German superiority, myth or fact?

German tank strength on 10 may 1940 (not including tanks for training,only those committed in the attack on France,Belgium,Holland):
Pz I :523
PzII :955
PzIII:349
Pz IV:278
Pz35(t) :106
Pz 38(t):228
Total :2439
Losses 714
French tank strength (only north east front):3254
BEF (on the continent):310
Belgium:270
Holland :40

 

As regards to the atomic bomb, In the early-to-mid 1940s German intelligence agents were looking into why US troops and scientists were in South America searching for uranium, so its all semantics as to what German-Jewish scientist were onto what and what German scientist was onto that, but they didn't know why we were looking or uranium?

In regards to troops, we attacked fortified areas from the sea that the enemy troops had YEARS to build up, and in the Pacific it was even worse. The Japanese were even more fanatical and aggressive, and we attacked every island of importance and beat them back bloodily. We attacked the Northwest coast of France from the sea, the attack that everyone knew was coming, that everyone knew the Germans were preparing for. Sure, they were short supplies, logistics, etc., but they had coastal defenses. And I've read about the German superiority of troops by giving examples of how US troops crawled around a battlefield or how US troops communicated and moved when attacking... That's rubbish in my opinion. We attacked from the sea and pushed them back. We were just as aggressive, and no matter what the equipment, men have to use it.

I suggest reading "A Time for Trumpets" that puts the battle of the bulge in a whole different perspective, as the US troops put up way more of a hurting and a fight on the Germans initially than is usually reported.

And as for aircraft, The Germans had no match for the B-17, B-24, B-29, Lancaster, Mosquito, etc., and I'd take the P-51, P-47, Spitfire, F4U, and F6F any day of the week over the German counterpart.

And the fact that we had to create a logistical system from another continent and transport across the oceans to other continents in great numbers and quality is a feat upon itself. If the war was in our own backyard and we could move tanks easily to the battlefield, do you think we would have stuck to medium tanks for that long?

 

The Finns were not cannon fodder for the Germans. They received aid from the Germans and coordinated many of their military actions. There were also not an ally of the Germans. They were a co-belligerent.
Their war with the Soviet Union was actually a separate war over long standing border issues. The British were planning to send aid to Finland in their fight against the Soviets. Then the German invasion made the Soviets an Ally so the British plans to aid Finland were dropped.

From Wikipedia:

"The first two major conflicts were the defensive Winter War against an invasion by the Soviet Union in 1939–1940, followed by the Continuation War, alongside the Axis Powers against the Soviets, in 1941–1944. The third conflict, the Lapland War in 1944–1945, followed the signing of an armistice agreement with the Allied Powers, which stipulated expulsion of Nazi German forces from Finnish territory."



The purpose of the Continuation War was to take back territory lost to Soviet aggression in the Winter War not to assist the Nazis in their aggression.

 

Aleksander will be taking a brief vacation.

 

How not to do a bit of thread necromancy, an annotated example.

 

This is a very interesting topic for me because I'm writing an article about the Wehrmacht proficiency. It is a very complex subject and I fear it cannot be covered in a post or even a whole thread.
A key point is the tactical superiority (or lack of whereof) of German land units. Since much of this subject is based on Dupuy methodology and conclusions, I'm trying to find independent studies about the validity of the QJM and TNDM. I haven't been able to find much, almost all the material comes from the Dupuy Institute. I would appreciate if you could suggest articles, links etc.
My impression is that the methodology is generally considered sound, at least in broad terms. The critics generally don't address the most technical aspects of the methods.

One of the main problems I see is the accuracy and reliability of the battle data, especially from the German side. From 1944 German records are generally poorer and many documents have been lost or destroyed. Another point is how different armies record their data. For instance I have read long time ago on the web (I don't remember the link) that Germans didn't include light wounded in their casualty records. Is it true? How did different armies define light casualties? Another aspect is the inclusion of Hiwis in German units (apart from the Ostbattalions). In 1943 for instance they employed Hiwis for rear areas duties in Italy. At least from 1944 several German front units had Hiwis fighting side-by-side with German soldiers, at least in the East (a tragic part of the war I think, because they could expect little pity from the Soviets, and those prisoners who didn't help the Germans faced a dire fate). Was it common in the west too? Were they included in all records? In the battle casualties?
Another point is how differences between individual weapons of the same class are quantified. For instance, I think the MG-34 and MG-42, which were included at squad level, conferred a significant tactical superiority to German infantry, especially compared to weapons like the BAR. Conversely the Garand probably gave a certain superiority to the GI, but individual weapons didn't play such an important role compared to crew-served weapons in WW2.

All in all, from what I have read I have the impression that German infantry, and probably panzer units as well, were indeed tactically superior (on average) to the Western Allies up to and included the Normandy campaign. After that the situation becomes more confused, but in general I think German tactical proficiency decreased because of the losses in previous campaigns, while that of the W. Allies increased as they gained experience. By the time of the Ardennes they were probably equivalent, and even some data from the Dupuy Institute seems to support that. Even at that time however I think most German soldiers were more determined than their western opponents, and this is an important factor to take into account. Apart from the ideological motivation, that probably by that time was running thin except in elite SS formations, Germans knew about the "unconditional surrender" clause. The same for the "Morgenthau plan", that Goebbels exploited in his propaganda. An American Lt Colonel complained that the plan was worthy 30 divisions to the Germans. American attitude was different, they probably still considered Japan the principal enemy because of Pearl Harbor, and had a more detached interest in the European war. For many GIs the attitude was "let's finish the job and go home". I will not discuss here the attitude in the British army or the post will become endless, but several books have been written on that subject.

 

Blitzkrieg was bombing the named areas with Ju 87s and the panzers simply went around the target . The forces were surrounded. The speed going ahead was the key like Guderian wanted, not staying to to keep the panzers destroying the enemy.

 

Well, yes, and they generally did it in 1940 and 1941. If you mean that they failed to do it during the following years, I think that was because of bad operational decisions from Hitler and the High Command (like at Stalingrad or Kursk), or because they didn't have much choice. In the latter part of the war the Germans were forced to fight attritional defensive battles, and increasingly lacked the means to conduct large scale maneuver operations. It was not a matter of tactical proficiency. In Normandy they had to use their mechanized divisions to bolster the front line. One can speculate what would have happened if they had tried Rundstedt idea of letting the Allies move inland and then counterattack en masse with the panzer divisions. According to Rommel that wasn't viable because of the Allies air dominance. But this is a matter of operational choices and doesn't address the question of tactical proficiency.

 

I would refer you to Thomas Nutter's excellent "Mythos Revisited", but it appears to have disappeared from Military History Online. Your best bet is Home Page and Mystics & Statistics

 

Thank you Rich. I know those links as well other material from the Dupuy Institute, including their forum. An interesting study on many WW2 engagements, that you probably already know: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-4epw1and2final.pdf
However I would like to find studies from other sources independent from the Dupuy Institute, to have a more comprehensive and objective picture.

 

Well, the problem with that is I'm not sure anyone ever took a comprehensive and objective picture of Trevor, the QJMA, the TNDM, or his historical work? There are numerous critiques of Trevor, mostly by people that got butt-hurt by clashing with him - Trevor was a take no prisoners kind of debater and suffered no fools - gladly or otherwise. Worse, too much of the analytical criticism was ignorant of history and too much of the historical criticism was ignorant of analysis. For example, John Sloan Brown included a critique of Trevor's methodology as an appendix in Draftee Division, which can only be characterized as..."artless" (and I'm trying to be nice). Another was the "independent" review of the CHASE study, which was simply poor. Much of the back in forth back in the 1970s and 1980s appear in Military Affairs and others in Phalanx (the MORS journal) you may have some success searching there.

 

German inferiority...

Their ideology...they were freaking nuts
Their leadership...see above
Their manufacturing quantity...Not enough, not even close.
Their manufacturing quality... Parts interchangeability rarely achieved
Their lack of mechanization - Mostly horse drawn right up to the end of the war; bad idea.
Their logistics - Where do I start?

 

Thanks Richard. I don't doubt the competence and seriousness of the people at the DI. And I don't buy the objection made by some that Dupuy skewed his analysis because he was a "germanophile". However, one requirement in scientific research is that studies must be reproducible. I'm a biologist and I have done research in the field of Molecular Biology. I know it's a very different discipline so probably the analogy doesn't entirely fit. However in natural sciences the conclusions of a study or series of studies made by a single research group but not consistently reproduced by others would be taken with caution. Now, I know it is not possible to have experimental proofs in this field in the same way that you would in natural sciences. However in order to validate the methodology I would expect that the QJM and the TNDM were analyzed by other research groups, examining the sources (about units strength, equipment, losses etc) independently, trying different values for certain variables or adding new variables, etc. If Dupuy's methodology is very good it would be of great utility for any military organization because it has a predictive value. I would expect that by now it would have been adopted as the gold standard by the major militaries in the world. And maybe this is the case and I'm just not aware of it. But, as I said, almost everything I could find about it, apart from discussions in blogs and forums - which don't qualify as legitimate peer-reviewed research - comes from the Dupuy Institute. As I understand the DI is a private organization and it sells the rights to use its software for a hefty sum (178,000 $ with one year support package). When there are economic interests behind studies a certain caution is warranted. Moreover I know that sometimes researchers "fall in love" with their theories and try to defend them to the utmost, generating bias. And not all biases need to be conscious either. Now, for all I know it may be that Dupuy's methodology has really been adopted by the major militaries and the information is just not easily available to the general public. I just haven't found evidence of it.
I don't find much problem with many conclusions of the DI. A lot of studies deal with the Italian campaign up to mid 1944. I would find it surprising if the US Army in that period had the same average tactical proficiency as the Germans, considering that up to 1940 it was little more than an underfunded constabulary force. The British had more experience but were affected by problems that stemmed from long before the war. I would however find it equally surprising if it was claimed that the Germans were still superior in 1945 (and I find indeed surprising that some Wehrmacht "average" division had a higher CEV than supposedly elite German formations). According to Dupuy's Hitler's Last Gamble in the Ardennes the Germans had a CEV of 1.05 (and I have the impression that later analyses add some uncertainty to that result). Even if the method is sound I personally have some doubt that CEV values can be measured with an accuracy of two decimals.

 

There were many flaws about German war effort during WW2 of course. They are due not only to purely military factors but also to economy, politics etc. For instance inefficiency due to competing agencies, obsession with quality for its own sake at the expense of standardization and smoothness of production etc, less attention to logistics in favor of operational art and tactics. Technologically they were superior in some fields but not in others, and many projects of "wonder weapons" were a waste of money and efforts. In the previous posts I was focusing about tactical proficiency, which is what Dupuy's methodology is about. The political leadership was flawed but the officer corps was very professional. Even after the start of the war standard officer training remained lengthy and included NCO schooling, giving them a very strong foundation. As the war progressed training was probably shortened. A great attention was given also to the training of NCOs, "the backbone of the army". I think this was much of the reason for Wehrmacht tactical prowess.

 

This is what made the Wehrmacht the envy of the world in the early war. Their system of training was second to none (early war), and the model we followed when we were making he huge expansion. Writing of manuals, testing tactics and strategy during peacetime, revising afterwards...Those were the things that paid dividends. Those are the things that made the Wehrmacht the envy of the world despite the incompetence in leadership, poor logistics & manufacturing. At the division level and lower, the Germans were very squared away. Early in the war, the US just wasn't. By the end of the war, the US military was everything the Germans always hoped the Wehrmacht would be (with perhaps the exception of the officer corps).

As for the individual infantry soldier. The US soldier was exceptionally well equipped, but very much under-trained at the start of the war. They were competent in small unit tactics, but very disjointed when battles got larger in scale. By D-Day, the average US infantry man was much better trained than his German counterpart.

 

Considering the huge losses starting from 1941, " not a step back ", concentrating on vengeance weapons, Luftwaffe forced to create more and more bombers to attack London when it was fighters that were needed, Me 262 being turned to fighter bomber etc all Hitler's massive ideas. Without these stupid decisions the war would have lasted longer although a two-front war definitely would have led to German defeat.

 

In a war of attrition, Germany was eventually going to lose even a one front war. For all their tactical brilliance, there was just WAY too much wrong at the top... They didn't have a workable model for government.

 

You mean with the last sentence that Hitler decided all?

 

Not just Hitler, the Nazi's were horribly incompetent, making bad decision after bad decision because they willingly allowed HUGE blind spots because of their ideology. The entire governmental leadership was essentially "infected" with Nazi ideology...and ideology that often has very big issues with facts. When you can't tolerate facts, you're ripe for the picking.