If Stalin attack the West, what year and month was optimum?

The Soviet peoples themselves were exhasted from war. On top of that, they had to deal with newly subdued populations in Eastern Europe, and their resistance (both passive and active) to Soviet occupation. In the Baltic states, in Poland, in Czechoslavakia. Their failure to support the Greek communists, and their inability to sustain the puppet states 'Kurdish People's Republic' and the 'People's Republic of Azerbaijan' they set up in Northern Iran from Iranian government forces, also reveal the truth: it was time to consolidate gains. On top of this, with no nukes themselves, and being uncertain of how many the US had (The US wasn't exactly broadcasting the fact "We only have 9!"), there is no way the Stalin could have attacked the West at this time.

 

The long term prospects of a Soviet invasion of the West were not very good at all. Industrially they were pretty much on par with the Germans of WWII, had no allies (in this scenario), no navy, no strategic air force and would be starting a war with an already ravaged country and infrastructure.
Also consider that the US Army Air Corps as of mid-1946 had an inventory of 36,000 aircraft (about 15,000 in service the rest were air worthy awaiting demob/mothball) and this does not include Navy aircraft, RAF-Commonwealth air forces or the French. "By the end of 1945, the UK possessed one airfield per every twenty kilometers."
In a matter of a few short weeks RAF Fighter Command could pretty much make the UK immune to the Red Air Force and the Soviets had no naval capability to stop a very rapid build up in the UK. Even if the Soviets occupied all of France, how exactly can they supply an army that is thousands of miles from its factories once the Allied air campaign gets back under way? Regardless of the size of the Red Air Force in 1946 it remained a tactical air force. I see no reason why the Allies would not sweep it from the skies and destroy its airfields and support structure once the proper strength was gathered. The Red Air Force did not possess a capability to reciprocate either.
If we're going to look at the Soviets attacking the West in 1946, there has to be a point of doing it for the Soviets (aka good long term prospects).

 

Agreed. Historically they could not. But this of course is alternate history and I've got an idea of how they could have done it. We'll see what you think about my actually fairly simple solution in the future.

Again quite right and that fact plays into why it would be almost impossible for the US to accurately bomb from above 25,000 feet during almost 6 months of the year around the Black Sea and Caucuses.

Again very true but if you were going to start a war would you not concentrate on stopping the enemies best weapons systems and figure out some deterrent. They had 3 B29s to study for over 3 years.

Again I will repeat my mantra. If one group of human beings can invent or accomplish some feat of mechanical or scientific breakthrough than any other group can repeat the same feat. The Soviets could and did match and in some cases surpass our scientific knowledge and military weaponry.

Your only possible objection to this mantra is that they didn't do this or that in historical fact. But again this is alternate history. First object in space, first man in space, first transplants. Given the right leadership and resources any country can reproduce what another has already done

I disagree.

I would submit that this statement is an unsupported opinion. Go back and read the old newspaper, speeches and magazines as I have and you will become enlightened as to the mood of the American public towards another war in 1946. It could easily have gone either way.

I sorry but I don't catch your drift on this analogy. Again this is 8 years after my suggested timeline. Stalin's true nature was well known. The Korean War had already happened and the Soviets had the Bomb.

From what I read there was just no market and the government wasn't buying. If there was problems with efficiency it didn't matter there was no demand in 1946.

What ever the reason they left the military and were not working to produce nuclear material for atomic bombs.

It never entered their minds. There is not mention or even a hint of a limited bombing assault on the Soviet Union. There is no mention of tactical use of the Mark III atomic bomb by anyone in the leadership of the US military. No one who knew anything about the difficulty of deploying this weapon ever considered its tactical use. Again if you can find any evidence of someone who knew about the particulars of using this weapon even suggesting it's tactical use the please direct me to this source.

Agreed but the Soviets were not helpless and they were not technologically illiterate and in the realm of alternate history I would argue that's all it takes to produce an interesting and plausible story.

 

Nice opinion and probably exactly why Stalin did not in fact attack. But as an alternate history it sucks .

I like mine better and IMHO it is plausible if the right circumstances prevailed and some kind of accident or incident happened.

 

Your probably right but again this is alternate history and one stupid move or accident could have set things in motion. The Allies could not have stopped the Red Army and Western Europe would have been under Soviet control within 90 days according to the vast majority if not all of the military planners producing every study done for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Also consider that the US Army Air Corps as of mid-1946 had an inventory of 36,000 aircraft (about 15,000 in service the rest were air worthy awaiting demob/mothball) and this does not include Navy aircraft, RAF-Commonwealth air forces or the French. "By the end of 1945, the UK possessed one airfield per every twenty kilometers."

Many of the US planes were in fact stored and eventually destroy over seas. Many were still in Western Europe in such a state they were not mobile nor were there pilots to fly them to safety. Many were being abandoned in Italy, the Far East and the Pacific. They were not bringing the older models back to the US. Granted within 18 months or so the US could have been up to war time strength if the will of the American public was there. I am not convinced it would have been. We were in debt to the tune of 108% of our GDP. The money for the war had come from the American public in the form of war bonds. Could and would the American public do it all again? Would they once again fight and die for the French, Germans, Italians etc. I'm not so sure.

Britain was in the worst debt crisis it has ever experienced. It was economically helpless and in a capitalist society factories don't give away airplanes for free and soldiers expect to be paid as well. In a dictatorship this is not the case.

Couldn't disagree with you more. Again where will they get the money for ... well anything? I did a study of the RAF in May 1946. I traced every single squadron and their history and the end result is...

Stationed in England
10 squadrons of Meteors
2 squadron of Vampires
42 squadrons of Spitfires
10 squadrons of Royal Auxiliary Air Force Spitfires
8 squadrons of Mustangs
6 squadrons of Tempests
9 squadrons of Hornets
9 squadrons of Mosquitoes
11 squadrons of Mosquito night fighters
5 squadrons of Lancaster bombers
1 squadron of Lincoln bombers

113 squadrons
1487 combat aircraft

and 67 various older model squadrons spread all over the world. The RAF was not anywhere near ready for a major war and would not be for a good 6 months if ever. Many squadrons and their planes were disbanded over seas starting very early after the Germans and Japanese where helpless. There just weren't that many flyable late model planes in the British Isles in May 1946.

The same way they supplied 80 divisions thousands of mile away in Manchuria and the Red Army in their 550 mile March through Poland in 14 days. The supply argument has been dealt with. It is a myth. They were able to do it a number of times from 1944 on.

If we deviate from the historical timeline in 1943 like I am proposing that gives the Soviets 3 years to prepare to deal with the B29 and it's fighter escorts. Considering that they had in their possession 3 fully functional B29 from 1944 on I don't think it's too far of a stretch that they could have come up with an answer for the B29 and high flying fighters.

To put a buffer between the US and the Motherland. Stalin was convinced that the true war was between capitalism and communism. He wanted Western Europe to be the battleground instead of the Ukraine. If push came to shove the usual scorched earth policy would be through France and Germany.

If he could find an answer to the atomic bomb and the B29 he was golden. Demonstrate the superiority of communism. Send out agent provocateurs and fifth columnists and wait for the inevitable implosion of capitalism.

 

Been reading recently about the US "balloon" offensives (recon operations GENETRIX and MELTING POT and propaganda operations PROSPERO, VETO, FOCUS and SPOTLIGHT) and soviet efforts to counter them. It shows the Soviet air defence system against very high altitute intruders (the recon baloons operated at over 30.000m in the daytime) is not such a walkover as some people suggest here. Even the loss of a couple of bombers with one of the very few nuclear weapons available initially would have been a major disaster.

As to the unwillingness of the US to drop nukes on western Europe, no such thing emerges from pubblished doctrine, they even setup nuclear land mines at choke points in "allied" countries, US doctrine always included first use of nukes and "hoped" that it would not escalate to MAD.

IMO the critical question is how does it start, Stalin is unlikely to start a war unless he sees war as inevitable and opts for a preentive strike or he sees a chance for large gains at little risk but Stalin is not in the same risk-taking class as Hitler making that scenario unlikely and in that case is more likely to go for the "low hanging fruits" (Iran, Irak, Japanese northern Isles).
Political not military consideration will determine hostilities, most likely (well less unlikely) scenario in Western Europe is the left winning an election and NATO staging a coup. Morale is, as always, a critical factor, badly motivated troops make poor fighters so Stalin needs a good "casus belli" for a major attack involving full mobilization.

From a military standpoint the mid sixties probably show the peak of soviet relative strength, before then they have little to balance the nuclear threat and after 1975 the technological gap is significant.

In western Europe the attitude of the large communist minorities is critical, France is not defensible if 30% of the population is working against NATO, Italy has less strategic importance unless Suez is closed so isolating Turkey, in 1945/46 the communist ex-partisans still have considerable firepower, after that they have mostly turned in their weapons and gone back to civilian life.

 

Every study? In any case would you mind giving us some sources.

Was the Soviet air force in any better state?

 

Good information!

I'd have to disagree with you as it pertains to the years 1946-1948 or so. Very serious talks were going on that would have put control of atomic bombs in the hands of the UN. The newspapers were filled with the horror stories of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It was very real to everyone in this time period. It was not some abstract jingoistic solution to every political problem that it would later become. The Europeans where absolutely horrified by it as were most Americans.

Why would we light off a bunch of atomic bombs in Europe? How would that save them? If we didn't care about saving them then why fight at all? Isn't that the whole point of going to war in Western Europe once more? The Soviets had no way of attacking mainland US in 1946.

I have a casus belli in mind already but I am looking for a better one.

Why the mid 60s? What are you basing this on? From what my research has revealed is that the largest army ever created filled with the toughest veterans of WWII was or could have been, on the East German boarder in May 1946. While the forces facing them consisted of a comparatively small force filled with untrained, unmotivated, green troops who by any measure were not ready for combat operations.

Excellent observations that have eluded many others.

 

Every study I've seen. If you can find one that was taken seriously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff please let me know.

I'm not at home but the books I've used are /American War Plans by Steve Ross and Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945-1954 by Michael Cohen

I would say yes if they were planning to attack in May 1946. They would have kept their veteran pilots and not mothballed and destroyed so much of their late model planes. Plus there is the fact that the Soviets did not have bases all over the world and wouldn't have had to ship what were older planes from places like Iwo Jima.

And the situation in May 1946 would be very similar in Western Europe. I would argue that in fact it would have been a close to a mirror image operation for the Soviets. They gathered and hoarded the necessary logistics, stage a surprise attack which easily breaks through the front lines and the Soviet Deep Battle doctrine utterly destroys and opposition and it becomes a drive in the park to the Med. The only worries would be getting enough sleep.

What were they? What are your sources please?

I think we're talking about two different Polish campaigns. The one I'm referring to is in 1945 from the Vistula to the Oder and I made a mistake it should be kilometers. Sorry about that. I had my google earth set wrong.

The two I already mentioned, Manchuria and Vistula to the Oder.

In the storyline I'm suggesting the only assets being used from 1943-1945 are the ones that would have been killed anyway. I have the authorities using the minds and bodies of the political prisoners that filled the gulags and the penal brigades. Wasted in history...put to use in alternate history.

If the Soviets could take Western Europe easily and quickly they can strip Southern France, scoop up the huge supply depots through out Europe. Instead of having a possibly starving, trained, armed and very pissed army looking back at their starving families, he could use them to create the buffer he has always wanted between him and the US.

If he could destroy any chance of the US or Britain using the British Isles as an unsinkable aircraft carrier by taking over the skies before the US can get there. Combined with an answer to the B29 he would be sitting pretty.

The US would have no chance of invasion from across the Atlantic without England so they would have to find some other way. Perhaps from Africa or the Mideast or Greece etc. but nothing as direct as D-Day.

 

You are propbably right for 1946-48 I was thinking more in 1960 terms when the "land mines" were deployed.

Not based on numerical analisys, more of a "gut feeling". But my impression is that at the end of 1945 the soviet strategic stockpiles and manpower pool were shot, the eastern Europe logistics in very bad shape and the communist hold on the occupied areas was not fully secure, any operation then would be a gamble and Stalin was not much of a gambler. They would also need some re-training of the air force to switch to air superiority.
I picked the mid sixties mainly because of "vietnam rot", and technology near parity that would make soviet pact numbers count. Support to US policies in Europe was low at the time, France had a foot out of NATO, and given a good "casus belli" the soviets may have gotten a lot of local support. Also the technological gap was at an historical low, the MIG-21 was probably better than the F-104 "widow maker" that equipped most European air forces. NATO at the time was "playing around" with a lot of first generation high tech stuff tha didn' work very well, though it created the base for the much better weapons that came later.
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On the otherhand the US detonated quite a few on US soil not to long after this. Do you have any sources for the above by the way?

Well if they are target vs Soviet troop concentrations, supply dumps, and or log nodes they won't necessarily inflict all that much damage on the civilians. Certainly not when compared to the conventional bombing campaigns of the recent past.

And that will hold for how long? Especially if they now own Western Europe?

The Red Army was in many ways on it's last gasp in 45. Many combat formations were at 60% strength and there wasn't really much a manpower pool to recruit more from.

 

One has to be careful of reports at that level especially during this period of time. The services were trying hard not to get cut back too far and there was even considerable interservice rivalry over the funding that did exist. For that reason domestic politics may have had considerable influence on the conclusions of these studies.

But Soviet planes tended to have considerably shorter service lives than US planes and they kept a lot of older stuff in their inventory as well.

I'm not convinced. First of all there's the question of surprise. If they didn't achieve it then things are going to be worse. Whatever the case they will face more allied airpower than they did in Manchuria. Furthrermore there's the question of just where their log assets stand. They weren't recieving anymore from the US at that point and some would obviously be lost or degraded. Then there's the demilling requirments of lend lease. If they violate these it's going to make the western allies a bit more leary. The Rhine crossing would also be a bit of a problem at this point I would think if they made it that far.

Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria)
In relation to the 6th Guard Tank Army

later on it further states:

That doesn't mean that it makes sense to use them the way you suggest in that time frame. It looks to me like you are using a bit of 20:20 hindsight here.

 

[/QUOTE]


Good thoughts on the subject. It would be interesting to pit a 104 against a Mig 21.

 

Just the New York Times from August 1945 through May 1946. That's how far I've gotten so far. The articles, op eds, letters to the editor etc. make it very clear that there was a very serious debate over the ethics and just the plain wisdom of ever using atomic bombs again during this time period. Many could just not imagine an evil bad enough to warrant it's use again.

Remember in 1946 Stalin is Old Joe and the brave Red Army was our heroic allies. This of course could and would change if they attacked it's just a matter of how much and how pissed we got.

Here's the rub. The Mark III was not a tactical weapon. It had to be used on a helpless static target. It required highly accurate target data.

Kokura Japan survived because it was cloud covered so they went to Nagasaki.

Forever if you believe some of the Uber US supporters. We are so far advanced technologically that they will never catch up. So no problem. Let them have Western Europe. Big deal. It's a total wasteland filled with starving people.

That's one reason I'm suggesting a 6 month rebuilding program and then they attack in May 1946 with enough force to over run a very weak defense. Take Western Europe, strip it, gain air superiority over England and start a staring contest with the US. All the time working on their own atomic bomb and super bomber.

 

Here is your comment and question...

This is the question I answered. Your follow up comment makes no sense. My point was that whether it was a reality or not they planned on it happening and made no plans for defending Germany and France.

The also have the fore thought that they are going to attack and have six months to prepare compared to their opponent who thinks the war is over and it's time to build Nash Ramblers again.

Yes you are correct. That's why I would suggest that it makes a much better story if they do succeed.

Yes and they will have more and better planes themselves.

Lend lease ended in August 1945. They were not using anywhere near the supplies they did after the German's were defeated. They hoard what they have, re-arm and wait till spring. Once the attack starts they use some of their supplies breaking the lines and then the race is on in a classic Soviet Deep Battle strategy using very little supplies but tires and fuel. All available in the massive supply depots sprinkled all over France and Germany.

Lend Lease ended already. The Rhine is 3 hours away from the East German boarder. The bridges are not rigged for demolition. There are over 60 bridges over the Rhine in May 1946. Paratroops, flying squads, wide gaps in the French-US lines...the Rhine would be crossed in day one.

Thank you for that information.

The fact remains that they went over 400 miles in 11 days. That would easily be enough to do what I have suggested. Add in the fact that there were those huge supply dumps filled with the basic things that the Soviets would need to over run Western Europe.

Um...There is no way you can write an alternate history without it. I have created a character that has the attributes of our own Henry Ford. That's it. No magic. No death rays. He has the skills of a Ford and the passion for aerospace. By accident he gains the ear of Stalin and is given the tools he needs to build the Model A so to speak. Add the fact that he has 3 B29s to study bolt for bolt.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see that you need workers with certain skills to build high tech weapons. You convince your boss to let you test a bunch of half dead prisoners that were going to die anyway.

It doesn't take a genius to see what happened to Germany and Japan and to figure out that the greatest threat to your country is the strategic bomber and the atomic bomb.

It doesn't take Superman to accomplish what dozens of US, French, German and British industrialists have already done. You don't have to be that smart to manage a bunch of scientists who already have invented the very weapons you are going to build. Again no death rays, flying saucers or giant robots.

 

Interesting. What were the leanings of the NY Times then? Would be interesting to see if the LA Times for instance is similar.

And the data you provided suggested that coming within a mile is good enough. Radar targeting was also improving a lot at that point in time. But log tagets are pretty static especially Soviet ones. It took them several months to build up enough to launch an offensive and of course railroad yards don't move much.

But weather prediciton would be good enough at that point to insure that at least one of the targets wouldn't be socked in or they wouldn't launch.

It's also a huge market. I doubt that US citizens of the time would be willing to write it off.

]
The problem is that you can't generate new troops that fast. The Soviets have severe problems econoically and logistically at that point. A new and especially offensive war may well meen starvation and economic or pollitical collapse.

 

Actually it does. Just because the studies you mention suggest that would happen it doesn't meen that we wouldn't have plans for defending them or that we wouldn't have defended them. For instance pre war we had War Plan Orange which was widely acknowledge wouldn't work as planned and which we had no intention of trying to follow. Studies and plans may be more or less than they seem and may be percieved differently by various audiances.

Which rather decreases the probability of surprise does it not?

Ah this may be the source of our problem. I don't approach what if's on historical forums as a literary effort. I see them as a way to learn something more about the times by examing plausible alternatives and the parameters that would effect them.

Relativly they will be in worse shape and that's what's important.

The point wasn't so much the supplies themselves as the trucks and logistics infrastructure. They still have to make pretty heavy use of it and they aren't recieving anymore trucks, spare parts, railroad engines, or cars, etc from the US.

That's not quite right though. Those offensives went through a lot of vehicles and ammo as well. Not to mention men.

Counting on your opponent for supplies is a very risky plan.
Lend Lease ended already. The Rhine is 3 hours away from the East German boarder.
[/quote]
Lend lease has indeed ended. And the Soviets are required to return or demil much of the equipment they recieved. If they don't do this it's going to set off even more alarm bells.

How many permanent bridges are still up at this point?

Or not. There are also US units scattered all over the place. US units also have a lot more mobility and thier artillery is a lot more flexable than the Japanese.

If they can secure them perhaps.

You use it to analise the probabilites of success. You shouldn't use it to plan things. But of course I don't see exercise like this as designed to write alternate histories either.

Well acutally you have already embedeed several PODs here. That's not a promising sign. First of all you have the Henry Ford analog (which doesn't work real well in the Soviet Union but we'll let that pass). Then he has to get the ear of Stalin. Then he has to convince him to spend precious resources in a possible war years away when he's fighting for his life right now. Oh and given Stalins paranoia has to survive the prossess for long enough to bring it to fruition.

But these take resources and oh by the way if you've got workers who can build useful tools why not apply them to the problem at hand.

Atually in 43 if you are talking about the USSR it's the German army.

In a Soviet style system it might very well. Oh and what gulag did you find these scientist in in 43?

 

I would be happy to examine them. As far as I can research they don't exist. It was all agreed that the Soviets would walk through our lines and take Europe in less then 90 days. I have ample evidence that the US forces were 3rd string or worse. The veterans were demobilized or where in the states enjoying life. Much of the heavy equipment was put in depots managed by 108,000 German POWs guarded by less then 4000 green troops.

I'm curious about your comments about Plan Orange. Is it your contention that the US never had any intention of putting it into place if the war had started as they predicted? That the whole plan was never intended to be used from day one?

The US had no clue as to what was going on in the Soviet Union in 1946. They had no intention of poking the Bear.

I would submit that there is nothing implausable about what I've proposed.

Not at the point of the spear and that's what counts. Sure the US had numerous mothballed late model planes, ships, tanks etc. but they were in the US. They would stay there until manned and transported to ... where? By that time Western Europe would be gone and England would have lost control of it's air space.

And they wouldn't need them until they used up their current supply. It's 700 miles to the Med. Western Europe is just not that big. After the first few days it's like driving to a picnic at grandma's. No opposition, nothing to stop the classic Soviet Deep Battle doctrine that they've proven they are masters at.

In Manchuria (12001 dead), the Vistula to the Oder campaign (43,476 dead) not too bad for ridding Europe of your worst enemy.

I'm not so sure they would need them. No one has shown me that they would. I've just used that as insurance. If they can move and supply 80 divisions 3000 miles away
in Manchuria with total secrecy my opinion stands that they can pull a 700 mile campaign against minimal opposition through very tank friendly territory.

Not many if any. The US used what ever kind there were to supply and invade Germany. I that was enough for them it's enough for the Soviets.

The US troops are glorified policemen and prison guards. Ill trained, Ill led and no where near combat ready.

Again I don't believe they would even need them.

That might be the rub. How would you have analysed the Japanese chances at taking Singapore, the Philippines, surprise attacking Pearl Harbor. The French collapsing in 1940 etc.?

I would contend that history is much more implausible then alternate history. I personally could never match the seemingly implausible stories that come out of history. I just don't have that much imagination.

No just one. The birth of my character Sergo. You can't label every time Sergo craps as a new POD. Sergo is a reclusive nerd who sends out memos that Stalin has someone act on. He has no power but his ideas and Stalin is the only conduit for those ideas.

Because Sergo wasn't around to save their lives by presenting Stalin with a logical alternative.

The actual production of any defensive weapons systems that can stop the B29 doesn't start until after the destruction of Germany. All that's done before is the research and the research consists of gathering prototypes and the plans of German wonder weapons and US secrets. A really pretty cheap operation.

Do you mean to tell me that you are stating that there were no great minds, talented engineers, women and men with massive IQs but no education etc. that died in Stalin's gulags? Whose talents and great natural abilities will never see the light of day because they were worked to death. That there were not thousands of talented people who were tortured to death for sport? Now that's what I call implausible.

 

I think there's a bit of a misunderstanding. I'm not saying they exist in fact you are probably correct that they don't exit.

War Plan Orange and the follow on Rainbow plans proposed an immediate counter attack across the Pacific. Both of these efforts preceded PH being the base of the US Pacific Fleet. Even with PH as said base when the navy started looking closely at the plans they determined that they couldn't reinforce the Philipines for at least 6 months and that only if they still held out at that point. Otherwise they were looking at a year or more before we could counter attack across the Pacfic. For info on the war plans see:
United States color-coded war plans - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
and Plan Dog memo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Opana can probably point you at even better links on his site.
The point is that even in the military logistics is often not looked at in as much detail as needed for a true assessement of capability. In this case the military is trying to keep itself as strong as possible so it pays them not to look to closely at Soviet logistical problems (and to be fair depending on when the study was written the situation in the Soviet Union may not have been well known). Thus the conclusions of the reports are subject to considerable question.

I don't think that's quite accurate. While there may have been a lot going on that we weren't aware of there were at least some intel efforts. Relations weren't all that rosy in 46 either. See:
Containment - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Then the British were also rather nervous about the Soviets and the French weren't exactly thrilled with them either. So they also had the potential of noticing Soviet buildup efforts. Furthermore the "iron curtain" wasn't as solid at that point and refugees from Eastern Europe would likely have seen some signs of the build up. Furthermore the US and allies are moveing through Eastern German to Berllin and back and have observation posts as well as aircraft flying to Berlin and along the border. I beleive there are flights in and out of Austria as well at this point. The LL demil efforts requires some verification as well. So there are intel sources.

But your job as the propnent is to make as strong argument that it is plausable. At this point I don't think you have.

Yes at the "point of the spear". According to Soviet invasion of Manchuria - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Then there's the question of how many of these were destroyed on the ground and how much fuel they had and whether they had anything but green pilots. The Soviets would face much stronger opposition in the air over Europe.
Since P-38's could self deploy to Britain. I suspect P-51's could as well. B-24s, B-17s, and B-29s could as well. The US had a lot of carreirs at that point which could also deply planes to Britain. Indeed they could put enough fighters on the carriers to take back control of British air space at least for a time. Of course if there is any sort of warning or even a build up in tensions these could deploy prior to the Soviet attack.
And they wouldn't need them until they used up their current supply. It's 700 miles to the Med.
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That's at least two offensive surges.

That seems rather difficult to believe. There would indeed have been opposition at first it may or may not have been organized but as time went on one would expect it to be more so. US units did pretty well when surprised in the Battle of the Bulge and many here will have more time to react. Furthermore the French have their army and their are signficant British units available as well.
[qutoe]I'm not so sure they would need them. No one has shown me that they would. I've just used that as insurance.
[/quote]
A typical Soviet offensive ran out of steam after about 300 miles due to logistical constraints. It usually then took them at least a couple of months to build up enough supplies to attack again.

The situation is hardly comparable.

If they were there perhaps. But pontoon and Baily bridges can be removed pretty quickly even if they aren't rigged for demolition and the western allies would have more than enough time to rig the bridges for demolition.

Often history seems to be implausible because one hasn't looked closely enough at the details. The cases you mention I would tend to place in that catagory.

No but every time he causes others to react a historically you can.

The problem is if you convince Stalin that they represent a useful resource the logical thing to him would be to apply them to his current problem.

But one that is already taking place at least to some extent. Or can't take place until after the war or at least it's latter stages.

That's what I call a straw man. The question I raise is whether or not Ford's innovations would work well in a Soviet system. History shows that they didn't. You should also consider that the Soviet system wasn't easy on Mavericks/

 

One must remember here that the Ford motor company, in fact Henry Ford himself set up the Gorky plant, which produced the Soviet single axle trucks the GAZ-AA. They were literal copies of the Ford AA pickup from the late twenties. Then the American Autocar company built another assembly plant for larger trucks in the USSR (the ZIS plant), and the Magnitogorsk iron/steel plant was built by Kerr-McGee.

GAZ remained in full production through the war years, using Ford's assembly line plan.