Biological Fugo's

I am not saying that historicaly an increase of the fugo program wasn't problematic. It should be understood though, that luck played a role on both sides of the fugo equation and the balloons did achieve a measured amount of success.

It is accepted that about 10% of the balloons launched by Japan reached North America, which is consistant with the Japanese expectations. The fugo program in the IJN incorporated launching the balloons from submarines which would have been radio tracked and remotely detonated.

Due to the US desire to keep the attacks secreted from the Japanese, the Japanese were prevented from attaining the data which would have allowed them to improve on the platform. Simply put once the balloons were launched the Japanese didn't know where they went.

The Japanese Scientist- Oishi Wasaburo- was the first to discover and track the Jet Stream in the late 20's and continued to study it through WW2. So, it would stand to reason that Japan may have known more about the Jet Stream than anyone else.

A cost comparison of the Balloon bombs. If we assume the cost of each balloon was $100.00 that would make the cost of the project +/- $1,000,000.00. That $1,000,000.00 investment caused the redirection of 4 Canadian and 4 US fighter squadrons along the west coast of the US and Canada as well as the diversion of a a battalion of Parachute infantry; not to mention the cost of the B-29 raids against the Hydrogen production plants and the resources used to ascertain where the balloons were comming from.

If a very few things had happened differently I honestly think the Fugos would not be relagated to obscurity: If the US did not have access to a comprehensive database of the world's beach sand, If the attacks were not censored, if the Japanese had used water instead of sand for ballast....etc. etc.

Had the Japanese known that the balloons were reaching the target (The US) and had the US not been able to discover the launch sites and destroy the Hydrogen production facilities; I think it is feasible to assume the Japanese would have developed the fugos to a point where they could be used to deliver biological weapons.

Be as contrary as you like; but, the response to the fugos was much greater than the expense. Do you really think that the Allied response to 300 bombs (Using a number you're comfortable with) is proportionate? If the potential for destruction/ confusion was not that great then why weren't they just ignored?

 

I pretty much agree with this although the measure of success was awfully small.

It's accepted that that is a reasonable estimate and from what I've read the number is likely to be higher rather than lower but that's quibbling with respect to the points we both are discussing.

But how extensive could the navy plan have been? How many could a sub carry and how many subs did they have? Note that the US thought that they might be launching from subs and would have been looking for them pretty quick if this indeed was the case.

But if the US hadn't kept it secrect how much more would the Japanese have really known? They launched a bunch of balloons over a considerable period of time and some reached the US. They wouldn't have necessarily known which launch for instance.

That does indeed appear to be the case from my readings as well. However it's not clear just how much they did know about it particularly away from Japan.

That can however be misleading. The US had assets to spare and so there was no problem covering this with the above. Were the hydrogen plants even targeted because of the balloon program or would they have been targeted anyway? A weapon that relies on ones opponent over reacting in order to have any appreciable pay off is rather problematic in my mind.

If the family that was killed had been killed by one of the first launches then you are correct the program wouldn't have been relegated to obscurity as there would have been more publicity and knowledge of it. I'm not at all convinced it would have been any more effective but that's another matter.

Perhaps but it's not likely that they would have been at all efficient in doing so.

The response was in part that great because the US had the resources to waste on it. It's not clear Japan had the resources to waste on their end. The US was worried about biologicals and that was clearly part of the equation. However I have never contended that the response looking on it with 20:20 hindsight was overkill. My position was and is that there was little that the Japanese could have done to make this projcect more worth while. Furthermore you have said that I was wrong on a number of occasions and you have yet to support that contention, this latest missive hardly does so.

 

Japanese had plans to, and infact did, install hydrogen generation plants on at least 2 submarines. However it was not the quantity of balloons a sub could carry; but, the tracking and remote detonation capabilities the IJN Balloons had. Theorretically a sub could surface, launch a half dozen balloons, resubmerege to track them and then remote detonate them.

The Germans got a great deal of feed back from the BBC in the accuracy of their V1 &2's.

I think with a few tweaks it could have been a bigger pain in the a** than it was. In the end it boiled down to the use was answering the paper balloon campaign with aluminum and steel.

 

??? I would think the number that they could carry would be a significant restraint. Just where there launch point was would of course be signficiant but you are looking at weeks to get from Japan to the launch point I assume. Also the closer they get to the US the more dangerous it is for the sub. Given the duration of the trips and then numbers of subs available was this likely to be a serious threat?

A couple of points here.
1) The time of flights and time from impact to discovery were much shorter. Thus it was easier to tell which launch was being reported.
2) BBC reports were in some cases deliberately misleading the allowed the British to draw off the aim of the Germans. The US could easily have used a similar approach.

Probably correct especially as it wasn't much of a pain in the first place.

 

Japanese subs were able to get close enough to the west coast on a few occaisions to fire their deck guns at shore targets. Considering the nature of balloons it wouldn't take a sub being very far out of the water or very close to land to launch an 'attack'.
As far as the seriousness of the threat that would all depend on what they managed to hit with them or if the attacks were just meant to confuse, disrupt or reallocate defense forces. You get 5 or 10 subs launching 10 - 20 balloons over a few days to a week and it's going to disrupt things, especially if it's near a populated area. The Doolittle Raid was intended to prove that the Japanese Home islands were 'touchable' causing a significan reallocation of Japanese defense resources even though the impact of the bombing was not that significant.

Both are valid points; but, the key is that the Germans were able to utilize the information and make adjustments, even though the reports were misleading, which lead to repeated attacks in less populated areas. You could look at the Balloon attacks as being a 'shot gun' and the V1&2's being more of a dart.

I think that is due to the War Department not underestimating the potential the fugos presented; a broken clock only has to be correct twice a day.

 

Or not. Remember the balloons were apparently detectable on radar. If they spot them going up that often then there's going to be a lot of pressure on the subs and a very good chance ASW aircraft will catch them on the surface. Then there's the whole question of the time line. The balloon launches didn't start until Fall of 44. How long does it take to revive the navy program and get it up to the point where it can conduct these attacks? At that point how many long range subs did the Japanese have left?

And my points were two:
1) The information on balloon landings is a lot less useful to the Japanese even without misleading info.
2) Misleading info could potentially lessen the already low probability of doing any significant damage

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Or not.

 

Theoretically the balloons could stay under Radar if they were launched close to the as they wouldn't be reiant on the Jet Stream for propulsion.
IF there had been less competition between the IJN and IJA Fugo programs it would have been a more a matter of 'building upon' than reviving.
The Japanese had a couple of the I-4oo's and a couple of the other larger "Air Craft Carrier" subs that were either enroute to or lurking in the Canal Zone.

How would information about the landings be less useful to the Japanese? Any information broadcast in the clear would have told the Japanese that the balloons were reaching the US. Remember the Japanese had been researching and mapping the Jet Stream sine the mid 20's; any information they received would have been beneficial.

 

If they were off shore a significant distance they might have been able to stay under the radar as far as shore instalations were concerned (that's without ducting). On the otherhand that would mean that they would have a hard time clearing the coastal range. Might not be much of a problem if they were attacking LA or San Diego though. It would be a problem if they were attacking Oregon or Washington. It would also mean that the balloons would be at the mercy of surface winds which are less prictable although you do get the off shore on shore effect due to differential cooling/heating.

That's a huge if. The Japanese army and navy didn't play well together on a huge number of projects. This requires a POD that predates the war by years if not decades.

I wasn't aware that any were "luriking" in the Canal Zone. Lets see what Combined fleet says. From and linked pages:
Japanese Submarines
Looking at their air craft capable subs:
Type A1 (I9, I10, and I11) all sunk by Aug 1944
Type A2 (I12) lost Jan 1945
Type A mod (I-13 and I-14) These are both availble during the period in question.
Type B-1 (20 in class) all but 4 sunk before Aug 1944 1 of those is sunk in Oct 1944 and 2 more in Nov 1944
Type B-2 (6 in class) 3 sunk before mid 44 1 sunk in Oct 44, 1 in Nov 44, 1 April 45
Type B-3 (I-54, I-56, I-58) I-54 is sunk Oct 44, I-56 Sunk April 45
I-400 class (I-400, I-401, and I-402) The first two aren't completed until Dec of 44 and Jan 45 not sure when they are operational the third isn't completed until July of 45
Since the balloon bomb attacks didn't start until Nov 44 that leaves I-13, I-14, 1 B-1, 1 B-2, I-56, I-58, and possibly I-400 and I-401. 6-8 subs.

Useful yes. Less useful certainly. If the Germans launched some V-1's or V-2's and BBC noted their landing locations then the Germans have a pretty good idea that it was the ones they launched that day. Furthermore they know where they were targeted and while the CEP for those weapons was fairly large they can assume that one that hit say the greater London metro area was indeed targeted there. The Japanese on the other hand launch balloons for several days in a row. Did the one that was say found floating in the straits of Jaun De Fuca from a launch 3 days ago or even two days ago or did it date back to a launch a week ago or perhaps 10 days or so. Even if it's noted that say a balloon bomb went off. Did the bomb detonate as it was suppose to or was it found days after landing and detonated at that point? As for studying the Jet Stream since the 20's we've been studying it a lot longer now with better equipment and over a wider area and it is still far from predictable. Watch the weather reports and see some of the huge bulges and curves that form and move across the US.

 

No, the Japanese did not have any aircraft carrying submarines near the Panama Canal or enroute to it.

The Panama Canal attack was scrubbed while the submarine force was still training for the attack. After the mission's cancellation other suitable targets, such as San Francisco or Los Angeles, were suggested, but any Seiran attacks would cause, at best, very minimal damage(due to the small number of aircraft taking part in the attack. Before any planning to attack the aforementioned American cities coalesced, the planning was overtaken more matters of more importance to the continuing Japanese war effort.

Japanese Naval GHQ had decided that the vast naval base at Ulithi posed much more of a threat to Japan than the American cities, so they changed the submarine attack force's target from America to Ulithi. The attack on Ulithi was a two phase plan that consisted of a recon/kamikaze run by planes launched from the submarines I-13 & I-14(Operation Hikari/"light"), followed by the final kamikaze attacks by I-400 & I-401(Operation Arashi/"storm")

Formerjughead, this is the attack/s you are thinking of. The war ended while these Japanese submarines were getting in position to attack, not the Panama Canal, but Ulithi. Of the four submarines, only I-13 was sunk enroute to the target.

 

That's what happens when you have the History channel on in the back ground while you talk to the voices in your head.

I dunno, float a couple of dozen Fugos over San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, Portland or Seattle and it would cause a stir.

 

A stir yes. But I'm not convinced you'd get a couple dozen over those cities. Even if you did delivering the load via the onboard plane would probably be more efficient. Certainly the pilot and plane cost more but the delivery would be much more precise and controled.

 

The Panama Canal attack was conceived in 1943 by Captain Chikao Yamamoto, Chief of Operations Section and Commander Yasuo Fujimori, Submarine Staff Officer of the Naval General Staff. They consulted with Rear Admiral Ariki Katayama on redesigning the I-13 class and I-400 class to carry more aircraft. Because of this, they were well aware that the submarines would not be ready until 1945 to carry out such an attack. As such, the final plan was not submitted for approval until early May, 1945. As originally planned, the aircraft were to return and be recovered by the submarines, however Vice Admiral Onishi had decided that the attack should be a Kamikaze mission. This caused a rift to open between the aircrew and their superior officers, not because they had been "volunteered" for a suicide mission, but because they superior officers had kept this fact from the aircrew out of fear it would disrupt their training.

The switch to west coast American cities was made by Captain Shojiro Iura, Chief Staff Officer of Sixth Fleet, and friend of Captain Tatsunosuke Ariizumi(CO of the Seiran unit). This switch was done for several reasons, such as, delays in producing the Seiran floatplanes, a response to the US incendiary bombing of Japanese cities, and concerns about the airworthyness of the Seiran & it's ability to hit the pinpoint targets. This plan was approved by Vice Admiral Tadashige Daigo, Commander in Chief of Sixth Fleet, and passed on for approval by Naval GHQ.

The plan, as it was, was formally killed by Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff. He saw that the attacks were too little and too late to have any effect on the war. However, an attack on the US fleet at Ulithi had the possibility of inflicting great damage. Such an attack might bring a brief respite to the hard pressed Japanese forces. Thus came about the final change in targets.

Source: Amazon.com: I-400 Japan's Secret Aircraft-Carrying Strike Submarine - Objective Panama Canal (9781902109459): Henry Sakaida, Gary Nila, Koji Takaki: Books
This is an excellent book for anyone interested in the I-400 class.

 

Oh good grief, balloons are silent and don't need to return to the ship. It's not an issue of accuracy as the attacks are psychological and not tactical or strategic in nature; even though there may be tactical or stategic ramifications.

 

An attack on a major population center by a dirty bomb/chemical/biological weapon would have caused a bit more than a stir I think. The US was the only major combatent that saw no serious battle on or over its land. The American attitude at this point was we know we will win, lets get this over with. Such an attack would harden opinion in the US.

The Japanese surrender might have gone along like this,

Japanese Foriegn Office: " We would like to surrender unconditionally now"

US State Department: " Please Hold, all our represenatives are currenty helping other customers right now. Your call is very important to us and will be answered just as soon as we finish turning all your cities into glowing radioactive embers. Thank you and have a pleasent day!

 

Allo, dis is Peggy wid de surrender help line, what kine of prolem are you experieinceing wid you surrender?

 

Oh no! Not Peggy, that would be too cruel!

 

Planes don't need to return to the ship either. Both are visible on radar and optically the balloons probably have a bigger signature. Furthermore the planes can make use of cloud cover to hide from intercepts. A balloon that lands in the Ocean or in the desert or on top of a mountain or in a dense forest has no impact. I suspect that the planes could actually be launched quicker than the balloons as well. Indeed now that I think about it there are significant problems launching a paper balloon from the deck of a submarine.

 

You need to look at how the thread has progressed. The IJN balloon program incorporated radio tracking and remote detonation. The use of a submarine would allow the balloons to be launched from a platform that was near enough populated areas that the chances of it detonating un noticed would be minimal. As far as planes being more stealthy than an airplane when is the last time you were interupted by a balloon passing over head at night?

The intention of the fugos was not to attack significant targets. They were intended to disrupt, and instill fear in, the civillian population; hopefully bringing about the same response in the US that the Doolittle raid had on Japan/Tokyo.

I am thinking that using the water tight hangers, used to house the aircraft, several balloons could be launched in the same amount of time as it would take to prepare and launch a plane. Historically the fugos created more casualties than the submarine launched sea planes, which tells me that the fugos were more successful in attacking the US mainland than planes.

No cruel would be balloon bombs carrying lap girraffes that had explosives strapped to them.

 

Ah ha!, your cover is blown! You were no Marine, Baloon bombs, carring lap giraffes, with explosives strapped to them is clearly the thinking of an ex-CIA man. That or your well into your second pitcher of Bloody Mary's