Dunkirk ?

Well, we now NOW that it was a mistake not sending the Panzer against the beachhead. But AT THE TIME is was NOT a mistake. And the Luftwaffe COULD complete the work itself. The two days of good weather the number of troops evacuated was very low and ship losses extremely high. It was LUCK, bad weather.

 

Friedrich, please... I guess you realize yourself how odd this arguing is!

If you need to hurry to crush a hostile army and insist - unnecessarily! - on a method depending on the wheather, when you can't predict it's in your favor, this is a MISTAKE.

If you do not take into account that bombs don't have their full effect on sand, this is a MISTAKE.

If you do not take into account that the English have limited ability to cover the airspace with their own fighters, this is a MISTAKE.

All in all, it is a VERY BIG MISTAKE.

 

OK, OK. If you don't want to buy my statements, I am not buying yours either.

Do we agree on that?

 

In the name of von Richthofen, we will fight it out! May the readers decide in my poll...

About the Battle of Arras:

In a book about general tank history it is mentioned that after the British tank victory, French SOMUA tanks attacked erringly the Mathildas, deeming them German tanks. Does anybody know whether this is true?

[ 23. October 2003, 08:58 AM: Message edited by: KnightMove ]

 

OK, if we want to fight, en garde!

First, I do not think that the battle of Arras was a victory at all! ANd second, now, I have never heard anything about Somuas and Mathildas fighting each other. To my knowledge, the British and French armoured forces were not even close...

 

This is true for Rundstedt, wrong for Halder and Brauchitsch (I don't know about the others). They disagreed and DID foresee the consequences.

But it doesn't make too much difference WHO took part in this decision, it was anyway wrong and an unlucky change from the plan.

The Luftwaffe needed good wheather (and they couldn't influence this), the sand at Dunkirk beach mildened the effect of the bombs. Letting the Luftwaffe and the infantry do the job, was a MISTAKE. That it was agreed by others, doesn't make a difference that it was ALSO Hitler's mistake, and a very big one. [/QB][/QUOTE]


Ahh, Knight, so true. Can't describe it better, you took the words right out of my moth, really.

As for the "blame most" side for the ABSOLUTE BLUNDER to not go for Dunkirk, the list is:

1. Rundstedt
2. Rundstedt
3. Hitler
4. Sodenstern
5. Rundstedt
6. Brauchitsch
7. Kleist

Goering and OKW came in late, so no much relevance. We're talking about the critical May 25 stop.

Now, Guderian, Bock, Halder, Brauchitsch, Jodel, Richthofen etc. pp freaked out or couldn't believe the May 25 "stop"-order. Even Kleist, who initally requested a pause on 23rd, was eager to push forward again a.s.a.p.

No, Rundstedt the old school warrior, who was seemingly bloddy pissed about Brauchitsch taking away all his panzers as soon as he issued his stop order is the snake in the grass.

Brauchitsch, the man without balls, went to Hitler in the believe to convince him easily that the halt-order is plain crap with all the facts on his side, but Hitler pushed him away like a school boy. Rundstedt and Manstein were his "Sichelschnitt"-brothers in minds so Hitler put more trust in Rundstedt's assesment than others...and was wrong in doing so.

Friedrich, please check again, Halder and Bock definately do _not_ belong to the "stop"-fraction, to the contrary!

Well, of course after the war all memoirs agreed that ot was just Hitler who screwed it up, Rundstedt was even lying about this matter after the war, claiming he couldn't do anything about it it was all Hitler's idea, what a joke!.

Cheers,

 

When the halt order was given, was it considered by the Germans that the British army could have escaped by sea? The Germans had control of the air for the most part, had the army trapped against the sea. They may simply have been waiting for this allied force to surrender, or use the surrender in part to gain an armistice with Britain. Even midway through the evacuation with the small boats and lots of bravery relatively few soldiers were disembarked from the Dunkirk beaches. The miracle was that there was cloud cover for a few days and the British realising there was nothing to lose docked at the mole and loaded ships directly rather than emplying the little ships. Yes the little ships did help, but docking ships at the mole under cloud cover was the major reason so many returned. IMO I doubt Hitler and his generals ever thought this could happen, particularly with the Luftwaffe being as strong as it was at this point in the war.

Thoughts?

 

It is in my understanding that the Germans halted because they thought the Luftwaffe would finish of the Brits. Easier to bomb from the air with nothing shooting back at you then sending in troops that can potentially be killed. I suppose the Germans thought that with enough bombardment by the Luftwaffe, the Brits would capitulate. This not being case, they finally sent in the Panzers and Infantry to finish of the job, at which point a large portion of the Brits had made good use of the added time to get on ships and head home from Dunkirk. They left lots of equipment behind, but the retreat/evacuation was mainly concerned with getting troops off the beaches and back to safety, no room for the equipment. Pictures of Dunkirk during the evavuation are pretty impressive with the amount of equipment, trucks, etc left on the beaches.
Also, i might be confusing this with something else, but a small force did remain behind and held up the Panzers/Infantry for a while in a last-stand type of action buying more time for more troops to escape. They were dug-in on a hill or something.
Forgive me if i am wrong.

 

On the "Stop" order I read a while ago that it was Rundstedt that gave the stop order and actually Hitler just did not cancel it...??

It should be in the Wehrmacht archives according to the book.

Interesting....

 

It was considered. That was why the German Army High Command pushed so strong to get to Dunkirk a.s.a.p. from the south, before it’s defended there. Dunkirk was the open drain in the bathtub and you don’t use a tea strainer (Air Force) to close it, if your solid plug (german tank and mot. Divisions) are only 15 milers away with no considerably enemy forces in-between.

No, Rundstedt, stopped all advance of the Panzer and Motorized Divisions west to Arras on May 23/24 because he was afraid of his flanks and wanted time to let the Infantry Divisions arrive to improve his troop coherence.

This is right. Hitler gave Rundstedt a free hand to do as he think what is right. So Hitler’s main mistake was to put more trust in an Army Group Commander like Rundstedt than in the German C-i-C Brauchitsch, who was pushing to go for Dunkirk. Once Rundtstedt realized his decisive mistake and ceased his “stop”-order on May 29 (?), Hitler was consequentially O.K. with that, too.

So any postwar myths surrounding the “Miracle of Dunkirk” are quite exaggerated. Fact is: A German “old school” Army Group Commander (Rundstedt, C-i.-C of AG “A”) suggested to stop his troops closely before the encirclement was finished with the capture of the last big exit: the harbor of Dunkirk. The German High Command strongly disagreed with that and took away all of Rundstedts motorized Divisions to give it under Bock’s (AG “B)”command, who was willing to finish the encirclement. Understandably Rundstedt was pissed about this “degradation” and told Hitler about it, who was likewise pissed that “his” puppet Army C-i-C makes a decision like that (shifting the entire German motorized forces from one command to another) without even informing him about this rather relevant decision. So Hitler decided to allow Rundstedt to do whar Rundstedt believed to be right, and Rundstedt did, by issuing a restrictive “halt”-order and stubbornly defend it for three critical days, IIRC against all common military sense and desperate begging to advance again.

That’s the story. After the war, Rundstedt blamed Hitler for his own mistake, a common exercise among those surviving German Generals who re-wrote history.

Cheers,

 

Did Manstein put forward his opinion in this discussion?

 

Slightly off topic, but...

How is the fact that the BEF was not destroyed seen as a failure? The Germans had captured France, French army had surrendered, The BEF were shattered, and all their heavy equipement were left behind...how can this be seen to be a failure? Sure they escaped, but the offensive capability of the British army was set back years.

This was a huge propagada Coup for Britain but honestly, if the BEF was destroyed/surrendered, would that have affected Churchill's decision to "Fight them on the beaches!"...I seriously think not!

 

It was far more than a "propaganda coup". 340,000 (?) British and French soldiers escaped to England instead becoming a POW dead pledge for Hitler, so Britain had still an Army of experienced soldiers. Without weapons, shattered, yes, maybe even demoralized but an Army. How many British Army Generals and leading Officers who became so valuable later in the war were NOT saved by DYNAMO?

Drafting men to built up a trained but still unexperienced and awfully green land Army from scratch takes how long, 3 years? Compare this to having 340,000 battle experiened, trained men at disposal who just need new weapons to continue to fight.

Cheers,

[ 21. November 2003, 10:07 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

The BEF were the heart and soul of the British army, who were later to fight in North Africa, Sicely, Italy and in the Normandy campaign. The evacuation of Dunkirk may have been truly the turning point in WW2. IMO without it Britain may not have had the confiedence and heart to continue to fight Germany but may have been willing to enter into some form of armistice, giving Hitler a much freer hand in eastern Europe and to gain access to oil resources in the middle east. as well as to purchase supplies from the US. The POWs would also have been a good bargaining chip for Adolf. The Battle of France may not have been intended to knock out Britain, but if may well have had this result had the evacuation not been the success it was. Remember that Churchill was not a PM with strong cabinet and governmental support at this time - it would take many months before he won the home battle with his own party and government, and till then his position was more insecure than many realise.

 

WRT Dunkirk Manstein wrote: “This [the escape, A.W.] is the result of Hitlers interference, who stopped the Tank groups two times during their rush forward – first time during their advance to the coast and a second time in front of Dunkirk.”

(Manstein: “Verlorene Siege” (Lost Victories), p. 122 of the German edition)

As shown above, it was mainly von Reichenau’s responsibility and decision to stop the tanks in front of Dunkirk. As Manstein held Rundtstedt [A.W.: edited, thanks!] in high esteem (Manstein was explicitly thanking him in his foreword), it’s clear that Manstein would not criticize Reichenau, but Hitler instead.

Hope this helps.

Cheers,

[ 25. November 2003, 08:11 AM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

I guess you mixed up von Rundstedt and von Reichenau now. But my question was more about 1940 - if Manstein put forward any statement in this discussion in 1940. But as it seems, he didn't.

 

Something interesting :

If Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the BEF troops´ movements and other British troops placements then Hitler might have been aware of all this until 20th May 1940!

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SSkentT.htm

"On 20th May, 1940, the Special Branch raided Kent´s flat. Inside they found the copies of 1,929 classified documents including secret correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill."

Then again maybe not:

"..that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris , head of German military intelligence (Abwehr), now had copies of the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence .."

 

Recreading the summary of Jochen R. Klicker, you probably underdo the role of Göring. He suggested the Luftwaffe to do the job on May 23rd.Reason: If the army does it on their own, the Generals might become cocky and less obedient... one day later Rundstedt suggested that the infantry would cooperate better with the Luftwaffe, and to stop the panzers. And Hitler was certainly influenced by Göring when he overruled in favor of Rundstedt.