well then sorry but the defender is then either going to end up winning or forcing a draw. And I think the consensus amongst most people is that draw for an attacker is the same as loss for an attacker

So while it probably hasn't ever happened and probably will not ever happen either, that two armies completely equal in every way will ever face off against each other, the above rules still very much applies to warfare and how it is fought. And it all boils down to the fact that Leadership, Technology & Numbers all matter in a war.

The thing I forgot to mention in my original comment however was awareness, which I had implied with "everything is equal" but not clearly stated. Cause without awareness a defender, despite having the same quality & number of troops & equipment will certainly not fair well against the attacker atleast initially. But it depends on the state of awareness the defender is in.

 

Tanks were invented to break the trinity of trench, machine gun and artillery. Its role is to be the bullie of the battlefield, their intended victims are trucks, clercks, HQ staffs and enemy resverses. The minimum capability required of tanks is not antitank firepower, it is the ability to move deep behind the MLR. The antitank requirement only came when tanks were used to stop other tanks from acomplishing that mission. A tank without the ability to exploit--Tiger B for example--is a waste of resources.

The existence of modern MBTs proved that antitank firepower is not the first requirement of a tank. Was it not the point of MBTs to have a heavy tank's firepower and shock in a package that made no compromises in mobility and operational range? Another example: if antitank ability is the first priority in tank design, then why didn't the US manufacture Conquerors exclusively and the Soviets T-10s?

Btw. your order of tank design priority only agreed with GB's philsophy. In Israel, they have only two criteras for tank design, firepower and protected mobility. In France, firepower is first but mobility precedes armored protection until the current gen. of LeClerks. The US Army's doesn't follow this scheme at all: when the Abrams was designed the priority was battle field suveilance, target aquisition, crew survivability and then mobility and armor in equal measures.

 

I think Jaeger was far more succinct than my reply would have been. I'll just add that you also need to factor in training and quality of the equipment.

SSDasReich-
Have you read Otto Carius' Tigers in the Mud? He talks about his time in Jagdtigers. The guns did not have optics and they could not maintain boresight during a return trip from the gunnery range. Several of his crews were inexperienced and fled during battle, exposing their rear armor, resulting in their destruction. So, as great as the 12.8cm seems on paper-- there are other factors...

You do buy, and read, history books for your library, right?

 

Then I don't understand your contention that tank-killing is the first mission of tanks. The defender were not obliged at all to use tanks. Antitank firepower and sheer armored protection is far less important for a force in defensive posture than say position and mobility. Whereas the attackers need to fight both AT and armored threats at the same time.
I believe that in North Africa, mines and antitank guns accounted for a larger percentage of tank losses than any single weapon. What does that imply about a gun that sacreficed HE capability for AP performance?

Why, indeed, the British were considered to have committed a major blunder in only equipping their cruiser tanks with AP rounds?

In fact, what sparked this dicussion is not the design perimeters of a tank. Your contention is that the primary role of tanks on the battlefield is to kill other tanks. That is what I disagrees with and I affraid 9 out of 10 tankers would not side with you in that issue.

 

The Jagdtiger certainly had gun optics, infact it had great gun optics, and the way they were connected to the gun meant no risk of a loss of zero. The optics were WZF. 2/1 & 2/7 with 10x magnification. The combination was lethally accurate, and Jagdtiger units frequently achieved hits at ranges as great 4km. In one incident on April 9th 1945 a couple of Jagdtigers from s.Pz.Jäg.Abt.512 managed to engage an entire Allied collumn of Sherman tanks and trucks from long range, managing to knock out 11 of the Shermans and destroy roughly 30 trucks and other soft skinned vehicles. Several of the Shermans were hit and knocked out at a range of over 4000m.

Best book on the Jagtiger available, and the place I get my information from is Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development * Production * Operations by Thomas L. Jentz, Walter J. Spielberger & Hilary Doyle.

 

It seems strange that in this general Firepower, mobility, armour protection, my dad is stronger than your dad arguement, armchair arguement that nobody points to the early successes of the Heer with inferior tanks to that of French and British. They won due to the comms fitted in the vehicles, the training and application of their armoured divisions.

Much in the same way that the modern MBT's have a battlefield managment system, that allow for the tankies to know the exact position of friendly units, and to enact new information and orders in an instant AND to let the Warthogs to rip open enemy tanks so that they can manouvre at will.

 

That the British allowed themselves to be lured into well prepared AT gun traps was a tactical mistake and shouldn't have happened in the first place. And the lack of effective range of the British guns also proved a major problem.

That was also a major blunder. Cause while the AP capability is more important, the HE capability is still crucial. And like I've already explained just because you have the no.1 requirement covered, that doesn't mean you can leave out the rest, cause if you do you're gonna end up with a vehicle helpless in certain situations.

I don't think so, and neither does the US, British, German or Russian millitary.

Tanks usually go into battle with a round loaded in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time incase of an encounter. The US doctrine calls for this round to be a Kinetic Energy Anti Tank round. Why do you think that is Triple C?

And according to the British military:
The primary role of tanks is to deal with any hostile armored force vehicles that are encountered.

 

It's always easy to tarr the vanquished in failed battles as incompetents who failed to implement the correct doctrine or paradigm instead examining the soundess of the doctrine. That and tank-on-tank wasn't how the British defeat the German panzers in El Alamein, not how the Americans won in El Guetarr, and sure as hell not how the Wehrmacht made it to the outskirts of Moscow. I am rather piqued by the British FM however.

FM 17-15 Table of Contents

The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy. The platoon's ability to move, shoot, communicate, and provide armored protection is a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends, and performs other essential tasks to support the company team or troop mission. In accomplishing its assigned missions, the platoon uses fire, maneuver, and shock effect, synchronized with other maneuver elements and with combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets. When properly supported, it is capable of conducting sustained operations against any sophisticated threat.

Does Deep Battle, Blitzkrieg or Air-Land Battle ring any bells?

 

In Africa Rommel used his smaller number of Panzers to lure Allied armour into well prepared AT gun traps. He used guns with great AT performance to deal with his enemy's tanks. And that because he didn't have near as many tanks as the Allies, so he wanted to take special care of the ones he had. And because at the time the 5cm L/60 armed Pz.III was his best armed tank, and against a Matilda the 5cm L/60 wasn't very effective, and far from it when you could see your enemy from over 5km away.

By the time the British stopped falling for the lures anymore the Germans got upgunned panzers, such as the 7.5cm L/43 equipped Pz.IV F2, which was very well suited for long range tank engagements, and superior to any Allied tank in the theater. But they were few in numbers, and even alongside all the other tanks available the Allies still outnumbered Rommel in tanks by almost 3 to 1. And in the end Rommel couldn't prevent his panzer from getting into head to head clashes with Allied armour, fierce tank battles developing in both battles of El Alamein. The Panzers gave good account of themselves in these battles, inflicting great losses to Allied armour for less in return, but it was never enough to negate the Allied advantage in numbers and their eventual reign of the airspace. So in the end the Axis forces were overrun and ended up having most their men & equipment captured, and the war in Africa was over for good.


Now regarding Blitzkrieg;

In Blitzkrieg tanks are most definitely expected to clash with enemy tanks, and they did again, and again and again and again during the long march towards Moscow. Blitzkrieg calls for tanks being the very spearhead of the attack, breaching the enemy lines, cutting enemy supply and communication lines, isolating enemy positions into pockets and having infantry follow suit behind to secure the areas and deal with these pockets.

 

You said "again and again and again and again" in referring to German tanks clashing with Soviet tanks on the way to Moscow but just how many "agains" do you want to add to all those "agains " you mentioned about when German Panzers avoided Soviet Armored formations and conducted breakthroughs & encirclements during which they were having to deal with infantry,AT guns & artillery ???

I agree tanks have to be able to deal with tanks to a degree but they have to deal with targets requiring good HE far more often. Let's put this more into perspective and let's agree for the sake of argument the 8.8cm/71 or 12.8cm/55 are the best guns . The problem you have is that to put that powerful of a gun onto a vehicle with proper armor & mobility you get a vehicle that's extremely large ,ackward, and still has an armament that's predicated to dealing with one type of target. A large vehicle such as the Tiger may have good TATICAL mobility, on paper least, say a decent road speed but may have lousy STRATEGIC mobility since it can only use the strongest of bridges while the mobile type bridges the US/Allied engineers used probably lack the capacity to handle a very large tank. Also just how hard would it be to get a Tiger I, Tiger II or M6 ashore at Normandy? How much more fuel does a large vehicle use? In using large tanks one may have to devote far more logistical assets to keep them going.

 

A minor correction.

Momentum = mass * velocity so kg*m/s