F4U Corsair vs F6F Hellcat

They were both good fighter aircraft. Numbers, tactical situation probably had more influence on the statistics than their relative merit as fighters. There was a consensus among players of the combat flight simulator Warbirds about the F4U and F6F which have different characteristics as fighters and have to be flown differently.

The F4U is a boom and zoom aircraft that needs to be flown fast, like an Fw190. It isn't a dogfighter. Never try to turn with anything. It has a high instantaneous turn rate and a good rate of roll - but a large turn radius and slow turn rate. Stay above 5,000 ft and never get caught slow and low.

The F6F is a middling sort of aircraft. It isn't the best for boom and zoom nor as a turn fighter. It is a good "e" fighter, like a spitfire IX.

 

Why didn't the US use the Hellcat and Corsair in Europe against the Luftwaffe? The US used P-47s and P-51s in the Pacific, but the top-line Navy fighters didn't see service for the US in Europe. That would have given the US even more air and materiel supremacy if they used the excellent Navy fighters in the ETO and MTO.

 

I think it's because of the different Naval Aviation segments, the Marine Corps was almost totally dedicated to the PTO. The US Navy's major carrier units CV's/CVL's were dedicated to the PTO at the time those two aircraft became widely available (with the exception of Ranger). Naval land based fighter units were primarily used to protect or operate out of US Navy/USMC bases, in the ETO the US Army Air Corps and the Brits had that segment covered. F6F's and F4U's did operate with Fleet Air Arm units and from British CV's. US CVE's operated the F4F or variants thereof because of their smaller size.

 

They could have used them from air fields and land bases, as the F4U was land-based and carrier-based.

 

They could, but why? There were plenty of the best Allied land-based fighters in Europe, of quite a few different types - why add more non-standard aircraft to the mix? And don't forget good old logistics and its tiresome insistence that you never get something for nothing; transporting and supporting a squadron of say F4Us would be instead of a corresponding squadron of P-47s or some other common ETO type.

 

The USN and Marines didn't have any land based fighters in Europe did they? Moving a whole new organization into theater would have been a bit more effort than just adding USAAF squadrons as well. That said the USN carriers in the Atlantic did carry some F6Fs and F4Us I believe and some even saw combat vs Germany from what I recall (possibly F6Fs only).

 

The only operational use I'm aware of - though mccoffe or R Leonard may correct me - of F6Fs by the USN in the European theater was by two CVEs supporting the Dragoon landings, Tulagi and Kasaan Bay. Both were subsequently transferred to the Pacific where they operated standard CVE air groups of TBF/TBMs and FMs. A British (US-built) CVE also operated Hellcats in Dragoon, and I believe there were other RN operations.

USS Ranger conducted several raids on Norweigan ports and German shipping in 1943, but AFAIK her fighters were F4Fs. The F6F was being phased in on Pac Fleet CVs and CVLs, but apparently Ranger was not considered a priority; she was already spending much of time on training and aircraft ferry duties.

 

Thanks MrLeonard, Vitamin C.... Well said, great reading.
My only comment might be- wouldn't the F4 be considered the better craft because it served well in 2 wars...Was the F6 used in combat after WW2?

 

Yup, pretty much. For the US Navy F6Fs the only action over Europe, indeed, transpired during Operation Anvil/Dragoon, the invasion of southern France, in August 1944. USS Tulagi, with VOF-1 (LCDR William F Bringle, USN) and USS Kasaan Bay embarking VF-74 (LCDR H Brinkley Bass, USN), both squadrons, operating F6F-5s, provided coverage for the landings. VF-74 also operated a 7-plane F6F-3N night fighter detachment from Ajaccio on the island of Corsica. On the day of the invasion, 15 August, VF-74 flew 60 sorties, VOF-1, 40 sorties, all ground support missions. Royal Navy CVEs also supported the operation, their fighter complements were a mixture: HMS Khedive, with Seafires (899 Squadron), HMS Attacker, Seafires (866 Squadron); HMS Emperor, F6Fs (800 squadron); HMS Hunter, Seafires (807 squadron); HMS Pursuer, Wildcat Vs (881 Squadron); HMS Searcher, Wildcat Vs (882 Squadron) and HMS Stalker, Seafires (809 Squadron). The RN squadrons were tasked with providing CAP over the invasion force.

For the USN squadrons, action started on the morning of 19 August, the first German aircraft, three He 111's, were spotted by a four-plane division of VOF-1 pilots. The Americans were too short on fuel and could not attack, in fact, two of the Americans were forced to land on HMS Emperor due to their fuel state. Later that day, two He 111's were spotted by another VOF-1 division and were promptly shot down, this occurring near the village of Vienne. LT Rene E J Poucel and ENS Alfred R Wood teamed up to bring down one and ENS David E Robinson brought down the second. Soon thereafter, in the same vicinity, a third He 111 was shot down by ENS Wood.

That same morning, a division of VF-74 pilots led by LCDR Bass brought down an Ju 88 and in the afternoon another division attacked a Do 217 with split credits to going to LTJG Edwin W Castanedo and ENS Charles W S Hullard.

On 21 August, pilots from VOF-1 shot down three Ju 52 transports north of Marseille. Two were credited to LTJG Edward W Olszewski; one went to ENS Richard V B Yenter. Operating for two weeks in support of the invasion, these two squadrons were credited with destroying 825 trucks and vehicles, damaging 334 more and destroying or otherwise immobilizing 84 locomotives. German aircraft shot down: VOF-1: 6, VF-74: 2.

Although the two navy squadrons lost some 17 aircraft, combined, all were to ground fire or operational accidents. None were shot down by German aircraft. Among the 7 pilots lost (2 from VOF-1 and 5 from VF-74) was the CO of VF-74, LCDR Bass, awarded 2 Navy Crosses from early Pacific actions, killed by antiaircraft fire while strafing near Chamelet on 20 August.

After their participation in Operation Anvil/Dragoon came to an end, both the CVEs and their squadrons returned to the US. The CVEs went on about their business, picking up new VC squadrons and heading for points west, USS Tulagi with VC-92 and USS Kasaan Bay with VC-13, both in early December 1944.

VF-74 was disestablished on 1 October 1944 and its pilots reassigned. VOF-1 moved across country to the west coast, setting up shop at NAS San Diego and on 18 December 1944 was re-designated as VOC-1, and began the process of turning in their F6Fs for FM-2s and TBMs. After working up, VOC-1 headed west as well and had two combat deployments, one aboard USS Marcus Island and the other aboard USS Wake Island. On 1 August 1945, back at NAS Alameda after its last deployment, the squadron was again re-designated, becoming the new VC-1, the previous squadron so designated having been disestablished on 1 April 1944 at NAAS Pungo. The change did not last long, VC-1 was disestablished exactly one month later.

There was another USN squadron, VCS-8 (LT Delwin A Liane, USN), patrolling the beaches of Operation Dragoon for spotting for naval gunfire, but they were flying P-51s, so they weren’t operating from carriers. Back on 21 April 1944 the observer pilots normally stationed aboard the cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Philadelphia were formally attached to the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, flying F-6A's to qualify type. In July, the VCS-8 pilots received 10 new P-51C's which they flew during the invasion of southern France.

VCS-8 pilots were assigned to the “Camel” sector, which stretched roughly from Ponte de la Calle, just to the south of St. Aygulf, thence north and east to a point just east of Les Beaumettes and west of Cagnes-sur-mer on the Baie des Anges. This included the area surrounding Cannes and was in support of operations conducted by the 36th Infantry Division (USA). Each spotting mission consisted of two fighters, one to spot and the other to "weave" astern. The spotter reported the fall of shot and the weaver reported presence of anti-aircraft fire and hostile aircraft. This second pilot was prepared to take over the spotting duty in case the spotter suffered casualty or communication failure. By August 30, with the land operations outside the range of naval gunfire support, the pilots turned their P-51's over to the 111 TRS and returned to their ships and their more tame floatplanes.

 

I would not get too excited about the F4U serving in both WW2 and in Korea while the F6F served only during WW2. It was largely a matter of what was in the pipeline developmentally and where the Navy wanted to go with its air group configuration. Keeping it short . . .

Despite, or perhaps as he planned, Leroy Grumman’s pitch of the F8F concept to BuAer as a replacement for the FMs on CVEs was quickly seized upon by the BuAer planners as the replacement for the F6F in CVGs. Had war continued, thus necessitating high manning levels, the F8F would have replaced the F6F, first in the CVGs and then in the CVLGs. This would push the F6F inventory down to the VC squadrons – BuAer knew F6Fs could routinely operate from CVEs, witness the CVEGs with F6Fs – to replace the FMs until sufficient quantities of F8Fs were available for VC use. The end of the war squashed this grand plan. By the fall of 1945, with ships being laid up and air groups disestablished, BuAer went straight to the elimination of the F6F as a front line fighter and its replacement with the F8F.

The F6F was recognized as reaching the end of its developmental life while it was equally plain that a couple more versions could be wrung from the F4U concept. Planning documents by the end of the war clearly point to the near future demise of the F6F as the standard carrier fighter, to be replaced by an F8F/F4U combination. This was in keeping with the Navy’s one-two combination of fleet defense fighters, F8Fs, and attack oriented fighters, F4Us. This system gave the fleet the best of both worlds, a point defense fighter that was arguably the best piston engine fighter ever deployed from a carrier, or just about any place else for that matter, plus another fighter that was well beyond merely “satisfactory” in a fleet defense role if necessary, but could haul large earth moving devices as well as any VB type in service (the USN already knew it would be a long, long time before they would have to go about sinking somebody’s capital ships on a regular basis).

I would point out, though, that the Navy was also fully aware of the F4U’s propensity for having problems in its CAS role. It was already known to be, generally, more vulnerable than the F6F, and one USN study conducted during the Korean War found that the F4U was twice as likely to get shot down by ground fire as the Douglas AD, which, itself, was twice as likely to get shot down as the F9F. The problem with the F4U was its oil cooling system which was extremely vulnerable to fire from below. In the long run, the F4U went away because the AD series could haul more ordnance and was less vulnerable and jet fighters were the way of the future . . . just as there were no improvements to be made to the F6F to keep apace with the times and technology, neither was there any further lives to be wrung from the F4U design.

Rich

 

Just the F4U? Any airplane that can operate from a carrier can operate from land. The Royal Navy operated Seafires out of NAS Lee-onSolent during Overlord and probably from other places as well, not to mention more than a few Wildcats buzzing around the area.

But for US assets? Well, there were, eventually, more than 100 USAAF fighter squadrons in the European theater, all stationed on bases that had no worries about getting sunk. (And that’s just plain vanilla fighter squadrons . . . not counting recon squadrons, mostly because I’d have to go back and see how they were equipped & that’s too much trouble. Disclaimer: Truth be known, except for actual US naval aviation activities, I really have very little, bordering on none at all, interest in WW2 in Europe and Africa -see disclaimer) I have never counted RAF and Commonwealth fighter squadrons - previously noted lack of interest - but a large number would not surprise me.

Except for places where all these fighters were not readily available, for whatever reason, operational or logistical, such as Operation Torch or Anvil/Dragoon, obviously carrier aircraft, USN and RN, could be made available. Note, though, as soon as fields were available ashore, the AFs moved in and the carriers went back to whatever they were doing before. So, where would the Allies have needed full time land based carrier fighters such as F6Fs and F4Us . . . strikes me as a waste of assets. Better yet, where would they put them?

 

One other aspect to the continued use of the F4U in the ground attack role - the US Navy liked to keep two options for its fighter aircraft. The F4F was originally beaten out by the F2A Buffalo, but became the front line fighter after the Buffalo's developmental problems. The same with the F4U and F6F, where the F6F contract was a hedge against the Corsair's developmental woes.

Post war, Grumman was producing the F8F and then the excellent F9F Panther/Cougar. Meanwhile, Vought was going through the F5U "flying pancake", the F6U Pirate and the F7U "Gutless" Cutlass. By using the F4U-4 and -5's in ground attack, the Navy kept Vought in the game until after several whiffs they finally jacked one over the fence with the excellent F8 Crusader.

 

Great story about the Navy float plane pilots getting to fly P-51s, must have been the highlight of their careers!

We are getting a little off topic, perhaps we need a new thread - P-51 vs. OS2U

 

The RN used both the F6F (Hellcat) and F4U (Corsair).

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/57864-us-carriers-in-the-eto/#entry646598

The difference in the loss rates between the F6F and F4U may reflect the differences in handling qualities as much as robust construction. It must have been particularly tricky trying to land a battle damaged F4U, an aircraft with a reputation for being difficult to fly at low speeds.

 

the problem of everyone getting there information from websites means that there is more arguments

the answer has already been posted --- insurance.

this is some thing the yanks learnt from the poms. and the navy learnt first. i mean look at heavy bombers

usa, B17, pre war concept sold to the army, and nearly canceld. B24 sold to the army. B29 sold to the army. all airframes were private initiatives.

US Navy, states in-conjunction with private business what thay want. a more hand in hand relationship.

the RAF on the other had, stated some specs and industry had to meet those specs. and as insurance usually all of the aircraft that meet those specs where ordered, as insurance against each other.

IE both the spitfire and hurricane were developed against or to the same speck at the same time.

as already mentioned the US army only had 1 bomber developed at a time. the poms had 3. the Avro Lancaster, Handley Page Halifax, and the Short Stirling were all developed to the same RAF spec.

the only aircraft in pommyland not produced to a RAF spec but was taken on. IE american style was the Mosquito.

even post war, England continued this style of purchasing/ development, thus the mutatude of jet fighters. and the RAF running all 3 V bombers at the same time. infact thay still run one today

 

That could very well be argumentative. As the F6F design began life as an new model for the F4F Wildcat using the Wright R-2600 Cyclone. However, as matters quickly became far more complex than just hanging a new engine on the F4F, and it was soon found that instead of a Wildcat upgrade, a new design was necessary. The design, rather than being an F4F-X, eventually became the XF6F-1.

The Yanks didn't learn it from the "poms", nor did the Navy. The Navy learned it from Brewster. I would add that it was not, as had been mentioned earlier, design problems that were at fault, but production of the Brewster Buffalo in the numbers the Navy desired - Brewster rapidly fell behind on their delivery schedule, and continued to fall farther and farther behind. The Navy, needless to say, was less than pleased with Brewster. Hence, they reopened the door for Grumman.

This statement is far from correct.

Yes, at the time, all US military air frames were private initiatives. The process usually went thusly...The Army or Navy would issue a set of specifications, aviation companies would then design and produce an aircraft at their own cost, there would be a competition, and the declared winner would get the contract, while the losers were out their costs.

The B-17 was not a pre-war concept sold to the Army. It was a multi-engine bomber built to specifications set forth in the US Army Air Corps Circular Proposal 35-26. The bombers that participated in the competition were the Boeing Model 299, the Douglas DB-1, and the Martin Model 146. Although, the Model 299 was decidedly superior to it's competition, it crashed during a test flight and the Douglas DB-1 was declared the winner of the competition. Still, the Air Corps was impressed by it's performance and issued a contract for 13 more aircraft.


You are correct about the B-24, Consolidated sold it to the USAAF.

You are incorrect about the B-29. The B-29(Model 345) was the winning design in a competition with three others: the B-30(Lockheed Model 51-81-01), B-31(Douglas Model 322F), and B-32(Consolidated Model 33).

From the looks of it, the "insurance" was very much hit or miss
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_Of_Air_Ministry_Specifications

That maybe...But, the Hawker design was repeatedly passed over before they finally "sold" it to the Air Ministry.

Did Hawker learn that from us "Yanks"?

I don't think so.

The Avro Manchester and the Halifax were designed to Specification P.13/36.
The Stirling was designed to B.12/36.
The Lancaster was somewhat of a mish-mash, but the closest appears to be Specification B.1/39. IIRC, neither competing designs from Armstrong Whitworth or Supermarine were produced as "insurance".

That depends on how you are qualifying this, as the spec that the Mossie was more or less designed to was the same P.13/36 that produced the Manchester & Halifax. And, as I have pointed out the Hurricane was "sold" IE your "American Style" to the Air Ministry.

Not anymore. http://www.vulcantothesky.org/history/end-of-flight-2.html