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Hitler decides to finish Britain

Discussion in 'What If - European Theater - Western Front & Atlan' started by T. A. Gardner, May 26, 2008.

  1. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Facts?? I've seen no facts from you, just some silliness about Germany increasing it's industrial output by 400% across the board. Even if that was true, which I seriously doubt, it's irrelevant. It didn't help Germany in the slightest.

    And if you want to assert facts, it's incumbent upon you to look them up and present them with appropriate citations. Take a look at the reference I made to Kennedy's book to see how it's done.



    Well, if you think so, prove it by citing references that say so. It's obvious you don't even understand what Kennedy is talking about when he says "war-making potential". If you did, you wouldn't come back with a non-sequiter like "Germany increased it's industrial output 400% bla, bla, bla....". That is not the same thing as increasing war-making potential as defined by Kennedy. It involves a lot more than just piling up fighter planes on some airfield somewhere. What Kennedy means is that Germany's ability to effectively wage war decreased as time went along, and I defy anyone to find any reputable source that says otherwise.

    For the rest of it, you have moved completely away from the original "what-if" proposition, and as it appears to be the case that you can't or won't present any arguments for the original question, this discussion is over as far as I'm concerned.
     
  2. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Before this thread gets out of hand, don't be the one who is left standing when the music stops.
     
  3. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello Devilsadvocate,

    Increasing Germany's military output by 400% from 1942-1944 is not silliness but a fact.
    Kennedy'd assumtion about potential is based entirely upon Germany on its own it does not include the potential of the occupied countries, such as France, the Benelux countries, Chechoslovakia, Polandetc. etc. not to mention the vast Russian areas such as the Ukraine.

    The occupation of those countries add automatically to the potential which in not taken into consideration by Kennedy. As such the conclusion to say that the war making potential of Germany decreased as the war went on is already totally out. Did Kennedy further take into account 8 Million slavelaborers from 1941 onward?

    As I am not familiar with Kennedy's sources and formulas in regards to his theory potential, I would even find it hard to believe that Britain was evaluated with 10%, France with 4,5% and Germany with 14%, (other sources state that the potential of France was even higher then that of Germany in 1938), not to mention the by Kennedy neglected build up of Germany's potential in the comming years, due to occupation of other countries. The annexation of Austria in 1938 already flushed 1.5 Billion RM of federal reserves into Germany's economy.

    Again I will forward that if the warmachinery had been started in 1936-1940, Russia would not have been able to stop Hitler. Now maybe you can forward the Kennedy potential of Germany by adding the occupied countries plus the western part of Russia into account as of 1942.

    "Nazi Germany can't win" written by Wilhelm Neckers and published in London 1939.

    The following are cut outs of 4 military historians who debated about this book and the emphasisis of W. Neckers towards the war making potential.

    Possony
    Schiffrin
    Sternberg
    Neckers

    In conclusion all 4 agree that the factor "war making potential" comes only into effect - once Hitlers Blitz strategy fails. A sudden victory over France and western Europe and a sucessfull Blitz war against Russia - would take the figures of the war making potential as of before the war out of the existing equation(1939) in regards to a continuation of a victorious Nazi Germany from 1941 onward.

    Russel H. Stolfi an American military historian "Hitlers Panzer East" (Norman 1991) also refutes the claim in terms to the war making potential, to be the only or main decisive factor. Applying this "potential" as of 1940 (Reality and Myth 1966) Germany could not have been victorious against France - due to the rapid progress of the German advance however France's war making potential could not be utulized militarily.

    Schiffrin "Military Strenght of the Powers 1938" and Stefan Th Possony also agree in 1938 that only a "Sudden victory" against the European western countries could counterbalance the differences in potentials of the "war making potentials" in favor for Germany and prepare the basis for a "longer" war against Russia and its allies.
    Interestingly Schiffrin however forwarded that Germany's military might as of 1939 would not be able to succeed against Russia "The Military Strenght of the Powers" Army Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 July 1939. (This was received as an astonishing view in Britain)

    Schiffrin "Battle for the World" 1941, US magazin (The New republic) even states that after the entering of the USA - inspired by Britain, and joining forces with Russia "the present (1941) equal balance of war making potential" will change in favor for the allies.

    Schiffrin analyses very correctly in 1942 "The Great Offensive"-December 1942, that the German failure to succeed in Winter 1941 (Battle for Moscow) in its only existing Strategy of speed (Blitz) turned the fortune of war against them. Germany was doomed since its only strategy was no more in effect.

    The Swedish author G.Tonndorf forwards in "Krieg der Fabriken"1943 (War of the Factory's) that in the beginning of 1942 the industrial battle had turned in the favor for the allies.

    It must have been very difficult to determin the war making potential in 1943, since J. Burnham "Total War" forwarded a fast and sucessfull end of the war against Germany towards the end of 1946 and another 2-3 years to crush Japan.

    So Germany did as in history "blitzconquer" western Europe - but due to neglecting the "total war" production industry from 1936-1940 it simply did not have the necessary numbers to Blitz succeed against Russia by 1941/42 just as history shows, and thus enabeling history to get the USA alongside with Russia and Britain into the picture against Germany.

    Regards
    Kruska
     
  4. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Maybe so, but the question is, was Germany 400% stronger in military terms relative to it's opponents in 1944 than it was in 1942? The answer is obviously no. Therefore Germany's war-making potential decreased rather than increased. Military production is only relevant if it can be effectively applied.



    Of course it is. He clearly states that his figures are based upon the year 1937. Germany did not control any other countries in 1937. Nor could Kennedy include countries that Hitler intended to occupy. However, you must beware of ascribing too much value, in terms of war-making potential, to occupied countries because they come with a cost and the benefits cannot truly be counted to Germany until they are fully integrated into the German economic (includig logistical), military, and political systems.



    That's because you still don't understand that Kennedy is talking about a concept that goes far beyond mere military strength to include economics, demographics, infrastructure, geographic advantages and disadvantages, and cultural factors. I'd bet anything that your "other sources" referring to France's "potential" were simply comparing the paper strength of France's army to that of Germany. A useless comparison as everyone found out in 1941.



    Again, that's not part of the original "what-if" But even if it was, what you are talking about is simply "mobilization" of the economy to put it on a complete war footing. Germany's share of the world's actual war-making potential is still just 14.4%, about the same as the Soviet Union's at 14%. And Germany mobilizing it's economy completely in 1936-1938 is likely to have the unforeseen consequences, such as the western nations doing the same thing earlier. As for the Soviets stopping Hitler in 1941-42, it's going to unfold pretty much the same either way due to Germany's neglect of logistics and the Soviets ability to trade territory for time.



    Another way of putting this proposition is, that if Germany doesn't force a surrender in six months, it will lose the war. I think that is a fair way of stating the situation. Germany could "bounce" a country and force a quick surrender if the country was militarily weak and/or irresolute, but if determined and able to trade space for time, such as Britain or Russia, Germany just didn't have to war-makibng potential to stay the course in a long war. I'd say that's a vindication of Kennedy's analysis and his concept of war-making potential concept.

    Another way of looking at the concept is to consider the fact that as the war continued the Axis strength (war-making potential) decreased in proportion to the Allies because the factors that Kennedy included in his analysis had time to come into play. Germany might increase production of certain kinds of weapons, but that did not mean it became stronger, had more options, or military potential, it lost war-making potential as time passed.



    This is simply a restatement of my analysis; Germany managed to subdue a few militarily weak or irresolute countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Poland, but didn't have the war-making potential to subdue stronger countries like Britain, and the USSR. The Axis combined, was exceedingly weak in terms of war-making potential and had no chance whatsoever of winning a war against the Allies which had three times the war-making potential of their opponents.
     
  5. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello Devilsadvocate,

    Besides a mere statistic from Kennedy (which does not take into account any historic or “if” changes) I haven’t, seen any facts/literature posted by you that would support your argument or personal opinions.

    Maybe you will find the following interesting to read since it is reasoned and documented, -not just a single table statistic – It shows, proves that my “if” assumption has all reasons to be a very realistic one. If Russia is “Blitzt” within 6-9 month, the GDP would be at par even with the entry of the USA in 1942/43. (As you can see countries such as Poland 94 GDP or Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway or Greece 76 GDP are not taken into account.

    However my statement forwarded very clearly that “if” Hitler would have succeeded against Russia it would be very unclear whether the US would actually get involved in Europe’s ww2.

    I also stated that the lack of German war machinery in 1941 due to a non total war production between 1936 and 1940 caused the failure of the war against Russia. Your assumption that if Germany had gone into total war production in 1936 it would have resulted in a similar reaction by France, Britain and Russia is not supported by the fact that both did not do so even under the historic occurrence in regards to Hitler’s buildup and Russia was already in 1937 on the same war production level as in 1941. After all Stalin had planed to build up his invasion army to strike in 1941-42, hoping for a war scenario in the West such as in 1916.

    The following readout also proves you wrong in your assumption that Germanys GDP or war making potential did not increase during ww2. Its ratio towards the allies did not improve, but that is only due to the US entering the war and Russia not being conquered or robbed of more then half its GDP through Hitler’s occupation.

    Further I would like to point out that the increase of the war making potential – based on the GDP – is inclined to so in regards to rationalization efforts and work hours increase, and not just by building new factories. Germany increased its work hours from 48,5 in 1939 to 72,5 in 1944 and introduced production rationalisation – therefore a 400% increase could be achieved.

    Since you always point out that this is not according to the initial thread, I do not mind to move “my if” to a new thread.


    Allied and Axis GDP

    by Ralph Zuljan Allied and Axis GDP

    please klick to see the statistic


    The GDP story of World War II is richer than such analysis suggests. GDP is a rough measure of economic power and decision makers probably make their determinations based on the results of the previous year. From this assumption the following statements may be derived from the estimates of GDP during the war years

    In 1939, France and the UK confronted Germany (which included Austria) over Poland. The ratio of Anglo-French GDP to that of Germany/Austria was 1.25 for 1938. Allied GDP was superior to that of Germany/Austria.

    However, on the eve of war, Nazi Germany announced a treaty with the USSR. The Nazi-Soviet Pact certainly neutralized the economic weight of the USSR and it may have been interpreted as a German/Austrian alliance with the Soviet Union. In the latter case, the ratio of Allied/Axis GDP shifts to 0.64 and the Allied expectation is to lose.

    During the battle of France, in 1940, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany/Austria. In terms of 1939 GDP, the Allies to Axis ratio now stood at 0.86 because of the addition of Italian GDP to the Axis.

    With the loss of France to the Allies, the Allies to Axis ratio dropped to 0.51 as the UK stood alone against the combined economic power of Germany/Austria and Italy. With the addition of French GDP, the Allies to Axis ratio plummets to 0.38 and an Axis victory seems economically certain. British intransigence, epitomized by Churchill's poignant bluster hid the hopelessness of the Allied cause from the public. Realistically, only the hope of a Soviet or American entry into the war on the Allied side provided any solace.

    Adding the 1940 GDP of the USSR to that of the UK shifted the Allies to Axis great power GDP ratio to 1.31, giving the Allies the economic advantage lost with the entry of Italy in 1940. However, with French GDP included in the Axis tally, the ratio was 1.01. Hitler said of the war with the Soviet Union that "the world will hold its breath."

    With the addition of Soviet GDP to the Axis, Japan engaged on the Axis side and the United States on Allied side, the ratio would be at 0.94.

    At the end of 1941, the Axis had every reason to believe the war against the Allies was economically winnable. The reality of an undefeated USSR, however, gave Churchill every reason to say "we will win after all,"

    This analysis shows that while by 1942 there was a substantial Allied economic advantage, measured in GDP, this did not exist at the beginning of the war in 1939. In fact for a period of time the Axis commanded greater GDP than the Allies. Suggesting that the Allies had a GDP superiority from the start is wrong and misses the dynamics of World War II.

    It is worth noting that from a lead of 1.25 in 1939, the Allies were reduced to a miserable 0.38 by 1941. There was nothing preordained about the recovery of GDP that followed.

    It is unreasonable to believe that Allied decision makers were particularly confident of economic dominance until well into 1942, regardless of their public pronouncements.

    Regards
    Kruska
     
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  6. Tomcat

    Tomcat The One From Down Under

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    according to your reference here, they don't even agree with what you are saying, because you seem to have picked out of that reference statments which only agree with your argument and not disagree with it. You have left parts out for example, it starts of as.

    I personnaly think that this is a load of **** and although apparantly on paper is possible, in reality this is far from the truth. Why? Because if this was possible, Hitler would have done it, Germany would have increased its production by your 400%, yet they didn't, Why? Because it clearly was not possible in reality.

    Another point is that your whole argument appears to be that the axis forces could defeat the 1940-41 western allied armies. Ok, again in theory yes, but then why did the Germans lose the BoB? Why did they lose in North Africa? Because in reality they couldn't, and this is even before bringing the USSR and the USA into the equation.

    You also keep bring up the fact that the Germans could use captured enemy factories within occupied countries. You fail to rememeber, that merely taking over a factory dosn't automatically mean it starts churning out tanks and guns. This takes time to rebuild the factory, which means more materials taht Germany is short on to be allocated, as well as men and trucks (that are already short in supply).

    Yes I know that you said the Germany starts her build up eariler, but I just don't see how this is possible.
     
  7. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    One thing I can say, Kruska, Devil, Tomcat and the rest, this thread certainly has a lively exchange of ideas and opinions.
    Okay, let's say Germany does (by some miracle) increase her potential industrial output in the years Kruska says. What happens then? I'd have to say this would essentially be insignificant or at best a minor development, because, without enough raw materials, these factories, no matter how high their potential capacity have been increased, would still be putting out less than their rated capacity.
    Another thing to look at. The internal situation of Germany, if I remember what I read in the book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Germany's labor situation was still very much in flux. And with such a situation, increasing industrial capacity would be an iffy thing.
    On paper, it would seem easy to say, "It can be done." Okay, let's say there was a German masterplan to increase production prior to opening hostilities. Unfortunately, there's an old World War II saying, "the plan was smooth on paper but they forgot the ravines."
    Oh yeah, your exchanges of ideas and opinions are quite illuminating and I'm glad that neither of you guys go overboard.
     
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  8. Tomcat

    Tomcat The One From Down Under

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    I agree, they both conducted themselves very professional and politely, I think I will give some rep:)
     
  9. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello Tomcat and Falcon Jun,

    I do hope that my above statements make it more visionable?:)

    Regards
    Kruska
     
  10. brndirt1

    brndirt1 Saddle Tramp

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    deals more closely with a comparison between the Nazis and the Soviets, it is still quite interesting.

    To win in an armed conflict, a nation must be able to optimally supply one’s own forces both in offensive and defensive situations. Germany was able to (reasonably) supply her forces with military supplies in the early years of the war, when she fought a series of small, quick action campaigns. But after 1942, Germany could no longer provide her armed forces with the needed military supplies. Quick campaigns gave way to a prolonged war. The Soviet Union however could supply her army with the needed materials and the United States was indeed the global Arsenal of Democracy.

    Since Adolf Hitler and the German Nationalist Socialist party came to power in 1933, Germany was both economically and militarily preparing for war. German military officials studied the failures of the last World War, recommended corrective measures and developed new combat techniques, which would deliver a proverbial deadly knockout punch as early as possible in any future conflict. German propaganda specialists made sure that all of Germany’s future opponents also believed that Germany was militarily superior to one and all.

    In reality, Germany was not prepared for war in 1939. The German economy of the 1930’s continued to satisfy both civilian and military requirements, even after September of 1939 when production should have shifted to military needs. Hitler believed that he could have it both ways, "Kanonen und Butter" - that is, satisfying the civilian population at home by not placing restrictions on their consumer product consumption, while at the same time satisfying the production needs of Germany's military forces. In fact, Germany was not geared for total war production until 1944. This indicates that German economic and military resource management efforts were not optimally configured for a nation at war previous to that time, and in 1944, the tide had already long since turned.

    For example, in FY 1942, Germany produced 30 million tons of steel - but only 8 million tons of that was directed towards military production efforts (airplanes, guns, munitions, supplies, tanks, etc.). The following chart highlights German steel production allocations for the fourth quarter of 1939:

    Heer - 3.060.000 tons
    Marine - 1.250.000 tons
    Luftwaffe - 2.220.000 tons
    Military construction - 2.060.000 tons
    Total military - 8.590.000 tons

    Civilian sector - 7.320.000 tons
    Export - 1.730.000 tons
    Total civilian - 9.050.000 tons

    Total steel - 17.640.000 tons

    The civilian sector thus consumed 41.5% of the total German steel production in the fourth quarter of 1939. By the fourth quarter of 1940, the civilian sector "only" consumed 40.8% of the steel output. When Speer reorganized the German economy when Fritz Todt died and he replaced him, it is clear to see where the slack came from.

    In terms of human resources, Germany should have increased the hours of a workday to way beyond a regular "9-5" day early in the war. Women were not considered as a serious alternative work force until late in the war either. In 1939, German industries utilized 2.62 million women. In July of 1944, German industries still only utilized 2.67 million women. This average was maintained from 1939 to 1944.

    In terms of manufacturing/production related intricacies, the Germans too made a number of long-term calculation errors. For example, the Germans would begin to produce one type of a weapons system (say a Pz IV), then, for whatever reason, added to or modified the basic production model within a very short period of time (the Pz IV came in a myriad of variants as time progressed). This "upgrading" only served to slow down the total number of units which could be produced in the long run. Standardized production equals mass quantaties. The Germans should have produced the Pz IV in just one or two variants and produce them as much as possible, just like the Soviets with their T-34 production. German tanks utilized more complex gasoline engines (higher maintenance and production costs); Soviet tanks ran on very basic diesel engines (and also less flammable when hit). Here too, the Germans realized their error in 1941, but it was too late to convert the German economy over to diesel engines.

    From 1939 to 1941, Germany used her now well refined Blitzkrieg tactics to conquer Poland, Denmark, Norway, the BeNeLux nations, France, the Balkan, and so on. The end goal was to obtain a German victory through the utilization of the minimum quantities of men, materials and supplies as possible, and in the shortest time. This worked quite well in the early years of WWII. If there was a chance to win the war, it was most probable during the summer and fall of 1941 provided that the existing resources were not squandered or misused.

    In the end, Germany’s excellent military leadership and her many technical advantages were not enough to overcome the economic advantages of her enemies. From the very beginning, Germany should have been able to exploit many of her economic and technology advantages far more optimally. Placing Herman Göring in charge of domestic economic planning was not the wisest of selections either. While Albert Speer did achieve some very impressive production increases in 1943, 1944 and 1945 (he became Armaments Minister on 18 February 1942, replacing Fritz Todt), the German efforts were essentially a day late and a dollar short.

    Germany lost the Second World War not because of any single military action, she lost it primarily to a war of economic and human attrition.

    From:

    A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison

    The potential was there for a "short" war, but improving production as Speer managed can NOT be translated into a war-winning position by any stretch of the imagination. Having the "gear in the rear" is only an advantage if it can be delivered, fueled, manned, and deployed with skill. Otherwise it is just "stuff".
     
  11. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello brndirt1,

    Thank you very, very much, I realy appreciate your post to the utmost :D

    Quote: but improving production as Speer managed can NOT be translated into a war-winning position by any stretch of the imagination.

    If it happened in 1936 it would have been the war-winning position, improvment could have already simply been achieved by conceiding to Female labor ( Freeing additional men for service) and gearing up the % towards the military hardware, since as you pointed out correctly - a huge share of Germany's industrial potential was wasted upon civilian commodities.

    Thanks again and Regards
    Kruska
     
  12. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    I'm not going to offer another detailed rebuttal at this point, but I will say that I disagree with Kruska that Germany in the late 1930's, had either the economic or industrial wherewithal to successfully prosecute a war with either Britain or the USSR lasting more than a few months. The proof of that statement lies in history.

    Kruska's contention that ordering full war mobilization of the economy in 1936, three or four years early, and placing the industrialist Krupp (which one I'm not sure) in charge of a well thought out mobilization plan, certainly wouldn't have hurt Germany's short-term capabilities. But such an early start has it's own problems; it places strains on the economy that can only be endured for a limited period of time. Hitler's domestic political support was largely based on his role in the perceived improvement of the average German's standard of living. Inevitably, the sacrifices, rationing, longer working hours, and economic disruptions introduced by full mobilization would seriously cut into that support, something that a leader such as Hitler could afford to ignore. In addition, full economic mobilization would alarm Germany's neighbors and potential opponents, and encourage them to rearm more quickly so that any advanatage Germany might gain would soon be diluted.

    Historically, Germany's economy, through heroic efforts managed to increase production of war material as the war progressed, even as Germany became militarily weaker and less able to fight the war. This was due to focusing production efforts in certain industries, using less than satisfactory substitute materials, moving selected factories underground, and using slave labor. These methods reflected acceptable war-time solutions to the basic problems which affected Germany's economic /industrial base and which would NOT have been solved by earlier mobilization of Germany's economy. The fundamental economic limitations on Germany's war-making potential would continue to exist regardless of when economic mobilization was initiated.

    I'm am no advocate of strict historical economic determinism. I do believe that extraneous, and often intangible factors, such as geography, morale, clever strategies, and sometimes just plain luck, play a role. However, the magnitude of the of the disparity between the Axis and the Allies was so great that Geramny, no matter how successful, in the first year of the war, had no realistic chance of eventual victory. Resolute and determined opponents, such as the USSR and Britain did play a role in Germany's defeat, but my opinion is that these countries hung on because they were fully aware that in doing so, they guaranteed that time would be bought allowing the economic factors to come into play.

    The idea that Germany could inegrate captured industrial capacity in occupied countries into it's own war-making potebtial is, I think, greatly exaggerated. Certainly, weapons factories, if undamaged, could continue production with only a short interval needed to bring them under new adminsitration, but this is not the same thing as effective integration into a country's war machine. It creates severe logistical and planning problems and introduces significant complexities into both the raw materials and finished goods supply processes. At some pont, the sheer number of these "planning exceptions" becomes more than they are worth as additions to the country's armed strength. In most cases however, to truly utilize captured "war-making potential" requires years to integrate the industrial capacity into a country's military/economic/logistical infrastructure. It just can't be forced overnight.

    Suffice it to say, Hitler gambled in 1939. When Britain refused to throw in the towel within a few weeks of France in 1940, he was in serious trouble. He lost the gamble in September, 1940, when the US initiated Lend-lease as a sign it was in the fight, at least from the supply standpoint. After that, Hitler should have figured out some way of unilaterally ending the war because with an Allied/Axis economic siparity of over 3:!, there was no way "Blitzkrieg" was going to work.
     
  13. Miguel B.

    Miguel B. Member

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    After reading this thread I find myself inclined to agree with Kruska. I dont think tough that it would be economically viable for germany to move its economy to a war economy as early as 36. The people wouldnt like it as they wouldnt understand. However, if they had increased production in 1939 in the levels they did in 1943, things in Russia could be diferent. Maybe they could have reached farther than they historically did maybe even get to the oilfields in Baku.
    But we must remember that they didnt have an unlimited ammount of fuel so there would be limitations to the amount of mechanisation that they could bring to the army However, if they kept the divisions at the same strenght levels pre-41 (round 300 tanks irrc opposed to the 240 they had in 41) and added maybe half the production gains they had in 43 (their late war economy was a desperate move you couldnt drive a car cause all the gas was going to the army) they could have increased their strenght to maybe an extra 5 panzer and mechanized divisions (got to do the math dont quite recall the number of oil barrels and lubricant each Panzer division used in times of war) and some 6 motorized divisions plus more aircraft wich could bring some more havoc in the great sunday blow.

    I also dont believe Russia would mobilize faster for war than it did. Stalin was fully convinced that germany would never attack. Even in the first hours of Barbarossa they tought that all the German attacks were provocations designed to obtain a Russian response and give probable cause for germany to attack.


    Increasing their armored and mechanized divisions as well as their airforce numbers would suffice to get farther into Russia than they did.
    The fate of the war however would depend on the reaction of the Russians and what their response was after loosing maybe Moscow and the oil fields (more the oilfields I guess)...


    Another advantage would be the possibility of maybe attacking Greece and USSR at the same time giving Germany the warm period of March to June as an extra in Russia.

    Oh and pre 42 the germans had the upper hand. Whenever the British faced them they had to withdraw. Norway, Greece and Yuguslavia are proof enough that the Germans were putting more of a fight than the British could handle.

    Well, all this are ifs and I am glad Hitler did things the way he did. As I know we all are :)



    Cheers...
     
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  14. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello devilsadvocate,

    Regards
    Kruska
     
  15. Totenkopf

    Totenkopf אוּרִיאֵל

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    I can recall reading that Germans were dividing up factories and industries in Europe to be administered by German Companies after they were conqueored so that war production could be increased to take on surviving enemies. Holland and Belguim specificly if memory serves. They just didnt hold with these plans; they put any high standing person who wanted to run it in charge.
     
  16. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Yes the Nazis acctually already planed a long time ahead before starting a conquest in regards to exploitation of available resources in the respective country - Goering had exessive literature and guidance in regards to Museums and valuables to load up his plunder train.

    They even managed to calculate on how to make a slave laborer or KZ prisoner die just in time without wasting to much calories on him in regards to his output ratio.

    Regards
    Kruska
     
  17. DarkIce

    DarkIce Dishonorably Discharged

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    Hitler should have put the ME-262 into full production back in 1942, and then equip long-range bombers with jet propulsion. Not to mention the V-1 or V-2's he could have used on England or Russia but by the time he did the war was already lost for Germany. He lost the war because he didn't defeat England.
     
  18. Kruska

    Kruska Member

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    Hello DarkIce,

    You are worse then me or Devilsadvocate. I changed the thread to "if" 1936-1940 then 1941/42??, Devilsadvocate is constantly bringing up history and 1943/44 and you bring up Me262's V1&V2's Jesus :D

    Regards
    Kruska
     
  19. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    And how would the Germans have gone about doing that? The first true "Jet" flight of the 3rd test aircraft wasn't untill July of 42. Then the were the problems with the unreliable engines and airframe improvement that slowed development not to mention the lack of engines. End even after being in production there were still problems with the engines.
     
  20. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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