Hitler's strategy

That's a very big exaggeration and also an unjustified comment .

 

You need to do better research.

11. Panzer established 1 August 1940. Operational mid-January 1941.
12. Panzer established 5 October 1940. Operational c. 10 January 1941.
13. Panzer established 9 October 1940. Operational c. 10 December 1941.
14. Panzer established 15 August 1940. Operational 20 January 1941.
15. Panzer established 1 November 1940. Operational c. late-March 1941.
16. Panzer established 1 November 1940. Operational c. late-March 1941.
17. Panzer established 1 November 1941. Operational c. 15 March 1941.
18. Panzer established 26 October 1940. Operational 1 May 1941.
19. Panzer established 1 November 1940. Operational ?
20. Panzer established 15 October 1940. Operational 1 May 1941.

The DECISION to double the number of divisions took roughly a month during which a quick analysis of the campaign was done. Guderian's contribution, advocating keeping the division as existing, is extant. Accomplishing the reorganization took four to six months per division and was accomplished for all ten divisions in nine months.

 

This scenario is sometimes called the 'Southern Option' and held favor with some, though not the majority of, members of the Wehrmacht command structure. It gravest flaw in my opinion is that it is proposed as a compliment to the War in the East rather than as a stand alone strategic choice. Hitler stated that the greatest mistake made by Imperial Germany in the Great War was embarking on a two front war, a mistake he said he would not make.

Of course historically he made that mistake.

As a stand alone option it does present some advantages, and a slim chance of some kind of favorable outcome to Germany's existing conflict with Great Britain.

Opana is correct that the Axis had trouble supplying the troops historically there and neutralizing Malta, but that need not be the case with a reallocation of assets not being consumed in a war with Russia. All/most the support/engineer troops could be used to develop air bases in southern Italy to accommodate more air units, more POL not being used pushing 100 plus division's east could be allocated to the Italian navy. These two could make a neutralization or capture of Malta feasible. A capture of Malta could make running convoy's from Italy to Malta to North Africa during daylight hours and under a air umbrella possible, greatly reducing the loss of merchant hulls to enemy action.

A drive on Gibraltar, with or without Franco's consent, could neutralize (or capture) that British base thus restricting and possibly closing off access to the eastern Mediterranean for the Royal Navy. This makes the neutralization/capture of Malta somewhat easier. Franco's military could not stop Germany with or without British aid, and if Britain did send troops that likely would result in another Greece debacle. Nor would it be implausible that a pro-Germany faction in Spain would take Franco's place. This should make some or all the merchant hulls available to the Axis at some point.

This alone could make the support of a larger DAK feasible, or at least the less capable Italian mobile forces could be withdrawn in favor of more effective German formations. A 'army' sized force of German troops would not conquer all of Africa, or points east but may just tip the balance in a drive to the Suez. This could turn the Mediterranean into a 'Axis' sea. After that Germany would have to change tactics.

Historically Germany tried to stir up trouble in the Middle east by sending money and arms to disaffected factions within the Empire, but these were feeble attempts. A more robust effort could have been undertaken and Germany could take a page out of Churchill's playbook with LRDG and Commando operations deeper in British control areas stirring up mischief, forcing Britain to spread her limited forces far and wide.

In time there exist possibilities favorable to Germany. It would be a tremendous gamble for Germany, but no worse and likely much better than any war in the east.

 

The italian fleet would have been available for operations in the Atlantic and for a later Sealion too.

In Germany this southern option is known as mediterranean strategy and Admiral Raeder was the main man behind her. And typical for gerrman military, there were soon phantasys about a Reich from the Nordkap to South Africa. But Hitler had zero interest in colonies far away and history showed that this was a wise decision, african colonies caused a lot of trouble and little benefit after the war.

The alternatives were:
- doing nothing, no Sealion, no Barbarossa, no war in North Africa
- preparing for Sealion 1941 or even 1942 and more action in the Atlantic War.
- something else

Hitler decided to choose the last option and for good reasons.

 

If the Germans controlled the Middle East they would not need to fight a war to the death with the Soviet Union. Having displaced the British as the leading colonial power in the Middle East the Germans would have plenty of Lebensraum and access to oil. German engineering could turn the fertile crescent into the granary of Europe.

The Germans would need to introduce a colonial infrastructure and settlers. (This was a big problem in Russia. Few German farmers wanted to emigrate from Germany to the Ukraine). Under this scenario, perhaps the Wannsee conference might consider the deportation of Europe's Jews to the Middle East. They Germans had, pre war, looked at possible destinations such as Madagascar. Here might be a better solution which killed two birds with one stone, and invite the deportees to take on the role that the Anglo Indians/Eurasians performed for the British Empire. The obvious homeland would be close to the Mediterranean ports with access to the Asian end of the Berlin to Bagdad railway. How about Palestine? Perhaps changing the name....

 

So Hitler really didn't have a blind hatred of the Slavs and didn't want to starve them or deport them or straight up murder them?

 

I think an Army sized German force with a large amount of armor could push the British out of North Africa and Germany complete a drive into the middle east, with the support of the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and the Luftwaffe. They could have committed far greater resources to that theater, counteracting the supply problems they faced.

Thus that leads to, will Stalin see this as a threat to his Southern flank and the resources of the South Asiatic USSR, and attack Germany directly West?

 

Gunslinger the Germans could not support such a large drive in Africa and the results would achieve nothing. The Italian navy was not willing to fight the British and served no purpose in the war except as a threat in being. The few times the two navies met the Italians lost and fled. The Ukraine was what Hitler wanted first and then the oil of the Caucasus, Africa was never more then a side show.

 

When Rommel first came to North Africa with his small force he pushed the British all the way to Egypt, and the Luftwaffe was effective at hampering the British supply lines at first. It just seems feasible that if Germany allocated bigger armies, more supplies, and sufficient logistics to a commitment of pushing to the Suez and the Middle East, that it could have been done, especially if the Luftwaffe stayed an effective fighting force. I can see Russia taking action if Germany got close to their Southern Frontiers, and that could be an issue if Russia decided a direct attack to the Eastern German borders while Germany is committed in full to the middle east.

 

Opana, You're saying that Hitler didn't really hate the Slavs, and he didn't want to starve, enslave, deport, murder them, and all of that was just for propaganda purposes?

 

Gunslinger, you assume that the Germans could support more troops in Africa. As I stated it was not just oil Hitler wanted, there were all sorts of vital materials in the Donets/Ukraine that the Germans needed

 

I'm just asking a question, was that a propaganda lie or was did feel they were truly sub-human and deserved starvation, enslavement, and death?

 

Steve, he could have gained access to Southern Russia through the Middle East, and North Africa was a way to fight the British on land and not start a second front with Russia.

 

You may want to look at a map and start measuring. From Naples, via Tripoli, to Cairo is roughly 1,700 miles. Naples by sea direct to Cairo is 1,250 miles. Cairo to Tblisi is roughly 1,500 miles, across deserts and mountains.

 

To get from Cairo, to Baku, by road, even today, is nearly 3,000 km (1875 miles). Which is like driving from London, to John o'Groats, and back again, and then back up to John o'Groats.Or driving from Washington DC to Albuquerque, NM. Except it's a camel track along a path with desert and mountain vistas along the way, with a sore lack of pubs.

Here is a map of the Iranian Railways, in 1938;



The Iranian State Railways, was constructed on modern lines, but lacked rolling stock and was capable of carrying only 6,000 tons monthly.
Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 by Richard M Leighton, Robert W Coakley

IOW, it could only support a single armoured division for 20 days.... every month. If you ignore civilian requirements. And only in that north south direction within Iran, and nothing going North-West from Teheran in the direction of Baku.

And between Teheran, and the Caspian sea, you have the mighty Alborz mountain chain, with an average height of 4,000 meters. So you are limited to using roads across mountain passes. Germany had how many trucks to spare?

Teheran, and the mountain range behind it.

The British, US, and Soviet forces all spent a great deal of effort to upgrade the infrastructure within Iran, and did so throughout 1942. They built and expanded truck and plane assembly/maintenance facilities, developed port infrastructure, expanded roads, brought in rolling stock. But not in 1940. IIRC it took more than 18 months to get to the stage where they could deliver 200,000 tons of supplies monthly. Yet the OP suggests the Germans can do it from the Med, to the Caspian, across Syria Iraq and Iran!

So Iraq;



Once again, North-South, and not even a half-decent road heading west. Once again, limited rolling stock.


And so Syria and Lebanon;

http://nabataea.net/hijazstations.html


In 1940 the whole region had few roads, underdeveloped railroads with little rolling stock and shifting railroad gauges, deserts, & mountain ranges.

Germany did not have the excess in its economy to spend effort upgrading infrastructure in the Middle East.

As previously stated, without the co-operation of the Turks, Germany cannot supply anything significant beyond the coast of the Mediterranean.

[Irony]Of course, if we allow the Japanese to kick the British out of the Indian Ocean, they could supply German Divisions in Iran, because we know how well the Japanese did at supplying their own forces in the Pacific....[/Irony]

 

He did not .

 

When he first came to North Africa in February 1941 he had 2 German Divisions with him.

And that's why I asked the question... If it wasn't possible for logistical or transportation reasons, then that's why it wouldn't have worked.