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British Covenantor in North Africa

Discussion in 'North Africa: Western Desert Campaigns 1940 to Ope' started by Vince Noir, Mar 4, 2007.

  1. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    As with everything so far brought to the fore, Facts presented (such as they may be) could have two very different interpretations. I could see a decision to place all the Covenanter's sent to North Africa into a repair training facility due to their small numbers. Or it could be that in a image (granted a small slice of area) one quarter of all vehicles present are of the very few units ever sent there, are there because their breakdown rate exceeds others visible in the image.

    If the "official" written record of the Covenanter is that it was substandard design that bordered upon being a scandal for its production run, then in my humble opinion the burden is upon those who claim it is unfairly maligned to offer conclusive proof to the contrary.

    So far we only have scattered anecdotal stories, some of it clearly in error, that it wasn't all that bad compared to other types of the period or some inconclusive accounts of very limited combat use, none of which is terribly convincing.

    Clearly no one in a position of authority was prepared to send this tank into battle. Granted they may have been fools, or idiots, or even corrupt, but the more likely and reasonable explanation is that they being far closer to the situation than we ever could hope to be, concluded that to do so would have been a grave disservice to the British serviceman.

    Sometimes a cigar, is only a cigar.
     
  2. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    As the evidence is mounting up, it's starting to become clearer that there was nothing particularly wrong with the Covenanter, at least in comparison with its peers.

    The only difference between the Covenanter and the Crusader was that in mid-'41, the Covenanter had one identified problem, whereas the Crusader had a plethora of unidentified problems.

    Therefore, the Crusader got to go into battle. If the Covenanter had gone instead, I doubt it would have done any worse. It might even have done better.
     
  3. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    I should point out at this juncture that the "evidence" that the Covenanter suffered from persistent cooling problems consists of this single quote from David Fletcher's "Crusader and Covenanter Cruiser Tanks 1939-45":

    Actually, Fletcher is wrong. Photographic evidence suggest precisely the opposite. Photographs of Mk.II, Mk.III and Mk.IV from April 1942 onwards suggest that all Covenanters had only one type of radiator louvre cover. This one here:

    View attachment 19486

    (Click all photos to enlarge)

    There was only one previous type of louvre cover, this one for the Mk.I:

    View attachment 19487

    There is no evidence that the louvre cover was changed to improve cooling. It seems more likely it was beefed-up to improve protection.

    The only photographic evidence of a plethora of louvre covers on display all date from the same event - an exercise in August 1941 by the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers:

    View attachment 19488

    It's not known why these covers are different, but suggestions are that it was simply due to a lack of castings, or some sort of trial was being undertaken. However, this selection of louvre cover types is entirely untypical.
     

    Attached Files:

  4. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    Actually - we have distinctly more courtesy of the NZ OH.... which we'd have to regard as more reliable than the anecdotal material...regarding the heavy daily training use the 19th's two Covenanters survived for seven months before being worn out! ;)

    While I greatly respect Fletcher as an author...and STILL do, he still contributes very regularly to Classic Military Vehicle magazine in the UK...where he's VERY ready to re-address issues that he got wrong earlier in his career due to lack of evidence, incorrect identification etc.! Unlike many authors...it's worth noting that "his" Official History is a conflation of the testing/development history of the Covenanter and its experience in training service...

    ..whereas the New Zealand official History by definition is ONLY concerned with its brief service in NZ hands.

    And the notable difference between the two is the lack of any mention of faults with the Covenanter - and in fact it seems to have afforded the 19th Armd. Regt. sterling service in a desert environment for many months!

    So exactly how much is Fletcher's account coloured by his knowledge and opinions of the development and testing issues with the Covenanter? (or the opinions of his former boss at Bovvie, the equally-legendary and legendarily-opinionated George Forty? ;) )

    As the 1942 reliability tests would indicate, the later "operational" Covenanter seems to have been a very different beast from any problem-ridden development hacks or prototypes!


    Regarding THIS -

    ...remember what Peter Brown's article notes about the Covenanter's production numbers vs. other Cruiser production 1940-41-42 - it filled only a fraction of what the British government wanted/needed. Building the Covenanter got SOMETHING out there and into tank crews' oily mitts...at a time when the the War Ministry was having to equip armoured regiments with "I" tanks (as well as the army tank brigades they were intended for!) just to get the units formated and out there!

    See Postan's British War Production for more details on this.

    Essentially - we got 3, maybe, 4 years' training use out of the Covenanter when we needed SOMETHING to train on. We had nothing else; what we COULD...what we SHOULD... have been using to train tankers in the UK in 1941/42/43 we'd sent to North Africa at the end of the summer of 1940! The old cruisers, the Cruiser MkIIs and MkIVs used up, worn out and lost in North Africa, Greece etc.? THEY should have spent their venerable years trundling round the North York Moors, not Covenanters!
     
  5. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    Without question use in the Training brigades must be counted as a net positive and I will give some credit there, but it was intended to be a bargain basement combat tank and its faults seem to bear this out. If the units available by early 1942 and sent to North Africa were glitch free, it does not mitigate that by this time it size and armament made it unsuitable for combat use in its original intended role.

    Nor is it inconceivable that the 10-12 Covenater's sent to and used by 19th Armoured Regt. might have been units given extensive TLC to ensure those sent were of the best quality rather than an average unit. Such things have happened before. It is also note worthy that these tanks were employed in the same task they preformed in England, training, not combat. I take it that when this unit took up combat operations the Covenanter's were replaced with other types.

    I still submit that they were never sent into battle despite considerable numbers is telling. Can anyone offer an explanation for this if the Covenanter was as good or better than those sent to North Africa or Russia?
     
  6. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    Only two were received by the 19th, and one Crusader.

    If you read the OH section...they received at least one Sherman after a time - the one that accidently destroyed the Crusader! Then a month or two before their training was complete received a handful more Shermans...than a further 19 when they were made operational.

    HOWEVER - I wouldn't mitigate this against the Covenanter alone - when British and Commonwealth forces made the jump to Italy, a lot of the tanks they'd previously used in North Africa were left there.

    The important datum here is that they weren't regarded as obsolete for combat in European conditions until late 1942 (or early 1943!) As training tanks in the UK, they'd have been used in combat in 1941 or even 1942 IF the Germans had invaded (yes, it was STILL anticipated in 1942...)

    In other words - an operational, combat"worthy"-until-judged-obsolete tank type was kept in the UK in a potential DUAL role.

    Plus the numbers weren't THAT considerable when measured against the numbers of cruisers etc. that the British government thought it needed! See Peter Brown's article...
     
  7. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    I think there are two issues here.

    The first is whether the Covenanter, as it has been alleged up to now, was kept out of combat because it was catastrophically unreliable. I think the evidence is pointing more and more away from this.

    The second issue is whether, even if it were totally reliable, it was a combat-worthy tank. To this I would say that it would only have been combat-worthy in its intended role for about 8-10 months from its introduction into units between February and April 1941. It was during this period that it was at its least reliable, but I think it would have been OK in a home defence role. By the time it had become as reliable as its peers, sometime in early 1942, it had stopped being a competitive cruiser tank, didn't have the Crusader's capacity for limited upgrade, and therefore was essentially a state-of-the-art light reconnaissance tank. This role was already occupied in the desert by the well-proven M3 Stuart, and so to a great extent the Covenanter was surplus to requirements for combat duties.

    So was it combat worthy? Possibly. Was it necessary? No, not in a combat role. However, there was a desperate need for training tanks. This was a period when, during exercises, soldiers on bicycles waving flags were used to imitate enemy tanks - that's how desperate the home requirement was.
     
  8. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    Don Juan I can almost completely agree here, my quibble is in calling the Covenanter a "state of the art" light recce tank in 1942-43. Indeed it is questionable to call it state of the art even when it was on the drawing boards in 1939, but I will concede that as a light recce tank it could/might have been reasonably useful, but of course we will never know for sure.

    I would submit that the M3 Stuart likely was not simply well proven but overall better suited for the role of a light recce tank as it was designed for such a task and it did earn the name "Honey" from her British crews in affection for it reliability. This does tend to imply that they had some mounts before that fell short of such affection in this regard.

    phylo, I think you are reaching here, but I have to admire your loyalty to the Covenanter.

    You infer that this tank was wasn't obsolete for use in Europe until 1942/43, but I presume was for North Africa. Was Germany going to use different tanks in Europe?

    The Covenanter remained in service simply because there was no realistic threat to it after winter 1940/41. While a German invasion was theoretically possible, in real terms it had about as much likelihood as someone winning the lottery jackpot. After June 22nd, 1941 the threat was even less real (one could say by late spring, early summer as Britain was warning Stalin about a imminent attack on the SU).

    For all intents and purposes the Covenanter fleet in England serving in line units was still doing the same thing it did in the training brigades, training. I believe some units did go overseas, but without their "Covies" who were left behind. By late 1942 and early 1943 Britain could provide enough modern tanks though her own production and American Lend-Lease that they could shed the pretense that Covenanter was a capable battle tank and officially relegate them to training only.
     
  9. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    Belasar - I agree the M3 was the better tank. It also had a better level of armour protection IIRC - I think 51mm against the 40mm of the Covenanter.

    From further research I've posted on AHF, it may be the case that what kept the Covenanter out of the front line in 1941 was production shortages of the armoured radiator louvre covers - lots of tanks can be seen with temporary plate covers as late as October 1941. If this was the case, then the extent of the problem with the cooling becomes irrelevant to an extent.

    The Covenanter was "in service" in 1941, but there weren't enough of these critical components to allow it to be sent to the front.
     
  10. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake Member

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    Phylo.

    Re 1 Ah one of the great phrases of our time: "with the greatest of respect".....

    Re 2. Maybe, but not enough for a desperate British or Red army to consider using them in battle. The reliability test used two vehicles which may or may not have been typical of the tank, which clearly never satisfied the British Army or the Soviets.

    Re 3 The Coventor entered service in 1941 and wasn't any improvement on the A9.10 and 13. By 1942 the Covenentor and the Crusader had been overtaken by the M3, Pz III and Pz IV and lacked the reliability or potential to be developed further. The point that David Fletcher made throughout "The Great Tank Scandel" is that Britain made a rotten job of building tanks during the first half of WW2. It would have been better to have closed down the production of the Covenentor and used the production resources to bring a tank into production which was reliable and could carry a 75mm+ gun. 200 Centurions in service by D Day would be a good swap for a tank park of 2000 un battle-worthy Covenentors.
     
  11. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    Again, we need to differentiate the points being made. Fletcher et al. alleged that the Covenanter was unusually unreliable due to extreme problems with the cooling circuit. I think it's clear now that wasn't the case.

    On the other hand, was the Covenanter otherwise an unambitious design that offered little improvement on its predecessors? On the whole, yes.

    The problem with the Covenanter was that it was built to an unambitious specification. However, as far as I can tell, and contrary to the received view, it was built to that unambitious specification fairly well.

    Any argument that better tanks could have been built has nothing to do with the quality of the Covenanter. That has everything to do with the pre-war (Tory) government.
     
  12. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake Member

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    I don't think that is so except in your own mind. David Fletcher, as the official historian gave the explanation of why the vehicle was not considered suitable by the Army for operational use overseas. It is likely that this opinion was based on more than just the initial trial report. The evidence of a couple of machines in a trial or in a training establishment in Cairo does not overturn that this historic fact. Nor do the reminiscences of veterans trained on the type before they had any benchmarks for comparison. If you wish to demonstrate that the problems were solved and Fletcher et al have misrepresented the reliability of the vehicle it would take a thorough trawl of Kew to establish the verdict of the RAC and REME on Covenentor in service in the UK. There will be periodic reports on serviceability and mechanical problems experienced, as there are for equipment used by the RA

    My own brief exploration of the serviceability of the RMASG Centaur in the break out from Normandy is an example of how the failure to examine all the data can lead to erroneous conclusions.
     
  13. Don Juan

    Don Juan New Member

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    Yes, I'm very keen to do exactly that thing.

    I'm not sure that Fletcher really did much research on operational experience as he states in his "Crusader and Covenanter Cruiser Tanks 1939-45" that he is using photographic evidence of the louvre covers to ascertain that the cooling problems weren't solved. This doesn't strike me as being evidence that he trawled through service reports.

    "The Great Tank Scandal" doesn't contain a single reference to a primary source by which we can check his assertions. He even asserts that the commander's hatch on the Covenanter could decapitate crew members! I would like to see proof of that.

    Ultimately, our discussion is basically boiling down to the fact that you think David Fletcher is infallible while I think the opposite. There's no point continuing it, so I'm going to end it here. You quite rightly state that I need to amass more evidence, so that is what I'm going to do. It may be that the evidence shows that Fletcher was right all along, it might prove the opposite. So, researching I will go!
     
  14. phylo_roadking

    phylo_roadking Member

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    Arguably - in late 1940 and 1941 the "desperate" British were at least as desperate about Home Defence as they were about events in the Western Desert ;)

    Do we know they were offered to the Soviets? Or is that an assumption because they didn't use them?

    Also...think numbers as Peter Brown notes. The Covenanter total production numbers were small compared to the cruiser numbers the government wanted...were we going to give any away? DID we give any cruisers to the Soviets???

    And also...dates ;) by the time Covenanter production was in full swing, with the Mk IIIs alongside the MkIVs...we were keeping Matilda production going at the request of the Soviets anyway! They wanted a tankthey liked that was proven in Russian conditions I.E. more of the same despite the fact that the British thought it obsolete!

    Yes - with a great deal of that being because he's prepared to revisit and update earlier efforts and work...

    The point was LMSR were building the Covenanter...allowing Vickers Armstrong to build something else ;) A net increase in numbers available. Just the same as the Air Ministry did with aircraft...

    Lead time. Same bugbear as aircraft too ;) Those various projects (and the occasional deadend) were already underway - and as such there was no way that stopping LMSR/EE producing the Covenanter in 1941 or 1942 would allow them to design their OWN equivalent of the Cromwell/Comet/Centurion lineage and have it fielded BEFORE those.

    That's one of the things that only trawling through Kew or Bovvie would show up...where in the quite long development and modification-in-series production (don't forget that big chunk of time!) process of the Covenanter this apparent decision was made ;) During the original prototype tsting? The second, with revised transmission/driveline? Production of the MkI...or development of the improvements for later marks....?

    I have a feeling that the date of this alleged decision - and I'd also like to see the precise wording - is going to be very revealing about the history and evolution of the Covenanter.

    Questionable ;) Look at the huge difficulty that Tom is having with turning up the supposed Austin K5 repair issues in the field, for example...

    D-J....check out the various project start dates ;) Would it actually have been expected to be much of an improvement???

    Belesar - I've a feeling that that particular decision wasn't a comparison...more an indication that towards the end of 1942, the British were aware there wasn't going to be a North African front worry about soon!


    I don't want to stray into WI territory....but the British remained worried about the Germans' managing to mount a "snap" invasion in 1941 and early 1942 even after the start of Barbarossa; given that by then they had their dinky little fleet of specifically-designed and built landing vessels of various classes ready and waiting...!
    After all - the Sealion threat came out of nowhere and vanished again in only three months!

    Early 1942 was a dubious time for the British - the first U.S. troops didn't arrive in the UK...to Northern Ireland!...until February IIRC, and in quite small numbers. There was an unfortunate window when a large part of the British Army had been sent aboard to North Africa etc....and the "numbers" at home were in large part accounted for by the various training commands! Home Defence still worried about a fast, two-three division "decapitation" attempt, a fast dash on London of the sort that had preoccupied Gen. Kirke as C-in-C Home Defence in 1939-40!
     

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