German invasion sept. 1939

I think the French are quite grateful that they didn't have leaders such as Stalin and Zhukov. For one, the French didn't have 20+ million lives to throw away. They attmpted something similar in WW 1, then decided it was a bad idea. When the average Russian soldier is given the choice between a German bullet, and a bullet from his unit NKVD officer, it gives a new definition to the word "bravery" doesn't it?

When it comes to the complete disregard for the lives of their own soldiers, I think the Russians sit rather comfortably in a class completely apart from the rest of the world.

 

I knew Mosier's book was unpopular among the traditionalist interpretations of WW 2 history. I myself disagreed with many of his conclusions, some of which were stretched. On the other hand, I found that Mosier's method of research to be a breath of fresh air compared with the more well known military/war historians of our time. His bibliograhphies and references reflect a great deal of comparative research, a method I think other historians of warfare would do well to emulate. While Mosier's conclusions may have raised questions, his use of comparative research should not. On many occassions he's explained how doing so helped debunk some common post-war assesments. To disregard that, is to accept that traditional interpretations of the war are not only to be taken as the final word, but also are not to be challenged. In other words, if one is comfortable with a one-track, linear interpretation of a historical military operation, then one is more accepting that cherry-picking research and personal bias will, and should, always trump accuracy.

But then, that is my opinion of Mosier's work. Just like your review is your opinion, nothing more. I do not use his work as the sole reference, but as one of many. On a personal level, I'm much more knowledged on the immediate pre-war events, up to 1940, than later war. Given my almost 15 years of reading up on the subject matter, I found that certain question raised by Mosier in his assesments warranted further attention.

I certainly find his work more interesting than some of the old stale and repetitious banter offered by the likes of Keegan and Deighton, the Dr. Drivel and Mr. Tripe of the WW 2 history club establishment. But then again, that's my opinion as well.

 

I read much of Mosier and laid it aside. His conclusions were nothing earthshaking or original to me and his research familar. In the end he did not look any better than those you mention. At best this book is bad execution of a good idea.

But we are digressing.

I took a quick look around and cant find anything usefull in English concerning the French war plans. Just the usual itmes about the Dyle & Escaut operational plans, and a offhand remark about a French offensive plan into the Rhineland written after the Cezch crisis in 1938. Anyone else know of any sources with details?

 

As for overall French plans in the Saar, there isn't much. I've found very little in the way of English language publications, perhaps nothing more than one or two sentences or a paragraph at most. Ernest R. May (Strange Victory) has a little bit to say about it, but not much.

I'm sure there is something in French, though I do not have it. The only sources regarding Saar operations I have, is what I've listed earlier on this thread:

Alain Legrand's-Alain leBerre's "La Bretagne a l'epreuve - Sarre,Flandres, Dunkerque" (devotes a whole 9-10 pages on this, mostly derived from individual accounts)

"8 Septembre, 1939 - Cette Nuit Nous entrons en Allemagne" by Bertrand Le Barillec (I learned that apparently Barillec has - or had - in his posession many personal papers of General Mast and draws much of his information concerning Saar op. planning - or lack thereof- from them.)

another book I have is "Les Grandes Unites Francais" S.H.A (1967) -has some mention of overall objectives for the entire 21e I.D.

They all more or less say the same things: to capture a series of small towns and villages running parallel to the Seigfreid Line, dig in and wait for the artillery (probably elements of the 35e and 255e artillery -attached to 21e I.D.) to be drawn up. Then they were to destroy the Seigfreid Line, after which the troops would move up and occupy it, ostensibly to deny Germany her western defenses. Beyond that, there is nothing I can find, so your guess is as good as mine.

Frankly, I don't think there were any plans beyond that. My guess is they wouldn't have even managed to do that much. Notes I've taken from a book entitled "La Defaite de la France" by Henri Michel, mentions how the attached artillery observers couldn't tell where shells were landing since many failed to explode (old WW 1 inventory, perhaps even older).

Other than that, I have nothing else in my personal library solely devoted to Saar operations, though I wish I did. On my next trip to France, I should make a point to find out more.

 

I would love for you to back this up....

Perhaps you can educate me.


Oh and congrats to me on 3,000 posts!

 

congrats comrade. Let's drink some vodka and play some Call of Duty.

 

Ok. Lets begin with Order 227, Penal batallions, and NKVD Blocking troops. For added bonus, I'll add this:

"The prominent Russian military historian Dmitry Volkogonov obtained classified information from Russian state military
archives verifying that over 120,000 Soviet soldiers were sentenced to capital punishment and another 800,000 were
ordered to penal battalions. In fact, nearly two million Red Army combatants were thus murdered by “their own” Soviet
NKVD units during 1941-45.”

If comparing apples to oranges is the name of the game, then feel free to find for me an equivalent of the above in the French military between 1939-1945. I can be educated too, you know.

Oh, and congrats on your 3,000th post. Have a beer and pretend I bought it for you.