If hitler began operation Barbarossa at his initial proposed date

Bottle necks are capacity problems but as noted in the literature there were only a finite number of railroad lines available. The retracking made it easier to resupply troops close to the terminus of the tracks with German guages but this was a moving target. Furthermore if you are running low at one point, as the Germans were through July, August, and part of September, when you get the capacity you need you still have to make up for the earlier shortages and at one train a day that takes a while. If during that period you now have more troops then the shortages will be greater as will the required number of trains so it takes you longer to stop digging and even longer to fill in the hole.

 

Also noted in the report is the fact that much transport will come by truck and horse.
And we still get back to the point that apart from the early bottle necks page 13 (which were overcome) says they were no supply problems till the Soviet counter offensive when the number of trains again would have to be increased.
As much of the demands were over estimated in the first place.
These are just facts that can’t be changed.
To suggest the Germans where at maximum capacity of divisions able to supply in the field is ridiculous when they complained of infantry deficits from September onwards.

 

The occupation forces in the Balkans :7 divisions (the other one were included in the 3.2 million )
NAfrica :2 divisions
Finland :200000
Romania :intially :150000,later reinforced,but after the fall of Odessa,most Rumanian troops were withdrawn from the front
Hungary :60000
Slovakia:45000
Italy (from august on):60000
The German allies engaged some 500000 .
THere never were 5 million men from the Axis on the Eastern front .

 

The Germans faced supply problems from the first day
Some exemples
Tanks :
June +july :losses 59O replacements :91
august :losses 625 replacements : 9
september :losses 234 replacements :14

Trucs:
june + juky :losses 6927 replacements + booty 1928
august :losses 7655 replacements +booty 4271
september :losses 4993 replacements +booty 2935
I think the picture is very clear
The problems were caused by
1)very high losses
2)insufficient production
3)transport difficulties

 

Source :Va Banque (by Schustereit) P 95 :Abgang und Zugang der LKW

 

And it was proving inadequate. You rapidly reach the point of diminishing returns with horses and the trucks were breaking down at phenominal rates with spare parts difficult or impossible to get.

I'm sorry I didn't see the part where it said there were "no suppy problems" could you point it out or post it?

The study demands were overestimated but the German's tended to understimate theirs.
Take a look at the thread at:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Hitler's Decisions
in particular such quotes as the following on page 3:

and this one on page 4.

You are confusing the facts and your interpretation of them.

That is some really wierd logic. Indeed the lack of infantry can to some exptent be blamed on the logistics problems. In any case it hardly points to the lack of suppy problems.

 

Are you not counting the German troops in the West that would have been used had England been brought to the table?

 

All these loses yet still the rapid advance continued.
Less Panzers and Infantry to supply as time goes on too.

 

Halder said on August the 7th that the German forces needed 58 trains a day.
By September the the 11th they were getting 59 a day and even this was an overestimate.

 

The lack of infantry at the front was because of German manpower problems not logistical problems.

 

And how were they suppose to "bring England to the table"?

Yes. They had been operating on a defficit for over a month. That had to be made up. They also had to get the supplies from the railheads to the units. Where do you get that 59 trains a day was an overestimate?

Manpower problems are logistics problems.

 

It was based on an unfulfilled assumption.

The estimate was based on needs thus the deficit of the previous month was included in the demand for the said month.

It says in the document I posted.
The units were not useing all their supplies and many in 1942 managed on far less.

No the movement of the said man power is logistics.

 

Now how about you answer one of my questions.

How many more divisions do you think the Germans could have supplied other than what actually took part in the invasion of the USSR?

 

It was an estimate in August that wasn't reached until September.

This is not necessarily a good thing and again how much were they using vs how much was getting delivered.

Yep and Germany had the men in 41 they just didn't have them where they needed them. Nor is it clear they could have supported them there.

 

You are the proponent it's up to you to make your case. If you make a strong enough one I'll either accept it or try to rebut it. So far you haven't got to that point.

 

This supposes completely the theory that it was the weather that kept the Heer from taking Moscow. This does not take into account the appalling casulaties suffered by the Heer in closing the various pockets. It doesnt take into account the woeful supply situation, the fact that the heer had to cope with two types of Railway gauge, neither of which was compatible, they had to cope with the fact that their supply vehicles included a plethora of European trucks from all over the continent and for which the workshops had no spare parts, nor the fact that even before the weather kicked in, the Heer's formation were already suffering from a dearth of personnel arising from the Summer Battles.Oh yeah and here's the kicker: the Russians sorry SOVIETS had to fight in the same weather!! So all that would have happened would be that the Soviets would not have needed coats. Other than that the Siberians would still have attacked and Moscow would still be Soviet.

 

None,noppes,zero

 

The rapid advance did not continue :the Germans had to stop after 15 august.
That's stupid :the less Panzers and infantry,the better ?
Till September ,the Germans had lost 500000 men (most in the infantry ),they had not enough replacements and those insufficient replacements did not get it to the front,thus the operational pause.
But,it was already to late :the Germans had only strength(material and human)till september ;the war had be to won at this date,but it was NOT:the Russian frontstrength was bigger in september than in june and bigger in december than in september .

 

Army group Centre advanced another 300 miles alone.