FDR and the oil embargo.

Interesting. Just where you you get such an analogy out of the Hull Note? I see nothing that says Japan must do X, Y, and Z before the US will "think" about following through with U, V, or W but with no guarantee.
Here is everything except the ten points

Where in there does it come anywhere close to what you advocate it says?

No, my precedent covered what you asked for the first time. I precedent where country A asks country B to do something when Country B had not just lost the war. I did simply did so. What began that war was a second list of demands that Russia then refused. Russia fully complied after being asked to leave the area in question.

Again with calling it a demand. Even you claimed it does not meet the definition of a demand. You may discount it all you want, but based upon what you say it then could still be used as a precedent since the British and French decided to answer the "Eastern Problem" by furthering aggression toward Russia. It wasn't an acceptance or refusal of the provided precedent that began the Crimean War.

I will remain of the opinion that those who were there speaking with Hull and FDR have better opinions than you. In the excerpts of the Dairy of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura provided in The Pacific War Papers, Nomura claims several times that he is of the opinion that the US is genuine in its hopes for peace. In June he was rebuked for "overstepping his authority" and that adherence to the treaty with Germany was far more important than peace with the United States. No sir, Japan was itching for a fight, and nothing was going to stop them.

 

Ok, but did you have a precedent that helps rather than hurts your position?

I stated it did not meet the definition of an ultimatum. “Let me sleep with your wife” is also not an ultimatum, by the way.

Schroedinger’s Cat; we do not know what happened in the box, so our theory must encompass all possible explanations, not merely the one that you like. The evidence also supports the idea that Hull was looking to antagonise the Japanese, by way of the simple fact that Hull was making unilateral demands upon Japan that Hull knew may cause a war. I understand that Hull nor FDR ever admitted to aiming to make relations worse, but you will find boatloads of people who are not overly surprised that this underhanded motive, if it existed, was not recorded.

Whereas I got no read that the United States was prepared to moderate its demands in order to maintain peace with Japan. The pattern in 1941 was that the pressure was increasing, not decreasing.

 

.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
.
Comment: A non-aggression pact was useless with respect to Japan’s security requirements against the Soviet Union, or to the purpose of maintaining universal peace in the Pacific. The United States must be willing to enter an alliance with Japan, upon Japan’s meeting the US demands, not merely an non-aggression pact. Note that the United States has neverused non-aggression pacts when sculpting its regional security policies.
.
Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question....
.
What, precisely, was the threat to Indochina that required Japan to agree to this? Let’s re-work this to better underscore the problem with the demand,
.
Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the German, Italian, Mexican, Japanese and American Governments to pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of Mexico...
.
Why is this hypothetical Japan demanding equal say in Mexico to the United States, and who precisely is the agreement to be executed against, if not the United States itself?
.

.
Did the Japanese ask for this?
.
The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
.
This demand must cause a war. China = Manchuria?
.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support - militarily, politically, economically - any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
.
This demand may also mean war; not only did it infringe upon Japan's soveriegnty to dictate which government of China it recognised, but the demand itself was incompetent; the Nationalists were hopelessly corrupt and had to be supplanted by a real government for China to grow.
.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
.
Japan must withdraw from China, but in return the United States only guarantees that it will, “enter into negotiations” for a trade agreement. What if Japan withdraws from China, and the US then terminates negotiations without an agreement?
.
Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
.
This demand IS THE MOST INTOLERABLE OF ALL. Nah, just kidding. It's fine.
.
Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
.
The purpose of non-aggression pacts are the antithesis of peace, being that they have a function only when at least one of the parties is engaged in a war. Hull states that the United States' intention to create regional peace, but offers Japan a political treaty that can only have meaning to Japan if Japan is under attack from some other party. The United States has not materially demonstrated its commitment to, ‘the preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area’. What, precisely does Hull’s note guarantee to Japan in the form of American real security commitments if the Soviet Union attacked Japan after Japan weakened itself by surrendering its empire?
.

.
Hull cannot suppose that Japan would ever accept a political agreement that did not incorporate a benevolent joint policy towards Japan's allies, Germany and Italy. Does the US agree to work with Japan to bring about a ceasefire in Europe?
Again - to underscore the point. The US had the right to take this stance because Japan was out of control and was the aggressor. But to imagine Hull's purpose as attempting to find common ground for peace instead of trying to goad Japan into war, that IMO cannot be accepted beyond being one theory of why the US sent this note.

 

Re – non-aggression pact.
.
Which party other than, “British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States” forms the intended target of the non-aggression pact? Germany and Italy are the only Great Powers remaining. But Hull could not suppose Japan was threatened by either, or that Japan required protection against her own allies.
.
The non-aggression pact has some meaning against the Soviet Union. But that also happens to be the country that Japan already had concluded a non-aggression pact with. Why does Japan need a non-aggression pact that Japan already possesses? Hull is offering to sell a car Tokyo already owns.
.
Conclusion: Non-aggression pacts are a rare form of international agreement that occur only when one party is contemplating war and seeks to bind a potential enemy power to neutrality in that war. As Japan gains nothing, by process of elimination Hull’s target is Nazi Germany. The United States is requiring Japan to denounce its allies, but offers no group of allies to Japan to replace them.
.
RE – Indochina.
.
The US demand corners the Japanese government. Hull is not stupid, he will have known that the Japanese leadership’s prestige and ‘face’ would be lost at being forced to withdraw from Indochina just after a major policy decision where many careers and reputations had been staked on the risk.
Indochina had been France’s colonial playground, acknowledged as such by the United States with no apparent prior concern for the peoples under French rule. Had Washington suddenly grown fond of the national aspirations of the Vietnamese, a sudden fondness for their national identity that would last until the French boot returned to the Vietnamese neck after the war?
.
A better negotiating position would have been for Washington to agree apriori that Vietnam was to be independent, free from a return to colonial rule; that is, France would be ejected and would never return. Hull’s note contains phrases, such as,
.
“These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations”.
.
This declaration is incompatible with French, Dutch, and British colonial empires in the Pacific. Is Hull suggesting that Britain, for example is to be ejected from Malaya as an occupying power, or is it that nations do not exist if and when they interfere with the colonial asperations of the white man?
.
By giving Japan the ‘out’ of pretending it occupied Indochina in order to free the Vietnamese, the Americans would throw Tokyo a lifeline to save face to the world and to its own people, thereby improving the chances to a peaceful resolution on that issue. Hull, however, takes a different approach.
.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support - militarily, politically, economically - any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China
.
This demand obliterates the legitimacy of the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria, since Japan is to agree to only one government ruling all of China and the definition of “China” will be what the Nationalist government says “China” means.

 

If FDR had stayed alive it would have been interesting to see his next move on the demands of independence for India after the war won etc.

 

.
If you want to explain how the only recognised government of China is going to be induced to define the ancient Manchurian province as not part of “China”, then I’m all ears. I’m not saying the Americans were wrong to order Japan out of China, but I am saying that it’s not very possible they did so intending to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.
.

.
Or lack thereof.

 

Good points. Those are clearly seen in the historical record. The US had to be seen to be doing something. At first glance, cutting off Japan's oil could logically be seen as forcing their military to ground to a halt. Many responsible US officials anticipated that this could force Japan's hand but they didn't realize the scale or weight of the eventual Japanese response.

 

The logical policy was to limit Japanese imports to consumption, not to cut Japan off altogether. Note that in the 1930’s France and Britain refrained from an oil embargo against Italy for fear that that Rome would be cornered.

I never indicated whether I had or hadn’t – you simply assumed the answer you wished, when in fact the truth turns out to be the opposite.

And that may be the problem to your approach to this whole topic, no?

 

Do you mean in 1938-1940?. Nothing was sent to the USSR or Britian in those years. The US had next to nothing to give of any value and in fact 'gave' nothing in those years. Britian did place some large orders with US industry, but deliveries of weapons did not become significant until late in 1940 or 1941. Most deliveries in 1940 were small quantities, often test or evaluation or training allocations.

Germany withdrew its aid from China by 1938, so I cant see a correlation between that and US aid like the "Flying Tigers" arriving in late 1941.

A much larger obstacle to providing aid to China on the scale of that to Britian & the USSR post 1941 would be how to deliver it. In 1938 the japanese methodically took control of China's ports.

There was still a low capacity railroad link from Nationalist territory to the French controled port of Haipong near Hanoi, but was totally inadaquate for material of scale sent to Britain or the USSR later in the war. In any case Japan took control of French Indo China in the winter of 1940/41 and shut off that avenue.

A even less capable route was through Burma, which was made avaialble for a small ammount of deliveries in 1941. That route was shut off in early 1942 by Japanese conquest.

So, when the US was capable of providing large ammounts of material from 1942 there was no practical was to deliver it. No large ports or high capacity railways to deliver 1,000,000 tons or 500,000 tons of material each month to nationalist controled territory

 

You may feel the approach demands the reader take the assumption that Hull was acting in good faith, but I do not think this to be wise.
In any event this is what interested me was not expanding the details of the discussion to encorporate the subject you inquired to, but to stick to the points of the Hull note. I commented that,
.
“This demand obliterates the legitimacy of the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria, since Japan is to agree to only one government ruling all of China and the definition of “China” will be what the Nationalist government says “China” means.”
.
Did you have observations on how Japan acknowledges that only one government is to rule China without undermining the legitimacy of its Manchurian puppet?
.

 

There is agreement that Japan was the aggressor in China and at fault for the war. The question we are discussing is to what purpose Hull made demands in November 1941 that must result in war.
.
You appear to agree that Hull’s demand for one government in China made the continuation of the Japanese puppet in Manchuria impossible, and the demand for Japan to leave China made the continuation of Japanese influence in Manchuria in any guise impossible. That was my conclusion as well; the first time I read Hull’s note decades ago, and the last time I read it yesterday.
.
Moving on from there. Why does the United States suddenly take this attitude in 1941? Common sense says that if Hull’s real purpose is to avoid war with Japan, then he will moderate US demands to that end. Applied to the issue of China, it would be that Japan is to withdraw to the 1937 line, not leave China altogether. Applied to Manchuria, it would be that the issue goes on ice for a decade while far more important matters are settled. Why does the United States order Japan out of Manchuria when after the war the Americans thought so little of Manchuria that they abandoned it to the Communists with scarcely a whimper? How is Manchuria a crucial American interest and of no interest at all, both at the same time?

 

Carl W Schwamberger;

No, I ment from 1937 - 1940. In regards to quantity or value that was given to Britain and Russia during the war. Off course the US would have had the potential to support China in regards to weapons, ammo and US armed forces if they would have wanted to. Japan attacked in June/July37, so there would have been no problem for the US to get involved in China on a large scale by 1938/39.

Germany and China severed their relationship officially in 1940 - my remark towards the Flying Tigers was however primarily directed towards Russia. It was only after Chinas last ally or supplier was into war himself and as such in no position to infuence Chinas leadership, that the US started to get active in supporting China.

As I mentioned before, China was attacked in 1937 and its ports south of Shanghai were free till 1940. From 1940 onward supplies could have been brought in via French Indochina and Burma. And in the worst case the same route that these supplies were brought in from 1943 onward.

However with the US supporting China from 1937 onward and from 1938/9 with the same interest/priority as towards Britain/Europe and Russia - the Japanese conquest of China and its harbours starting in 1939 could not have taken place at all.

Since China however favored Germany and Russia, the US simply did not have any interest in suppling or aiding China before 1941, regardless of what the Japanese did to the Chinese. Japan was not considered by the US to be a threat to them before China was isolated on its coastline and ports by invading Japanese troops and the Japanese getting additionally greedy towards the now more or less unprotected European colonies after mid 1940.

Regards
Kruska

 

I dunno "Kruska", I myself feel that the importance of the depression and its effect on the American production ability is being overlooked here. In the thirties (until 1940 I believe) only 4 cents of every tax revenue dollar was spent on our own military, that includes the money spent on material and new weapons production.

Then there is the problem of the Gold and Silver Acts of the FDR administration, which further complicated international sales, especially to nations which had shifted to silver based economies. China fell into this group, and to protect themselves changed the way that "silver bullion/coin" could be exported for purchases. Until our own (American) weapons production got going, we had nothing really to sell (let alone "give") to China to protect herself from the Japanese. They were also engaged in a bitter civil war which was only partially put on "hold" while they fought the Japanese, and resumed as soon as WW2 was over. Remember in 1936 the "Sian incident" happened in which Chang Hsueh-liang captured Chiang Kai-shek and held him ransom. The release terms obligate Chiang Kai-shek to make a truce with Mao’s Communists and establish a united front against Japanese aggression. It is only after 1936 that the Chinese Nationalist government tries to take a harder line against Japan.

Also, Chiang’s Methodist father-in-law (T.V. Soong) was the finance minister, and a strong proponent of the silver based economy until about 1935,when he became the head of the Bank of China. He became a millionaire during this time, and remained one until his demise. When anyone reads the attached URL I’m linking to, remember that the abbreviation C.S. in this refers to Chinese Standard in silver content of their Chinese yuan.

See:

http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cm/m04/m04-28.pdf

China, especially after the occupation of North China by Japan's Kwantung and Tientsin armies, the lower Yangtze valley around Shanghai, and the Guangzhou region around Canton in 1937, had no factories with which to make modern weapons. China's armies depended on Soviet or Anglo-American weapons brought in over land. They couldn’t afford to buy them from America (if we had them to sell) and now had few if any ports into which they could be shipped.

 

Hello brndirt1,

I know what you mean. Certainly the US economy wasn't at its best in 1937-1940, neither was its military equipment.

However I would still maintain the view, that if the US would have viewed upon China as "their" zone of interest or opposed Japanes agression (besides voicing out through memorandums) as they had opposed Hitlers aggression, it would not have been a problem to push billions of aid and weapons plus even soldiers to China.

AFAIK - US involvement into WWII brought a huge surge to its industry and economics due to war production.

The question would be if this economical boom could not have happened just as well from 1937-1940 due to a commitment towards China.

Regards
Kruska