goering?

was defeat of luftwaffe due to in efficiency of goering?

 

Try reading Williamson Murray, 'Strategy for Defeat'...

 

It had something to do, but not all is to be blamed on Göring…

 

It is far too simplistic to lay the blame for the Luftwaffe's failure on Goering ( although to be sure, his leadership was ultimately disastrous ).

The Luftwaffe was insufficiently prepared for a lengthy war ; for a full discussion of the flawed strategy, see Murray's book mentioned by RedBaron, or Matthew Cooper's excellent 'The German Air Force 1933-1945 : An Anatomy Of Failure' ( Jane's, London, 1981 ).

 

it was well beyond Göring come end of 1943 when the Reich was getting bombed both day and night. the simplistic Führer could not see beyond the Me 262 as a bomber until nearly forced to realize it was better suited as a fighter/interceptor of the bombers and with that the sleek newer designs with longer range internal fuel cells and swept back wings did not come into bbeing except in papaer and wind tunnel test form. "Fatty" was out of the picture come early 1944 when he should of called himself "Ich bin Sack"; yeah he should of been sacked.........almost sad as Adolf blamed Göring for everything possible and wanted the Luftwaffe to down-grade and most truppen used as ground troops on the Ost front

 

Let's see, the design of the Luftwaffe —in building, developing and training programmes— was completely inadequate for a long attrition war.

By 1943 it is no surprise that the Luftwaffe was losing dominion of the skies in both east and west:

- Excessive pilot and bomber losses in the Battle of Britain
- Excessive losses of fighters and bombers in the campaigns in the east 1941-1943
- Excessive losses in ground crews and equipment in the east 1941-1943
- Inadequate training programmes and old models which were being over-matched by the RAF, USAAF and the Red Air Force
- High losses in the battles of the Mediterranean

However, Göring did manage to re-build the Luftwaffe in the east in early 1944 and amazingly equip almost from zero three Luftflöttes, totalising more than 2.500 aircraft with all their pilots and ground crews. By September that year, all had been destroyed…

 

..You mean Speer or Milch re-built the Luftwaffe, Friedrich? Or did the big guy do anything properly after June 1940? Do correct me if I´ve got it wrong!!

 

What was the impact on the luftwaffe by concentrating its bomber capabilities on the outdated Stuka and medium range bombers. Was the lack of a long range bomber a factor in Germanys defeat?

Would a long range bomber have impacted the Soviet unions capacity to produce arms in 1941-1943

 

Göring is immensely underrated in some affairs, Kai.

He's lack of strategical vision is no myth. His strategic and many tactical decisions decisively doomed the Luftwaffe, yes.

But it was Göring's capabilities or organisation and putting teams to-gether to work —mostly for his own benefit, though— what made the second '4-year plan' work, what build the Luftwaffe from zero and what re-build it in 1944.

Göring had one very good quality: he could see talent and he knew how to exploit such talent. He put men like Milch, Udet, Messerschmidt and Heinkel to-gether and then used his political power to clear the way of all obstacles for these men, who immediately set to work and achieved some great production miracles.

It is very similar to what Speer made.

 

I'd say the defeat of the Luftwaffe should be attributed more to Hitler (of course, the USAAF AND RAF had a quite a large role )

His foot dragging and getting in the way of aerocraft programs ultimately doomed the luftwaffe.

...Like his order to supply the Stalingrad Pocket by air... the transport losses were appaling

Cvm

 

I suppose the Red Air Force and men like the Hero of the Soviet Union Iván Kozhedub just stood there having some vódka…

Actually this was a suggestion made by colonel general Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe.

Hitler didn't take this kind of decisions lightly and just by himself, that's a cheap myth.

 

Kinda like the French Army

 

Yeah… tell that to the Germans at Verdun, the Marne, Bir-Hacheim, Dunkirk and Cassino…

 

Sedan...

 

Patrick,

It's irrelevant these kind of childish discussions…

Yes, there's Sedan, and the Meuse, and Trafalgar… but there's too Austerlitz, Solferino, the Marne.

As there's the Philippines, Savo Island, the Alamo… and there's too Iwo-Jima, the Bulge, Midway.

 

Lighten up mate

and Besides, I'll debate you into the ground about equating the Battles of Bataan and the Alamo to the French blunders at Sedan and such

 

This is not the board for such debates. Maybe the "Military History" forum or ICQ…

And I am perfectly aware that there exist many, many different circumstances and facts that don't allow any comparissons between countries and between wars and that we must consider to put every battle and every defeat and victory on due place.

Saying that the French Army is a myth is insulting. To annalyse something like the Battle of France of 1940 many, many things must be studied: WWI, French politics, demography, economics, strategy, tactics, characters…

Was the US Army of winter 1941-1942 a myth or did it face some overwhelming enemy superiority in the first battles at the Pacific in the same way the French Army did in summer 1940?

 

This'll be my last OT Post in this thread... I promise.....No really...

The sad thing was it wasnt overwhelmed by enemy superiority.

Just undersupplied and underprepared.

But not undermatched

CvM

 

*<

 

Maverik,

The lack of a long-range bomber certainly did not help the German cause. They basically designed their airforce as a tactical force rather than a strategic force and this ultimatly limited their capabilities when compared with the other antagonists.

If they had developed a decent heavy bomber and it had been able to hammer Soviet factories into the ground, then it may have made a difference... But knowing those pesky Ivans they would have just moved them back even further!

As for Stukas... Love 'em!