British Fire Planning

1ST Chutes · Nov 18, 2011

Nice and concise explaination of how British Artillery Conducted Plans of Fire during WW2.

FIRE PLANNING

4th wilts · Nov 27, 2011

Very good link Chutes.! Thanks,Lee.

Poppy · Nov 27, 2011

Excellent. Lots of info there. Target saturated!...Was wondering about the lethality of the 25 pounder. The lethality area. The lethal area is horizontal to line of fire. Why is that? Would think a bursting round would detonate in a 360 degree pattern. How is it that a spinning round could scatter shrapnel horizontally. Is that a design feature? In order that infantry could advance? ...I'm gonna call that horizontal area "The Phoenix" 'cause the lethality area looks like a bird.

4th wilts · Dec 6, 2011

So,was it the norm to have1 F.O.O.per infantry company,and 1 per Armd Sqn.?Cheers,Lee.

leccy1 · Dec 6, 2011

Poppy said:

Excellent. Lots of info there. Target saturated!...Was wondering about the lethality of the 25 pounder. The lethality area. The lethal area is horizontal to line of fire. Why is that? Would think a bursting round would detonate in a 360 degree pattern. How is it that a spinning round could scatter shrapnel horizontally. Is that a design feature? In order that infantry could advance? ...I'm gonna call that horizontal area "The Phoenix" 'cause the lethality area looks like a bird.
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The pattern changes with the angle the round strikes the ground at.

The subject of safe planning distances needs further explanation. Figure 3 shows the lethality pattern for a 25-pdr HE ground-burst shell with angle of descent 20º and the percentage casualties to men standing in the open around the point of burst of the shell. The likelihood of casualties to men in a 'protective posture' was far less. At higher angles of descent the `butterfly' pattern is less pronounced and the lethal area becomes more circular as it approaches 90º. Outside the `wings' there was still a very small chance of a casualty, obviously this increased as more shells were fired. The safe distances were planning distances providing an acceptably low chance of a casualty, although higher than would be acceptable in peacetime.
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leccy1 · Dec 6, 2011

4th wilts said:

So,was it the norm to have1 F.O.O.per infantry company,and 1 per Armd Sqn.?Cheers,Lee.
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From the same site

Royal Artillery Methods in World War 2

Each troop commander (and BC) had an OP assistant, usually a bombardier although the BC's might be a lance sergeant. By 1942 each party had three radios, one fully integrated in their vehicle, one for FOO manpack and one on the supported infantry or armour net. The last improved situational awareness and enabled the supported arm to indicate targets to a FOO/OPO. If the observer was unable to see the target then the supported arm directed fire via the observer using simplified procedures (giving either corrections or observations). A third observer party could be deployed from resources at the gun position if the battery was up strength. If a troop commander was required to act as an FOO or liaise with the supported arm then the OP assistant would takeover, inevitably this also happened when observers became casualties. In Burma additional observer parties were created often led by warrant officers or sergeants from the battery and it was general practice to rotate officers and soldiers through the battery's OPs when conditions were static, although signalers were rotated more often. In some cases in Burma OP deployment was planned regimentally to ensure optimum coverage in difficult terrain.
The observation officer's duties (whether operating as an OPO or FOO) were:

Observe and report the tactical situation.

Maintain close contact with the supported arm and give required support at the earliest moment.

Direct and control the fire of the allotted guns.

In most types of regiment BCs and troop commanders had an armoured tracked vehicle, the Universal Carrier (Lloyd or Windsor carrier) called an 'Armoured OP' in field batteries. COs in field regiments were equipped with Universal Carriers from mid 1943. However, these Armoured OPs were less than ideal so other armoured vehicles were adopted.
OP tanks were first introduced in 1942, by early 1943 batteries in armoured divisions had 2 OP tanks and one armoured OP, in infantry divisions it was the other way around. Army field regiments had no OP tanks but each tank 'battalion' in tank brigades held 2 tanks for OPs. Other types of vehicle were also adopted including light tanks, armoured cars and M14 half-tracks ('Truck, 15-cwt, half-track' in British terms). In early 1944 the official position was as follows:

SP regiments:- CO - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, BCs - Truck, 15-cwt, half-track with 2 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, GPOs - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (total 13 OP tanks).

Field or RHA Regiments:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets (Inf Div), Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Armd OP 2 wireless sets (Inf Div). A BCs Lt Tk OP could be a Tank OP as an alterative and in Italy one of the Armd OPs would be an armd car.

Medium regiments:- BCs - Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Armd OP 1 wireless set or Armd Car 1 wireless set.

Heavy regiment:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets or Armd Car, Subaltern - Armd OP 2 wireless sets.

In mid 1944 the policy changed again with the decision to remove all heavy AFVs from infantry divisions. SP regiments retained their 13 OP tanks and the other field regiment in an armoured division had 6 for its OPs. They were withdrawn from all other units although Armoured and Tank Brigades held 8 OP tanks.
The basic policy was that OP tanks should be the same type as used by the supported tank unit. However, the policy could not always be followed and in some cases Ram tanks were used (a Canadian design used as the carriage for Sexton SPs but not as a tank in armoured units). Radios were standardised as 2 × No 19 sets and 1 × No 38 set per OP tank and stowage modified for some artillery equipment. In some cases (eg Covenanter, Crusader and Ram) a dummy gun was fitted to permit space for the wirelesses. Apart from dummy guns, the differences between OP tanks and standard control tanks was an additional wireless and stowage for other OP equipment.
The tanks held by Armoured and Tank Brigade HQs were a pool for use by regiments in support (or allocated under command) of these formations. They had RAC crews who were joined by an OP officer and his OPA, unlike the tanks held by RA regiments that were fully crewed by RA (usually the OPO, his OPA, a driver-operator and a driver-mechanic). Armoured divisions also held an OP tank for their CRA. The tanks for GPOs also provided immediate replacements for OPs.
The observers’ basic equipment were binoculars, map, compass and protractor. Manpack OPs became important in some theatres, this was achieved by reinforcing the normal 4 man OP party with 6 'porters' to help carry the 2 wirelesses and associated equipment.
Batteries also held telescopes, tripod mounted stereoscopic binoculars, optical range finders, directors and artillery boards for their OPs, the last 3 to enable 'silent' or 'instrumental' registration. However, such equipment was not always conducive to a well concealed OP and certainly inappropriate for an FOO. The Telescope, Stereoscopic, was tripod mounted (full size or 16 inch) with azimuth and inclination scales and gave ×8 magnification, it was binocular and the binocula tupes could be either vertical to provide a short periscope or horizontal to give enhanced stereoscopic vision.
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4th wilts · Dec 6, 2011

Thanks leccy,I somehow missed this,(not uncommon).

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