How many divisions to defend France with Britain out?

With Britain out of the war, does anyone have an educated guess as to how many german divisions would have been necessary to garrison France, or know where I can find this information for sure?

 

Personally I think they would have used some kinda Vichy France system all around after that, because mostly they would need Germans for bigger cities if there was no need to keep the Atlantic wall manned. And these would be more or less "paper work people".

 

I would imagine that it would not be too many....

I agree with Kai

 

The reason I ask is I am curious as to how many German divisions would have been freed up for duty on the Eastern Front...

 

Well then that would all depend on how many German divisions would be needed to Garison Great Britain. ( this is ofcourse based on Britain being knocked out of the war ). I would guess that most of the freed up Germans from France would might end up in Great Britain. Which still would not leave too many German divisions being moved to the East.

Also not all German divisions were at full 20k strong.... there were some with as little as half that.

 

Not many. Most of the divsions in France in 1942 and 1943 were unfit for service in the east. Some had been sent west to reequip & train replacements. Others were static or fortress divsions that had little equipment for field service. They were organized to garrison the fortified ports. A few others were made up of unreliable non Germans. In the winter of 1943 - 44 the rehabilitation of the depleted divsions was accelerated and more men and equipment were diverted from the other fronts for garrisoning France, Belgium, & Holland in anticipation of the Allied attack in 1944.

Had it been possible to reduce the garrison in the west the largest difference would have been in men available for infantry replacements in the east. After that the transport & fuel.

 

It depends upon on whether Britain signed a forma surrender or was occupied - resulting in resistence activities and external threats (of whatever scale), and the continuation of military activities elsewhere, e.g. North Africa, using troops from India and the other Commonwealth countries.

But don't forget that, if Britain had been knocked out and had signed a formal surrunder, then there would have been no British threat in North Africa, Yugoslavia, and no need to garrison Norway so heavily.

The most important part of that equation wouldn't be in actual manpower but the freeing up of more aircraft and tanks. And there wouldn't be a need for the German navy to be so active in the Atlantic, or lurk around around Norway, freeing them up for coastal activities around the Soviet Union's northern coast (affecting the siege of Leningrad), and the Black Sea.

 

I would think the biggest factor here would be is the US in the war or not. If the US is then the Germans would have to definitely put a sufficent garrison to prevent an amphibious assault in at least Great Britain and keep troops in France and Western Europe for the same reason.
If the Germans followed their original pattern most would be static divisions with a smattering of units being formed up and others recovering from operations rather than top line troops.

 

The Germans could have usef some of the men from Norway could they not? Afterall Norway was heavily garrisoned based on an assumption that Britain might attack there.

 

I don't think that the US being in the war would have made a major difference. Without the use of the biggest aircraft carrier (i.e. Britain), the Americans would have been very limited in their options. An amphibious assault across the Atlantic would have faced as many problems as the oft discussed threat to the American West coast by the Japanese. I doubt very much that the Germans would have allowed Iceland to remain unoccupied if Britain was.

And politically, the Americans would have had a greater incentive to concentrate their efforts against the Japanese, especially if Churchill had been killed (or exiled) and been unable to present such a political counter-force.

There may also be doubts about the introduction of land-lease to the Soviet Union (which was encouraged by Churchill) - but one could discuss what effect that would have had in another thread

 

Didn´t the major part of the US forces for TORCH come all the way from the US so actually not impossible...?!

 

Completely different. Firstly, only one of the Task Forces (Western) travelled from the States, and as the US Army states:

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/algeria/algeria.htm

Basically, whereas with Britain in the war, the American could convoy their troops across the Atlantic protected by the RN (and Canadian Navy), without this protection, the US would have had to divert a lot more resources for an invasion of Britain, including a major commitment of US carriers.

And the invasion of Britain, or a direct assault anywhere on mainland Europe would have been completely different from the invasion of North Africa,

So, maybe not impossible, but a damn sight harder than D-Day was.

 

If the US is assumed to be at war with Germany and Britain et al., are still actively fighting even after the British Isles are occupied, then the US remains a viable threat to Germany. One can assume in such a case the US would have made Japan the primary target and defeated that nation by late 1944 or early 1945. The following are also reasonable assumptions based on historical data:

The US would have continued to expand their military into 1945 having as many as 200+ divisions available. The US Navy would be the same gigantic force it originally was meaning that Germany is essentially powerless to stop an Atlantic crossing or inflict any meaningful casualties on such an operation using seapower. The US would also have sufficent carrier forces by that point to reasonably challenge what Luftwaffe forces might be present.
The Germans would be far less aware of US intentions and operations than the Allies would be of German dispositions. Germany had no spy network in the US while one can reasonably expect a large and active one in German occupied nations.
With a very reduced convoy / shipping escort requirement the Allies can likely sweep the Atlantic of U-boats using ASW groups and aircraft. The Germans would be forced to operate much further from their bases rendering alot of their U-boats worthless (ie the Type VIIs) as these lack the range to operate off the US or outside the eastern north Atlantic.
The Germans would also certainly get hit with nuclear bombs at some point. This would likely be another rude shock far beyond some of the ones like use of Window or H2S were. Since Japan would almost certainly fall before nuclear weapons were available the surprise would be complete. The US could have used a B-36 or B-29 out of Iceland to deliver such a weapon. It is very unlikely that Germany could mount an invasion of this island given its defenses which would, no doubt, have been beefed up following the fall of Britain. It is simply that the Germans lack naval power and the amphibious capacity to carry out such an operation.

Another problem for the Germans is that the Allies could begin their own "U-boat" campaign against German shipping, such as it was. This could cause serious problems supplying their forces in Britain. Again, the lack of naval power by Germany is going to be a severe handicap to their challenging Allied naval operations.....And, the Luftwaffe is no substitute.

On that last, let's just say the US shows up with a 5 to 7 division amphibious assault with say 200+ warships in tow. If we assume the Luftwaffe has say, 200 to 300 aircraft in Britain immediately available for use how long would they last? I would speculate based on US operations off Okinawa that the Germans would lose air superiority within a week after which they could mount the occasional strike with substancial losses. Off Okinawa the Japanese threw almost 5000 aircraft (mostly in suicide missions) against the US barely making a dent in their naval operations.
A couple hundred aircraft not trained in anti-shipping operations could hardly be expected to do much at all.

The problem here for the Germans is that fighting a war in an occupied Britain is first and foremost a naval operation something they are virtually incapable of sustaining.

 

I agree that Japan would become the primary focus of the American war effort, but cannot concur that they would/could have been beaten by 1944 or 1945. Firstly, the Americans wouldn’t have had the use of bases in India (not an issue for direct military action but it was for the American supplying China, and tying up troops in Burma). The Japanese could have redeployed these troops in Burma elsewhere. If at this early stage the Japanese were seen to be winning, the nationalists movements in Burma, Thailand and even possibly India, would have quite happy to run Vichy-style governments.

Again I agree that the US would have become a massive force but disagree that the Germans would have been powerless against them. Firstly, one has to assume that the losses incurred by the US in the Pacific were equal to the real situation. Therefore, one assumes that they are then transferred to the Atlantic and then have to cross it with ALL their needs enshipped aboard. Considering the problems that the Allies had with their supply network after DDAy, WITH a land base (Britain), I cannot see how they would have been able to accomplish this operation without severe problems. The invasion of Britain and or Europe would not be the same as island invasions on the Pacific. The requirements in manpower, equipment, supplies and defence would be tens, if not hundreds, times greater. All this would require being shipped across the Atlantic. And there would be no need for the German U-boats to have cross-Atlantic capabilities. A screen at their usual operational limit would have been sufficient to score major successes. And if the US Navy’s only major experience of counter-submarine operations had been the Pacific, the u-boat threat would have been a big surprise. The Japanese submarine threat was pathetic in comparison. If anything, the escort requirements would have been higher – protecting aircraft carriers is a big enterprise than food or even troop convoys (and for an invasion the initial troop convoy concentration would have been much greater).

With Britain out the war, the Germans would have been operating from Britain, Norway, and North Africa. For the Americans to incapacitate the u-boat, and to a degree the surface ship threat, they would have had to disrupt these bases as well. How would they have done that – just with carrier-borne aircraft?

I can’t see how this would have worked or helped much. Firstly, all of the OSS activities in occupied Europe were centred in Britain. Secondly, spying on the ground contributed very little to the war effort, in any meaningful way. Thirdly, most of the intelligence gathered was through Enigma interceptions and decodes – something that the Americans were very poor at and didn’t get to grips with until the British provided their know-how.

As I said in a previous post, I doubt that the Germans would have left Iceland unoccupied. And the occupation of Iceland by the Americans occurred in the summer 1941, taking over from the British. So, if Britain had fallen, it would have been a race to who could occupy it first. Thus, who would have down the “beefing up” of the defences?

And to occupy Iceland (with the minimal defences that existed upto the US occupation in 1941), the Germans wouldn’t have needed a major amphibious occupation. An airborne one would have sufficed, with naval support.

The use of nuclear bombs will always be supposition.

Thus any use of it by the Americans would have required them to occupy a base close to Europe first. Surely any attempt on Iceland, even for this sole purpose, would have been an early warning to the Germans to some sort threat?

The same problem that you outlined for the German subs operating so far from their bases is applicable here for Allied subs.

That extrapolation from the experiences on Okinawa doesn’t stand up. By the time that Okinawa was invaded, the Japanese air force had been decimated, with most of their experienced fliers dead. For the Germans to be in that position, they would have had to have had their air force decimated on the Russian front – there is no evidence that they ever got to that stage solely in the East. Their major air losses, and the decimation of their experienced units occurred almost entirely on the western front.

And you are assuming that German air defences would have been used mainly in anti-shipping operations. I wager that the Germans would probably have used it at the invasion stage – do more damage to the carrier based aircraft (and I reiterate that the Americans would have been reliant almost completely on carrier aircraft), and inflict more damage to disembarking troops.

Could you explain what you mean by that

 

Here is an idea.

If Britian was to surrender then is it not resonable to assume that teh Royal Navy would be incorporated into the Kriegsmarine along with possibly the French Navy. Know i may not be the best person when it comes to maths but it doesnt take a genious to work out that the two most powerful navys in Europe put under the control of the Kriegsmarine could do a hell of alot of damage to any attacking US fleet.

Then assuming the US would launch an attack around mid to late 1945 that gives the Germans alot of years to build a massive sub fleet, Several carriers and build up a strong defensive force.

They could end up with upto 24+ Battle ships alone by 1945.

Just a fought, Oh and also it means that the Russians would have to face the full industrial power of Germany instead of some being diverted to France and North Africa etc.

 

Also the fact that if Britain fell, Iraq would fall into German hands along with the oil..... This makes things interesting.

 

Why would the US bother with seizing Iceland ? Maybe they would just launch B29 + nuke from USSR, don't you think ?

 

You forgot to include the fact the GErmans would have there own carriers.
LOTS of land based aircraft.
LOTS of subs which the US were not experienced in fighting.
And so many carriers would require all of the resources of the US navy alone leaving little or no room for an invasion force.