German Airborne at Bastogne

If Bastonge was such an important objective, why didn't the German's attempt an airborne assault? Were they concerned that it would draw forces there too quickly?

 

weather Drache is my best guess.

Also Hitler basically canned the idea of airborne ops after Crete. There actually was an pussed airborne landing by von der Heydte forces in Ju 52's but it was a total botch during the first days of the engagements.

Actually quite happy you brought the Ardenne up as I am getting "psyched" that a few of our members here will be attending ceremonies next month....

♪

 

That's what I'm saying - I know about the drops north of Malmedy, albeit screwed up. But von der Heydte's attempt "was" made, so I'm not so sure weather was the only issue. Why not try one near Bastonge?

 

I think that the German paratroopers were a 'busted flush' by December 1944 - all their best men had been lost at places like Cassino.

Von der Heydte is quite scathing about the whole of 'Operation Stosser' in his memoirs.

Here's a memento : -

http://www.lerenfort.fsnet.co.uk/page38.html

 

Don't forget that we've got 20/20 hindsight here...the Germans were counting on weak American resistance, so why need paratroopers to take Bastogne when the Panzers were expected to blast straight through ? And the often-overlooked St Vith would have needed the same treatment.....

It's a bit like Arnhem in reverse.....a great plan ruined by the enemy !

 

Besides the aruments mentioned above; It's been a while since I was in Bastogne, but does the surrounding countryside allow for any sizable force to be landed there?

 

Not by glider ( too many ditches and fences ) and don't forget that the offensive opened in 'Hitler weather' ; ie mist, cloud, drizzle....

 

Martin didn't von der Heydte's team get hopelessly lost during Op Stösser ?

E ~

 

Yes - I'm going from memory as I don't have the book to hand right now, but von der Heydte was appalled at the lack of experience of both the paratroopers and more especially the crews of the transport aircraft.

The drop was a disaster with men being scattered over a large area ( many were miles from the battle area ).

Von der Heydte managed to gather a small group of men in the Haut Fagnes area ; they spent much of their time avoiding US forces as engagement would have been pointless. Poorly-equipped for the winter conditions, and with little food or supplies, most surrendered at the end of the offensive. Von der Heydte himself was severely frostbitten and suffering from hypothermia - he later admitted to being happy to give himself up to the Americans as by that stage he was beyond caring.......

Once again, as with Skorzeny's commandos, the main effect of the paratroopers was psychological with rumours causing great confusion behind Allied lines.

 

The airborne force led by Von Der Heydte was doomed from the start.

I wont repeat Martins comments as they are all correct, just add a few of my own..

The selection of the troops started badly... Many commanders used the call for airborne trained troops as an excuse to get rid of the 'malcontents' in their units. The aircrews had no training at dropping troops and the drops was scattered over many scores of kilometers. His battle group never amounted to more than 80-100 troops and many weapons containers were lost in the snow and the forest.

As a note of interest Von Der Heydte used a triangular parachute for the jump in the Ardennes as he had a broken arm. By bad luck he broke the other arm on landing... HE was certainly very relieved to surrender after trying to escape suffering not only from hypothermia and the broken arms but also from blood posioning. He was not in a good way!

I would recommend the German Appraisal of Airborne Operations which is available online in the archives section of www.wargamesdirectory.com much of this was written post-war by Von Der Heydte and it includes a short appraisal of Strosser.

On the greater subject of GErman Airborne operations, although no grand strategic operation were launched after Crete a number of smaller tactical operation were undertaken with varying degrees of success. Rather than the losses of Crete being the reason for their 'grounding' (Student himself felt the losses on Crete were what he expected) the lack of strategic opportunity and the lack of trained air crews also played its part...

 

Agreed the paratroopers for the task were ill equipped and poorly trained and the men landed all over the place.

However, in Reynolds´ book I seem to recall that Peiper was angry that the paratroopers did not even try to fulfill their mission (?) I guess it´s always from one person´s view point what the situation looks like....

 

From Robin Cross the Bulge 1944:

17.12. 112 Ju 52´s in order to maintain formation they had been forced to fly with their landing lights on....

 

Germany had not the transport planes necessary to transport the Fallschirmjager needed to dislodge the Americans at Bastogne. After Crete(Netherlands and Belgium too) Hitler learned never to use Paratroopers as the main assault force, considering he lost the majority of his Junkers JU-52 transport planes there. The Falschirmjager simply would not have been a formidable option in the assault on Bastogne, armor was much more efficient, the Germans just didn't send enough of it to Bastogne, allowing the Americans to hold the Germans off until resupplyment.

[ 29. March 2005, 08:09 PM: Message edited by: us11thairborne ]

 

Yes, and they did the terrible mistake of underrating the Allies once again, thinking that they wouldn't be able to recover from the initial blow and that they couldn't effectively use their very scarce reserves.

Of course, for the German High Command's little mind, Eisenhower shifting his front's gravity center, moving hundreds of thousands of men and their supplies in 3 days… just couldn't possibly happen. Also, what about Patton's 100 km dash and 90º turn?

Another thing to thank the Stalingrad airlift for…

[ 30. March 2005, 10:34 AM: Message edited by: General der Infanterie Friedrich H ]

 

I thought Hitler lost most of his JU-52 transport planes during airlifts in Russia especially the Stalingrad one.

 

Welcome aboard, Ancient!

And you are right, the Ju-52 transport fleet had been decimated by the long struggle at the Eastern Front and the Mediterranean (all airlifts and their misusage as ambulances and supply transports, which also took its weekly toll of losses). That's why, by 1943, when Speer took over the German industries and focused air production on fighters and light bombers, the losses of planes had been too high and production had nearly stopped.

Also, flying crews didn't have any planes to train with…