If hitler began operation Barbarossa at his initial proposed date

I think Hitler was round on getting army group Centre to help in surrounding Kiev and securing the German flank, ensure the lose of alot of Soviet heavy industry and secure the gain reserves.
But after that given the time scale of the campaigning season he may have been better off concentrating on Leningrad in the North and preparing defensive line in the Centre.
While this was going on he should have done all he could to keep Japan from moving against the USA.
With the Japanese still a potential threat the Soviet counter offensive would be much smaller.

 

However from what I've read it was a very wet spring. IE bad mud conditions so the advance wouldn't have been as rapid initially. This may have allowed the Soviets to firm up sooner and caused even more delays.

While the mud was significant the Geramans also outran their log support. This scenario doesn't improve that at all.

In summary it's not clear that the Germans would have been any better off launching 5 weeks earlier.

 

The shear scale of the German attack in May would have over oared the defenders the more muddy ground in certain regions early in the war would only have been of minor significance.
The Germans were still advancing right up to the time of the Soviet counter offence so an extra 6 weeks campaign time an extra 3 weeks movement not in the October mud would mean a lot more ground is taken.

 

That may be your opinion but others have said differently and I see no facts to back yours up. Indeed you mention mud being a serious problem in October. Why is it in October and not in May? Furthermore the Soviet defences were realing under the real assault. Slow it down just a bit and some of them may have firmed up. Even if they don't hold up much longer then the next line has even more time to dig in and firm up or pull back to a more defenceable location and/or make sure the Germans don't capture as much intact.

The advance had slowed and was only taking place in some sectors. I believe the logistics situation started haveing some considerabl impact in September if not before. Will see what I can find.

 

The mud in May was no where near as bad as October and wasn’t even present in some areas.
Even if the invasion itself had began in October the Soviets couldnts have stopped in at the front line.
The Logistics problem will be improved by less no October mud stopping the Germans surrounding Moscow.
Also infantry shortages started to kick in after September which may be earlier in this scenario.
This is where the extra Axis forces wasted in the Balkans both in the invasion and occupation come into it.

 

Do you have proof of this? Where in Russia (a country with few paved roads) would there be no mud after a rain season other than major cities?

How little mud needs to be present in order for 30-40 ton tanks and heavy horse drawn artillery not get stuck?

So you are under the impression that these 20 or so German divisions invovled in the Balkans would turn the tide in Russia?

 

Launching the invasion earlier would probably have made little difference in the outcome of the Barbarossa campaign in 1941. Actually, I recall that the original intent was to launch the attack on May 15th, not late April. Regardless, what many overlook is that the weather in Central and Eastern Europe in the spring of 1941 from March on was unusually wet with many more inches of rain fall than normal. Rain means mud, and while not a really big deal in Western Europe because of the good road and rail network, it was a show stopper in the former USSR where the roads were mostly dirt tracks that become mud rivers when heavy traffic attempted to traverse them in the forties. Isn’t rasputitsa the word in Russian for that time of year? And doesn’t that translate to quagmire season or something?

Have you every see pictures of the Soviet roads prior to the winter freeze, and after the spring thaw? They get quickly churned into impassable mud pits in no time flat. Only tracked vehicles can use them with any degree of certainty, and sometimes even they have difficulty with throwing tracks and getting "high centered". Then most wheeled vehicles just flat get stuck. The clay and loam based soils of the area just turn into the most nasty, sticky, clinging goo, if they aren’t simply standing pools of water that don’t drain.

In those kinds of conditions, the mobility the German "blitzkrieg" relied on would have been impossible, and to a large degree the playing field would have been leveled for the Red Army. Take away the great mobility of the German panzer divisions and the Germans main advantage disappears. So for the first two months the battle is fought at the pace the infantry can advance through rain and mud, while the tanks, artillery, and vehicles are worn out in the process, and then when the weather finally clears, the German Army is in no position to exploit it.

I would speculate that the end result would have actually ended up with the Germans gaining less ground than they did historically, and the great surrounding and capturing of millions of Soviet Red Army troops would probably not have happened, or perhaps at least not to the degree they did. And as a little piece of trivia that those who haven’t ever used a heavy tracked vehicle in the winter, you cannot just park it at the end of the day in the snow and cold. And NOT because it won’t start up easily either.

The weight of the unit will press down on the frozen ground, or snow, and the pressure creates just enough heat for the surface to be melted slightly and the steel tracks will then freeze into the ground. Now the unit cannot be moved without tearing your gears and clutching system completely apart. The thing that needs to be done is park your "Cat" on a set of wooden blocks so that the track is not touching the earth completely over it’s entire length.

I learned that lesson the hard way when I managed to "stick" my Dad’s D-5 to the ground and tear out the final gears on the left track. He was NOT amused.

 

You are the propeonet so the burden of proof is on you. I've seen nothing other than your statements/opinion so far.

And no one has said they would have. However they caught the Soviets off balance and their rapid advance didn't allow them time to recover for the most part until the German advance slowed. If the German advance goes slower then the Soviets have more time to recover. The Germans have to fight harder for lesser victories. Maybe not a whole lot at first but it builds.

Will it? How? It might even become worse if they advance further faster. On the other hand if there intial advances are slower they may be in better shape logistically although further from Moscow.

Part of the shortages were the infantry just couldn't keep up with the armor. Move faster and it has even more of a problem. Also there is a big difference between reaching Moscow and taking it.

Put more forces in and the log problems become greater.

 

Less forces in the Balkans doesn't necessarily mean more trucks to supply the higher manned army on th eastern front either, considering most of the supply lines were done with horses not trucks.

 

I add Option 5 ''the Germans suffer major setback at Moscow''.

Remeber a few weeks wont do much for the Heer, It fought quite a few bitter city battles against the Red Army which in some cases lasted for months.

In this case I can see Soviet and German troops fighting for weeks both in and around Moscow. Until the winter freeze sets in, then German troops caught in the city would be screwed as the Red Army's arriving Siberian forces start going on the offensive and push the Heer back. This could turn into a major loss for the Germans and we cant just assume more time works in their favor instead of the Soviets.

Few people in this topic seen to appreciate just how luck the Germans really were to get as far as they did in 1941. there is just no friggen way they can take Leningrad, Moscow and push the Red Army back to the Volga in 1941, it just cant be done all at once. Even with a few extra weeks.

 

Not only will it mean more trucks (no wear and tear during the Balkan invasion) but as suggested more horses too.
The Italians will defiantly have more transport available thus free up German transports and men from army group south.

 

The Germans will still have to support all the divisions in and around France, Denmark, Norway, North Africa, and Russia, so it does not mean they have more trucks, since historically the Germans relied almost fully on horse and infantry drawn supply carts, and trains. So just becuase there is no Greece to occupy they still will have this problem, and therefore will still out run there supply lines, and still get overstretched, especially with more troops from Greece involved.

 

But a lot of people are argueing as if there was no Red Army ,if the Russians were no able to send 3 million men to the front before september,they were done ,and if Hitler began earlier or not is irrelevant :what is relevant,crucial or determining (you have the choice )is the Russian numerical superiority from the beginning .

 

Ill see if I can find reports on the conditions on the Eastern front in May.
As for supply problems it wasnt so much the supply of the infantry itself that was the problem in the push towards Moscow but after September the lack of Infantry itself.
This will be eased in this scenario.

 

With the extra 5 weeks and 4 days to campaign and the fact they would reach Moscow before the October mud will mean they will have enough time to surround the capital and still have 2 months before the Soviet counter offensive begins.
The Volga bend around Moscow could be fully taken in this time too.

 

So are you seriously suggesting that not a single truck was deployed in Yugoslavia and Greece not just in the invasion but the occupation too?

 

The eary start is not irelevant at all.
An extra 5 weeks 4 days campiagn time would make a huge difference.
Remember the Germans advanced right up to the Soviet counter offensive in December.

 

Of course not, but there were not a horde of trucks as it sounds you are implying to save the Russian columns from running out of supplies still.

 

Because of the annual spring floods in eastern Poland and western European Russia, 15 May was the earliest possible date for the start of the invasion of Russia. No postponement was mentioned before the Yugoslav revolt, which had an immediate effect on the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia.

Headquarters staffs, divisions, and GHQ units that were on the way to the concentration areas for Operation BARBAROSSA or whose departure was imminent had to be diverted. Those units had to be replaced by others whose departure was delayed because they were not ready for commitment. However, of the two corps headquarters and nine divisions that were diverted to the Yugoslav campaign, all but three infantry divisions were replaced from the Army High Command reserves by the time Operation BARBAROSSA got under way.
?Another factor considered in calculating the delay was that all. units, in particular the armored and motorized infantry divisions, would have to be refitted after the Balkan campaigns. This rehabilitation, which was estimated to take a minimum of three weeks for the mobile Units, had to be performed within Germany in the vicinity of major repair shops and spare parts depots.

The only flooding that would hinder units on an invasion that started on the 15th of May would be of army group Centre.
These could be over come.

8 German divisions where left to occupy Greece and Yugoslavia.
Including two Panzer divisions.

The considerable losses suffered by the Luftwaffe during the seizure of Crete, especially insofar as troop carrier planes were concerned, affected the strength of the German air power available at the start of the Russian campaign. Moreover, since the German parachute troops had been decimated in Crete, the number of men qualified to carry out huge-scale airborne operations at the beginning of the invasion was insufficient.

Even if wet conditions were to be avoided then the invasion could have started on June 1st.
Giving an extra 22 days campaign time enough to reach Moscow before the mud began in October.

Moderator Edit - Six posts merged into one. Lets not do this again.

 

Even