German logistics and railroads

The Germans had little to no info on the factories in Siberia and so their production was not factored in. There was no knowledge about the KV1 and the T34, the Germans assumed they would only be facing the BT series of tanks which were becoming obsolete.
Why would they plan on only a short campaign if they didn't think a long campaign was not practical. German production was not greater then the Soviets on any level.

 

In WWII,Germany was the poor relation,who had to resort to the war of the poor :the Blitzkrieg=short campaigns which had to be decisive,because Germany could not win in a long war .

That's why Hitler stated the following in Weisung 21 (Barbarossa):

1)The WM must be prepared to eliinate the SU in a FAST (=short) campaign


2)The withdrawal of Soviet units capable to fight to the Russian hinterland,must be prevented .


Why? Elementary :such a retreat would allow the SU to continue the war,which had to be avoided.

3)At the beginning of Barbarossa,Halder said :speed is essential .

Why :because general time was running against Gemany,the longer the war,the bigger the possibility for the SU to mobilize its reserves .

 

In Hitler's war,Heinz Magenheimer writes the following :

Many experts agree that,as far as arms production was concerned at the outbreak of war in 1939,the German Reich was neither prepared for the conflict against the Western Powers,not for a WAR OF LONGER DURATION.

And,in note 163 of chapter one,he is giving the following sources:

Milward'The Second World War' inHistory of World Economics in the 20th Century,P 47

Kröner,"The Frozen Blitzkrieg" in Wegner P 135

Fest P 841

Of course,in 1943 Germany's production would be higher,but also would be the production of the SU.

 

Seriously now:

An overall ratio of military casualties USSR vs. Axis is 1,7: 1. This means that for every 17 Soviet soldiers, 10 Axis soldiers died. Indeed, the Germans were better but not good enough. By extrapolating this result to fighting until the last man they would have lost. You may use other figures, but the result would be the same.

Obviously, someone has screwed, but I wouldn't blame Hitler alone or more than any other person involved in the planning of the operation. In my view, the Barbarossa is a failure of the entire German military elite because they were all involved in this operation either in planning or in it's execution.

It is true that all the survivors wanted to blame the Führer and all other possible factors, including the logistics, but the truth is inexorably invariable: the notorious Prussian/German military elite was defeated by their Russian/Soviet counterparts. Everything else is moaning.

 

You stated my point nicely. After WW2 and for 50 years it was always Hitler is to blame for all the mistakes, if only Hitler had listed to us generals. Generals like Guderian never talked about how they didn't always make the right decision and in the case of France if Hitler had listened to the generals the attack would have failed.

 

Why would the Germans plan a short campaign? For the same reason every military plans on short campaigns....because that is the most desirable scenario. The Germans planned for a much longer strategic campaign in other theatres that were going to continue on long after Barbarossa, so look at the big picture. The Wehrmacht and Germany's supporting econonmic base were being shaped in terms of personnel and equipment allocation, design and procurement of new equipment and overall production priority based upon the same planning assumptions that Barbarossa was produced from. Look at where the longer term economic priorities were planned for BEFORE Barbarossa and you can see that there was industrial backing for a longer campaign in Russia but the resources were allocated elsewhere based upon what was expected to happen (successful Barbarossa).

As far as German production not matching Soviet:

The measure of industrial strength is GDP, the Germans outpaced the Soviets in 1939 and 1941 (as well as 42-44). In terms of 1940 when Barbarossa was planned, the US was not in the war and the UK was marginalized to peripheral operations while France was out of the picture. Therefore in terms of the planning parameters of Barbarossa, why would the Germans feel that a campaign lasting into a second year (longer term) would be untenable?

To all, please avoid the knee jerk reaction to presume this is a fanboy revisionism where the uber-generals succeed. What I stated are the facts in proper timeline context.

My point about the base assumptions for Barbarossa being flawed is that those assumptions are really the crux of the whole matter for Germany and the turning point of the war. Based upon those assumptions the Germans built a plan for campaign AND made long term economic decisions that take months to get going and again months to change, the result of which was catastrophic failure within 12 months (from the failure of Typhoon to the encirclement at Stalingrad). The Germans suffered massive losses in equipment and trained Infantry during Barbarossa due to over extension far past the culmination point of the campaign. If the base planning assumptions had been accurate this very well may have not been the case. The evidence of the proficiency of German operational planning is clear when looking at the first 6 weeks of Barbarossa which was within the planning parameters of the campaign. To me, the interesting question(s) is how would the Barbarossa plan look if the Germans had accurately estimated Soviet capabilities? For the Abwehr to deduce that was not impossible and in reality quite a bit of available information was ignored.

It's an interesting subject to say the least (so please spare the one liners and fanboy accusations, its just historical discussion).

 

??? Which ones were legally incompetent and what has that got to do with blameing them?

Really? Certainly Hitler talked like peace with Britain was possible. Depending on the concessions he was willing to make it might even have been realizable. Nor was Barbarossa the only other alternative. Some have for instance suggested a Med strategy. Not sure it was workable either but it was an alternative.

This is far from clear. Indeed without the US and Britain in the war it is very questionable. Based on what the Germans knew of Soviet industry even with them in the war it's far from clear.

But is that relevant to the current discussion? Nor does it mean that at least part of the fault doesn't rest on Hitler.

 

Reply to post 106:
In WWI, the Germans had planned a short war (the Schlieffen thing-,this failed,and they were forced to wage a long war,which they lost ?

In WWII,the Germans,being the poor relation,planned a short war,this failed, resulting in a long war,which they lost .

It was thus obvious that the Germans would try to win in a short war /short campaign in WWII,because,as in WWI,the longer the war,the weaker Germany would be .

If we are looking to the war in the east,what do we see about the manpower situation ?

In 1941, 3.6 million Germans were fighting against 9 million Sviets,and the Germans failed.

In 1942, 4 million Germans were fighting against 13 million Soviets,and failed

In 1943, 4 million Germans were fighting aainst 13 million Soviets,and failed

In 1944,4 million Germans were fighting against 13 million Soviets and failed .

These figures are the total of men who fought on both sides,losses(without sick) included .

On the manpower front,the most favourable period for the Germans was 1941,after 1941,the situation was worsening.

In 1941,the most favourable period for the Germans was the summer :if the war was going on after the summer ,losses could no more be replaced .

There were only 500000 replacements available for 1941,and on 1 september,the German losses were already 400000.

Thus,after the summer,the manpower situation would become worse .

This was known in Berlin before 22 june 1941,thus,it was natural that the Germans planned a short campaign .

 

Peace with Germany was out of the question:the war would end with an unconditionnal surrender of Germany (or Britain).

The Mediterranean was a loss of means,and,worse,a loss of time :Rommel at the canal would not result in someone in Whitehall saying :we can't win the war,let's make peace .
The only possibility was to destroy the SU in a short campaign,and hoping that,if Guderian was on the Wolga,Whitehall would make peace .
To go to the canal would also mean that Barbarossa would have to be delayed,which means :abandoned.After 1941,Barbarossa would be impossible .

About the Soviet military complex being stronger than the German one :maybe I am wrong,but,Britain was in the war,and for Adolf,war with the US was certain and nearing.We are not talking about a war between Germany and Russia,while Britain and the US were neutral :already before Barbarossa,Britain and the danger from the US were claiming a lot of German resources,the war against Britain and the danger from the US had priority in the arms production,...till the end of 1940.

 

Interesting way to look at the ratio of opposing forces. What about frontline troop strength? Wouldn't it be accurate to include Germany's allies? (Romanian, Hungarian, Finn)

In regard to the manpower and replacement issue, how do you suppose an army arrives at the number of replacement troops that will be required in an upcoming campaign? Where does that figure come from? hint-It's not reflective of the maximum number of replacement troops that can possibly be made available if required.

 

Insanity is planning for a short war, when faced with the reality that you cant win even a short war, unless everything goes perfectly. I mean the Germans expected the Soviets to offer no resistance, that they could not raise any troops as replacements and that there were no troops beyond the border area. This is the German generals belief, Halder believed that the Germans were so superior that they simply had to say boo and they would win the war.

 

You keep saying that but don't provide any support for it. Certainly Churchill would be unlikely to have wanted a peace agreement but I suspect Germany could have offered terms that the British would have found very diffiuclt to decline. Hitler was unlikly to offer them but that doesn't mean that such were impossible.

Perhaps but it was also an alternative, not necessarily a viable one but then Barbarossa wasn't viable either was it?

Quoteing acting wierdly so will conintue in another post.

 

You keep saying this even though I've poitned out other possibilities. Perhaps not good ones but again it's pretty clear that Barbarosa wasn't a very good option either was it.

Barbarossa might have been but if peace with Britain can be achieved then a successful war with the USSR isn't necessarily precluded.

 

Ah. I was joking. ... obvoiously, that joke failed.

What I really mean is here! But don't worry if have different opinion on this subject. :

 

This is an overly simplistic description of events and also very wrong.... The plan was based upon the base assumptions, as all plans are. If the base assumptions are wrong all of the subsequent planning is invalidated. Within the parameters of what the Germans expected to face during Barbarossa there was a good deal of flexibility built into the overall plan. Once those basic parameters were proven invalid that is when Barbarossa began to fall apart, not before. The Germans planned for a great deal of resistance, but only token resistance after 6 weeks and they had reached Smolensk. German Intelligence underestimated Soviet reserves and force generation, so based upon what Halder was looking at (flawed Intel) and knowing the Wehrmacht's capability why wouldn't he be confident?

 

I would like to see some documents to support those contentions. I've never seen anything to indicate that they expected any of the following:
1) No resistance on the part of the soviets.
2) No additional troops being raised by the soviets.
3) No troops beyond the border area.
4) The Germans just had to say "boo" and they would win.

 

The figures about the German allies in 1941 are not very reliable (from memory :Finland :250000,Romania :300000,Hungary:75000),in the autumn of 1941,most Romanian units were withdrawn from the the front.
Including the German allies will not change anything :this would mean 4.3 million axis against 9 million Soviets ..

As far as I know,the figures I have given,are for frontline troop strength .

About the replacement troops:the Germans had some 3 million men available on 22 june 1941(not all were committed on that date),and,some 500000 men would be available as replacements till 31 december (what not means that they all were available on 22 june)


The following figures are from
Operation Barbarossa /German fast facts P 4

Total German Army and LW strength in Operation Barbarossa between 22 june and 4 july (sadly enough no separate LW figures)

3316000 men,,4085 tanks and AG,3277 combat aircraft and 19705 artillery pieces (without Flak) and 577120 motor vehicles ,including OKH reserves (240000).


Occupation troops in Norway :100000 men and 7 divisions(LW included)

France,Belgium and Holland ::487000 (43 divisions) including LW.

Balkans :153000 (12 divisions) ,including LW

NA:70000 (2 divisions)

Germany, Poland and Bohemia/moravia::1936000 (7 divisions)

 

The Soviets never topped 7 million men in front line strength, the ratio from January 1942 to July 1943 was roughly 3 Soviet Soldiers to 2 Axis. After Kursk until the end its roughly 2-1 (except for 1945, by then it was all over).
This however does not mean that the Germans could not have greatly expanded their replacement army in 1940 when the decision was made on Barbarossa (that is assuming more accurate Intel has changed the base assumptions).

 

I made the comments about no bad assumptions because the Germans said the campaign would be six weeks long. That means they had no alternatives if it did not end.

Hitler said "kick in the door and the whole thing will come crashing down" Halder said after 3 weeks or so " we have won the campaign" That is not a quote from someone expecting more resistance.

 

German expectations were for 8 (roughly) weeks to destroy the Red Army West of the Dnieper River, after which only the mobile forces would advance and seize the Moscow-Gorky space against the anticipated light resistance. Therefore there was a support plan in place for the continued advance (after the planned 3 week pause at Smolensk) of at least a substantial portion of AGC.
In the historical timeline, they reached Smolensk after having destroyed the Red Army forces they had expected to meet and discovered that the Soviets were far from defeated. This does not mean in any way that they had no alternatives when considering they had destroyed a huge portion of the Red Army, still held the strategic initiative and there were weeks left of good campaign weather.

Wehrmacht doctrine was flexible if nothing else and the Germans were masters of operational expedients and improvisation. Unfortunately for them they were evenly matched with an enemy who was highly skilled at operational deception.

btw- It was Halder that said:"the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks"

And he also later said:
"The Russian colossus... has been underestimated by us?. Whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen"
(an obvious sign of the massive Intelligence failure)