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German Kamikazes

Discussion in 'Wonder Weapons' started by JCFalkenbergIII, Feb 28, 2008.

  1. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    As a Part Two to the Thread I made about Flying Ramms and Aircraft ramming I thought I would post this too LOL. :)

    This is from Wikipedia,

    "The idea of Selbstopfer (self-sacrifice), or suicide duty, was not widely received by German air force authorities, but did appear in several different military programs. Suicide-based programs included “Rammkommandos” (Bf 109G ramming units), Sturmgruppen (Fw 190A crash attack units), “Mistel” (Junkers Mistel 1 units), and “Sonderkommando Elbe” (Me 262A ramming units). In all of these cases, the newest jet aircraft where designed with a secondary purpose of suicide missions, but provided with a means for the pilot to bail out before impact"

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_German_special_attack_aircraft

    And this,

    "Desperate to inflict massive losses on the American Bomber stream and force a month long bombing pause, the Germans concocted a plan for a massive ramming attack. Late in 1944, Oberst Hans-Joachim Herrman proposed using 800 or so high altitude Bf-109G’s stripped of armor and armament to reduce weight for such an attack. Lightened in this manner, he calculated the planes could reach 36,000 ft well above the American escort fighter’s ceiling. German pilot losses were predicted to be around 300, more or less what was lost in a normal month’s fighting. Aircraft losses would be much higher of course, but by this point numbers of aircraft were not the Luftwaffe’s problem. Trained pilots and especially fuel were. Fully trained fighter pilots were too valuable to be wasted in these attacks, so volunteers were called for from the training units. The first ramming unit, "Sonderkommando Elbe" formed in April 1945 and flew a single mission with 120 aircraft. Its inadequately trained pilots were unable to inflict much damage. Fifteen bombers were rammed but only 8 were destroyed."

    http://freepages.military.rootsweb.com/~josephkennedy/German_Pilot_Perspective.htm
     
  2. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    This is from Lonesentry.com,

    The German Kamikazes" from Intelligence Bulletin

    A postwar report on German efforts to develop a suicide corps to attack the Allied invasion fleet, from the Intelligence Bulletin, June 1946.

    [Editor's Note: The following article is wartime information on foreign tactics and equipment published for Allied soldiers. In many cases, more accurate data on foreign equipment is available in later postwar publications.]



    THE GERMAN KAMIKAZES

    German Leaders Failed to Recognize a
    New Counteramphibious Tactic

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------




    One of the most hushed up secrets of the war, back before the surrender of Japan, was the damage and inconvenience caused by the suicide-bent Kamikaze pilots of the Japanese Air Force. Troops who sailed to the invasion of Okinawa remember the Baka bomb, the winged aerial torpedo with its human pilot. But not until the end of the war, when intelligence officers began nosing around in the former Nazi domain, was it disclosed that a small group of fanatical Nazis had also organized a suicide corps for the purpose of breaking up the seaborne invasion of the continent with a German version of the Japanese Baka.

    In fact, there is much evidence to indicate that the Nazi suicidists were laying their plans long before their Japanese allies conceived the idea for this unconventional tactic. Only bureaucratic inefficiency, and disinterest in official circles as high as Hitler himself, forstalled the appearance of Nazi Kamikazes in the air over Normandy on D-day.

    The inception of this strange project goes back to the year 1943, when the fortunes of war were beginning to turn against the hitherto victorious German Army. At that time, many people in Germany were beginning to see that the Fatherland would ultimately go down to defeat, unless some miraculous event produced a severe set-back to the Allied cause. Among these thinking Germans was a small group of idealists who were determined to do something about it. These people, who at first numbered no more than 30 or 40 persons, came together from all walks of life. Some of them were from the Army, others were civilians, and one of the leaders was a well-known German woman flyer.

    It was the common belief of these people that the war was lost unless a most decisive blow could be struck against the Allies. They believed that this could only be accomplished by the complete disruption of the eventual Allied assault upon the continent, thus convincing the Allied leaders that Germany was secure and impregnable within her "fortress Europe."

    AN IDEA IS BORN

    From this line of reasoning, the idea of a suicide corps was born. It was thought that a weapon could be devised in the form of a flying bomb which, when piloted to its target, could sink a large warship or troop transport. Enough of these, the idealists believed, could completely wreck any seaborne invasion with an expenditure of less than 1,000 volunteer pilots. The members of this strange group were ready to volunteer. They asked only that they be given a weapon which would be certain to achieve its end, and they felt there were persons among their membership who had the skill to design such a weapon.

    By October 1943, under the leadership of the woman flyer, a doctor of the Institute of Medical Aeronautics at Rechlin, and a first lieutenant of the Luftwaffe, organizational plans had advanced to a point where it was necessary to obtain official recognition and cooperation in conducting the project further. Because of her unique position in German aviation circles, this duty fell to the aviatrix.

    The woman first presented the idea to the Luftwaffe High Command, and met with immediate rebuff. The German Air Force was not interested in an idea they considered to be the unstable reasoning of a group of psychopaths. After much delay, the Luftwaffe was by-passed, and the aviatrix went directly to Field Marshall Milch, at that time the head of the German Air Ministry. Again no progress was made.

    After more weeks had passed, the woman determined to exploit her position and reputation in German aviation circles, and succeeded in gaining a hearing before the German Academy of Aeronautics. This Academy had the power to assemble the necessary scientists, technicians, and air tactical authorities, and eventually a meeting was called by the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Council. After a lengthy conference, the committee of authorities decided that the idea was indeed operationally sound.

    With this authoritative evidence in hand, the next step before the group of idealists was to obtain official support and leadership for the suicide plan. Application was made for an interview with Hitler, and in February 1944, the woman leader of the project was summoned to Berchtesgaden for a 3-hour discussion with the Fuehrer.

    INTERVIEW WITH HITLER

    Hitler did not approve. He objected to the philosophy of suicide entailed in the plan, and pointed out that there was no precedent in German history like it. Therefore, he said, the whole idea was not in keeping with the character of the German people. The woman countered this with the argument that never before in German history had the fate of the country been in such a precarious position. This, apparently, was the wrong thing to say, for Hitler replied emphatically that the position was not precarious, and that if it ever became so, then he, Hitler, would personally give the orders for such desperate measures to be taken.

    The interview was anything but successful, but before she left, the aviatrix did obtain Hitler's permission to continue with the development and planning so that the organization would be ready to operate if ever the Fuehrer felt the time had come to take such desperate steps. His parting remark was to the effect that he did not want to be bothered with the idea again until the time for action was ripe.

    Meanwhile the group of suicide volunteers had grown to about 70 or 80 members. As yet no concerted recruiting effort had been made, and such volunteers as were accepted were a very select group. Once accepted, a candidate for membership in the suicide corps was required to take a pledge to the effect that "I hereby volunteer as a pilot of the manned glider-bomb. I am convinced that this action will end with my death."

    On the basis of Hitler's permission to continue with the development of the program, the matter was laid before the Chief of the General Staff of the German Air Force. He half-heartedly assigned the official direction of the project to the commander of a Luftwaffe bomber wing that was engaged in all sorts of special operations and clandestine activities. At first it appeared that the plan was finally on the road to fruition, but it soon became evident that the new commander accepted the assignment mostly because he saw in it the means of receiving the glory and credit which would be brought by the self-sacrifice of the volunteers under him.

    THE WEAPON

    But at the same time, the German Air Ministry was ordered to perfect the technical preparations which would be necessary to put the plan into effect. The Messerschmitt 328, originally designed as a fighter or fighter bomber, was selected as the flying weapon to be used by the volunteers. Production of the plane was ordered, but proceeded so slowly that the volunteers began to suspect that some sort of official sabotage was afoot. As a result, the suicide group began to look around for another weapon—one which was easy to produce and would be available on short order. The V-1 "buzz bomb," rebuilt to carry a pilot, was decided upon. In less than 3 weeks, four types of this piloted missile were ready for testing.


    This is the Nazi version of the Japanese "Baka" bomb. It is driven by a typical V-1 jet engine. Carrying a load of explosive in the nose of this craft, Nazi suicide pilots planned to wreak destruction among our D-day fleet with this weapon. Although the weapon was developed, the plan went astray through official indifference and bungling among the higher echelons of the Nazi command.


    Contrary to the wishes of the volunteer group, the Luftwaffe testing division insisted upon using their own pilots for the test flights. The two Luftwaffe men were soon seriously injured, and it was then that the woman pilot was called in and permitted to do the test flying. It was not an easy proposition. In order to train the suicide pilots, a two-seater "buzz bomb" had been built. Of course, it was necessary to land this model, if trainees were to be kept alive for the D-day mission. But since it was necessary to glide to a landing without power, and since the missile was not of conventional aircraft or glider design, the approach to the runway was necessarily steep, and landing had to be made at speeds approaching 155 miles per hour.

    But as the technical development of the weapon went on with fair success, the rest of the program began to go astray through the bungling of the Luftwaffe officers put in charge of the volunteers. Although the suicide group at first believed the Luftwaffe wing commander—the one who had been appointed their official leader—was fully behind their plan, it soon became evident that he had little sincere interest in the project. What was worse, he appointed a staff of other Luftwaffe officers to responsible planning and operational positions. These officers apparently had no conception of the original mission of the volunteers—to destroy the eventual Allied invasion fleet. Instead, they were continually fostering half-baked ideas, such as suicide attacks upon Soviet ammunition trains on the Eastern Front. Although the volunteers were willing to give their lives to deliver a smashing blow to the Allies, they were reluctant to die on some comparatively non-essential mission. Meanwhile the training program had also bogged down. Much time was spent in physical education and pistol shooting, but little attention was paid to establishing a sound flight training program. The Luftwaffe Lieutenant, one of the original volunteers and who had been the spark plug behind the whole idea, found himself helpless because of his low rank. Although he tried repeatedly to make improvements, he could do nothing but take orders.

    Again the woman flyer was called upon to use her influence to try and revive the rapidly failing program. This time she went to Himmler, in hopes that he might be able to do some good for the cause of the suicide volunteers. Himmler was not much help. He was not opposed to the suicide idea, but he was of the opinion that the membership of the corps should be made up of criminals and the incurably diseased. He offered to take over the program if one of his officers was permitted to assume the leadership of the entire plan. It was evident that under Himmler the plan would not receive any better treatment than it was getting under its present supervision, so his offer was turned down.

    D-DAY ARRIVES

    About this time, the Allies took a hand in things by staging their invasion in Normandy. Neither the suicide weapon, nor adequately trained suicide pilots were available, greatly because of the mishandling the whole program had received from its selfish or uninterested directors. The disappointment of the volunteer group was profound. Within 6 or 7 days after D-day, they realized that the invasion was a success, and that the moment for which they had been preparing had passed.

    But, several days after the invasion had started, and all other efforts to halt it had failed, Herman Goering suddenly remembered that somewhere in his Luftwaffe there was a group of pilots who had volunteered for a suicide mission. In due course, Goering reached the commander of the bomber wing under whom the volunteers had originally been placed. The commander, a colonel, immediately declared that the group was ready for action. The volunteers were astounded. They knew that no planes or "buzz bombs" were available, and that only a few of the men had any more than the briefest of preflight training. Nonetheless, the commander and his technical assistants, without consulting the volunteers, set to work on plans to use a Focke Wulf 190, carrying a 4,000-pound bomb, to crash into selected targets. Now no one in the German Air Force had ever flown this plane with such a large bomb load, and it was highly doubtful that the plane would be able to get off the ground without crashing. Consequently, regular test pilots declined the honor of testing this experimental makeshift. Undaunted, the commander announced that his suicide pilots—none of whom had ever flown an FW 190, if any other plane—would within the next few days conduct the test flights themselves. If they were killed, he said, their names and loyal sacrifice would be recorded in German history with the same honor they would have received if they had crashed their plane onto the deck of an enemy ship. Any enthusiasm that had remained among the volunteers disappeared completely at this point.

    Fortunately for these men, Hitler heard about the plans for using the FW 190, and ordered the project abandoned. The bomber commander was removed, eventually, and his successor set about trying to salvage some of the finer ideas of the original project. But by then it was too late. The Allies were established in force on the continent, the hour to strike had passed, and so the group of suicide volunteers was disbanded.

    "And so," to quote the woman flyer, "did an idea that was born of fervent and holy idealism, only to be misused and mismanaged at every turn by people who never understood how men could offer their lives simply for an idea in which they believed."

    CONCLUSION

    Were it not for the grievous damage done to our fleet units a year later by the Japanese Kamikaze corps, this German project might be passed off as just another unconventional tactical venture which the German leaders were smart enough to recognize as nothing but foolishness. But in the light of our later experience with the Japanese, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Nazi command failed to realize they were being offered an impressive counterweapon to seaborne invasion. It is useless, in retrospect, to attempt a reconstruction of what might have happened off Normandy on D-day, if the Nazi command had recognized the potentialities of these volunteers and their piloted bomb. Although it is unlikely that the suicidists could have thus defeated the invasion, the introduction of such an unconventional tactic, if exploited on the scale later used by the Japanese, would certainly have offered another serious threat to an already difficult amphibious operation.

    http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/kamikaze/index.html
     
  3. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    And this,


    The Eye of the Storm:
    The Birth Of the Luftwaffe's Elite Sturm Units
    by Dillon "Jazz" Poole

    When the discussion of suicide pilots comes up, everyone thinks of the Kamikaze units of the Japanese military in the war in the Pacific. But the Poles of the Polish Air Force also resorted to ramming, and they fought valiantly during their short war with Germany in September 1939. But it wasn't an endorsed tactic, nor did Russia endorse the occasional ramming in air combat when it was thrust into the war with Germany.

    The origin of Sturm tactics can be traced back to Reichmarschall Hermann Goering's insistence that Reich defense units should start ramming bombers as a last resort. Although German Sturm units weren't tasked with ramming bombers exclusively, it was one of the many tactics employed as a last measure. With the exception of Rammkommando Elbe, no German units were specifically tasked for suicide missions, and even Rammkommando Elbe's pilots only rammed when there was a chance to get out of plane alive.

    Goering's Orders: 1943

    On 4 October 1943, the Eighth Air Force attacked Frankfurt-on-Main. The local party leader in Frankfurt protested very loudly about the fact that the "terror bombers" were not interecepted. This made Goering issue an order to all Reich defense units:


    there are no weather conditions unfavourable enough to prevent fighter units from taking off
    every fighter pilot who lands an undamaged machine without scoring a kill will be court martialed
    if a fighter pilot is out of ammunition, or his guns are jammed, he is to ram the enemy bomber.
    After that the heated orders were put to rest and were virtually forgotten. Then Major Hans-Georg von Kornatzki persuaded certain powers to let him form an experimental unit based on the army's Sturm units who got in close to enemy units and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. He envisioned a unit designed to break up the heavily armed 4-engined bombers of the Eighth Air Force. Members pledged themselves to the unit by a handshake from Kornatzki. The rules of engagement in the unit were as follows:


    to look for a fight with 4-engined bombers, and whenever possible to avoid engagement with a fighter
    to not open fire on the bombers until at a position of 150 to 200 meters, when the four engines appeared to be in the target circle of the Revi gun sight
    to ram the bomber if weapons failed or the gunfire was ineffective.
    The new Staffel became operational in January 1944 under the command of Major Kornatzki. They were based alongside the First Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 1 (I./JG1) at Dortmund airfield.


    On 11 January 1944, Oberleutnant Zehart downed a B-17 and claimed the Staffel's first victory. Unteroffizier Willi Maximowitz scored his first victory on 30 January near Hannover.

    Due to the increased weight of the new fighters being used, the fighters of SturmStaffel 1 had to be escorted by Bf109s, who had better performance at altitude.

    The unit became an immediate success and was soon considered an elite unit. Soon many Jagdgeschwaders began forming Sturm units of their own. The first of these was the new Fourth Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 3 "Udet" (IV.(Sturm)/JG3) led by Hauptman Wilhelm Moritz.

    Another unit, the Second Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 4 (II.(Sturm)/JG4) was built around the original SturmStaffel 1, and command was given to none other than Major von Kornatzki.

    Few pilots resorted to actually ramming a bomber unless they had the chance of escaping safely. Oblt. Werner Gerth, Staffelkapitan of the 14th Staffel of JG3 "Udet" (14.(Sturm)/JG3) was shot down at least 11 times and was finally killed when his parachute failed to open after ramming a B-17 near Halle.



    The Weapon of the Sturmflieger

    Due to the new mission of SturmStaffel 1, better equipped aircraft had to be used to effectively combat the heavy bombers at close ranges. The Focke Wulf 190A-series was known to be a good bomber interceptor. The only problem was that closure time for stern attacks by Fw190s was very slow, leaving the Fw190s vulnerable to both bomber gunners and escorting fighters.

    SturmStaffel 1 soon adopted the baby-brother of the 'Sturmbock.' They used Fw190A-5s and A-6s and added 5 inch armor plating called Panzerplatten to critical areas of their aircraft. The unit also added 30mm glass panels to the side of the canopy and to the quarter-panels of the windscreen.

    These new and heavier aircraft resulted in double the fuel consumption rate, and soon fuel drop tanks were added, further weighing down the new converted aircraft.

    Armament on these early 'Sturmbocks' were the same as the normal FW190A5s and A6s.

    Reich Defense

    SturmStaffel 1 was among the first units to adopt Reich Defense (Reichsverteidigung) bands. These bands helped pilots distinguish each unit from the other. SturmStaffel 1 chose to adopt the black-white-black band scheme.

    Sturm units would soon incorporate the new Fw190A8 and A9 versions into their units and along with the earlier modifications of Sturm aircraft, they soon also incorporated Rustsatze (Field Conversion Kits). The most numerous one used by the Sturm units was the R8 kit which equipped the Fw190A8 with armor glass and a Mk108 30mm cannon in the wing. The new 30mm cannons meant that bombers could be brought down with just a few well placed hits. But the it added still more weight, making the nimble Fw190 sluggish.

    The Luftwaffe's Sturm units suffered tremendous losses from enemy escorts. SturmStaffel 1 alone suffered roughly 350% loss of pilots during its short time in the war. Yet the Sturm units were the most groups at bringing down the endless streams of 4-engined bombers that were devastating Germany by day.



    The most successful 4-engined bomber killer, Walther Dahl, was in command of JG300, of which there was a Gruppen (group) and Geschwaderstab (wing staff) of Fw190A8/A9s (R-2 and R-8 variants) that were used in Sturm-style attacks quite successfully. Walther Dahl went on to score at least 36 confirmed 4-engined bombers.




    For many years people believed that some of the rammings by German pilots were accidental or were a personal thing the pilot did out of desperation. Occasionally this could have been the case, but the pilots of the Sturm were tasked to ram a bomber if necessary; it was what they signed up for and it is what they agreed to do if firepower alone could not do the job.

    Lost in History

    It is amazing how little information has come out of Germany about the Sturm units. The book "Flying School: Combat Hell" (by Ellis M. Woodward, Copyright 1998) has many letters to the author from American servicemen that served on the 4-engined bombers.

    "....,we exchanged experiences with each other, and it turned out that he was a bombardier in 445th Bombardment Group. This was the Group that was decimated by a LUFTWAFFE STORM GROUP on September 27, 1944. His entire squadron had been shot down and he was a prisoner of war for more then 8 months.

    "Now 50 years later he still had never heard of the existence of the LUFTWAFFE STORM GROUPS.......the atack on the 445th BG on September 27, 1944 resulted in the loss of the greatest number of 4-engined bombers by a single Bombardment Group on a single mission in the history of the Eighth Air Force." - Ellis Woodward, 493rd BG

    "the attack lasted less than two minutes, and when we looked around, only two of the twelve B-17s remained in formation. The other 10 had disappeared, as if by magic. What had hit us on that fateful day was a LUFTWAFFE STORM GROUP, but I didn't learn of the existence of the STORM GROUPS until 49 years later." - Jimmy Stewart

    The story of the Sturm units is a short but yet a mysterious one. The units served with incredible bravery for the simple fact that they were defending their homes. They weren't thinking about keeping the Third Reich alive (with some exceptions, but that's another article), they were thinking of the "terror bombers" wreaking havoc on their homes and the people that lived there.

    They regarded themselves as an elite group of pilots, and they were. Unfortunately, note many people know their history, let alone that they existed.

    http://www.combatsim.com/htm/oct99/sturm1.htm#cont
     
  4. Erich

    Erich Alte Hase

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    your whole copied articles is so full of errors I cannot even count. One note is that Jimmy stewart was in the 445th bg equipped with B-24's only not B-17, Eliis Woodwrd helped write a book on the acct his bomb group took from JG 4 SturmFw's in September 44's beginning his B-17 and his group got slaughtered as well and I have the book besides interviewing several of his ill fated comrades on that date.

    type in Sturmgruppen an our old web-site will come up with articles on the 3 Sturm units for the truth.
     
  5. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    Thanks for the Corrections there Erich :). I never claimed that the information was 100% correct LOL.
     
  6. Erich

    Erich Alte Hase

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    I know you didn't and truthfully it is appreciated, I'll work in corrections slowly when I have time to think.

    Under Wiki and free-pages: when it says Sonderkommando Elbe (Me 262A). No that should read Bf 109G units, some schools and the rest made up of veteran units. JG 7 with 262's were to engage the US fighter protection but they were ignored, and JG 7 did not provide any air protection for the almost un-armed Bf 109 a/c, instead going after US heavy bombers. The nose mounted 20 and 30mm cannons were removed but the cowling mg 131's were left so the pilot could hit the tail and provide himself with an aiming point in which to sheer off the tail surfaces, so even the term Ramm is not quite correct.

    I'll correct more soon
     
  7. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    Have you read the book "SturmStaffel 1"?
     
  8. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    I look forward to it :).
     
  9. Erich

    Erich Alte Hase

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    I have Mombeeks work which has errors, his two volumes on JG 4 are much better, slowly coming into English and our forum member and the web-site that I spoke of - her owner Falkeeins translated the JG 4 volumes into English so now we wait. once you purchase that book(s) you will understand what Ellis and his crew and buddies went through in Sept, of 44. But I will get to that later......by the way Falkeeins is a member on this forum

    I also have a signed copy of Combat Hell by E. Woodward, a funny book actually it is his personal story through the war but he bounces all around from one date to another and nothing in order, he uses Jimmy Stewarts typed text in the book as a reference point for "storm" groups" as only after reading Jimmys text did Ellis understand that is what attacked them in September 12, 44 near Magdeburg by II.Sturm/JG 4
     
  10. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    Thanks :). I wonder why the quote from Jimmy Stewart had him saying that they were B-17s? I happen to meet Mr. Stewart back in the 70s when I was a kid. A very nice gentleman.Oddly enough 3 of my high school teachers all flew B-17s over Europe.
     
  11. Erich

    Erich Alte Hase

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    it is easy to gt confused, Ellis group flew B-17's. One of our members here B17sam knows all about the Sturmgruppe as his group faced them and got hit pretty badly in November of 44, flying B-17's. I believe it was Nov. 2nd a pretty ugly day for all concerned in the air from both sides
     

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