Hitler invades the Soviet Union in 1940

From everything I read the Western Allies had more available troops than Germany at the time of the Invasion of France, unless that was Western apologists trying to blame Western lackadaisical thinking or behavior towards military action and is untrue I don't know..

 

On 10 may 1940 the French 1st Army group had 30 divisions + 2 fortress divisions (who could not be used for an advance);there were also 8 British divisions, 22 Belgian divisions and 10 Dutch divisions who were considered as lost in advance . Thus 38 Allied divisions (French and British ) and 22 Belgian divisions against 2 German Army Groups (75 divisions ) with a reserve of 42 divisions (not all were committed) .

With the existing forces (38 divisions ) the French could not defend a frontier from the Channel to the Maginot line,they needed and a shorter front line and additional divisions: these were available in Belgium,that's why the Allies advanced in Belgium .

Long time the German victory was explained by a qualitative superiority, til ,some years ago, Frieser (an officer of the Bundeswehr ) claimed that the Germans were quantitatively and qualitatively inferior, but won because they had 2 brilliant generals (something one can expect from a Bundeswehr officer), Manstein and Guderian but he is wrong: the simplest explanation is always the most obvious one :the Germans were quantitatively superior,they had more boots on the ground,something which is mostly decisive . Americans give to much importance to technology, this is a very dangerous illusion (explainable by the wish to win on the cheap),and this illusion is responsible for the failure in Iraq .

In the 19th century,it was possible for brilliant generals to win battles ,this epoch is over .

 

I thought the French had 100 Divisions and 5 million men mobilized?

 

Welcome to LJAd's selective-reductive math, if it doesn't support his conclusion's it is 'irrelevant' and therefore doesn't exist.

What he discounts ( because it doesn't fit his conclusion ) is that both sides had roughly equal numbers in all categories such as formations, tanks, planes, guns, troops et al, only in Machine guns and mortars did Germany have any significant advantage over the Allies.

The problem was the Allies had them in the wrong place and sent those in the right place in the wrong direction.

He ends with the asinine comment that in this era 'brilliant general's' can not win battles. (since he will ask for a example I offer Nimitz/Spruence/Fletcher at Midway who was inferior in every aspect, yet won) Not only do brilliant commanders win battles, even mediocre ones can win battles when their opponents are led by fool's.

(example, Battle of France)

 

GA 1:
1re Armee - 1 DCR, 2 DLM, 3 DIM, 1 DI, 2 DINA, 1 DM (1 DIF, 1 SF)
2e Armee - 2 DLC, 3 DI, 1 DINA, 2 DIC (1 SF)
7e Armee - 1 DLC, 2 DIM, 3 DI (1 SF)
9e Armee - 2 DLC, 1 DIM, 4 DI, 1 DINA (1 DIF, 1 SF)
BEF - 8 divisions

Total 40 divisions
Belgium - 22 divisions
Holland - 10 divisions, but if lost to the Allies, then by the same rational, 18. Armee was 'lost" to the Germans.

So 62 divisions facing, HG-B, less 18. Armee was 2 Panzer and 16 Infanterie divisions, HG-A was 7 Panzer and 37 Infanterie divisions, so the total was actually...62 versus 62.

 

Yes, but these were not on the north-eastern front ;and the 5 million men were the total of the mobilised men .The French website I consulted gave a total of 30 divisions (+ 2 non mobile fortress divisions ) on French side on the border with Belgium,with the BEF this was a numerical inferiority . It was much less than what was available in 1914 .

 

18 th Army was not "lost " to the Germans.

And the French site I consulted mentioned the following divisional strength for the French

1 Army : 8 + 1 fortress division (SF is not a division )

2 Army : 7

7 Army : 6

9 Army : 8 (+ 1 fortress division )

Reserve : 1

Total = 30 ( + 2 fortress divisions )

 

There were no equal numbers : the theory of the equal numbers is a myth, to put the blame of the defeat on Gamelin

Exemple : aircraft : the Germans had available 2589, the French 879

Manpower : the manpower of the 30 French divisions was lower than the manpower of the 75 German divisions ., the same for the artillery and the tanks

One can not blame Gamelin for the French defeat ,neither can one (as does Frieser) attribute the German victory to Manstein and Guderian ,because this is a totally obsolete way of thinking :brilliant generals who were the architects of victories (Halsey/Nimitz/Fletcher were admirals ) .

The French numerical inferiority dictated its strategy and was responsible for its defeat, the replacement of Gamelin by Weygand changed nothing .

For the tanks : the Germans had 10 PzD with 2602 tanks (source = Jentz) ,the French had 4 operational armoured divisions with 700 tanks=3 DLM with each 180 tanks and 1 DCR with 160 tanks .

The French had also an undetermined number of tanks outside the armoured divisions .

The number of "chars non endivisionnées " (= separate tank units ) was :

for the 1 Army :90, 2 Army :135, 7 Army : 90, 9 Army :153 = a total of 468; thus : 1168 French tanks against 2602 German tanks ,which means a German superiority .

 

Why, gee, exactly...and neither were the Dutch. Thanks for understanding that point.

You are truly tiresome. Indeed, yes, the SF were not divisions - I wonder if you actually know what they were? Anyway, if you bothered to look you would notice they were not included in the total of 32, which also didn't include the 2 DIF. The total was 32, plus 2 DIF, as follows:

1re Armee – 11 divisions including I fortress
Armee Reserve – 1re DCR, 32e DI
CC – 2e DLM, 3e DLM
III CA – 1re DIM, 2e DINA
IV CA – 15e DIM, 1re DM
V CA – 12e DIM, 5e DINA, 101e DIF

2e Armee – 8 divisions
Armee Reserve – 2e DLC, 5e DLC, 71e DI
X CA – 3e DINA, 55e DI
XVII CA – 1re DIC, 3e DIC, 41e DI

7e Armee – 6 divisions
Armee Reserve – 4e DI, 21e DI, 60e DI, 1re DLM
I CA – 25e DIM
XVI CA – 9e DIM

9e Armee – 9 divisions, including 1 fortress
Armee Reserve – 1re DLC, 4e DLC, 4e DNA, 53e DI
II CA – 5e DIM
XI CA – 18e DI, 22e DI
XLI CAF – 61e DI, 102e DIF

Total

 

Moronic repetition of incorrect data does not make the data correct.

Example, you are posting to an English-language forum, are you truly incapable of recognizing "exemple" is not correct?

In any case, the Luftwaffe had 3,214 serviceable aircraft on 10 May 1940 of 4,440 on hand. Of those, 2,581 serviceable combat aircraft and 435 transports were concentrated against France and the low countries. The French had 1,147 serviceable combat aircraft, plus perhaps 30 transports.

The "manpower" of the 62 Allied divisions committed against the 62 German divisions committed (or 72 Allied versus 71 German if the "lost" divisions of the Dutch and 18. Armee (including the Luftlande Korps - get found) was very similar.

Meanwhile, you seem to be the only one bringing up Gamelin, Manstein and Guderian. Perhaps instead you should look at the distribution of mechanized forces and operational tanks for an explanation for the imbalance> Or perhaps it might have something to do with that combined arms myth?

 

Let's all be civil gents. No need for name calling...

 

In post 44 ,Belasar said that the French were led by fools, something that is questionable and of which I do not see the importance .

 

On P 45 of the Blitzkrieg Legend, Frieser writes that that the French had 879 operational combat aircraft at the Western Front ; as you disagree with him, I suggest that you write him a letter,instead of using your figures as an argument .

 

Then address your question to him as to why he thinks the Allied leaders were fools. And then state exactly why you think it questionable they were foolish in their actions.

 

Pish tosh. That is an appeal to authority of the worst sort. I'll translate for others: ""Frieser" wrote it, so argue with him rather than argue the facts."

I was actually being generous. As of 10 May there were 585 1st line and 272 2d line fighters, 210 1st line and 141 2d line bombers/transports, and 482 1st line and 167 2d line reconnaissance observation aircraft in Metropolitan France, plus 108 fighters, 40 bombers/transports, and 51 fighters in training/conversion units, in repair, and on miscellaneous assignments. So a total of 2,056.

Try again.

You are happy to use total Luftwaffe figures in the west versus a subset of French figures. Why?

 

Metropolitan France is not the front .

 

From "Armée de l'air "Ordre de bataille au 10 may 1940 (there is an English version available )

Northern Operation Zone :

operational :344 fighters and bombers and 191 observation aircraft

Eastern operation zone :

operational : 164 bombers and aircraft and 122 observation aircraft


Southern Operation Zone :

operational : 57 fighters (no bombers ) and 26 observation aircraft

Operation Zone of the Alpes :

operational : 142 fighters and bombers and 22 observation aircraft


Thus on 10 may 1940, in the zones affected by Fall Gelb, (Nord and East ) the French had 508 combat aircraft (fighters/bombers ) and 313 observation aircraft , which means a clear French numerical inferiority .

 

Given that a flight across France is about 600 miles, any French aircraft can be at the "front" in about 3 to 4 hours...So it would seem that you are stretching the truth to prove your point.

 

I'm not seeing the relevance of this to the OP, at all...

We went from "Hitler invading the USSR in 1940" to the ability of French planes to fly across Metropolitan France....

 

Neither is Germany.