How we come to know what we know

belasar wrote:

Duckbill wrote:

Whichever came first, it is really irrelevant because the american version of the LST, and the most numerous type, would accomidate the M-26 Pershing also. Therefore the supposed shortcomings of the M-4 can not be attributed to that area.
Duckbill, I did however enjoy the wooden LST trivia.

Duckbill wrote:

The shortage of artillery shells was due to a decision by Congress to halt production of same because there was a surplus in artillery shells:

"The truth is that during World War II Congress constantly looked for ways to exert influence over the military effort. A favorite area in which Congress asserted its influence was the war budget, and one particular decision is highly relevant to today. Congress, concerned about the vast amounts being spent on the war effort, took a look at the budget to see where savings could be made. One area in particular stood out- artillery ammunition. According to military historians James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi, the U.S. military (thanks to careful planning) had huge stockpiles of artillery shells available in the first two years of the war. However, relatively few divisions were engaged in battle during that time, and so few shells were used. Congress, noting the large stockpiles of shells, felt that the tremendous amount of money being spent on ammunition was a "waste." Dunnigan and Nofi note that based on that conclusion, Congress felt that cash would be spent elsewhere and ordered significant cuts in artillery shell production."

This decision to cut production had severe results once the U.S. invaded France. Artillery shells were used at such a prodigious rate that the surplus quickly disappeared. It now wasn't just merely a matter of shipping the item to where it was needed, it was ramping production back up we'd have the product to ship. So if a shortage of artillery shells lengthened the war, and I do not doubt it did, it was not the fault of poor planning, lack of industrial capacity, etc. It was a matter of politicians meddling in military matters without the training, education or experience to make the proper decision.

Duckbill wrote:

Again the artillery ammunition shortage resulted from politicians cutting production, not military logistical planning.

Volga Boatman wrote:

That's one thing american tanks have long been noted for, crew survivability. In the case of the Sherman it was designed with easy egress from the vehicle, relatively few tankers were lost compared to the loss of the tanks themselves. Production is important when you can just plug a veteran crew back into a new vehicle and get them back into the fight. The Germans didn't have that luxury.

 

As pointed out, the Germans concentrated heavy maintenance at the factory or depot level in Germany. Field maintenance orgainzations were orgainzed for the routine stuff for the most part only. One area Germany failed badly almost from the start of the war in was recovery vehicles. Their Famo 18t was barely adequite for tanks they had in 1939. It also was not designed or equipped to perform on site maintenance of vehicles that broke down. That is, it was strictly a tow vehicle. With the introduction of heavier tanks like the Tiger and Panther the Sdkfz 18 was completely inadequite.
To make matters worse production of these ended in early 1943 and their replacement by ARV based on obsolete tank hulls never fully occured. This usually left a panzer battalion severely short of recovery vehicles.
In this respect the US did much better. They gave their units an excellent ARV in the form of either the T2 (M3 medium chassis) or M32 (M4 medium) for medium tank battalions. These were supplemented by 5 ton wreckers. As a result the US had ARV that could repair minor breakdowns on the spot and tow in major repair problems.

Initially this is true. As the war progresses training became more abbreviated. Driving training was done not with the vehicle the crew would man but rather wood gas generator equipped obsolete tank chassis that might or might not be similar to the ones the driver would eventually be assigned.
Gunnery was usually limited to just sighting in the gun and a minimum of practice rounds. Maneuvers were rarely held at the battalion level simply due to lack of time, fuel, space, and often vehicles. Many mid to late war German panzer battalions only received their full complement (or close to it) shortly before moving to the front.
By contrast US and British tank crews got lots of driving practice. They generally got at least one or two tactical maneuver exercises of battalion / regiment / or brigade in size and at least one divisional one. US crews typically fired hundreds of rounds in training and had considerable time to train together as a crew on the vehicle type they would use in combat. They also got considerable time operating as a functioning unit rather than just having a few tanks for familiarization.

That is a very important aspect of not just armored warfare but warfare in general.

 

Now, I'm going to expand on this issue of crew training a little. You have quoted Dunnigan and Nofi as sources for the artillery ammunition. They were wargamers, and for this issue at hand I now refer you to the opinions of another wargamer/historian JOHN DESCH. John designed a Command magazine game called "SS Panzer" on the subject of Prokhorovka; the following extracts are from his design notes for the game, page 21 of issue 36....(highlighting is mine)

"KILLER TANKS"

For decades experts in the world's major armies have spent a great deal of time exploring why a few tank crews in every outfit inflict the lion's share of their entire unit's battlefield kills. When one or two crews out of a company of 15 tanks routinely compile over 75% of the kills inflicted by their company, there is good cause for study. Virtually every possible reason has been considered, from the crew's socio-economic backgrounds to the mechanical reliability of the individual tanks being used. Historical case studies have been meticulously assembled and examined to try to extract conclusions. Some of the resultant ideas have been apparent to the tanker's themselves from the beginning of mechanized warfare.
Without doubt, the most important factor is how long the crew have been together. With just school training, any crew can be made to muddle through the basics; it takes combat experience to trancend those rudiments to achieve expertise.
Everyone in a tank in combat is extremely busy. The tank commander must aquire targets, lay the gun (or assist the gunner in doing so), and maneuver his tank within his platoon. If he's the platoon leader or company commander, his responsibility for overseeing maneuver greatly outweighs his need to fight his own tank, hence the need for good gunners who can do things on their own. The driver must know not only how to drive the tank, but also how to maneuver it in formation while making the most of opportunities for concealment. A tank commander who must busy himself riding shotgun on his driver is not doing his other jobs. Loaders and gunners tend to be less busy, but are obviously no less important.
Thus the trick is really to get everyone to be able to do his job -and more- without the need for supervision. For example, loaders who aren't immediately involved with their primary task (servicing the main gun), should assist the tank commander in scanning for targets. This seeming bit of common sense is really not that common in practice, and the simple fact that German loaders did more of it than their Soviet counterparts gave the panzer units a major advantage. With two pairs of eyes searching, German tank crews almost invariably got off the first shot against their opponents.(In T-34's the tank commanders also served as loaders!)
Though equipment is less important than crew cohesion, the greater the superiority of the tank itself over those of it's opponents the better the chances are for the crew to survive to develop skills. The most important feature of a tank in this respect is the protection it offers it's crew, followed closely by the lethality of it's main gun. It's not surprising, therefore, that the Tiger fostered more killer crews than any other vehicle in WW2. It's superiority over Allied tanks during 1942-44 is well known.
Extraordinary efforts were usually required to knock out a Tiger. Allied tankers calculated as a rule of the thumb it usually took about 20 Shermans to knock out one Tiger. With a superiority like that, it's no wonder the Tiger's often created field days for their side. Increased survivability permitted Tiger crews to live to fight another day. Virtually every Tiger ace worthy of note had more than one tank shot from under him, but only rarely did a shell kill an entire crew."


On the subject of Prokhorovka itself, Desch had this to say.....

"On the morning of 12 July, 1943, 5th Guards tank army had nearly 800 tanks and assault guns on line. About 600 of those were divided among the army's own 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guard's Mechanized Corps; the remaining 200 were with 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, which had been placed under command of the army especially for the counterattack.
Oft quoted Soviet sources claim there were nearly 1,000 German tanks and assault guns ranged against them, 600 of them with 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and the balance belonging to the 3rd Panzer Corps. Further, of those 600 machines, the Soviets claimed more than 100 were heavies: Tiger tanks and Elephant assault guns.
In actuality, 3rd Panzer Corps began Operation "Citadel" on 5 July with about 290 tanks and assault guns of all types, but by the 12th they had been reduced to somewhere between 150 to 200 operating machines. On the main sector, in front of Prokhorovka, 2nd SS Panzer Corps had 273 working tanks and assault guns, many of which had already been damaged and repaired. Of that total, fewer than 20 were Tigers and none were Elephants. Excluding an additional 50 or so self-propelled anti-tank guns, usefull mainly for defense, 2nd SS Panzer Corps armor strength on the 12th was therefor less than half that claimed by the Soviets.
In relation to their claims about the number of Tigers present, it seems the Soviets were afflicted with the same malady subsequently experienced by the Western Allies in Normandy; in the eyes of the Allied tank crews, most German panzers were considered to be, and were reported as, "Tigers" until proven otherwise. But with only one Tiger company in each of the 2nd SS Divisions, the total available in that corps at the start of Citadel was only 35, and by the morning of the 12th there were fewer than 20 operating. All 90 Elephants had been deployed in Citadel's northern pincer, and it's therefore certain none were to be found on the field at Prokhorovka.


So to summarize, good equipment will only make it's technological superiority felt if the crew has sufficient training to bring these inherent advantages to bear. You will then have the ideal scenario for tanks, where a small amount of well crewed heavies can have a proportional effect on the battlefield thats a long way above the numbers committed. They even have the effect of becoming "force multipliers" where the performance of the 'inferior' machines is heightened simply by their presence, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of "Tiger Fever", something the Soviets suffered from to a greater degree than the Western Allies.
As Desch says,
"By any standard, the 5th Guards Tank Army was mauled on 12 July.....".

"The critical point about Soviet casualties at Prokorovka is that whatever the actual cost it was one Moscow could afford to pay"

 

I would like to expand this further.

The Tank Corps of the United States possessed, technologically, a device that could have proved to be THE major advantage in engagements. It was the Gyro-Stabilizer, a piece of equipment that, when used, provided such improvement that it could have been a major factor in the positive outcome of these engagements. It was not, and the primary reason for that was lack of crew training in it's use.

Many American tank crews went into battle with their Gyro-stabilizer DISCONNECTED, eliminating the inherent advantages that this fine piece of engineering offered.

 

Volgaboatman wrote:

I'm the guilty party. Rather than re-type or scan the information from the book I originally read it in, I used a web source that referenced the same topic; the reason for the artillery ammunition shortage caused by congressional actions. They referenced Nofi and Dunnigan. However, both Nofi and Dunnigan have the education and background to qualify as historians, they also happen to be wargame designers.

From Wikipedia:
Albert A. Nofi (b. January 6, 1944), is an American military historian, defense analyst, and designer of board and computer wargaming systems.
A native of Brooklyn, he attended New York City public schools, graduating from the Boys' High School (now Boys and Girls High School) in 1961. Nofi attended Fordham University, earning a bachelor's (1965) and a master's (1967), and then received a Ph.D. in Military History from the City University of New York (1991).

Dunnigan served in the military, has a degree in history from Columbia University and is a fairly prolific author.

 

Jim Dunnigan had a prolific pen as a wargame designer, too. Lack of blind playtesting meant that some of them came out half-baked. But his output of workable designs was just as huge, not to mention he was founder and head of SPI, the largest manufacturer of conflict simulations. I personally preferred Avalon Hill, but a lot of people bought SPI's games and their design philosophy had a massive following.

Command Magazine, of which I was a subscriber, took the mantle of King of the Magazine Game from SPI. Jim Dunnigan's influence continued in "The Hobby" for a long time, though.

As for Albert Nofi, I have posted one of Albert's articles here, in a thread called Rommel Demythologized, from an early issue of the Dunnigan edited "Strategy & Tactics" magazine. It makes for great reading.

 

I recently bought D-Day to Berlin by Alan J. Levine and have found a perfect example of what I complain about here. Levine tears U.S armor to shreds, calling the Sherman tank a failure, comparing it to the inability of the Navy to get a decent torpedo for many years. He goes on to praise the Soviets for fielding the "truly modern tank." So the T-34 is vastly superior because its frontal and side armor were sloped? I can only guess. From his bibliography it would seem Levine took his armor knowledge from Faint Praise and no other source that I can pick out. He does seem to be aware that tanks do more than fight other tanks but this seems to be his only litmus test for evaluating the Sherman. He degrades the tank destroyer concept and wants to prove how faulty an notion it was by pointing out that the army dropped it after WWII. Like most folks that point this out he does not seem to notice that the concept of the tank destroyer is alive and well and living in the Italian Centauro, the French AMX-10, the Stryker and variations of the numerous IFV's and recon vehicles equipped with tank destroying missles or high velocity guns. Yes, the tank destroyer (fielded by every major armor producing country of WWII) was a flop for the U.S.

In hindsight I think I bought the wrong D-Day to Berlin. I know this will go down as one to read, begrudgingly, and have little faith in. Levine's researching abilities are clearly left wanting.

 

Sadly, a good number of new books have this flaw. With the shear volume of what is written too often an author must start with a whiz bang hook that differs them from what has come before. As for Mr. Levine's book I am sure that the point that US armor was grossly flawed was his hook. Nor is this a new trend. I am a fan of American Civil War history, and it suffers from the same complaint. After the end of the ACW, many of Lee's staff trashed Longstreet on Gettysburg. As we know now there is plenty of blame for Early,Ewell, Stuert, and even Marse' Robert to accept.

I caught the history bug at 10 when I transfered to a new school and a asst. principle gave me a book on the American revolution to read as I waited for my class to return from a field trip. Since then I have read a good number of books and have seen a fair number of documentories on history subjects. Over time I have seen some of my cherished ideas and beliefs evolved and sometimes shattered.

This especially true concerning the Sherman. As a young lad I was convinced that the M-4 was about the best tank ever made. I mean we won the war with it, didn't we? After a while reading about the thinner armor, and weaker gun and comparing it to what a Panther/Tiger/T-34 could do, you could only conclude it was a deeply flawed AFV. I have come full circle (nearly), the Sherman did what it was designed to do. It did effectively, reliably, and relatively cheaply. Numbers and specs are all well and good, but context matters as well.

 

JBark,

First allow me to extend my sincere apologies to you and everyone on this thread for my earlier comments. They were ill-advised and inappropriate.

You appear to be of the opinion that Baily’s Faint Praise is an unreliable source of information about American armor during WWII.

To date, I have seen nothing to suggest the author perpetrated any serious errors, and a review in my possession is very favorable. Aside from some minor quibbles regarding the correct ranks and commands of two officers mentioned in the text the reviewer, Robert J. Icks, found nothing wrong with the book. A former Ordnance officer and author of several works on armor, as well as writing the introduction to Hunnicutt’s book on the Pershing tank, Icks is well qualified to pass judgment on this work. He concludes his review as follows:

The author [Baily] chose his title with care. The job was done, but he seems justified in damning it with faint praise because the real problem was that no one was in charge. They only seemed to be. (Military Affairs, Jan. 1985, Vol. 49, pp. 44-45.)

Duckbill

 

Duckbill writes:

"JBark,

First allow me to extend my sincere apologies to you and everyone on this thread for my earlier comments. They were ill-advised and inappropriate."

Takes a big man. Thank you. Apology accepted.

Duckbill goes on:
"You appear to be of the opinion that Baily’s Faint Praise is an unreliable source of information about American armor during WWII..."

Unfortunately I can not afford to buy it and appraise it myself. My next thought was to ask some of you folk with deep armor pockets to let me know what the book is about. I don't criticize what I don't know, what I mean to criticize is Levine using (apparently) only one source. I want to believe he read more but I see no evidence of it. I can not come close to accepting his evaluation of U.S. armor as it compared to Soviet (I'm talking Levine) and if he gets this from Baily then I say Baily's thinking is flawed. I see no comparison of the M4 to the T-34 which can possibly have the T-34 coming out as a "truly modern tank" while the M4 is a failure. Yes, the decision making back stateside left a lot to be desired, doctrine did not agree with reality (should we mention that more than one country came up with the tank destroyer fights tanks concept, or that the TD concept is alive and well now?) If Baily wrote criticizing what went on stateside then I have no problem with his book.

Tell me, does the T-34 rate leaps and bounds above the M4 in your evaluation? Did we suffer much higher casualties wit the M4 than the Soviets? The Germans? Was the survival rate of a tanker that much worse than an infantryman? A ball gunner in a B-17?

By the way, your quote tells us nothing of how Icks felt about the book, or am I missing something?

 

JBark,

Icks’ conclusion is overly succinct. However, it seems clear that he agrees with Baily’s thesis as expressed in his title; that American tanks deserved faint praise, and that in spite of appearances no one was really in overall charge of US armor development.

Baily's book is cited in several excellent works concerning the US Armored Force including, From Camp Colt To Desert Storm and Mobility, Shock, And Firepower: The Emergence of the US Army’s Armor Branch, 1917-1945. This speaks well of its standing within the professional military history community.

The only comparisons made by Baily between the M4 medium tank and the T-34 is that the narrow tracks of the former made it less mobile than the latter. And that the two man turret of the T-34 was more problematic in terms of combat effectiveness than track width and mobility. This suggests Levine did not obtain his comparative information regarding the T-34 from Baily.

Duckbill

 

JBark wrote:

Actually this is a near perfect example to illustrate your initial premise. In the Longstreet controversy most works are tainted by a bias for or against Longstreet. The truth lies in the middle and closely reflects the opinion held of him immediately after the war. A good solid commander, a competant Corps commander, a bit slow but devastating when he got moving, excellent on the defensive. He lacked Jackson's brilliance and was not well suited for independent command. (Notice when the ANV was at it's peak and organized into two Corps (Jackson/Longstreet) Lee habitually sent Jackson on the independant operations, but kept his headquarters near and moved with Longstreet's Corps.

In my opinion, looking at the Korean War is the best example to compare the two tanks. The M4 (M4A3E8 version) and T-34 (T34/85 version) went head to head, US tank crews in 1950 were less proficient than in WWII and North Korean tankers were probably on par with an average Soviet Tank crew. This being said the Sherman's gave better than they got in Korea. One question I've always had is why the Sherman is always compared to the German Tiger or Panther? The PzIV would be a more accurate comparison. Contemporary, and more similar in size, the PzIV was the most numerous tank type encountered by the U.S. armored forces in Europe.

 

I'll recheck his twisted bibliography and see if I can figure out what else he read.

 

USMCPrice asks:

"One question I've always had is why the Sherman is always compared to the German Tiger or Panther? "

Agreed. I've often asked posters I debate this with if comparison of a battleship to a heavy cruiser makes sense. For that matter does it make sense to constantly compare tanks as if all they do is meet in an open field and have a gunslinging duel?

 

Here is Icks' introductory remarks about Faint Praise. I would post the entire review, but it is copyright protected. For personal reasons I take such things very seriously.

Fascinating, easy to read, this is a significant contribution to the military history of WWII in spite of a few errors such as the ranks and commands of G. M. Ross and John K. Christmas.

For whatever it is worth I agree with Icks' assessment. I view Faint Praise as an extremely well researched work by a career armor officer who knew a great deal about his subject.

Works like Faint Praise do not easily lend themselves to the sort of distillation you request. It is onerous for me to do justice to Col. Baily's observations and conclusions without investing in a full on review. For this reason I must demur from the task.

You are correct that some historians do not perform the research necessary to produce high quality works. Unfortunately the economics of the publishing business encourage the practice of writing quick and dirty, poorly researched books that cater to the largest possible audience. Compounding this problem is the fact that works which are truly well-researched and genuinely well-crafted are frequently written for professional military historians, and as a result can be prohibitively expensive, putting them out of the reach of the average student of the subject unless he or she happens to live near a major university with a comparable library, or is willing to enlist the aid of Interlibrary Loan.

Duckbill

 

I guess than that leads me to the one point of my last post you did not address. Can you offer criticism, of your own or by Baily, of the M4 that would give me some idea of why it should be viewed as a failure?

While I understand the respect you offer Baily and his service to our country I personally still see there a possibility of faulty research. What was the quote you offered earlier?

 

The M4 medium tank had several shortcomings that made life difficult for those who crewed them in battle.

n They leaked when it rained making it extremely difficult for the crew to stay dry.
n They had no heater, an omission that made the interior into a steel ice box in cold weather. For this reason, frostbite was a problem for tank crews.
n The interior was extremely noisy when the auxiliary generator motor was running, a common occurrence.
n The cooling fans of tanks equipped with the air-cooled rotary engine created a steady breeze that flowed through the crew compartment. Although the breeze was welcomed in hot weather, in cold weather it created a wind chill factor that increased the likelihood of frostbite.

These shortcomings reduced crew effectiveness.

This returns us to the question: How do we come to know what we [think] we know? It is a process that begins by reading, with an open mind, everything we can find on a given subject, and ends with an informed, defensible conclusion about what we think we have learned.

Your preconceived notion of faulty research by Col. Baily is problematic. What is its basis?

You will have to help me a little. Like so many things in recent years, the nature of the proffered quotation has escaped my addled pate. Can you direct me to the post where I made this offer?

Duckbill

 

You asked for some of my criticisms of the M4 medium tank. In response I provided you with a few often overlooked, but quite legitimate criticisms of the tank. The fact that other tanks of the period might have (most likely) suffered from the same types of problems is irrelevant.

Your overall tone is one of skepticism, or perhaps I should say the preconception that Baily’s work is suspect.

If you have not yet read Faint Praise, you are not in a position to claim that it guided Levine’s conclusions about the M4 medium tank. Lida Mayo’s work is generally excellent, and The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead And Battlefront is no exception. Have you read it?

Your swaying one way or another is not my interest. You are free to “feel” about the M4 medium tank any way you wish.

Thanks for checking.

You are clearly heavily invested in the idea of defending the reputation of the M4 medium tank at all costs. Military history suffers from no shortage of apologists and others who feel they are on a mission to restore or maintain the reputation of some person, organization, piece of equipment, etc. Some wish to “destroy” the arguments of those who believe the Tiger and Panther were superior tanks to those of the Allies, and they sometimes resort to deception, manipulation, and intimidation to gain their point. Others wish to prove that the M4 medium tank was without flaws, even if it means disregarding the criticisms of the veterans who actually used them in combat. Each group, and there are many, display a singular common trait -- Unyielding Preconception. And they will not allow the facts to sway them from their chosen path. Rather they will dissimulate, deny, and ignore what does not fit their particular “feeling” about the topic which they have undertaken to defend, disprove, or revise. This is all well and good, but it necessarily casts aside open-mindedness, and with it, wisdom.

There is a distinct difference between vigorously defending a position that is adopted after having mastered a substantial portion of the available material on a given subject, and one that is held a static prisoner by feeling and belief. Recently at a conference held to discuss Operation Dragoon/Anvil, two highly respected military historians found themselves in disagreement over the level of involvement by MG Lucian Truscott in the pre-invasion planning. Both had examined much of the available information on the subject, but had arrived at different conclusions about Truscott’s actual involvement in the planning. Who, in this case was right? I don’t really know, but I do know that both men arrived at their respective conclusions after they had performed the requisite research on the subject, not before.

Duckbill