Does Anyone Still Believe FDR Was Right to Blame Kimmel and Short?

What??? You have no clue what you are talking about, do you? The chain of custody for Marshall's message was exhaustively examined by the APHB, by the Clarke Investigation, and by the JCC.

Some additional points:

* If Marshall was truly worried about comms security, what did he think he was gaining by not using the scrambler phone but instead sending the message via a commercial line?! Is anyone going to argue that a Western Union telegram was more secure than a U.S. military scrambler phone?

* The scrambler phone was just as secure as the Army radio coded cable system that Marshall ostensibly preferred to use. In fact, there was such concern about the security of Army radio cables to Hawaii that it was standard practice not to send the same message to Kimmel and Short for fear that it would enable Japanese cryptologists to decipher the message. Marshall explained that this was why he and Stark would routinely end messages to Short or Kimmel with an instruction to share the message with the other.

* Stark tried to persuade Marshall to send the warning via the Navy radio system because it was much more powerful than the Army radio system. The Navy radio system broadcast with 25,000 kilowatts of power versus the Army’s 10,000-kilowatt transmitter. The Navy radio system usually had no trouble transmitting messages to Hawaii, but, as Colonel French explained to the APHB, the Army system was “normally out of service with Honolulu between 11:00 and 1:00.”

But Marshall insisted on using the Army radio system, and, surely enough, the Army system was down when Col. Bratton arrived at the Army Message Center with Marshall's warning, and that's why Col. French told Bratton that he needed to send it via Western Union.

French advised Bratton that it might take Western Union up to 45 minutes to get the message to Hawaii. Marshall had no choice but to admit that Bratton told him about this because Bratton testified that Marshall sent him back to the message center to find out how long it would take the message to reach Hawaii. But even when Marhsall found out that the message might not reach Hawaii for 45 minutes, he still refused to just pick up the scrambler phone on his desk and warn Short.

Marshall's tale about his warning message is beyond flimsy, beyond absurd, and beyond unbelievable. The pity is that no one on the JCC had the guts to ask him why, if he was worried about the scrambler phone's security, he chose to send the warning via the Army radio system when there were known concerns about that system's security, not to mention how in the world he thought that a Western Union transmission would be more secure than the scrambler phone.

 

Actually, it was more secure, since it did not rely on radio comms. To intercept the message, the cable had to be directly tapped. Some downsides to this though - the cable could only carry Morse code not voice transmissions, volume was always high thus creating an ever-present backlog of calls to be sent.
But any serious student on Pearl Harbor would know this and not have made such an imbecilic statement.

In other words neither were "SECURE"...Why am I not surprised. Why are all these Nobel prize winners so dumb? They seem far more qualified for a "Darwin Award", than a Nobel Prize.

Apparently, they never heard of interservice rivalry either. The same reason the US had such an asinine code breaking setup.

What mystical powers does this "scrambler phone" have? How do you think the voice signal was transmitted to Hawaii when their was no voice telephone cable to Hawaii. If the Army radio to Hawaii was down...I will go out on a limb and say the scrambler phone also would not be able to reach Hawaii.

Already explained that to you...Western Union cables had to be directly tapped to listen in to their Morse traffic - Scrambler phones broadcast to any one with an antenna.


Why does common sense seem so uncommon these days?

 

The scrambler phone was sooo secret that photos of it have just recently been declassified.

 

Oh. My. Goodness. This is what you get when you combine arrogance with ignorance. After I prove that your arguments are erroneous, as I'm about to do, will you acknowledge your gaffes? Some points in reply:

--- Marshall's message only went a small part of the way via Western Union cable. Most of its transmission was done via RCA radio. Col. French, who ran the Army Message Center and supervised the sending of the message, explained this:

As this message could be handled directly to San Francisco via the Western Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA office in San Francisco, with that excellent dispatch, this method had been chosen. (JCC Exhibit 147, p. 33)

The message was relayed from RCA San Francisco and arrived at RCA Honolulu 46 minutes after Western Union transmitted it (JCC Exhibit 147, p. 7)

So all this nonsense about the Japanese having to tap into the Western Union cable is based on your ignorance of the chain of transmission.

-- No, the fact that the Army radio system was down does not mean that Marshall's scrambler phone was also down, and not even the JCC majority or Marshall himself claimed otherwise. The APHB and the JCC minority zeroed in on Marshall's inexcusable failure to use his scrambler phone or to use the Navy or FBI radio systems.

-- You keep ignoring the fact that the whole issue of the security of the scrambler phone is a phony issue, given the fact that Marshall had no need to convey classified information to order Short to put his forces on alert. And, if Marshall had felt the need to explain the order, he could have given any number of plausible cover stories, such as that a spy in Tokyo had indicated that Pearl Harbor would be attacked in a day or two, or that some Russian fishing vessels had spotted a Japanese naval task force in the North Pacific heading east, etc., etc.

-- "Interservice rivalry"??? Seriously??? That's your explanation for why Marshall refused to use the Navy radio system???! So your telling me that Marshall, knowing or at least strongly suspecting that American forces somewhere in the Pacific were going to be attacked at around 1:00 PM Eastern Time--your telling me that he declined the fastest means to get a warning to our Pacific commanders because he didn't want to have to suffer the indignity of using the Navy radio system??? Yeah, uh-huh.

You can't really believe that. Marshall and Stark were good friends, and it boggles the mind how anyone could believe that the Army Chief of Staff would refuse to use the fastest means possible to warn our Pacific commanders merely because he didn't want to use the radio system of another branch of the military.

 

Well, I would class that as the pot calling the kettle black. But I admit to being biased.

 

What never ceases to amaze me is the fact that absolutely NOBODY in the CT department ever thought that if the time of the attack was known, Pearl could just as easily have been turned into a perfect ambush for the Japanese carrier planes:
It would still have become a "day of infamy" and one would have just as much the desired reason for war. But one could have also exploited a spectacular defensive success for propaganda purposes with far fewer losses. In addition, everyone would have perfectly understood why the knowledge about the attack was officially kept secret.
But no: Instead, the government deliberately sacrifices hundreds of soldiers and most fleet assets in order to get a reason for war - without thinking even for a single second about the devastating political consequences if the true background becomes public at the wrong time?
With such a limited mindset, FDR would not even have been able to manage an aquarium full of whelks...

 

Well, at least I have learned more about the background of the attack here in the few weeks through the numerous responses to the nonsense of MTG than in the last years.
With which MTG confirms once again that really EVERYONE is good for something - even if only as a cautionary tale.

 

The problem with all this is that it ignores the well-documented fact that Marshall and Stark deliberately led Short and Kimmel to believe that an air attack on Hawaii was extremely unlikely and that any Japanese attacks would occur thousands of miles away in the western Pacific region. Indeed, when Short received the do-don't "war warning" and notified that Marshall that he interpreted it as a warning against sabotage and had taken action accordingly, Marshall replied (through an aide) that this was acceptable and made no effort to correct his interpretation.

Keeping Kimmel and Short in the dark about the distinct possibility of an air attack on Hawaii was the reason that Marshall and Stark (via key collaborators) ensured that the critical, all-important bomb plot messages were not relayed to Hawaii, even though those messages clearly and plainly indicated preparation for an air attack on Hawaii. Two Navy officers resigned in protest over their superiors' refusal to relay the messages to Kimmel. Stark later admitted that the bomb plot messages obviously indicated planning for an air attack.

The bomb plot messages requested and relayed information about Pearl Harbor that was not requested about any other American naval base. Even the lying, dissembling JCC majority felt compelled to at least admit this fact. MacArthur's intelligence staff in the Philippines instantly recognized that the bomb plot messages were seeking information that would be needed for an air raid.

The new chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Captain Alan Kirk, recognized the implications of the first bomb plot message and urged that Admiral Kimmel be warned about it. So did Captain Harold Bode, head of the Foreign Intelligence Branch at ONI. So did Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, head of ONI’s Far East Section. So did Commander Laurance Safford, head of the Communications Security Division, Office of Naval Communications. Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Army Intelligence Division’s Far Eastern Section, likewise recognized the importance of the bomb plot intercept and urged that General Short be told about it. But Admiral Turner, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark refused to allow one word about the bomb plot intercepts to be passed to Kimmel and Short.

It is no wonder that FDR tried vigorously to keep the bomb plot messages secret and to prevent the NCI from examining them.

The JCC minority capably summed up the importance of the bomb plot messages:

The "bomb plot" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was divided into subareas by Japan. And no other American harbor had such a large share of the fleet to protect.

In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With the "bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet. But as to the presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. The reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of instructions emanating from the Government of Japan in Tokyo. (JCC minority report, p. 518)

If Kimmel and Short had been made aware of the bomb plot messages, they would have instantly recognized their implication and would have executed their preparations very differently. Kimmel would not have his ships bunched together in the confines of the harbor, and Short would not have had his planes bunched together and with no protection, among many other things they would have done differently, as Kimmel especially made clear when he found out about the bomb plot messages after he'd been pushed into retirement.

 

This would have raised all kinds of troubling, problematic questions, not to mention the fact that an ambush where we whipped the attacking Japanese would not have had nearly the emotional impact of a surprise attack on an unsuspecting Pearl Harbor.

Here are just some of the questions that would have arisen if FDR and his cohorts had followed your suggested course of action:

* Why did you make no effort to dissuade the Japanese from carrying out the attack after you learned it was coming?

* Why did you keep the impending a secret instead of loudly alerting the world that Japan had sent a task force to attack Pearl Harbor? Did you want the attack to occur?

* What if your planned ambush had not worked and we had suffered thousands of casualties instead, because you chose to keep the impending attack a secret from the American people?

Putting aside hypothetical what-if scenarios, the fact remains that we have an abundance of evidence that FDR and other key high officials knew the attack was coming, and there is no dispute--except among a fringe element of FDR apologists--that Kimmel and Short were denied critical intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attack. Let's summarize some of this evidence:

* The Hoover-Ladd memos that reveal that Army intelligence knew from Japanese intercepts that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.

* The account of Dutch naval attache Captain John Ranneft, whose account is corroborated by his contemporaneous official diary.

* The account of Joseph Leib, a New Deal Democrat.

* The account of James Stahlman, a former Navy officer and close friend of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

* The account of Congressman Dies, a Democrat.

* The account of Col. Ketchum.

* The account of John Burns, a retired counter-espionage officer who later became the governor of Hawaii and who gave his account when he knew he was dying, whose account was corroborated by one of his fellow counter-espionage officers.

* The accounts of four--yes, four--British intelligence officers.

* The account of former CIA Director William Casey.

* The account of Captain Safford, arguably the most brilliant intelligence officer during the war. Safford single-handedly discovered that the Germans had broken Naval Cipher 3, and it was thanks to this discovery that Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic were dramatically reduced.

The lame reply of "they were just mistaken" strains credulity, especially given the fact that so many of these accounts mutually corroborate each other and were given independently and at different times.

There's also other evidence:

* The 30 November Japanese intercept from the Kido Butai aircraft carrier Akagi that revealed the Akagi was communicating with support vessels on a tactical circuit, something that would never occur in operations in home waters.

* The SS Lurline DF bearings on comms from the Kideo Butai. And before anyone cites the dishonest, misleading polemics of the likes of Jacobsen on the Lurline evidence, let them first read the defenses of that evidence written by Ladislas Farago, Brian Villa, and Timothy Wilford, as well as my own humble chapter on the subject in my book. Here's a good online article on the Lurline material:

nm_11_2_1to17.pdf (cnrs-scrn.org)

* The 6 December transmission from submarine I-72, which was part of the Kido Butai's advance force under the Hawaii Operation.

* The 1944 Navy intelligence documented discovered years after the war by historian John Costello and naval expert Roger Pineau, which provides strong evidence that the "East Wind Rain" execute message was sent and intercepted a few days before the attack. The document mentions the serial number (7001) that was assigned to the execute message after it was intercepted.

 

sigh... This little thought experiment, after all, takes place under the assumed premise that FDR knew about the attack beforehand and deliberately let it happen in order to have a reason for war:

1) Why did you make no effort to dissuade the Japanese from carrying out the attack after you learned it was coming?

Because he can only prove the aggressive intentions in front of the whole world if an attack is carried out - Which explains point 2)

2) Why did you keep the impending a secret instead of loudly alerting the world that Japan had sent a task force to attack Pearl Harbor? Did you want the attack to occur?

Yes, of course: Because the fleet is deep in the Pacific, hears the warning, turns around as if nothing had happened and FDR can prove NOTHING. That would only play into the hands of the Japanese politically and, moreover, tell them that he knows their codes, which is absolutely undesirable. At least not before he gave them a good bashing on the head - Which explains point 1)

3) What if your planned ambush had not worked and we had suffered thousands of casualties instead, because you chose to keep the impending attack a secret from the American people?

If radar, flak, and fighters are alerted, the element of surprise is with them (The core element of an ambush), and the Japanese planes will be unlikely to do more damage than actually happened.

Above all, it has the huge advantage that FDR don't have to make a huge effort to keep the knowledge about the attack secret afterwards, so that clever sleuths like you don't eventually find out.....

Incidentally, it is far from enough to list an infinite number of sources: The relevant passages are important and interesting. And the chronological context also plays a role:
AFTER something has happened, many pieces fit together perfectly and seem to lead quite inevitably to the event. This is called backsight error. (Or also smarty-pants science)
Or do you think at the moment anyone can make a reliable forecast of what will be going on in Ukraine in a week's time? Certainly not. When at some point later historians have evaluated all possible sources, the course of events can be wonderfully reconstructed - but just not before ;-)

Before I go into any further sources, I am still waiting for the corresponding passage of the Hoover-Ladd memo to which you refer all the time - by the way, I am asking for it for the third time now ;-)

 

That's mighty crass verbiage from someone who is defending a position that most scholars on the subject have rejected as demonstrably false.

Again, most of the scholars who have studied Kimmel and Short's performance and the Roberts Commission's claims have concluded that the evidence shows that Kimmel and Short were not derelict in their duties and that the Roberts Commission's investigation was biased, unfair, and flawed. And, by the way, most of those scholars do not posit an advance-knowledge Pearl Harbor conspiracy. They argue that FDR and other high officials scapegoated Kimmel and Short to cover up their own egregious failure to relay critical intelligence to Kimmel and Short and their failure to recognize from Japanese intercepts and other information that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.

If anyone wants to read the evidence that has persuaded most scholars who have studied the subject that Kimmel and Short were not derelict but were unfairly blamed by Washington authorities, and that it was the Washington authorities themselves who had been derelict, here are some good online sources on that evidence:

"Reopen the Kimmel Case," by Dr. Michael Gannon
Reopen the Kimmel Case (richardsorge.com)
This is an article that Dr. Gannon, a naval historian, wrote for the Naval Institute of Proceedings in 1994. It contains much of the evidence that Dr. Gannon would later present in his landmark 2001 book Pearl Harbor Betrayed. Dr. Gannon's book is the second-best defense of Kimmel ever written, the best being Summers and Swan's exhaustive and ground-breaking 2016 book A Matter of Honor.

"Held to a Higher Standard: The Downfall of Admiral Kimmel," by LCDR Matthew Pettinger
458621.pdf
This is Pettinger's master's thesis for his master's degree in military science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

"FDR: Guilty Short and Kimmel Were Scapegoats," by David Richardson
FDR: Guilty Short & Kimmel Were Scapegoats | AMERICAN HERITAGE

Pearl Harbor: The Real Seeds and Fruits of Infamy, by Percy L. Greaves
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy (mises.org)
This is the PDF version of Greaves' book. Greaves was the chief counsel for the Republican minority on the JCC.

"'Pearl Harbor Betrayed': A Day of Government Infamy," by Tom Bowman
'Pearl Harbor Betrayed': A day of government infamy? – Baltimore Sun
This is a detailed review of Dr. Gannon's book Pearl Harbor Betrayed.

"Reasons to Support the Advancement of Admiral Kimmel on the Retired List"
kimmelreasonstosupport.pdf (wm.edu)
This is a paper compiled by one of the professors at William & Mary University to be used by students in some of the university's WWII courses. It includes numerous statements by senior military officers on the shabby conduct of the Roberts Commission and on the reasons that Kimmel deserved to be restored to his pre-Pearl Harbor rank. Here's just one of the gems from the paper, a statement about the Roberts Commission by Admiral Henry Yarnell, the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet in 1940 and the head of a special section in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations during WWII:

“The most disgraceful feature of the whole affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. One of the strongest impressions of the affair is the lack of moral courage of anyone in Washington from the President down to accept in the slightest degree any blame for the tragedy in the face of overwhelming evidence that their incompetence and stupidity was entirely responsible for what happened."

"For the Good of the Service: Husband E. Kimmel and the Aftermath of Pearl Harbor," by John Keegan
Thesis021710.pdf (jgkeegan.com)
This is Keegan's master's thesis for his master's degree in history from the University of Pennsylvania.