Did the Southern Press Have a Negative Effect on the Confederate War Effort?

Were not Lee's "last words" attributed to Colonel William Preston Johnson, whom purportedly "witnessed" Lee's passing.

IIRC, most contemporary publishings on Lee made no mention of his last words. However, Margaret Junkin Preston's poem "Gone Forward" - based on Lee's death and, in part, on Lee's last words, was first published in December, 1870 issue of the New Eclectic. Still, I don't think Lee's last words received notoriety until 1875 when William J. Jones book "Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes, and Letters of Gen.Robert E. Lee" was published, and Mrs. Preston, by now a well known poet, published her poetry book "Cartoons". That being said, it was not until 1935, when Douglas Southall Freeman published his " definitive" multi-volume biography on Robert E. Lee that "Lee's last words" would become cemented in the Lee mythos.

Jones book can be downloaded here: Personal reminiscences, anecdotes, and letters of Gen. Robert E. Lee : Jones, J. William (John William), 1836-1909 : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

If you don't mind reading HTML font, have a go at Freeman's 4 volume series here: Robert E. Lee (The Biography by Douglas Freeman, 1934)

and, finally, "Gone Forward": "Gone Forward." Margaret J. Preston (1820-1897). October 12. James and Mary Ford, eds. 1902. Every Day in the Year: A Poetical Epitome of the World's History

 

Freeman tells the same story....coming home from the vestry meeting, Lee was walking in the rain, and, removing his cape, sat down. Though late for dinner, something he never was, he made no mention when Mrs Lee remarked that he looked "different"...

The end, on October21, is described in Freeman as in other, earlier tomes of Lee....Quiet spoken delirium like musings...."Tell A.P. Hill he MUST come up", etc....Then...."Strike the tent."

Is it possible that this story was embellished by the press, or simply made up in the absence of further proof? It is certainly the manner in which an old warrior SHOULD have died in his bed, reliving old glories, his mind far away with those he fought with....and "Strike the tent" is something worthy of an old soldier too.....


Somehow, I think this yarn has been passed on as idealistic.....it sounds far more likely, given Lee's condition and the type of stroke he suffered, that he was robbed of the power of speech without paralysis....

Depends on that which you wish to beleive, I suppose. I'll favour the less melodramatic version given in 1990. Most likely, it's the one that is researched from original documents....but really, who can say?

Any suggestions from the rogues?

 

I had read the second, 1990 version and actually asked the resident historian at Lee Chapel in Lexington on one of my numerous visits there. I think the visit in question was in 2005. They stick with the original version and say it is supported by primary documentation. For what it's worth.

I have also found it interesting that both Jackson and Lee, purportedly, referred to A.P.Hill in on their death beds.

 

Volga wrote:

His power of speech had returned to him shortly after whatever attack he had. (I remember years ago that a Cardiologist/amatuer Civil War historian had an article in one of the Civil War periodicals, and speculated that it could have been a heart attack, or some other coronary condition and the treatment by his physicians led to heart failure).

His doctors, H. T. Barton and R. L. Madison, had arrived shortly after the attack, having been summoned. While removing his outer clothing Lee remarked: "You hurt my arm," he said, and pointed to the shoulder that had long been paining him." From Freeman.

The next day Freeman states this:
"The attendants' questions he understood and would answer. His replies were monosyllables, but his family explained that he always was silent in sickness."

Now his attack, whatever it was had occured on 28 September. On October 8th, again from Freeman, "He still talked very little, and once, when Agnes started to give him his medicine, he said: "It is no use." But she prevailed on him to take it."

During the days between his attack and death he is quoted as speaking a number of times so he did have the power of speech. He had quite a few visitors so there were ample witnesses. Some newspapers reported he was improving, others that he was paralyzed and could not talk. Freeman, "reports persisted that he was paralyzed and speechless."

Now it's been years since I read the article, but if memory serves me correctly I will try and lay out some of the details.
-After Lee's attack, he appeared to be getting better, no paralysis was ever mentioned. The doctors diagnosed him as having "venous congestion,". The medical definition of this is, overfilling and distention of the veins with blood as a result of mechanical obstruction or right ventricular failure. Distended neck veins are a cardinal sign of congestive heart failure. Congestive heart failure is most often caused by damage to the heart muscle from a heart attack. Lee had a history of cardiac problems. Strokes are normally acute, many witnesses mention him appearing fatigued and ill prior to his attack. Other than the lack of speaking ability noted, he displayed no other common symptom of having a stroke and he apparently regained his speaking ability very quickly. One of the few medicines mentioned as having been administered was "Physic" an archaic term for a Cathartic. Lee was supposedly getting better when his doctor gave him "Physic", Freeman: "Lee refused medicine and nourishment the next day, even from his daughters, but despite the confusion of his mind, self-discipline still ruled, and when either of his doctors put physic to his mouth he would swallow it."
Now modern medicine understands that one of the side effects of Cathartics is there is a risk of causing an electrolyte imbalance and dehydration. Two of the symptoms of a serious electrolyte imbalance are, "Change in mental status or sudden behavior change such as confusion, delirium, lethargy, hallucinations or delusions and Rapid heart rate (tachycardia), the former is sounds quite similar to what witnesses described and the latter is dangerous for a patient with a history of cardiac problems. In the very next sentence after mentioning the administration of "Physic" Freeman states, "During the morning he lapsed into a half-delirium of dreams and memories. ". . . His mind wandered to those dreadful battlefields." He muttered unintelligible words — prayers, perhaps, or orders to his men. Sometimes his voice was distinct. "Tell Hill he must come up," he said, so plainly and emphatically that all who sat in the death-chamber understood him."
The morning of the 11th is when the above referenced A.P. Hill quote was made.
He died the next morning that is when he purportedly made the "Strike the tent" statement so the two comments came about a day apart. Not exactly how you would write it for the most dramatic effect.

 

I've alluded to the premise that A.P Hill was mentioned by both old warriors before they died. My feeling is that the profound importance of A.P. Hill's arrival at Sharpsburg imprinted itself on the minds and consciousness of both these two.

Other historians have also pointed out the importance of the phrase "And A.P.Hill came up..." to more than one of these past engagements.

Funny also how no-one questions Jackson's last moments at all, yet Lee's last words are more than speculative, even though it took both men a week to succumb to their maladies, and Lee was surrounded by friends and family whereas Jackson was in the presense of his wife and surgeon only.

Jacksons last musings are entirely typical of the deeply religious man that he undoubtably was. On hearing from his wife that the surgoen had told he straight out that Thomas was to die that day, Jackson summoned him, and asked him directly, "My wife tells me that I am to die today.", to which his surgeon replied in the affirmative. Jackson is said to have been content with this, "Good....good....I always wanted to die on a Sunday." Lapsing into delirium, he is rambling much about his actions as a soldier, before gathering himself and stating clearly, "Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees."

It's very similar.

 

Yet Jackson's and Hill's relationship was strained, Jackson had even placed Hill under arrest at the beginning of the Maryland campaign. Lee was dissatisfied with him on more than one occasion. Yet he was on both mens minds near their deaths.

This is a fairly modern phenomenon that really started with Thomas Lawrence Connelly's "Marble Man". Connelly who wrote some pretty decent history about the Army of Tennessee (Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862 (1967), Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 (1971) and Five Tragic Hours: The Battle of Franklin (with James L. McDonough, 1983) and during his research he became a big admirer of the Army of Tennessee. His later works have the undertone of having a bone to pick with the ANV over their notoriety. In 1977 he wrote Marble Man a mixture of selective history and a lot of attempts to psycho analyze a man dead 107 years. He then was one of the first modern historians to try and attempt to rehabilitate James Longstreet's reputation, that had been pretty well savaged in the post war, partisan recriminations, where they attempted to lay blame for the south's loss. Some of it was justified, some not. Like all Generals he had his strengths and weaknesses. However, Longstreet partisans could only rehabilitate him by attacking Lee.

As was Lee.

 

As promised, here is the essay on Confederate General John Bell Hood. Hope you enjoy!

"A BOLD FIGHTER" PROMOTED BEYOND HIS ABILITIES: GENERAL JOHN BELL HOOD...By Keith S. Bohannon

At noon on July 20, 1864, Southern newspaper correspondent Felix G. De Fontaine stood in front of the Army of Tennessee's headquarters on the outskirts of Atlanta. A bevy of high ranking officers were nearby, including the army's commander, Gen John Bell Hood, his chief of staff, Gen. William W. Mackall, Gen. Mansfield Lovell, and various staff officers and escorts. De Fontaine noted that Hood was "arrayed in full uniform, leaning on his crutch and stick" in the doorway. Hood's manner was calm, the reporter recorded, but his eyes flashed "with a strange, indescribable light, which gloams in them only in the hour of battle."

When Hood shook De Fontaine's hand, the General said "at once I attack the enemy. He has pressed our lines until he is within a short distance of Atlanta and I must fight or evacuate. I am going to fight." Hood admitted that "the odds are against us, but I leave the issue with the God of battles." Hood and his retinue then left to ride for the front lines. Later in the afternoon, Confederate troops attacked the Federals in what became known as the Battle of Peach Tree Creek.

Hood commanded the Confederate Army of Tennessee for less than three days when he spoke to De Fontaine. Hood was thirty three years old at the time and handicapped by the loss of a leg and the use of an arm. He had the reputation of being a fierce fighter and a superb leader of men in battle. By the second half of 1863, Hood was one of the Confederacy's great heroes and a confidant of Pres. Jefferson Davis.

Hood inherited, in the words of Albert Castel, "a virtually impossible situation" when he took command of the Confederacy's Western Army with Sherman's hosts on the very outskirts of Atlanta. Most historians agree that Hood had been promoted beyond his level of ability by this point. The downward turn his military career took in 1864 was due in part to circumstances beyond his control, including bad luck, the superior generalship of his opponents, and his inability to have his orders executed by his subordinates. Hood also had his own critical weaknesses that probably prevented him from being effective in army command, including inattention to staff work, reconnaissance, and the logistical needs of his troops. Hood's command lasted almost exactly six months and ultimately resulted in the near destruction of the Army of Tennessee in the battles of Franklin and Nashville.

Hood was born on June 29, in Owingsville, Bath County, Kentucky, the son of John W. Hood and Theodosia French Hood. Dr. Hood, a plantation and slave owner in the eastern fringe of the Bluegrass region, wanted his son to follow into medicine, even promosing to pay for the youth to finish his studies in Europe. The son instead wanted to be a soldier and obtained an appointment to the U.S. Military academy through the assistance of his uncle, Congreesman Richard French.

Hood graduated from West Point in the class of 1853 with a mediocre academic record. In almost every subject area, including infantry tactics and artillery, he ranked at the bottom of his class. At the time of his graduation, Hood's overall ranking was forty-fourth out of a class of fifty-two. Despite the poor record, the general milieu of West Point, including it's authoritarian and military environment, markedly influenced the young Kentuckian. Hood internalized the professional military ethos of the Academy and saw the school's administrators, especially Supt. Robert E. Lee, as models of professional conduct.

Although Hood had hoped upon graduation to receive a commission in the cavalry, his low class standing resulted in him entering the service as a second lieutenant in the 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment.. His first assignment was at fort jones, an isolated outpost in northern California, where he arrived in March 1854. Lieutenant Hood remained at Fort Jones for over a year, serving much of the time as post adjudant, before he heard that the War Department had authorized the creation of two new cavalry regiments to protect the frontier.

Hood immediately attempted to gain a position in one of the cavalry regiments, trying at first to work through family friend, former Congressman John C. Breckinridge. When Breckinridge apparently failed to urge Hood's appointment, Hood wrote directly to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in late April 1855 asking that the application "be laid before the President." Hood apologized for having "violated the usual rule laid down in the regulations for such applications," but explained that he feared the "delay in other departments which would cause this to reach you too late." Hood's willingness as a young lieutenant to write such a letter reveals what biographer Richard McMurry claimed was "a lifelong habit of corresponding unofficially with those in authority without going through the usual channels."

Hood's continued efforts to secure a transfer to the cavalry paid off in August of 1855 when he recieved promotion to second lieutenant and orders to report to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, to join the 2nd U.S.Cavalry. From January 1856 through the spring of 1861, Hood served with the regiment, being absent only twice on lengthy furloughs. During his tenure with the 2nd, Hood renewed aquaintances with Robert E. Lee, the regiment's lieutenant colonel. The relationship, which Hood fondly remembered in his memoirs, only strengthened the respect Hood had gained for Lee at West Point.

Liieutenant Hood spent most of his time in the 2nd Cavalry engageing in camp and post duties or patrolling the Texas frontier to protect it against Indians, Mexicans and outlaws. He saw action only once, in July 1857 when he led a party of two dozen men on a patrol near Devils River that resulted in a small skirmish with hostile Indians.

In 1860, Hood recieved an eight month leave of absence from the 2nd Cavalry, which he took beginning in September of that year. During his journey back east, the lieutenant recieved orders to report to West Point to serve as an instructor of cavalry. Hood immediately went to Washington, where he told the U.S. adjudant general that he did not want the position, since he "feared war would soon be declared between the States, in which event I preferred to be in a situation to act with entire freedom." The surprised adjudant general granted Hood's request.

Hood was two months shy of his thirtieth birthday when he resigned his commission as first lieutenant in the U.S. cavalry on April 16, 1861, to join the Confederate Army, "...seeing no hope of reconcilliation or adjustment, but every indication of a fierce and bloody war." He entered Confederate service as a captain of cavalry on April 20, 1861, to rank from March 16, 1861. Captain Hood recieved orders to act as an instructor of cavalry companies stationed on the Peninsula between the James and York Rivers. While ther he engaged in scouting and picket duty, drawing the pay of a major in June 1861.

On September 30, 1861, Hood recieved a promotion to the colonelcy of the 4th Texas Infantry Regiment. The appointment undoubtedly thrilled Hood since he had grown to admire the Lone Star state during his years of service there in the late 1850s. The state's "vast and undeveloped resources" had impressed the young officer and just prior to succession he had decided to make it his "home for life", possibly to reside on a ranch he owned on the Nueces River.

Colonel Hood's West Point training, antebellum association with Texas, and demonstrated skill as a small unit commander made him an effective and popular commander of the 4th Texas. Hood told his men, "no regiment....should ever be allowed to go forth on the battlefield and return with more trophies of war than the 4th Texas- the number of colors and guns captured, and prisoners taken, constitutes the true test of the work done by any command in any engagement." Similar statements in Hood's later orders to his corps inthe Army of Tennessee reveal in part the measures by which he gauged success on the battlefield.

The 4th Texas infantry spent the winter of 1861-62 near the town of Dumfries in northern Virginia. While encamped there, Hood recieved promotion to brigadier general on March 3, 1862. Shortly thereafter he took command of Gen. Louis T. Wigfall's brigade, known thereafter as Hood's Texas Brigade, composed of the 1st, 4th and 5th Texas regiments, the 18th Georgia, and later, the Hampton Legion Infantry of South Carolina.

By the first week of April 1862, Hood's men were in trenches at Yorktown, part of an army under Joseph E. Johnston facing Union troops that had landed on the southern end of the Peninsula. On May 3, Johnston's men began a retreat westward toward Richmond. During the withdrawl, Hood recieved orders to assist in preventing enemy landings on the York River, a development that might impede or even block the Confedrate withdrawl. The Confederates learned on May 6 that Union troops had disembarked at Eltham's Landing on the Pamunkey river, one of two rivers that come together to form the York.

The next day, Hood's regiments attacked the federals at Eltham's Landing. Hood took an active role in leading and directing his men during the fight, personally deploying companies of skirmishers. At one point, Hood recalled, "a corporal of the enemy drew down his musket upon me as I stood in front of my line." A private in the 4th Texas saved Hood's life by instantly shooting the Federal, who fell only a few feet from Hood. The action at Eltham's Landing ended with the Federals withdrawing to the Pamunkey. Hood's leadership in the contest elicited praise from his superiors, including his division commander Chase Whiting, who noted the Texas general's "conspicuous gallantry."

Hood and his brigade gained even greater glory following the June 27, 1862 battle of Gaine's Mill, part of the Seven Days campaign. During the action at Gaine's Mill, the Federals occupied a strong line and managed to repulse numerous Confederate assaults early in the day. Realizing that the onset of darkness would allow for a Union withdrawl, Confederate army commander Robert E. Lee consulted with Generals Whiting and Hood about the possibility of their troops breaching the Federal line.

Fulfilling Lee's request would be a daunting task for Whiting's division. Hood's men would first have to cross several hundred yards of open slope leading to Boatswain's Creek, then cross the creek and charge up a steep hillside defended by multiple lines of Union troops. When the 4th Texas formed under fire to begin the charge, Hood reminded the men that he had promised to lead them in their first assault. Walking out in front of the regiment, Hood took off his hat, held his sword aloft, and shouted "Forward, guide right!" in a voice that could be "heard in the storm of battle."

Hood's men subsequently played a key role in breaking through three lines of Union infantry and capturing enemy cannon. Hood's Texas brigade lost heavily in the charge, the 4th suffering approximately 50% casualties. The morning after the battle, Hood rode up in front of his old regiment and upon learning the extent of their casualties, "the strength of his attachment was seen developing itself in tears" on his cheeks. As the general rode off to hide the display of emotion from his men, "there was not a soldier in that line that thought more of him...than ever before." Already popular among his men, Hood's performance at Gaine's Mill elevated his standing in the brigade and in the eyes of the southern army's high command, including Gen. Lee.

Several weeks after the Seven Days Campaign, Hood's immediate superior, Gen. Whiting, recieved a medical furlough and never returned to his division. As senior brigadier general in the division, Hood took command of Whiting's two brigades. In addition to the Texas brigade, the division contained Col. Evander M. Law's "Old Third Brigade." Hood's first experience commanding the division in battle took place during the Second Manassas campaign.

Hood's division, marching as the vanguard of Gen. James Longstreet's wing of Lee's Army, arrived on the Second Manassas battlefield in the early afternoon of August 29. Stonewall Jackson, who thought highly of Hood after the Seven Days Campaign, extended the Texan a "hearty welcome" as Hood's two brigades deployed facing eastward astride the Warrenton Turnpike. That evening, Hood recieved orders to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the east with his division. "If an opening was found" in the Federal lines "for an entering wedge," remembered Longstreet, the Confederates would "have all things in readiness" for a major attack the next morning. Hood's advance ended by 8:00 pm, when it became, in the words of one of Hood's colonels, "too dark to distinguish friend from foe at a distance of 20 paces."

At 4:00 pm, on August 30, Hood galloped up in front of the Texas Brigade. In a few minutes, the men heard him shout, "Attention Texas Brigade! Forward march!" The Texan's advance was part of a massive assault ordered that afternoon by Robert E. Lee and Longstreet to envelop the Union left. a few minutes after the Texas Brigade began it's advance, a messenger told Hood to ride back and report to Longstreet. Hood found the wing commander between a quarter and a half mile to the rear. Longstreet told Hood not to allow his division "to move so far forward as to throw itself beyond the prompt support of the troops he had ordered to the front." In Hood's absence, his troops did exactly that.

When Hood rejoined the Texas Brigade that afternoon, he ordered the men to hold their ground. During the remainder of the battle, Hood assisted in co-ordinating attacks beyond the Sudley Road. Hood's two brigades captured cannon, flags, and numerous other trophies at Second Mannassas, being "true to their teaching," in Hood's words, but suffered heavy casualties in the process.

Hood did not at first command his division in the subsequent invasion of Maryland, due to having been placed under arrest by his superior, Gen. Nathan G. Evans. The dispute originated on August 30 when Hood assigned a number of captured ambulances to his men for the use of their sick and wounded. The next day, Hood recieved orders to turn over the ambulances to Evan's South Carolinians. Hood refused to obey, since it was his men who had captured the ambulances and he considered them the rightful owners. Lee allowed Hood to march into Maryland with his division, but did not release the Texan from arrest.

On September 14, 1862, Lee sent Hood's division into battle to assist in the defence of South Mountain. As the Texans passed Lee, they shouted "Give us Hood!" Lee asked Hood to apologize to Evans, but Hood refused, claiming that while it would afford him "pleasure to do anything that could please" the commanding general, he could not acquiesce "without any sacrifice of personal honour." Lee "temporarily suspended" Hood's arrest in order for him to lead his division into battle at South Mountain, although nothing subsequently ever came of the matter.

Hood's troops arrived at Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 15, eventually being posted to the extreme left of Lee's line near the Dunker Church on the Hagerstown Pike. The next evening, Hood's command blunted a Federal attack before nightfall. Later on the 16th, Hood withdrew his famished men a short distance in order to prepare rations, with the understanding that they should go to the aid of General Alexander Lawton's division on the front line if needed.

Around 6:00 A.M., on September 17, one of Stonewall Jackson's staff officers came in great haste to Hood with the request that his men advance at once. "To arms was sounded," remembered Hood, "and in a few minutes I again moved out in line of battle" around Dunker Church and north toward the Federals. After passing a wounded General Lawton being borne to the rear on a stretcher and encountering Gen. Harry T. Hays fighting with the remenant of his decimated brigade, Hood led his division into the struggle.

Ten days later, Hood wrote that his "Two little giant brigades" had wrestled a far larger force at Antietam, losing hundreds of officers and men but driving the enemy back several hundred yards. Hood sent repeated requests during the battle to Generals Harvey Hill and Longstreet for troops to protect the left of his division. Hood recieved no assistance until his shattered brigades withdrew into the West Woods and the division of Gen. Lafayette McLaws entered the fighting.

Hood was one of the Army of Northern Virginia's rising stars in the weeks that followed the Maryland Campaign. In recommending Hood for promotion ten days after Sharpsburg, Stonewall Jackson commented on the Texan's "ability and zeal", stating that Hood was "one of the most promising officers of the army." An article in the Richmond Enquirer entitled "The Texas Brigade" referred glowingly to the Texans and their commander. Hood's "courage and genius" were unfailing, crowed the writer, and the general and his men "won for themselves immortal honour." Several weeks later, Thomas J. Goree of Longstreet's staff wrote home that "it is very probable that Gen. Hood will be promoted to Major Genl. for his gallantry in these various contests. No man deserves it more. He is one of the finest young officers I ever saw."

Goree's prediction about Hood's elevation in rank was correct. In the reorganization of Lee's army following the Maryland campaign, Hood recieved a promotion to Major general, to take rank from October 11, 1862, and command of a division in Longstreet's I Corps. Hood's division included four brigades commanded by Gens. George T Anderson, Jerome B. Robertson, Evander M. Law and Robert Toombs (later Henry L. Benning).

Shortly after Hood's promotion, Lee moved his army eastward into the Shenandoah Valley toward Fredericksburg. Longstreet's corps reached Culpepper Courthouse in early November and camped there for three weeks. On November 19, Longstreet's men marched to Fredericksburg to counter the Federal army massed on the opposite bank of the Rappahannock river from the Confederates. During the December 13 battle of Fredericksburg, Hood's division was on the right of Longstreet's corps, connecting with Stonewall Jacksons corps to the south.

Early on the morning of December 13, Longstreet went to Hood and told him that the enemy would probably be attacking Jackson's line, and that "when an opportunity offered he (Hood) should move forward and attack the enemy flank." Longstreet gave similar commands to Gen. George Pickett, one of his other division commanders. Ultimately only two regiments of Evander Law's Brigade of Hood's division advanced to skirmish with the Federals who broke through Jackson's line. When Pickett went to Hood with the suggestion that they assault the Union line, Hood decided instead to withdraw Law's regiments

Longstreet was deeply disappointed in Hood's performance at Fredericksburg. In 1868, Longstreet confided to Edward Porter Alexander that the victory at Fredericksburg was "so handsome that I did not care to mar the enjoyment of it by making official trouble." In retrospect, Longstreet claimed that he had "made a mistake in not bringing the delinquint (Hood) to trial." When Longstreet penned his memoirs many years later, he claimed that his reluctance to "push the matter" stemmed from Hood being in "high favour with the authorities."


INTERMISSION............WITH HOOD ESCAPING RETRIBUTION, AND HIS STAR STILL ON THE RISE AT THE END OF 1862...More to come, Mr Price! Hope you like it so far!

 

Part Two of Mr Bohannon's Essay.....

Hood spent the months after the battle of Fredericksburg attempting to increase the strength of his division. On February 6, 1863, he worte to Louis T. Wigfall that he would "Like a division of Texans, but I don't think I would like to leave this army, I am very fond of General Lee." In mid February, Lee ordered Hood's brigades to Richmond, in response to reports that Federals on the Peninsula were threatening Richmond and the main railroad leading south and out of the city.

Hood's division marched through Richmond on February 21 and camped south of the city, where it remained for several weeks. During that time, Hood ventured into the city where his medical director John T. Darby introduced the General to Col. James Chestnut, Jr, and his wife Mary Boykin Chestnut. Mary Chestnut became a confidant of Hood and her famous published "diary" is an important source on Hood's private life and romance with Sarah Buchanan Campell Preston, known as "Buck".

Hood met Preston, possibly for the first time, in the streets of Richmond on March 18, 1863, as his division moved through the city. Buck Preston was twenty years old and a member of an aristocratic and wealthy South Carolina family. Mary Chestnut described the ravishing Buck as having "a knack of being 'fallen in love with' at sight and of never being 'fallen out of love' with."

By early April, Longstreet's command had moved toward Suffolk, Virginia, to drive away or besiege the city's Federal garrison so that Confederates could collect supplies in the region. Longstreet posted Hood's Brigades on the left of the Southern siege lines along the Nansemond River. With the exception of an April 19, 1863, clash in which Union troops siezed Fort Huger from a garrison that included some of Hood's men, the siege of Suffolk was un-eventful. Hood was critical of the operation in his memoir, claiming that he "never could satisfactorily account for" Longstreet's move toward Suffolk.

During the spring and early summer of 1863, Hood may have been torn between his loyalty toward Robert E. Lee and an apparent desire to serve in the Western Theater. On April 29, 1863, Hood wrote Lee from Suffolk, saying that "when we leave here it is my desire to return to you. If any troops come to the Rappahannock please don't forget me." Earlier that month, Cadet A.D.C. Ethelbert. B. Wade of Hood's staff told a friend that Hood was "very anxious to be sent to Tennessee." Hood may have believed that he could best serve the Confederacy in the West, where their would also be a possibility of being promoted to lieutenant general and recieving a corps command.

Hood's burning ambition was obvious to the men who served under him. An officer in Anderson's brigade who interacted with Hood wrote home in April 1863 that the general "has his eyes fixated on other hieghts in rank to climb and he knows he has men to wing them for him." A man in the 5th Texas writing after the Chancellorsville campaigntold his mother that the Texans had made Hood "what he is and he is saving us now for a Lt. general's stars since (Stonewall) Jackson has gone." Although Lee did not replace Jackson with Hood, the army commander did tell Jefferson Davis that Hood was a "capital officer" who was improving and would make a good corps commander if necessary.

Throughout the second half of June, Hood's division moved north along the Blue Ridge and across the Potomac River in Lee's second invasion of the North. On June 28, Hood encountered Englishman Sir Arthur Fremantle, who described the Confederate officer as a "tall, thin, wiry looking man, with a grave face and a light colored beard." Fremantle also noticed that Hood was "accounted one of the best and most promising officers in the army."

While encamped in the vicinity of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on July 1, Hood recieved orders to march toward Gettysburg, where Confederate troops had encountered the enemy. Hood's men arrived near Gettysburg shortly before dawn on July 2. The general and his staff spent the early part of the morning with Lee, Longstreet and others at Lee's headquarters on the western slope of Seminary Ridge observing the Federals to the east. Twelve years later, Hood remembered that Lee seemed eager for Longstreet to attack that morning, but the corps commander convinced Lee to wait until Pickett's division arrived.

On the afternoon of July 2, Hood's and McLaws divisions of Longstreet's corps marched southward to get into position to attack across the Emitsburg Road and turn the left flank of the Union army. By about 4:00 P.M. Hood's men had reached the right flank of Lee's army. As the division deployed, Hood sent out scouts to ascertain the exact location of the enemy's left.

Hood recieved reports from scouts and General Law that the Federals did not occupy the Round Tops. Believing that a march around these elevations would place his men in the flank and rear of the enemy, Hood repeatedly sent staff officers to Longstreet requesting a modification of the attack orders as issued by Lee. In each instance, Longstreet responded that Lee's orders were to attack up the Emmitsburg Road.

As Hood's troops began their advance, Longstreet rode up and conversed with the Texan. A Georgia private saw the two men "riding coolly up and down in front of us, seeming to examine every man." Hood for the last time expressed his regret at not being able to attack around the Round Top, Longstreet replying that "we must obey the orders of General Lee." Hood then rode along his division lines before ordering the men forward.

When Hood rode into the orchard, probably one located just west of the Bushman farmhouse, a shell exploded over him sending fragments into his left arm. Artillerist John C. Haskell wrote that Hood "reeled and fell from his horse, utterly prostrated and almost fainting." Haskell remembered that the wound gave Hood "intense pain and utterly unnerved him, so that I could get no orders from him." Capt. Fredrick M. Colston later saw Hood sitting in an amulance near Pitzer's Schoolhouse, probably in shock.

On the retreat south after Gettysburg, Arthur Fremantle once again encountered Hood, this time riding in a carriage. Hood "looked rather bad," noted Fremantle, "and has been suffering a great deal." By mid-July, Hood was in Staunton, Virginia, and by August 12 he had arrived in Richmond. throughout August 1863, persistent rumors swirled through the Confederate capital and lee's army that Hood would be promoted to lieutenant genersl and be given command of the Army of Northern Virginia's cavalry corps.

While recuperating in Richmond, Hood "suffered himself to criticize freely our operations in Pennsylvania," claimed Moxley Sorrel of Longstreet's staff. Hood's alleged criticism might have extended to his corps commander. Three decades after the war, Lafayette McLaws wrote that "Longstreet told me...that Hood had always pretended to be very friendly at his headquarters when he frequently visited." On at least one occasion, Longstreet learned that Hood's "principle business" while on leave in Richmond had been abusing his corps commander.

Hood's motives for criticizing Longstreet, if indeed he did at all, are unknown. Hood may have had misgivings about the Gettysburg campaign from it's inception. E.P. Alexander remembered Hood saying early in June 1863 that the army was "taking a lot of chances" by marching north that summer. Hood might also have been critical of Longstreet's denying him permission on July 2, 1863, to execute a flank march around the Round Tops. In his memoirs, Hood wrote that the steep losses his division sustained at Gettysburg had often caused him "bitterly to regret" that he had not been allowed to "turn Round Top mountain."

When's Hood's division passed through Richmond in mid-September 1863, en route to reinforce the Army of Tennessee in Northern Georgia, a number of officers appealed to the wounded Texan to join them. Although Hood's arm remained in a sling, he met his troops at the Richmond train station. A Georgia private noted that Hood told the men that "his division was going west, and that he would bring up the rear in person and take command on his arrival out." Hood further remarked that he had heard it said that "the Yankees out West are of a different race from the Northern Yankees and were much harder to contend against.." but that his division "could whip ANY Yankee Division, no matter where it was."

Hood stopped at Petersburg while travelling to Georgia in order to propose to Buck Preston. He later told Mary Chestnut that Buck "half promised...to think about it." Hood left saying that he was engaged to Preston, but she said, "I am not engaged to you."

When Hood arrived on the Chickamauga battlefield on the afternoon of September 18, he took command of troops attempting to force a crossing of West Chickamauga Creek. Hood's men pushed the Federals across the creekin the vicinity of Reed's Bridge and then advanced southwest a short distance before nightfall.

During the fighting on September 19, Confederate army commander Braxton Bragg gave Hood command of his own division and those ofJoseph Kershaw and Bushrod Johnson. While waiting for orders to advance on the morning of the nineteenth, the men saw Hood riding along, "his hat off in a token of salute, his left arm still in a sling, and his noble countenance still pale from the wound recieved at Gettysburg." Hood dissauded his soldiers from cheering, lest it draw enemy artillery fire."Boys, I am glad to see you," he said, "you must whip this battle here." In the subsequent fierce fighting that day, some of Hood's troops siezed portions of the La Fayette Road, but they could not drive the Federals from the battlefield.

That evening Hood rode to army headquarters, where Bragg instructed him to advance the next morning as soon as the troops on the Texan's right began attacking. On the morning of the twentieth, Hood met with Longstreet, who had taken command of the left wing of Bragg's army. Longstreet gave Hood command of the "main column of the attack," which subsequently charged through a gap that had developed in the union line near Brotherton house. During the advance against the routed foe, Hood told Bushrod Johnson to "Go ahead, and keep ahead of everything."

After seeing Johnson, Hood rode northward where he found the Texas brigade falling back in confusion after a failed attack. A South Carolina officer in Kershaw's brigade saw Hood in the middle of the Dyer field "galloping on ahead" of the Texans trying to rally them. When the South Carolinians advanced, Hood asked their identity and told them they were "the very brigade he wanted to see.". While cheering on the South Carolinians and trying to rally his Texans along a wood line, Hood reached out for the flag of one of his regiments. At that moment a ball struck the upper third of his right leg and an aide caught the general "just as his crippled arm was about to be caught in the horn of his saddle."

When Hood arived at his division's field hospital at the reed Farm, surgeons amputated his shattered leg at the thigh. Achaplain tending to the wounded at the hospital that day wrote in his diary that at some point Hood said "as long as I have a leg or an arm, and I can ride a horse, and command such men as i do, I will fight those yankees." On September 21, a party of two dozen men accompanied Hood to the home of William Little in the Armuchee Valley.

Hoods Chickamauga wound was so serious that stories circulated that he had died. On September 24, Longstreet wrote the Confederate adjudant general requesting hood to be promoted to lieutenant general "for distinguished conduct and ability" on September 20. Longstreet claimed that Hood "handled his troops with the coolness and ability that I have rarely known by anu officer on any field." Braxton Bragg agreed, and President Davis added that Hood's "character as a soldier & patriot are equal to any reward and justify the highest trust."

By mid-October it seemed that Hood would recover from his wound and recieve promotin. The year between Sharpsburg and Chickamauga had clearly been the pinnacle of hood's career. While Longstreet had written in support of Hood's elevation to lieutenant general, 'Old Pete' might also have had other motives in mind in seeking his subordinate's elevation in rank. Lafayette mcLawas, who disliked both Hood and Longstreet by the fall of 1863, claimed tht "Longstreet wanted to get rid of Hood who was equally as unscrupulous as Longstreet and equally blind to his own demerits." McLawa claimed that Hood "was more of a politician & did not hesitate to denounce Longstreet's demerits."

Hood's robust constitution sped his recovery to the point that by early November 1863 he moved to Atlanta, where he remained briefly before travelling to Richmond. By November 17, 1863, Hood was in Richmond. There he boarded in the home of his distant kinsman, Gen. Gustavus W. Smith.

In late January 1864, Hood was eager to get back into active service. He appeared in Main Street in Richmond on horseback "groomed by a single servant, his lost limb supplied by an artificial one." As the crippled general rode along, crowds of people cheered and lifted their hats. A few days later, Hood wrote to Adjudant Gen.Samuel Cooper, claiming that as soon as he got together staff members and purchaced a smalll carriage for his use, he would "be ready for duty in the field."

During his stay in Richmond, Hood persisted in his frustrating pursuit of Buck Preston. Hood told Mary Chestnut that after being wounded at Chickamauga, he had given up hope of becoming engaged to Buck. But upon his return to Richmond he had pressed his case. By mid-February 1864, Hood believed that Buck had consented to an engagement and said that he would speak to her parents. The aristocratic Prestons opposed the match, probably because they felt that Hood was not sophisticated and refined enough for their daughter. Word of the engagement nonetheless appeared in Southern newspapers.

Hood also spent time with Jefferson Davis while in Richmond. Hood was clearly loyal to Davis; according to Mary Chestnut the Texan told the President "why don't you come and lead (the army)....yourself? I would follow you to the death." Such flattery raises the question of whether Hood praised Davis in order to win a promotionor whether the compliments were genuine.. Richard McMurry's astute analysis concludes that because Hood was both "naive and ambitious" his exact motives for praising the president are impossible to ascertain.

Regardless of Hood's motives for praising the Confederate president, Jefferson Davis had good reason to recommend the Texan's promotion to the second highest grade in the Confederate army. Hood was one of the South's most experienced major-generals by the winter of 1863-64, with an impressive record of contributing to decisive battlefield victories. On February 11, 1864, the Confederate Congress confirmed Hood's promotion to lieutenant-general, to rank from September 20, 1863. Hood was given command of a corps in the Army of Tennessee, then encamped at Dalton, Georgia. While the Texan later claimed that while he was loath to leave Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, he also agreed with Davis on the need for an "aggressive campaign" in the western theater.

Hood arrived in Dalton to take command of his corps at the end of February 1864. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the Army of Tennessee's commander, welcomed Hood's arrival. On April 1, Johnston wrote to Louis Wigfall that Hood has been his "greatest comfort since getting here-indeed the only one in a military way.

In March and April 1864, Hood began corresponding with President Davis, Secretary of War Seddon, and Braxton Bragg. The up-shot of Hood's correspondance was that although the Army of Tennessee was in good condition it should be strengthened in order to go on the offensive in the rear of the enemy. Hood believed that at a juncture of Johnston's army with troops under Leonidas Polk and William W. Loring in Mississippi and Longstreet's men in East Tennessee "should be sufficient to defeat and destroy all Federals on this side of the Ohio River." Hood "never before felt that we had it so thoroughly in our power" to defeat the enemy.

Hood's optimistic letters to Confederate officials differed from those of Joseph E. Johnston, who argued that his army's weaknesses made an offensive into Tennessee an unwise move. On April 13, Hood told Braxton Bragg that he had "done all in my power to induce General Johnston to accept the proposition you made to move forward." Hood claimed that he regretted "this exceedingly, as my heart was fixed upon our going to the front and regaining Tennessee and Kentucky."

Hood knew of Jefferson Davis's eagerness to take the offensive in the West and wanted the Confederate president to know that he shared this opinion. Such letters were clear breach of military protocol, as Albert Castel points out, although Hood was not the only high ranking officer in the Army of Tennessee to criticize Johnston or address letters directly to Confederate authorities in Richmond. Johnston undoubtedly did not know about these letters at the time they were written, because he and Hood remained on friendly terms throughout the first few weeks of the Atlanta campaign.

Hood's corps of the Army of Tennessee consisted of three divisions commanded at the start of the Atlanta campaign by Gens. Thomas C. Hindman, Carter L. Stevenson, and Alexander. P. Stewert. Hood attempted to instill confidence in his divisions by issuing numerous general orders, holding large reviews, and riding through the camps. On March 16, he held a corps review and a sham battle. A newspaper correspondent observed that during the mock battle "all the generals were seen urging forward the men, but conspicuous above all towers the manly form of the 'Sergeant', the nickname given to Hood by his men. Hood's voice rang out "above even the roar of the artillery, and once more he is seen, as of yore, dashing through the lines." The observer claimed that when the "Sergeant" and his staff rode down the lines, "cheer after cheer greeted the new commander of the veteran corps."

Hood also continued to assure people of his fitness to command. In a letter to a friend in Columbus Georgia, that appeared in Southern newspapers, Hood addressed fears that he was in poor health, and "had to be tied or fastened on my saddle...Since I came here," he continued, "I have been riding all over this country with General Johnston and have been in the saddle every day enough to have fought two or three battles, without feeling any inconvenience." Hood claimed that he rode "with perfect comfort," and expected "to walk with a cane before long."

When Union armies under Gen. William T. Sherman began threatening Johnston's lines in the first week of May 1864, Johnston placed Hood's corps on the right of the Confederate Army. Hood's line stretched from Rocky Face Ridge at Mill Creek Gap across Crow Valley north of Dalton. During the ensuing Union demonstrations, Sherman sent one of his armies to Snake Creek Gap south of Dalton to threaten Johnston's supply line, the Western and Atlantic railroad, in the vicinity of Resaca, Georgia.

On May 9, Johnston ordered Hood to take three divisions and proceed to Resaca. Two days later, Johnston recieved reinforcements from Alabama and Mississippi that became a third corps of the Army of Tennessee, all under the command of general and Episcopal bishop Leonidas Polk. Hood knew Polk and apparently had asked about joining the Episcopal Church. At 12:30 AM on May 12, Polk administered the rites of bapyism to Hood. Polk's son-in-law and staff officer noted in his diary that Hood "seemed much impressed" with the ceremony.

Johnston deployed his entire army at Resaca on May 13, with Hood's corps on the right of the line. The next day, Federals launched an attack that fell in part on the left of Hood's corps, but the Confederates beat it back. At 4:00 PM on the fourteenth, Johnston ordered Hood to attack the Union left flank, overwhelm it, and then cut the road between Resaca and Snake Creek Gap. Hood's attack achieved some initial success, but Union reinforcements ultimately stemmed the Southern charge.

The next afternoon, Johnston decided to send Hood forward again. Shortly before the attack was to start, the Confederate army commander learned that Federals were across the Oostanaula River and south of the Confederate position at Resaca. Johnston cancelled Hood's attack and ordered a retreat, but word reached Alexander P. Stewart after his division began it's assault. Union troops repulsed Stewart's charge, and that night Johnston's men retreated across the Oostanaula.

The Army of Tennessee had retreated to Adairsville by May 17, where Johnson came up with a plan to strike Sherman. Two roads led south from Adairsville. One went to Kingston and then east to Cassville, while the other led directly from Adairsville to Cassville. Johnston hoped that Sherman would divide his forces as they moved south from Adairsville, allowing the Confederates to strike the Union column marching on the road from Adairsville to Cassville.

Sherman did what Johnston hoped, and the Confederate commander ordered Hood to assail the left flank of the two Union corps marching south from Adairsville to Cassville. When Hood's troops marched out to give battle on May 19, they moved a short distance before Hood saw "a body of enemy", which he correctly percieved to be cavalrymen advancing against the rear of his corps. Hood cancelled his attack and fell back to Johnston's main line. In the wake of this withdrawl, Johnston pulled his army back to a strong position on a ridge located one-half mile to the south and east of Cassville, Hood's corps forming the right of the new Confederate line.

SEE ya tomorrow for part 3!

 

I actually have Fremantle's book around here someplace. It's a very interesting read because he was entirely new to America and his impressions of the south note things that natives of the time found unremarkable and thus go otherwise unrecorded. He had his own adventures, landing in Mexico and making his way up to the Army of Northern Virginia via horse, wagon and eventually train. He's an upper class Englishman, but tough enough to share tents and shacks and unspeakable food in places like Texas with a variety of unwashed gun-toting thugs and characters and find a touch of humor in the situations. And of course, he's quite at home with the polished plantation and political class further east. It's a good read for somebody who wants to get a feel for what the south was really like in the war years.

Three Months in the Southern States, April-June 1863: Arthur James Lyon Fremantle: Amazon.com: Kindle Store

 

VB, how is it that you are so interested in the Lost Cause? Just wondering you know.

 

It's facinating history. The american Civil War was THE watershed moment in american affairs, understanding it, particulary from the Southern perspective, can bring great insight into how modern Americans conduct themselves, and why they are so driven to create the type of society that they have.

It's also facinating to see many of the things that made Southern Armies so different from the mainstream military of the day are still present in the American Armed Services of today. It's as if it's a tacit admission that, somehow, Southern militarism had more going for it , and that even in defeat, the South proved that with more men and resources, they might easily have overcome the North with a different series of circumstances. but, like all great innovations in militarism, it's run was fleeting.

The South were very much the under-dogs in the conflict. It's very much part of the australian ethos to support the underdog.

In light of my old hobby of playing American designed conflict simulation games, when you play a Civil War title, there always seems to be a rich vien of literature to draw from, and some of the designs that come out of this genre show just how long the odds were with many of these battles.

There is always something intangably exciting playing the confederate side in most of these games. Playing the Union, you sometimes feel like a public servant, or an administrator, that also must harness his resources in a military way. But when playing the south, you FEEL the shortages.

 

I tend to read up on Lee's Tigers. Louisiana contributed two brigades of 10 regiments and 2 battalions along with supporting artillery to the Army of Northern Virginia. In 1861 they reported for duty with a little over 12,000 men. At Appomattox only about 450 were around to surrender.

 

Part three....with Hood in the Atlanta Campaign....


Johnston held a meeting on the night of May 19 at Polk's headquarters. Corps commanders Hood and Polk agreed that their positions would be rendered untenable the next day if Union batteries opened a cross-fire against them. Sources conflict as to what happens next. Hood claimed in his memoirs (he did not discuss the meeting in his wartime report) that he and Polk urged Johnston to attack the next day. Johnston claimed the two officers instead urged the army to retreat. Regardless of which version is true, Johnston decided to retreat when he recieved word that Union cavalrymen had crossed the Etowah River, south of Kingston.

Hood sent a volunteer aide, Col. Henry P. Brewster, to Jefferson Davis in Richmond on May 21. Hood told Davis that Brewster could provide "you an account of the operations of this army since the enemy made their appearance in our immediate front." It is unknown whether Brewster met Davis, but Albert Castel surmises that if he did he probably criticized Johnston for not having a plan of attack at Dalton and for repeatedly retreating in the face of the enemy.

After withdrawing across the Etowah River, Johnston halted his Army in a strong position in the Allatoona Mountains, hoping that Sherman would attack the Confederates there. Instead, Sherman attempted to flank Johnston out of the position at Allatoona by ordering the Union army westward toward the town of Dallas. When Johnston learned of the Federal movement, he shifted the Army of Tennessee westward to block the enemy advance.

By May 25, Hood's corps was in position at New Hope Church, four miles east of Dallas. Union troops assaulted the center of Hood's line late that afternoon, in a battle that raged for several hours. The enemy were "repeatedly and handsomely repulsed at all points" wrote Hood. At some point in the afternoon, Hood and Johnston had a narrow escape; while standing near New Hope Church, a Union shell "burst between them," but neither officer was hurt.

Two days after New Hope Church, Hood recieved word from Gen. Joseph Wheeler that the Union Army's left flank appeared to be "in the air." Hood went to Johnston and proposed to pull his corps out of line and swing around to attack the enemy's exposed flank. Johnston assented, but when Hood approached the Union position shortly before dawn on May 28, the southern corps commander learned that the Federals had entrenched. Hood called off the attack and Johnston ordered him back into a defensive position.

Johnston and Sherman's army's shifted back eastward in the last days of May and the first two weeks of June 1864. On the night of June 18-19, the Confederates fell back to a position anchored on Kennesaw Mountain. By the evening of June 20, the movement of troops on Sherman's extreme right flank prompted Johnston to shift Hood's corps from east of Kennesaw Mountain to a position on the Powder Springs Road southwest of Marietta.

When two Union regiments advanced as skirmishers against Hood's troops on June 22, the Confederate corps commander apparently took it for an enemy attack. Hood sent forward two divisions on his own initiative, apparently thinking that they would encounter little resistence and either turn the enemy line or deliver a blow against an exposed flank. The ensuing battle of Kolb's Farm or Mt. Zion Church was a bloody affair in which Union troops repulsed the Confederates with great slaughter.

Throughout the last days of June and the first two weeks of July 1864, the Confederate army retreated to entenched lines at Smyrna and the Chattahoochee River. On July 9, Johnston pulled his troops back across the Chattahoochee after Union troops crossed the river north of the Confederate position. The Confedrates then took up position on the northern outskirts of Atlanta south of Peach Tree Creek.

The relationship between Johnston and Hood had deteriorated during the month of June. While visiting James and Mary Chestnut in Columbia early that month, Hood's volunteer aide Col. Brewster stated that the retreat in North Georgia was "breaking Hood's heart." Johnston, Brewster claimed, was "jealous of the favor shown Hood at Richmond."

During the first two weeks of July, Jefferson Davis pondered what to do about the military situation in Georgia. Davis strongly disliked Joseph E. Johnston, a general who had abandoned Northwest Georgia, including the industrial city of Rome. Johnston seemingly did not have a strategy of keeping Sherman out of Atlanta, or if he did, he did not communicate details of it to Davis.

Davis telegraphed Robert E. Lee on July 12 saying that it seemed necessary to relieve Johnston and asked Lee's opinion of Hood as a successor. Lee replied that while it was a "grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee," that if it was necessary "it ought to be done." Hood was "a good fighter", Lee wrote, "very industrious on the battlefield, careless off." Lee had not had an opportunity of judging Hood "when the whole responsibility rested on him," but had a high opinion of his "gallantry, earnestness & zeal."

The Confederate president also sought advice from his advisor Braxton Bragg, who visited the Army of Tennessee in mid-July to assess the miltary situation. On July 15, Bragg wrote several telegrams and a letter to Davis stating that Hood "has been in favour of giving battle, & mentions to me numerous instances of opportunities lost." Johnston, Bragg continued, seemed to have no "more plan for the future than he has had in the past." Bragg recommended that if a change of command in the Army of Tennessee was necessary, Hood would "give unlimited satisfaction." Hood was not "a man of genius or a great general," added Bragg, but was "far better in the present emergency than any one we have available."

Bragg included in his 15 July letter to Davis one from Hood dated July 14. Hood wrote that during the campaign up to that point that there had been "several chances to strike the enemy a decisive blow." The army had failed to take advantage of these opportunities and had suffered 20,000 casualties. It's present position, Hood rightfully noted, was "a very difficult one." Hood asserted that Atlanta must be held and the enemy attacked, "even if we should have to recross the (Chattahoochee) River to do so." The Texan claimed that he had "so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to be almost regarded as reckless by the officers high in rank in this army, since their views have been so directly opposite."

Most recent historians of the Atlanta campaign agree that Hood's July 14 letter was a bid to replace Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee. Hood's comment about "officers of high rank" opposing the offensive was probably an attempt to give Davis a false impression of the attitudes of William J. Hardee, the other main candidate being considered to succeed Johnston. (Hardee outranked Hood and thus technically should have succeeded Johnston.) While ambition undoubtedly motivated Hood, he might also have felt that he, not Hardee, had the determination and skill to save Atlanta from the Federals.

Davis decided on July 17 to replace Johnston with Hood. "Johnston," wrote Adjudant and Inspector General Cooper, had "failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta" and expressed no confidence that he could defeat or repel Sherman. Secretary of War Seddon told Hood that day that he had been "charged with great trust" and must "test to the utmost your capacities to discharge it."

Hood claimed in his memoirs that the order to assume command of the Army of Tennessee was "totally unexpected" and overwhelmed him with a sense of responsibility suddenly thrust upon him. He was certainly placed in an unenviable situation with an army far larger than his on Atlanta's doorstep. Hood's adjudant general, James W. Ratchford, recalled many years after the war that Hood seemed shaken when he learned of the change of command and asked Ratchford to "say nothing about it to anyone." On the morning of July 18, Hood joined with Generals Hardee and Stewert in sending a telegram to Jefferson Davis asking that the removal order be postponed until the fate of Atlanta had been decided. Davis refused to rescind the order.

At the age of thirty-three, John Bell Hood became the last and youngest of the Confederacy's full generals. Davis and his government expected Hood to fight for Atlanta, and the Texan immediately determined to do so. Hood's plan called for Hardee and Stewert's corps to attack several Federal corps located north of Atlanta and south of Peach Tree Creek. Hood hoped that these Union troops had not entrenched and that Confederate attacks would drive them north against the Chattahoochee and destroy them. The resulting battle of Peach Tree Creek, launched late in the afternoon of July 20, involved a number of badly co-ordinated Confederate attacks that failed to force back the Federals.

Historians have blamed the defeat at Peach Tree Creek on both Hood and Hardee. Thomas Connelly and Richard McMurry claim that the Confederate attacks came too late in the day, not allowing enough time to enable the attacking troops to maneuver across difficult terrain. McMurry argues that Hood's failure to control the army on July 20 was probably due to "inexperience, physical handicaps, and impatience with an army commander's supervisory role."

On July 21, Hood pulled his army back to a more compact entrenched line around Atlanta. He also issued orders for Hardee's corps to march south and then east around the rear of the Union Army of the Tennessee, where the Confederates would attack on the morning of July 22. When Hardee's men drove back the flank of the Union line, Gen. Benjamin. F. Cheatham, commanding Hood's old corps, would join the attack.

Hardee's divisions advanced around 11:00 AM on the twenty-second, and some units succeeded in overrunning sections of the Union line. Unfortunately for the Confederates, two Federal divisions extended the left flank of the Union line, where they managed to repulse Southern attacks. Later in the afternoon, Hood ordered forward Cheatham's men, some of whom briefly broke through the Federal line in desperate fighting. At the end of the day, the Confederates had suffered heavy casualties and captured a number of prisoners, cannon and flags, but their attacks had only been partially successful.

On July 27, Hood learned that Sherman had shifted large numbers of Union troops from east Atlanta to the west of the city. In order to protect the junction of the Macon and Western and the Atlanta and West Point Railroads at East Point. Hood ordered Gen. Stephen D. Lee (newly appointed to command Hood's old corps) to sieze on July 28 an important crossroads west of Atlanta at Ezra Church. The next day, Gen. A.P. Stewert was to march another corps beyond Lee to the west, then swing around and strike the Federal flank.

Lee found the Federals in possession of the Ezra Church crossroads on July 28 and decided without consulting Hood to attack the entrenched Federals. The ensuing engagement, known as the battle of Ezra Church, consisted of a series of uncoordinated assaults launched by Lee and Stewert that failed to break the Union lines. when Hood learned the results of the engagement, he canceled plans for a flank attack on July 29.

Hood had clearly been willing to fight during his first week and a half as commander of the Army of Tennessee. His overly ambitious plans for battles of Peach Tree Creek and Atlanta had not involved his men charging headlong against entrenched Federals, but they had both resulted in uncoordinated attacks that ended in bloody repulses. The third engagement at Ezra Church had been precipitated without orders from Hood. Although historians now assess the battles as tactical failures on the part of the Confederates, in the summer of 1864 many southerners saw them as successful attempts to slow Sherman's advance toward Atlanta.

At the time of his transfer to the Army of Tennessee, Hood claimed that he "was still under the influence of the teaching of Lee, Jackson and Longstreet." In 1862, Robert E. Lee had been able to give his principal lieutenants, especially Stonewall Jackson, a great deal of leeway in achieving victory on the battlefield. Hood's subordinates in the Army of Tennessee in 1864, many of them relatively inexperienced in corps and division command, proved unable to win battlefield victories when he utilized the same command style.

The siege of Atlanta commenced in the days following the battle of Ezra Church, the Confederates relying on the Macon & Western Railroad to supply the city. In an effort to lift the siege and drive the Federals out of North Georgia, Hood sent off his chief of cavalry Gen Joseph Wheeler and half of his mounted force on a raid to disrupt Sherman's supply lines. Wheeler's men could do little to damage the railroads seriously due to improved techniques of defending and repairing the lines and the growing strength of Union cavalry forces.

During the early stages of Wheeler's raid, the cavalry chief sent back reports that he had damaged and destroyed track on the Western and Atlantic Railroad at various points. This news, combined with reports from scouts on August 26 that the Union trenches north and east of Atlanta were empty, led Hood to conclude that the Federals had taken up a new line. The Confederate commander apparently believed that Sherman had shifted his lines so that Union troops could strike railroads south of Atlanta.

On August 30 Hood called two of his corps commanders, Generals Hardee and Lee, to his headquarters and instructed Hardee to march two corps south to Jonesboro. Once Hardee's men arrived there, they were to attack a Federal force advancing toward the Macon and Western Railroad and drive it back west of the Flint River.

Hardee's attacks on August 31 were uncoordinated and bloody failures. In the late afternoon of the thirty-first, Hood instructed Hardee to send Lee's corps back to Atlanta and to deploy his remaining force so as to "protect Macon and communications to the rear." Hood concluded his message to Hardee by incorrectly predicting that the enemy might "make an attempt upon Atlanta" the next day.

Sherman's forces at Jonesboro attacked Hardee's corps on September 1 and temporarily breached the Confederate line before Southerners counterattacked and restored their position. Hardee then retreated southward from Jonesboro to Lovejoy's Station, leaving the Federals firmly in control of the Macon and Western Railroad. With the last Southern railroad leading into Atlanta in enemy hands and his army divided, Hood evacuated Atlanta and reunited his forces at Lovejoy on September 3. In the wake of Atlanta's fall, Hood displayed an unwillingness to accept blame for recent Confederate defeats. Instead, he blamed his subordinate officers for mistakes and the men for failing to press home attacks at Jonesboro on August 31.

Hood wrote Confederate Secretary of War Seddon from Palmetto, Georgia, on September 21, outlining his plan for the fall. Hood hoped to cross the Chattahoochee River and march north against Sherman's supply line, the Western and Atlantic Railroad. Such a move, Hood claimed, "will force Sherman to give me a battle, or march upon Augusta or Macon, when I shall follow in his rear." In an extraordinary conclusion, Hood assured Seddon that the "Army is anxious to take the offensive" and that he hoped the fall of Atlanta would "prove to be a benefit to us in lieu of our misfortune." When Jefferson Davis visited the Army of Tennessee a few days later, he approved of Hood's plan to strike at the Federal supply line.

During the first two weeks of October 1864, elements of Hood's Army struck the Western and Atlantic at a number of points, capturing several small garrisons and destroying sections of track. From near Gaylesville, Alabama, in mid-October, Hood decided to move northward. He hoped to threaten Sherman's rail lines west of Chattanooga and possibly invade central Tennessee, seizing Nashville and continuing on into Kentucky. If blessed with victory in battle in Kentucky, Hood claimed that he would "send reinforcements to General Lee, in Virginia, or....march through the gaps in the Cumberland mountains and attack Grant in the rear."

Hood made his plans without first consulting his superiors. In his memoirs, he said that if he met his immediate superior, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard (commander of the recently created Military Division of the West) he would submit his plans to him. When Beauregard did meet with Hood, he rightly expressed concerns about possible logistical problems, but otherwise approved the plan.

The Army of Tennessee crossed the Tennessee River at Tuscumbia on November 18 and began marching north. After the war, Hood claimed that he entered Tennessee with the hopes of getting in the rear of the Union forces under Gen. John M. Schofield before they could cross the Duck River. Thomas Connelly convincingly argues, and Richard McMurry agrees, that Hood's plan when he entered Tennessee was simply to march against Nashville, capture the city, and then push to the Ohio River.

Hood's headquarters were in Mount Pleasant, Tennessee, by November 25, only eleven miles south of Columbia, where Schofield had placed his forces in a strong position. That afternoon Hood greeted Episcopal priest Charles Todd Quintard, who recorded in his diary that the Confederate army commander was "in the best of health and spirits, and full of hope as to the result of the present movements." Two days later, as Confederates skirmished with Federals in front of Columbia, Quintard recorded that Hood "expressed such earnest trust in God and such deep religious feelings that I could plainly discern the Holy Spirit's work upon his heart"



Last part to come.....with Hood calling on the Almighty for help, he prepares for his destiny....stay tuned for the concluding post!

 

A very good initial question Bobby:

And a very enlightening reply Volga. Now that I understand the point of view your posts are originating from, I will modify my replies accordingly.
I'll give you where my perspective comes from. My own study and understanding has evolved over time. I grew up around the Civil War, my family, on my fathers side, has lived in this area since it was first settled in the 1830's and 40's when it was still virtually wilderness. My G-G grandfather fought in the 39th Georgia along with several of his brothers (their battleflag is my current avatar). He is buried along with many of his compatriots in the Chickamauga City Cemetary. His wife, they married post war, was a Reed, (Reed's bridge of Chickamauga fame). All her brothers, but one fought for the south. My mother's side is from Louisiana, that's how I ended up being born there, my parents were visiting her sister and her husband, along with her side of the extended family, when I decided to come early. My father was a career Marine, private to Lt.Col. (promoted upon retirement), I grew up all over the country on Marine Corps and Navy bases (Ft. Campbell, KY/TN; Camp LeJeune, NC (multiple times); MCAS Cherry Point, NC; NAS Pensacola, FL; Camp Pendleton, CA (multiple times); Quantico, VA; Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA (my dad's last assignment as IG inspector Marine Forces Reserve, Marine Forces reserve are Headquartered in New Orleans, he travelled around the country inspecting Marine reserve units). Chattanooga was where we always returned home on leave. Whenever my dad was deployed the family was also sent back here (normally 20 months at a pop, 13 month combat tour plus workup). Many summers when he was in the states I was sent back here or to Louisiana to spend the summer with family members. We moved back here for good when he retired and I was in the 9th grade. My dad was a big, big, history buff so I got to visit a lot of historical sites. We spent virtually every weekend at a historical spot, and/or at the beach. I've lost track of how many times I went to Ft. Macon, Ft. Fischer, Ft. Anderson, The North Carolina Museum of History (huge Civil War collection) and the Battleship North Carolina.
NC Historic Sites - Fort Fisher

NC Historic Sites - Brunswick Town/Fort Anderson

North Carolina and the Civil War

Ft. Macon though not very well known is probably the best preserved fort from the era, located near New Bern/Beaufort, NC:
Fort Macon State Park - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Plus in school we were required to learn North Carolina's Civil War history. One interesting tid bit here is the North carolina State flag and regimental colors.
When it was adopted in 1861 it contained two dates in the field:
May 20th 1775-(from Wikipedia)The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence is allegedly the first declaration of independence made in the Thirteen Colonies during the American Revolution. It was supposedly signed on May 20, 1775, at Charlotte, North Carolina, by a committee of citizens of Mecklenburg County, who declared independence from Great Britain after hearing of the battle of Lexington.

and....

May 20th 1861- The date they seceeded from the Union, their 2nd Declaration of Independance.



North Carolina, Civil War State flag.

When we lived at Ft. Campbell we frequently visited the site of Ft. Donelson, located about 30 miles southwest. Ft. Henry no longer exists being submerged when the Tennessee River was dammed in the 1930's.

When we lived in Penasacola we often visited Ft. Pickens, when we went to the beach and occasional Ft. Barrancas. Ft. Pickens is the cooler fort. An interesting bit of trivia is that Geronimo and several of his warriors were imprisoned there during the Indian Wars. Pensacola is located pretty close to Mobile and we often travelled there to visit the USS Alabama/USS Drum and Fts. Morgan and Gaines:

Fort Morgan State Historic Park - Guardian on the Bay

Fort Gaines, Dauphin Island, AL

Again we had to learn Florida's Civil War history in History class.

Now New Orleans used to have one of the best Civil War Museums in the country, visited it a number of times while living in New Orleans, and during a field trip with my Louisiana history class, (again Louisiana's Civil War history) it became politically incorrect and then there was Katrina. Bobby can probably let you know if it's still around.

Trivia: Port Hudson Louisiana was the #1 bloodiest battle for the Union, per troops involved.

At Quantico we visited the Museum of the Confederacy in Richmond a number of times and most of the Virginia battlefields.

Somewhere along the line my dad gave me this book and the love affair was on:



When he was deployed my Uncle Charlie, my dad's brother, would come get me every weekend and we'd spend all day at the Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge battlefields. Longstreet was my great Civil War hero.



Uncle Charlie in Korea, after the Reservoir.

I think my next big leap into Civil War history was reading Bruce Catton's Civil War Trilogy. Great interesting stuff:
From Amazon: "Three Volume set includes: The Coming Fury, Terrible Swift Sword, and Never Call Retreat. A journalist and public official before becoming editor of American Heritage magazine, Bruce Catton won both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award for his Civil War history A Stillness at Appomattox. As for this monumental Civil War trilogy, first published in the 1960s, historian Henry Steel Commager appraised: "better than any other history of our Civil War it combines narrative vigor, literary grace, freshness of view and independence of judgment, and a kind of catholic spirit which embraces the whole vast tumultuous scene." The first volume opens with the Democratic Party's Charleston convention in 1860 and the split that resulted in two Democratic candidates, followed by the Republican Convention and Lincoln's victory. The country first drifted and then was swept into war, even as Lincoln and Jefferson Davis were declaring that a peaceful solution could be found. The second volume shows how the Union and Confederacy slowly reconciled themselves to an all-out war, and how the statures of Lee, Grant, Sherman, Jefferson Davis, and many others emerged. McClellan's character is impaled here in extracts from his arrogant letters. In the final volume, Lincoln remains resolute in the belief that a house divided against itself cannot stand, while Jefferson Davis struggles valiantly for political and economic stability. Catton traces the most bitter years of the war here, from the fighting at Fredericksburg to the surrender at Appomattox and the end of the Confederacy, and the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Each book includes a section of color maps, and the three volumes are contained in a blue and red box."

It widened my understanding and led to his other books. This Hallowed Ground and The Army of the Potomac series; Mr. Lincoln's Army, Glory Road and A Stillness at Appomattox.

I went off to college and then joined the Marines. Before getting to boot camp I thought I knew all about the Marine Corps because I'd grown up around it, I didn't. Before I became an infantryman I thought I understood tactics, I didn't, nor did I understand the myriad of small seemingly insignificant details that effect a units proficiency. Elan', discipline, leadership, personalities and morale became not theoretical concepts, but I saw how they were primary factors in a units proficiency and success or lack thereof, real world. I also learned from reading articles and books, after the fact, that related to events I was actually involved in that the published accounts do not always reflect the reality of the event. Somewhere between the official reports and the historians account of the events, some things are misinterpreted, because they are historians and don't understand all the practical implications of conducting a military operation. What is written by a historian is not Holy Writ, their research may be immaculate, but their interpretation is just that interpretation, read it with a jaundiced eye. Take what they do well research and use your own critical thinking skills to analyse. Most often they get it right, sometimes wrong. If something doesn't quite make sense look deeper. Small things they frequently fail to see. So when I went back an re-read many histories I began to re-evaluate the historians thesis and conclusions. Many like Freeman and Catton seemed to understand, and their analysis and work, stands the test of time. I think in part because they gave a lot of weight to the participants opinions. Many modern historians the previously mentioned Connely among them, I think miss the mark. They try and interpret events in a more modern anachronistic manner.

You gave the example of Bragg's assault on the Hornet's nest as an earlier example:

-OK we all understand that one of the great advantages the German's had during the fall of France was radios mounted in their tanks allowing for better command and control of their combat units allowing them to respond more quickly to the tactical battlefield situation. Agreed? So why do modern historians fail to understand that fighting in battleline was NOT some holdover from the Napoleanic days, but a necessary tactical formation to control your forces, and maximize their fire power?
-They also do not look at the arms carried by individual units and assume every soldier carried a rifled-musket and all artillery are the more modern pieces, and ignore terrain. In the case you cite Bragg's troops had to cross a field, the Federals were greatly masked by underbrush. Most of the Federal regiments were armed with rifles, Bragg's troops with smoothbores, many flintlock's further decreasing their rate of fire. If Bragg undertook a fight where one side or the other were to attempt to gain fire superiority he would lose, less range, less rate of fire per man and inability to clearly identify opposing targets. Now the Federals had withdrawn to the area they were holding, they were already shaken, their units intermingled and disorganized. Bragg's best chance of success was to close the range and hit the Federals with a sufficient mass of men that their morale and disorganization caused them to break and retreat further. Men tend to fight better when men they have trained and fought with are on either side of them. Fighting beside strangers, due to intermingled units and men tend to be more prone to fall back.
-Failure to reduce the salient would allow troops located therein to fire into the flanks and rear of troops advancing on either side attempting to finish the Federal Army off. Because they were a salient the ability to flank the position, a favored tactic, was not an option. Flank fire for a Civil War unit was similar to that of a naval engagement where one line of ships crossed the T on another fleets line of ships.
He made the correct tactical decision, whether he executed the attack proficiently is open to debate.

 

I grew up in a small town in Michigan, far from the battlefield. But even there, you were surrounded by reminders of that conflict - monuments, artillery pieces in town squares, old flags and rifles in small town museums. When I moved to Alaska (which was part of Russia during the Civil War), I was surprised to learn that the last shot of the civil war was fired here, by the Confederate raider Shenandoah attacking the whaling fleet in the Bering Sea.

In the US 1860 census there were 31 million people in the country. We can discount 15 or 16 million as women, and perhaps ten million as male children or males too old for conscription. So, perhaps there were 6 million men in the generation called to war. Of them, there were 700,000 deaths. Perhaps another 1.5 million (I'm guessing here) were injured, or had their health affected through some of the many epidemic diseases that swept through camps. Roughly, 1/4 or 1/3rd of that generation were killed or debilitated by the war.
To take that further, given the size of families in that period, one might reasonably opine that the war seriously affected every family in America.

In the south it was even worse since casualty rates were higher, AND they suffered economic loss when the Union went through and seized every head of livestock, bushel of corn, wheat, chicken and so on. The hunger and disease and consequent deaths among the civilian population will never be counted.

So yeah, it is the great watershed in American history.

 

Brilliant stuff, guys.
Wish I was knowledgeable enough to contribute, but enjoying all the banter so far.

 

And Polk was actively involved in the insuing campaign and was killed at Kennesaw on the 14th of June by a 3" artillery piece. "The third shell struck Polk's left arm, went through the chest, and exited hitting his right arm then exploded against a tree; it nearly cut Polk in two..." So he wasn't around to give his version.

Johnston was an excellent General on the defensive but slow to attack or counter attack, so any mistakes by the enemy were unexploited. The enemy had the initiative, allowing them to dictate the time and place that combat would take place, Johnston's fighting style allowed them to retain it. They also had the larger force so given sufficient time, where they were not being pressed by the southern army they could usually maneuver the confederates out of their defensive works where they were too hard to assail. Simply use a part of their force, sited on good defensive ground, to face the confederates and maneuver the bulk of the army to flank the southern position. Lee gave a fair assesment as to Hood's abilities as they existed prior to Chickamauga. He had not seen Hood since his return to the AoT. First, the overall health effects of such a severe wound would be significant and affect his energy and vigor. He was now using liberal quantities of Laudanum to manage the pain (Laudanum usually contains alcohol, morphine and codeine) from his wound. Today would we want a commander in charge of an operation while he is still debilitated from his wound and taking large amounts of morphine for the pain? Or would we more likely understand that the Morphine and wounds after effects would alter his ability to make sound decisions?

Here I would disagree on the analysis. Was the letter an attempt to convey the actual situation faced by the southern army in relation a very valuable objective, Atlanta, or an attempt at political manuevering? Probably the former. Hood had to know that Hardee was not interested in command of the Army, having already turned it down once after Chattanooga. Hardee had quarrelled with Bragg, the presidents military advisor, on several occasions when Bragg had commanded the AoT. Hardee had actually requested a transfer after Tullahoma, which was granted, and D.H. Hill took over his Corps. D.H. Hill joined the cabal of generals advocating Bragg's removal after Chckamauga and he himself was removed from command and sidelined. Bragg also relieved Gen. Leonidas Polk and Hardee was sent back to the AoT to replace him. Bragg was not likely to recommend Hardee to command the Army. Polk the other senior most general was dead. Hood was simply the only choice if Davis were going to promote from within the Army and Hood would surely have been aware of it. D.H. Hill would have been a good choice from outside the Army but he had recently been sidelined for the aforementioned anti-Bragg cabal. Longstreet had utterly failed at semi-independant command at Chattanooga and independant command during the Knoxville campaign. Jubal Early could have done the job, but Lee had him serving independantly in the Shenandoah, protecting that flank and the northern confederacy's breadbasket. Breckinridge and Cleburne were very talented Major Generals and would have been good choices from within the army, but both were so junior that politically their promotion to command the army was unfeasable. Hood simply did not need to play that card.

 

Do you think for a moment, Mr Price, that Hood's tenure as commander of the AoT was sullied by the same kind of goings on with his subordinates as happened to Bragg? Some of the criticism levelled at people like Cheatham, Hardee and Polk has echos from the days of Bragg as commander, and Joseph Johnston after him. All three generals had cause to complain, particularly Bragg. And the offensive career of Braxton Bragg shows a General who had the tactical plans, but then put them in the hands of his subordinates to maake happen, and was let down. So, Bragg, then johnston, and then Hood, were all fighting the same lack of proper support from their subordinates.

And was Hood unfortunate in having been the rising star general in an organisation where Robert E. Lee was the acknowledged master? All professional tradesman can make their job look incredibly easy....that is part of their job, to not let their subordinates get too far ahead of themselves, and strike a balance between unbridled decision making without consultation, and torpidity that meant that the commnader could not issue discretionary orders, had to spell out absolutely every contingency.

The essay above postulates that Hood had learnt his 'craft' at the feet of Lee. If we look at the personality of Lee's lieutenants, we find dependability at a premium. James Longstreet was called by Lee "My Old Warhorse". Think for a moment what that could indicate. Strength....ability to follow the orders to the "T" of the man riding your back...character, enough to make decisions but not be too independant in them. Isn't it significant that Hood caims to have wanted to "go right round the round Tops" at Gettysburg? Hindsight surely tells that this may well have been the decisive move that could have closed the Cannae 'trap' Lee had been looking to spring. And, none other than Longstreet turned the idea down, not once but several times. Longstreet was acting like a 'warhorse', only doing as the master was bidding, responding only to the orders of Lee exactly as an old horse would, rather than moving to pastures greener to chew the grass, even though the grass looked particularly sweet. Longstreet dallied on July 2nd, and this dragging of the feet of his corps may have cost himthe opportunity to put into practice thqat which his firebrand and brilliant subordinate was suggesting.

Then we come to Jackson, an almost maverick personality by the standards of the day. He shared a trait with Lee and Hood of being pious, sometimes extremely so. 'Stonewall' had a highly developed streak of eccentricity, something he used to bind his loyal troops to his person. Old sweats would point out his known eccentric forms of behaviour as a method of seperating themselves from the 'newbies' of their command. They liked nothing more than to be referred to as 'foot cavalry'. It let them share their bosses behaviour in some form. Jackson, too, could be mostly dependable. MOSTLY. Even he had his limits, as demonstrated by his conduct during the Seven Days Battles. Weary from months of marching too and fro up and down the Shenandoah Valley, acksons performance at Seven Days was characterized by him falling asleep at critical junctures, with the result that he was never quite where Lee wanted him for the Seven Days. Even the best of subordinates have their weaknesses, as John Bell Hood was to demonstrate.

After Jacksons death, it has been noted that Lee's 'discretionary order' command style that so perfectly suited his lieutenants at Chancellorsville, suddenly became not so suitable when Lee attempted to manage his subordinates in the same way. The example used most often is the wide gap between perceptions of discretionary ordering when Richard Ewell took command of Jackson's corps. What worked with Jackson did not necessarily apply to Ewell. Jackson could be relied upon to know almost exactly what Lee intended with his orders, and his natural aggression let him pick exactly the right moment to unleash that aggression. Richard Ewell seemed to need each and every contingency spelt out for him, and he always erred on the side of caution, as his decisions on July 2 at Gettysburg were to show.

So, was Hood putting Lee's ordering style into action with the AoT? Hood had seen Lee's written orders often and for long enough to want to try to emulate his style, and he professed to be "under their spell" as it were. But Hindman, Hardee Cheatham and Leonidas Polk were not Jackson and Longstreet. And Hood had none of Lee's gifts for attention to details, like staff work, and recce.

Hood does not come across as uneducated. Quite the opposite. As the son of a physician, and a plantation slave holder at that, there would, I surmise, have been no shortage of literature to educate the young John Bell in the Hood family home. His father even wanted to pay for John to study medicine in Europe, so he must have shown some promise. But, like other children of intelligent people, John Bell could have been a lazy student, and this is reflected by his poor showing at West Point.

So, here we have an intellectual who was not noted for workload academically. A man of letters, McMurry also alludes to Hood attempting most times to bypass official channels to get what he wanted. This is also a character trait of intellectually active people, always trying to find the shortest way through.

Hood must have felt after his time in the Army of Northern Virginia that he had more than a good idea of exactly how Robert E. Lee achieved the results he did. After all, Hood was at the center of the action in most of these famous victories, so his ego must have been fuelled by this very factor. Add to this his ambitious nature, wanting to get as far as he could go in the military, probably to impress his family, but, most notably, it all could have been an attempt on his part to live up to the charms of Buck Preston. In this aspect of Hood's civil war career, I think his pursuiance of a suitor above his social standing was indicative of that which he was trying to do with his career as well; rise to the top. After all, wasn't John described by many officers of the AoNV as their premiere protege'? And does not the apprentice rise to become The Master in his own right?

On a mixture of drugs he may have been, but Hood is also described, post Chickamauga and convalesance, as 'In fine fettle.' I do not believe his wound can be given any share of the responsibility for his performance. He is described as having a "robust constitution", so it's easy to picture him as shrugging off whatever handicaps his wounds might have entailed, like being strapped to his horse. He states that he rode "in perfect comfort", something he could not have done had his wound been affecting his performance. Then there is note number 100 of this essay, which reads...."Some historians including Connelly and Sword, have speculated that Hood might have taken a derivative of laudanum or imbibed alchohol on the evening of November 29 to ease his pain, resulting in clouded judgement. As Stephen Davis has pointed out, there is no solid historical evidence to support these conclusions."

In summary, I believe John Bell Hood began his tenure of command with the Army of Tennessee with the idea that he was going to fulfill the long stated wishes of his friend, Jeff Davis, and do so in the manner of his 'teachers', Robert E. Lee and Thomas Jackson. By opening his mouth and criticizing Johnston for a lack of offensive mindedness, Hood was setting himself up for failure. He could hardly lobby for the top job with all his critical writings to Richmond, and then timidly ignore advice he had been giving Davis for well on 12 months by stooping to perform as Johnston or Bragg did. In short, Hood was a victim of his own criticism, painting himself into a corner by his letters, pressing for the offensive at a time when , clearly, offensive action was either uncalled for or downright dangerous.

Lee made commanding an army of the day look like something any well trained initiate could do.

John Bell Hood found out the hard way that Robert E. Lee was a GREAT general, not just a superb leader of men.

Hood's lotus eating at West Point had come back to bite him firmly on the backside.

 

I'm going to post the conclusion of this essay presently, but for now, could the good Mr Price or anyone elde please post a picture or two of John Bell Hood, or Buck preston, or other principle characters in this great drama of the American Civil War?

It would sure round out the essay, as we look into the eyes of John Bell Hood, and try to come to terms with the man and his career.....