German logistics and railroads

You're right. When I have said that German forces managed to come at the gates of Moscow in 1941 only for their operative skills, better training and the disorganizzation inside the Soviet Red Army, I have forgotten to say that, nevertheless, the soviets fought with great tenacity. I think that any other people or State, with the losses suffered in 1941, would have asked the peace; instead the soviets holded on and soviet society didn't collapse (contrary to Hitler's hopes).
The faliure of "Operation Barbarossa" was due to many causes: first, and more important, the soviet resistence, but also unclear strategic objectives; lack of troops; weather condition, etc. But I think that the whole plan had serious problems of logistics; problems that Germans knew very well. This is the reason because I have said that "Operation Barbarossa" seems a great game of chance. Hitler and his generals tried to defeat the greatest World country knowing the weaknesses of their armed forces and they hoped that, with a fast campaign "Blitzkrieg" style, the Soviet State and his army crashed. Probably they undervalued the strenght of their enemy, betting everything on the operative skills of the German soldiers and officers.....

 

Just because the assumptions were flawed and the plan was likely to fail doesn't mean that a Soviet victory was assured. For instance when the British went after the Italians in North Africa their plan failed rather disasterously did it not? Yet in the end who was the victor in North Africa? The Soviet defencive plan also failed disasterously in the early days of Barbarossa did it not? Yet who ended up holding Berlin?

 

I can certainly agree with that. There are other possibilities as well that may get into semantics as to what winning and loosing means. I can see outcomes where the front stalemates leading to the collapse of either or both politcal systems for instance.

 

Obviously if you know that the your plan is based on a false assumption you change your plan. On the otherhand it can be argued that the Soviet Union was weak in a number of ways. One of the problems that the Germans created for themselves is that they in some ways made the USSR stronger. There was still considerable disunity after the civil war and large groups of people living in the USSR were not happy with the governement. The German invasion and subsequent actions pushed all that into the background though.

Again this is far from clear. The plan was for a quick victory because that was of the most benefit for Germany. A long war didn't necessarily mean defeat although that became more likely but it did mean that the war would be significantly more costly and furthermore it would hand the initiative to the West to a great extent in other theaters.

The German offensive ground to a halt in August due to Logistical problems it sputtered in the Fall due to logistical problems (the latter induced in part by the weather and ground conditions). The railway troops did do a good job but that doesn't mean that the system was working at the level it needed to.

Was it? Certainly once the invasion started. But could the Germans have produced a better more workable log plan? Certainly if you go back far enough they could have. Standardizeing on a few types of trucks for instance would have been of significant help.

 

About the standardization of the trucs :this already stared before the war (the von Schell program):number of truck types :131 in 1939,é" in 1942.But,standardization does not mean a higher production :initially,the production will be go down,eventually,it will go up and,was there any need to build more trucks after the victory in the west ?

Whatever,
production of trucks:

1940:63.296
1941:62.400
1942:81279
1943109.085

Distribution of trucks:
1940: WM:38420, civilians:15571,export 9.305
1941: WM:37003,civilians:15.725,export:9.672
1942:WM:59.463,civilians:16577,export5.239

Source :the USSB report

The problem was that Barbarossa was decided at the end of 1940,which was late,very late .

 

The Germans did not knw that their plan was based on a false assumption,but,this was irrelevant :the plan could not be changed(it was depending on the German strength,and this could not be increased),the plan only could be cancelled .And,thiswas out of the question :there was no viable alternative for Barbarossa.

 

Again this is far from clear. The plan was for a quick victory because that was of the most benefit for Germany. A long war didn't necessarily mean defeat although that became more likely but it did mean that the war would be significantly more costly and furthermore it would hand the initiative to the West to a great extent in other theaters.



The longer the war,the stronger the Soviets and the weaker the Germans :this started already from the first week .
While general winter and colonel mud were post war excuses,the Germans were fighting against fieldmarshall time,who was a big ally of the Soviets.
If one is looking on what the Germans could commit on the start of Barbarossa,on the start of Typhoon,on the start of Fall Blau,on the start of Citadelle,it is obvious that their only chance was a quick and short campaign .

 

The railroad troops may have done a great job, but the railroads were not able to deliver the amount of goods needed by the Germans. even all the rail lines were converted as quickly as planned the Germans still had a shortage of engines, personal and wagons, add in the need to build new stations and the Germans would not have the supplies delivered in the quantities needed.

 

The logistics problems of the attack on USSR have been studded in Paulus' war games which have been conducted during December 1940. More specifically, Paulus has addressed the following fundamental problems:

1. How would it be possible to coordinate the movements of the mechanized units and the marching infantry, taking into account their differing rates of speed?
2. How would it be possible to supply an army of 3-3.5 million men deep in the interior of the Soviet Union?

He and several other generals have tested Halder's general staff plan. In these war games superiority of Wehrmacht was assumed. In his summary of the lessons learned in the war game study, Paulus concluded that the German forces "were barely sufficient for the purpose" assigned to them. Paulus demonstrated that the Wehrmacht would be out of its reserves by the time it reached Moscow and that the final assault on the city would have to be undertaken by forces already engaged on the front lines without any follow-up reinforcements at all. Paulus also noted that reaching the Volga-Archangel line was beyond the power of the Wehrmacht to achieve.

Halder knew and it is not known whether Hitler was informed.

 

In other words,the préBarbarossa conclusion was :

If the war continued with full strength east of the Dnjepr,Germany could supply its forces only with a decreasing strength and the Red Army would become stronger ..

The logical result was that on German side,every one started from the POV that this IF would not happen,closing its eyes for the unthinkable possibility that the whole thing could fail,which would result in the Soviets in Berlin .

I have two fundamental objections against the theory of the failure of logistics:

1)failure implies that the Germans could do better in the ATL :they could not have better logistics in june 1941,if Todt had been replaced by Speer,the result would be the same

2)the theory also implies that with better logistics,they could be at the A-A line ::it's a disguised form of :

the German soldier was racially superior to the inferior Soviets,and,if someone (Adolf,Todt,........) had not spoiled his victory by not giving him the needed supplies,he would be invincible.

This is only our old friend :it's the fault of :Adolf,the generals,general winter,general mud,Lend Lease,logistics.
The scape-goats are countless.

 

Its strange, but a major reason that the generals did not try to tell Hitler his idea was flawed is that they had only the year before argued against the invasion of France and the high command was against the Ardennes attack at first. Having been proven wrong by Hitlers intuition they had no grounds for saying his intuition was wrong this time.

 

This is what saddens me: Nazis have gained almost unconditional trust of the German nation. Yet they never considered what might have happened to "their" people. Alegedly,1945, in the end when Germany suffered the most, Hitler said: "I don't want to prevent destruction of Germany!"

 

I have hesitated whether I would publish a link to an article about Soviet railways in 1941 because it deals with yet another 'well kept secret' how Hitler lost the war. The story itself may be true but the suggested conclusions are wrong. The article simply reiterates certain difficulties in supplying Wehrmacht at the Eastern Front while the only 'novel relevation' is that some crooks were stealing food from the waggons.

Here it is:

http://www.junebarbarossa.com/blog/3021-soviet-railways-in-1941/

 

Good article, but I think he's stretching the point a bit:

The real trouble was the Soviets built and ran wider (and longer and heavier) locomotives. Those locomotives, being so much bigger than their German counterparts, were therefore able to carry more fuel and water and thus could go much farther between service stops. For example, the average distance between Soviet service installations on the Brest-Litovsk to Moscow line was 138 kilometers. When the Wehrmacht moved in, their railway troops had to build from scratch one major service installation between each pair the Soviets already had in place. Those stations had to include locomotive sheds, repair shops, slag pits, turntables, sidings, water towers, etc., and needed skilled labor and scarce heavy equipment to complete them.

The problem was the consumables, coal and water, and of those water was more critical. They would need a water tower at the halfway point and maybe a coal supply, but unless German locomotives were remarkably unreliable, they would not need a major maintenance facility at every water stop.

It's a curious but common phenomenon - someone makes a valid point, but then feels like they have to exagerrate it, which actually undermines their credibility.

 

It's hardly irrelevant. The plan was indeed subject to change how much would depend a great deal on the point in time selected. While it was indeed based on German strength in part quite a few other factors fed into it and while the the strength of the Wehrmacht was one of the elements with a great deal of inertia it was hardly fixed. Canceling the plan is changing it by the way. As to the last point of course there were alternatives. Viable ones, that is indeed quationable but if Barbarossa wasn't viable which is your claim then what makes it a better choice than any of the other non viable ones?

It was by no means clear that a longer war would mean the Soviets getting stronger compared to the Germans, indeed WWI is rather a counter example of that is it not? Indeed it's probably Dec of 41 where this becomes the most likely probability. At that point the US enters the war on the side of the Allies and Japan makes it clear they aren't going after the Soviets. Even then the degree of cooperation of the allies was probably not clear to the axis powers. Your observations on the necessity of quick and short campaign are based to a large extent on the Germans original plan others are possible by the way.

As to your first objection. June of 41 was not when they needed a better logistics system. However depending on when you can make the changes I don't see this as an impossiblity. What is possible however is a plan that places the Germans in a stronger logistics position in say August of 41 and from there out.
As for your second. I'm not sure what you mean by "A-A line". There is however no need to call on invincibility indeed better logistics does not even necessaily imply a German victory. It simply suggest that the Germans have a better chance at one and/or at least slow down the Soviet counter attack. Thus this is a starw man objection.

 

A-A means Archangel-Astrakhan, used to define the Germans' ultimate objective. A-A or variations are cited in Fuhrer Directive 21 and other planning documents.

 

A German victory was depending on the following conditions

1)The Soviets would have the grace not to retreat but to attack

2)The Soviet forces on the border would be defeated

3)This would result in the collapse of the Soviet state

4)Mobile occupation forces would advance to the AA line and be there before the winter.

All would be decided in a few weeks(june/july) and everything would depend on the SU,not on Germany :the inability of the WM to continue the war after the summer and to conclude him victoriously before the winter,was a GIVEN.

With the limited resources the Germans could commit,they were able to defeat the standing Russian forces,thus,I doubt there was any failure of logistics :shortage does not mean failure.

About the other non viable options,with the usual hindsight,it is obvious that Germany had lost the war already before Barbarossa.

North Africa was a wast of resources

The Uboat War was lost before he started:in june 1940,Britain had more GRT than at the beginning of the war,due to the escape of the Norwegian and Dutch merchand fleet

The BoB/Blitz was a failure

Remaining was :Barbarossa :what would have more impression in Whitehall:the WM at the AA line,or the WM at the canal?And,what would have more impression::the WM at the AA line before PH,or after PH (with PH,I mean US intervention in the war)

Barbarossa only could deliver the biggest results,the decisive results ,but,if it failed,it was over for Germany,and,as WE know (what the Germans did not) that Barbarossa was doomed,Germany was doomed already before 22 june .

For the whole of 1941,the Ostheer could expect 500000 replacements,while the SU was sending 6 million men to the front .
Better German logistics would not prevent the SU from sending 6 man to the front for 1 German ..
Unless the Germans were Übermenschen,they had no chance ..

 

I'm agree with you in all your four points. But they succeeded to defeat the standing Soviet forces because a lot of them were destroyed near the border, when German logistics lines were short; furthermore the first bad Red Army performances, and the initial surprise, hid the defects of the German plan. On the other hand it's a fact that also in the first two months of "Barbarossa" some Panzerdivisionen had problems with supplies of oil and spare parts (when I have more time I could cite precisely that units) then it's a fact that during the operation there were logistics problems, even though these were only some of the plan's lacks. I think that all these problems, together with the growing soviet resistence (harder than in any previously WW2 campaign and maybe the main factor), drove the German attack to the faliure.

Maybe shortage does non mean faliure in this particular case, but I think that it was one of the lacks of "Operation Barbarossa".

You are right, after all the polulation of USSR in 1939 was 168.000.000 men (196.000.000 in 1941). I don't know (we could be thousand of conjectures and never have an answer) if Germany could have defeated SU, but the differences in numbers were huge...

 

Not really. Indeed if 3 occured then the others would hardly matter. However None of them were required for a German victory. They were required for the German plan to work as written. Other routes to victory however were achievable.

The Germans were not able to continue the offensive at the same pace through August which meant theat they couldn't achieve your goal number 4. That counts as a failure in my book. Now one of the main reasons is the Red Army made them expend huge amounts of resources while doing it's best to deny them resources and hinder the delivery of the same but it's still a logistical faiure.

How does that make Barbarrossa a viable option? Indeed one could argue that the most viable option the Germans had was to come to a peace agreement with Britain even if it meant giving up much of what they gained.

Yet some argue that they had a chance of vicotry there. Then there's the question of what happens to Italy if they don't support them there.

But was this obvious prior to June of 1941?

That was hardly the only remaining alternative they had however. Now some indeed probably most if not all the more viable ones were distinctly unpallitable to the Germans. It also depends very much on the time frame in which the decisions must be made. I take it from this you are limiting them to sometime in early 41. It's not clear that was the case prior to this.

The first is conjecture on your part the last is your beief. It is simply not the case. Certainly the odds were against German victory once they invaded Poland but a victory was still possible and something less that utter defeat was even more likely.

By the end of the war the USSR was scraping the bottom of the barrel manpower wise. Germany had other strategies even after July of 41 that had a chance of keeping the relative losses of the Soviets high enough that thier victory was not insured. Not to say that they wouldn't win but the chance of them loosing was still there. Nor does that mean that Germany wins the war but it could well mean that the war doesn't end with the Soviets in Berlin and perhpas not in Germany.

 

Fascinating....I''ve said it before...I learn a hell of a lot from you guys on the Eastern war...I cannot possibly add anything but the educational use to some of us when you few guys debate this area is personal and much better than the facts I would have to read numerous volumes to garner...I'm sure others who just read and do not input feel much the same way. Thanks to you all.