If Stalin accepted western air advisors?

What if Stalin recognized the shortcomings of the Soviet air force and requested Roosevelt for advisors to help iron out problems? Wouldn't appropriate training methods, doctrine, strategy, tactics, management methods have an impact on what was a numerous and potentially well equipped force?

Supposing Roosevelt would comply and in say Jan.'43 put such men at Stalin's disposal as Claire Chennault, Carl Spaatz, Curtis LeMay, Henry Arnold. Stalin would accept the offer and would give them carte blanche and his personal full political and practical support, plus total basing and operational rights for the Allied air forces.

LL was supplying already a large number of very significant airplanes, perhaps there was no need to increase this, unless to add advanced fighters (P-47 and P-51?) or heavy bombers.

 

In Jan. 1943 I don't think anyone would want advice from the US on air tactics. The record then was pretty bad.

The Russian tactic of having the airforce support the ground troops seemed to work well for the Russians after they got the IL-2.

Also I have always read that most Russians are very xenophobic, plus US advisors would not have a clue on dealing with the extreme cold and also there would be the language barrier. Sadly Americans do not do foreign languages like the Europeans can master.

 

Ok, this may be a bit early, I was counting backwards to provide some early preparation for Summer 43, but we can postpone this for one year. Let's suppose they go in in Winter '43, in time to have VVS tip top for the Summer 44 offensive.

As for your last paragraph you're entirely right but this is the virtue of what-ifs: let's suppose... In this case I ask you to kindly suspend your disbelief

 

They worked pretty hard with Germany prewar on the Tank side of things, maybe more cooperation with them on the tactical side of air-war would've paid some dividends? However, at what point did any nation really understand air-war enough to start handing out lessons?
Sorry, must willingly suspend disbelief.
I'm really ropey on planes so what kind of strategic gear could the soviets field at that time? Wasn't there some lend lease of such aircraft (liberators?). I assume transport would be the primary strategic target? How far could Russian Airfields with B17 equivalents reach into Germany?
Cheers,
Adam.

 

The SU was not supplied with any heavy bombers. Lots of A-20s and B-25s, all useful planes for the medium bomber role, but no strategic bombers. I can't remember at present if they were requested and denied, or if they were simply not requested as the VVS had no role for them. In any case the VVS had some large 4-engine bombers but their use was insignificant so this may simply be a hole in the doctrine, that's why I was mentioninig the names I did.

Distance to Germany tended to get progressively shorter in the timeframe I'm envisaging , but even if we assume that at the beginning of the period they could not reach German soil there would still be a lot of logistical infrastructure that could be hit.

So if these assumptions are taken for granted, what would the effect be?

 

Another issue is 'what if' the SU with western backing managed to acheive Air Superiority over the 'important' areas of combat. The Germans relied heavily on their aircrafts during their offensives.

I just thought of the paralell to the desert. When the Desert Airforce managed to clear the skies in october of '42, the germans lost most of their offensive punch.

I think that it is a common mistake by army commanders of the time that close air support was a neat thing to have, rather than integrating it to the army.

The impact of AC on land battle is all offensive. Even if there is just fighters availiable. At least it would deprive the opponent from using flying artillery.

 

From what I recall the USSR didn't want heavy bombers because they had no place in the VVS doctrine at the time. From what I've been able to make out the only real 'strategic bombing' in which soviet air-power engaged were VMF air-raids on naval facilities. Then again, as these were intended to destroy ships the aircraft available were perfect.

 

What I mean by this what-if is as we know soviet air force performance throughout the war was rather weak. Supposing they could have imported know-how (training methods, doctrine, strategy, tactics, management methods) from he USAAC at a time it was well developed, would we see air action in the same style as in the Western Front after D-Day? What would the consequences be?

 

Very interesting thought, imagine the effect of a failaise style ground attack campaign on some of the battles in the east.

 

Although I would say Stalin would never have done this, going with the premise I would say that the Soviets would have faced some nearly insurmountable problems as well as major changes in many of their doctrines to make this happen.
Leaving out strategic bombing, at the tactical air level, the Soviets would have first had to come up with a massive number of both aircraft and ground radios to use in switching to a Western style tactical air doctrine. Radar and a ground control system would also have to be provided. Just training the technicians and operators of such a system would have proved daunting for the Soviets.
As it was, Soviet doctrine was very rigid in its application of air support. Support was planned and executed on a schedule. There was none of the late war US / British stacking of attack aircraft over a column with either ground or aerial direction over the radio, if for no other reason the simple problem many Soviet aircraft lack a radio.
Even the Il 2m more often than not was used in a large formation bombing and strafing more like a light bomber than the freewheeling ground attack fighters the West used by 1944.
The Soviet reliance on AA guns for air defense far more than fighter aircraft is also a major doctrinal difference.
Just changing the Soviet doctrine to allow far more freedom of action by regiments (squadrons) would have required major shifts in doctrine and probably would have been forbidden given the general level of paranoia in the Soviet military with freedom of action and initiative.
I would think the Soviets would have labeled the attempt to shift doctrine a failure from the highest levels of command and then booted the advisors out. This would have been followed by a general reassurance that the Soviet methods previously used were still superior and the whole program used as a propaganda campaign to paint the West as inferior and incompetent to Soviet eyes.

 

Theory R.I.P. It was good while it lasted

 

You surrendered too easily. Stalin will not be pleased.

 

So what is Za to do now? Shoot himself?

 

No, I'm doing a Vlasov

 

Man that guy was really bad looking.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrei_Vlasov