Hitler's strategy

In Spring '43, it was not so obvious they were winning to anyone. They had just lost Kharkov and suffered nearly 90,000 casualties. With the Western Allies going back on their promises of a second front, and the cancellation of convoys, the Russians were indeed interested, but not in the conditions Germany was willing to give. Of that, there are ample indications.


"Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught. For this reason the vagueness of your statements about the contemplated Anglo-American offensive across the Channel causes apprehension which I cannot conceal from you."

 

We will have to disagree my friend. With the loss of Germany's best army at Stalingrad it became evident to quite a few Germans that the war in Russia could not be won. In 1943 the Germans were in far worse shape in Russia than they were in 41' or 42'... Smaller force, unspeakable casualties and further from their objectives....

These messages do not point to any serious Soviet consideration of a seperate peace. They only stress that the Red Army wanted help. Why shouldn't Stalin ask for such help and stress the urgency? As far as he was concerned it was the Red Army who was fighting the Germans and doing so virtually by itself.

If you notice in your link, the Soviet Union is not among the nations speaking/hinting at a possible seperate peace between the SU and Germany. These were only the concerns of the allies. The dates are all also prior to the Soviet archives being opened. Much was taken from Kleist. There was nothing to cross reference however. To my knowledge nothing in the Soviet archives ever corroborated what is being insinuated in these messages. I would be very interested in reading up on something concerning a separate peace option/proposal coming from the Soviet side. The topic is quite interesting indeed tho I can't stress enough that the Russians never considered a seperate peace let alone one in 43'. Again to my knowledge nothing from the Soviet archives that have been thoroughly examined since their opening ever showed or hinted of such an option. Kleist was quickly discredited.

 

You are beginning with an erroneous premise, which tends to invalidate the rest of your argument. There was nothing special or "best" about 6. Armee. It was one of 21 numbered German "infantry" armies formed at one time or another during the war. It just happened to be the one at Stalingrad.

 

It wasn't just Kleist. There were meetings in Sweden. In the Spring of '43, the Soviet behaviour towards their allies was peculiar. Stalin was pragmatic. To categorically deny it was even considered would be wrong.

"The archives" are still not exhausted, and not entirely opened, which you well know. Stalin is notorious for not documenting.

Referring to what Germans felt in the Spring of '43 is both well known and irrelevant, to what was going on in Stalin's mind. He killed millions of his own citizens to secure his own paranoia. His allies were not doing what they had said they would do; why should the USSR do what the West was apparently unwilling to do?

Where is the Soviet endorsement of the demand for German unconditional surrender? When is it first publicly acknowledged as Soviet policy?

 

The meetings in Sweden were non-authorised and non-committal between persons of insignificant importance .

 

Just the level of deniability you want when you are sounding the waters. As the Germans were only offering an independant satellite state Ukraine, and not the '41 borders the Soviets wanted.....

 

There is only one serious source about this subject(and not in English:Anglo-Saxon authors are satisfied with parotting SS Standartenführer Dr Peter Kleist,nazi during the war, neo-nazi after the war) : A university thesis by Bernd Martin : Deutsch-Sowjetische Sondierungen über einen separaten Friedensschluss im Zweiten Weltkrieg .

 

And that thesis states:

"Vom Beginn des Krieges bis zum Vorabend der Moskauer Außenministerkonferenz signalisierte die sowjetische Seite eine unterschiedlich starke Verhandlungsbereitschaft den Deutschen gegenüber."

From the beginning of the War, until the Moscow Meeting of Foreign ministers, the Soviet side signaled a greater desire for negotiations than the Germans. (my rough translation; someone with better German is welcome to correct).

The Moscow meeting of Foreign ministers was in November, 1943.

Personally, I'd have put the breakwater in the Summer of '43.

 

A greater desire for negociations than the Germans does not mean that there were any negociations . As long as Hitler was winning, he would not negociate,and when Stalin was winning, he also would not negociate .

Only in september 1944 (when the Soviets were already in East Prussia) did Hitler reluctanty agree to the start of non committal negociations .

On both sides only insignifiant persons joined the "negociations " which were only soundings = what would they demand, what would they offer .

 

Which is neither here nor there, and only serves to strengthen the point I was making, a point Sloniksp was denying. The point was, the Soviet's in all likelihood, would've accepted a separate peace, had the terms been agreeable (a return to '41 borders), even in the Spring of '43. Just because the initial messengers were "insignificant" by your measure, does not make the contact unimportant in the context of history.

Further, we know contacts were made in Stockholm in 1943 in the Spring.

It is in fact more important, the longer people continue to deny it was ever even considered. Which, quite frankly, is ludicrious, as the Soviets were nothing if not pragmatic. Further, the idea that the meeting was done on some random individual's initiative, and not sanctioned from the highest levels, is equally ridiculous.

 

Ingeborg Fleischhauer has written a book about the claim of secret German-Soviet negociations with as title ie Chance des Sonderfriedens.

The book was reviewed in Die Zeit and the reviewer concluded as such :

"Weder gab es Verhandlungen noch überhaupt eine Chance der Realisierung ."

There were no negociations, neither was there any chance that the soundings would become more than soundings .

The reviewer also said that Hitler knew it : that what the Germans had done and still were doing in the SU made any chance for a separate peace impossible .



In 1949 Kleist claimed in Die Zeit that the SU proposed in 1943 a separate peace to Germany .46 years later, the same Die Zeit concluded that this was a legend and that all initiatives between 1942 and 1945 for peace talks started from German side .

 

You're not making yourself very clear.

However, the reviewer makes it clear:

"Eines freilich beweist diese Untersuchung nun wirklich mit letzter Sicherheit: Die Chance eines deutsch-sowjetischen Sonderfriedens im Zweiten Weltkrieg hat zu keinem Zeitpunkt bestanden."

"This study really shows now with absolute certainty: The chance of a German-Soviet separate peace during World War II never existed at any time;"

Which is not the question at all; this shows again the bias with which the reviewer, and you yourself keep making the mistake of; The question wasn't whether it could've been a reality; it admittedly couldn't, precisely because the terms were too far apart. Not because the principle "a separate peace" was never considered.

And that sir, is a key difference. After 70+ years of denying even contacts, soundings or feelers, of even "insignificant" people.

It is precisely because even these "soundings" were/are categorically denied, that feed speculation. The fact remains, the Soviets were willing, at least until the summer of '43. That nothing further occurred, is not due to lack of will, but lack of content.

Contrast the known British response to "soundings" after the collapse of France. The British demanded the liberation of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Poland, & France. Therefore, the idea of a negotiated separate British peace is easily dismissed.

 

Hitler was not interested in peace with Stalin he was as obsessed with destroying communism as much as the Jews.

 

What Nazi-Germany did in Russia was of no importance for Stalin whatsoever.
He almost did the same to Russians (and worse to the Baltic States, East Poland or the Ukraine) and didn't care about it.

He would agree a peace treaty if favourable without hesitation.

 

With two crutches and a cast.

 

Hitlers object was to destroy communism, he cant do that signing a treaty. Plus why would he do so if he thought he was winning

 

Nothing erroneous about that statement Rich. The 6th armee which captured Paris and later found itself in Stalingrad was the largest, one of the most experienced, prestigious and certainly the most mechanized army the Germans had at the time. I believe it was also most "decorated" army? The original Field Marshal wasn't exactly a slouch either

It was the Spearhead of Army Group South for a reason.