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Initial USA Battles.....

Discussion in 'North Africa and the Mediterranean' started by denny, Feb 7, 2015.

  1. denny

    denny Member

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    In the beginning, such as at Kasserine, The British Army had doubts about the fighting ability of the USA Soldier. Due, I imagine, to some failures and perhaps a bad showing on the part of the US Military.?

    1. Is that more or less correct.?

    2. Does that seem a bit shot-sighted on the part of The British.?
    They themselves (pre Montgomery) had suffered some pretty big defeats at the hands of The Afrika Korps.
    Was it really so surprising that (with what was basically a new and untested fighting force) "The Americans" would get beat up their first time against Erwin Rommel.?
    Not making "excuses" per se.....just remarking that it was all pretty new for The US Army at that point...wasn't it.?
    Thank You
     
  2. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    I thought the Brits beat the Italians, in the beginning of the NA campaign [the Italians outnumbered them? ] so they did have a little confidence there....and the Brits were ''vets''....isn't it natural, for vets to feel that way? [ good/interesting post, thank you ]
     
  3. denny

    denny Member

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    I do not think The Italians beat anybody during the war :)
    Sure, it is natural, but it was not ancient history. Rommel and The Brits fought and lost a few times.
    Without Ultra telling Montgomery what Rommel was/might be up to, and the influx of supplies and tanks from The US.....I am not sure how successful Montgomery would have been.
    Rommel had major supply problems...but who didn't at one time or another.?
    This is just from me watching Youtube videos.....it is mentioned a few times that The British "had doubts" about the US Army ability to fight.
    It is not as though The British had been beating the pants off the Afrika Korps for two years, and could stand in amazement at the hapless Americans.
     
  4. Smiley 2.0

    Smiley 2.0 Smiles

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    Part of the reason Rommel was having supply problems was because of the Ultra reports of German ships bringing in supplies to Rommel. Rommel's supply problem was very severe if you ask me. But I do agree that if the British did not have Ultra their success in the desert might have been so great. Wasn't Kasserine Pass the first time that Americans met the Germans during the war (minus the air and sea war)?
     
  5. denny

    denny Member

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    That is MY limited understanding. Kasserine was the first time The Americans faced off against The Germans in any numbers.
    I think it may have been a bit of a drubbing. Maybe even some of the American troops "running" from battle.?
     
  6. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    I agree
     
  7. KodiakBeer

    KodiakBeer Member

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    Like others here, I'm not very strong on this phase of the war either. If the British had their doubts, they were probably very justified.

    We don't talk much about the build up and reorganization of the American army in those frantic months and years prior to entering the war. Suffice it to say, that the army of the 1930's was not only small but still modeled after lessons learned in WW1, a model which was poorly adapted for the new mobile style of warfare. All through the 30's various stratagems, techniques and weapons were experimented with in a small way. Yet, there was neither the money nor the political will to make big changes. The army itself was dominated by very reactionary senior staff.

    It wasn't until about 1940 that real changes even began to happen. People began looking at events in Poland and across Europe and large scale exercises were held to test our own army against such tactics. What they saw was pretty sobering. The army (such as it was) began reorganizing to become more flexible, eventually becoming the "three regiments to a division" model that worked so well when we entered the war. Still, there was no money for large expansion and procurement of needed armor and artillery.

    That's a pretty ugly assessment above, yet I would argue that in the long term it probably helped when we were suddenly jerked into the war in December, 1941. For any other country it might have meant disaster, but the US with its huge industrial base was able to start fresh. When serious procurement began we weren't hampered with a mixed bag of outmoded equipment, instead we were able to manufacture very reasonable and modern equipment. For example; artillery - we simply made tens of thousands of 105mm and 155mm guns. That homogeneity of artillery meant gunners didn't have to adapt to a variety of guns. They learned one gun and got very good, very quickly. The same is true across the board with comms, armor, small arms, etc. The men drawn into the army in the huge expansion were coming into the new "flexible" organization and once trained, they knew their jobs, they knew their equipment and understood what was expected of them.

    To get back to actual battle - you still had green troops commanded by inexperienced officers. Even those senior men with experience, had their background in WW1 - not a good a good background to draw from in a new form of warfare. As I said, I'm not well versed in the North African campaign, but I do know a lot of heads rolled in the American leadership. Those who didn't perform found themselves commanding a desk somewhere. The lessons learned were adapted into further training of troops still coming online in the states or in the UK. By D-Day, the American army was a pretty good machine.
     
  8. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    adding to Kodiak, tank warfare was not exactly ''old time'' stuff....the US tanks/tankers were never used in combat before...interesting and good points Kody
     
  9. Terry D

    Terry D Well-Known Member

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    Yes, it is quite true that the US Army suffered some serious defeats in the early going against the Axis in Tunisia. Kasserine is the best known case but in fact the really bad disaster in that battle occurred at Sidi Bou Zid, when converging German attacks caught dispersed units of the 34th Division out of supporting distance from one another and encircled them. Unsubtle, straight-ahead counterattacks by 1st Armored were shot to pieces, and panic set in. Other battles before this had not gone well, either. One combat command of 1st Armored was outflanked in the Medjerda Valley and abandoned most of its vehicles.

    There were many reasons for these failures, some obvious and some not. Lack of experience at all levels was the most important reason; the US Army was new to battle, and like other raw forces it took the US Army time to find its feet. (The British were no better in this respect; their inexperienced units went through the same harsh learning process.)

    Command problems were also a factor. At the time of Kasserine, Eisenhower was far to the rear in Algiers playing diplomat--a role he detested but was unable to avoid. At this point in his career, Eisenhower was not ruthless enough and was reluctant to assert himself. The best commanders were not at the front. Patton and Harmon were in a static command in Morocco, while Bradley and Truscott were in staff and advisory positions rather than command roles. That left Fredendall to command US II Corps in the field with little higher direction. Fredendall had done adequately in TORCH, but he was a disaster in Tunisia. Allen of the 1st Division and Ryder of 34th Division were all right and so was Ward of 1st Armored, but Ward loathed Fredendall and quarrelled with him frequently. Some of the combat command and regimental leaders in II Corps were no good. Finally, prior to the formation of 18 Army Group under Alexander, the whole Allied command structure in Northwest Africa was a complete mess. The Americans, French, and British did not get along easily with one another, and cooperation and liaison betwen the three were often poor.

    Tactically, the US Army had paid a lot of attention to the war in Europe prior to Pearl Harbor, and under Marshall and McNair the pace of modernization was very rapid--perhaps too rapid. US ideas on armored forces were based on impressions of the 1940 Blitzkrieg but did not reflect the tactical changes that had taken place in the two years since. As a result, American armored units sometimes attempted straightforward charges that might have worked under 1940 conditions but failed against the integrated anti-tank defenses of 1942. There was little cooperation or collaboration between the Army and the USAAF; the airmen preferred to pursue an independent role, and tactical airpower was neglected.

    Organization, personnel, and supply were faulty, too. US armored divisions were so big and so abundantly provided with vehicles that they proved difficult to manuever. Personnel selection was inefficient, the infantry particularly getting too many men who should never have been sent into combat. Replacements often lacked proper training. The hasty mounting of TORCH at a time when Allied shipping was short also contributed to serious supply problems. Some equipment (like the 37mm anti-tank gun) proved inadequate.

    Finally, there was too much arrogance, complacency, and unseriousness. The relatively easy triumph over the Vichy French had given the Americans in Northwest Africa a swelled head. Eisenhower toured the front whenever he could, and he was often astonished and angered by the casualness, unseriousness, and inefficiency he found. The army needed tougher, harder men to take charge and kick people in the rear, and after Kasserine they did.

    Understandably, the US Army's early failures made a bad impression on the British. However, the British high command knew little about the US Army to begin with, and II Corps' early performances simply confirmed many British commanders in their prejudices. This was particularly true of Montgomery and Anderson (1st Army). Montgomery was never good with foreigners. Anderson was a dour, uninspiring, withdrawn man, the wrong kind of commander for a multi-national force. Alexander charmed many Americans and he always had good manners, but his private opinion of the US Army was not terribly high. These views might have changed if British commanders had taken the trouble to know the US Army and observe its progress, but that did not happen. For progress was made in North Africa post-Kasserine, and in the final offensive US II Corps fought very well and played a major role. Unfortunately, some British generals never realized that the US Army had learned anything, and so they continued to under-rate it. That had a bad effect on Allied relations and combat operations for the rest of the war in Europe. In fairness one must add that Anglophobia was far too widespread in the American high command at the time, Patton, Ward, Fredendall, and Clark all being guilty. Misunderstood themselves, they never made any effort to understand the British.

    While US II Corps' struggles in North Africa are well known, it is sometimes forgotten that British 1st Army struggled too. Most of 1st Army's formations and units had fought in 1940 and they had been training ever since, but most of 1st Army's early actions were tactical defeats. As in the case of US II Corps, training in British Home Forces had not been kept up to date with post-1940 developments. The British, like the Americans, improved greatly with new experience, and by the end of the campaign 1st Army's divisions were as good as any (though 8th Army would never admit that). The French got better too and came back into the war in a serious way in Tunisia--but that is another story.
     
    TD-Tommy776, Owen, belasar and 2 others like this.
  10. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Personally I always thought also that the supply problem had changed tables as now the fuel that the Germans received was almost immediately in use. Also for some reason, perhaps to keep Italy in war, Hitler also started sending alot more armor and troops to Africa, even Tiger tanks.

    The Italian special troops like Folgore and the kind were very good in battle to what I have read. Also the Italian manned torpedoes and mined fast boats were pretty successful with very brave men.

    "In more than three years of war, the unit destroyed some 72,190 tons of Allied warships and 130,572 tons of Allied merchant ships."

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decima_Flottiglia_MAS
     
  11. denny

    denny Member

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    Thanks for all the info ^^^^^^^ up there.
    I guess that was my Point/Question.......The British must have realized that the US Army was going through a similar "learning process" as they had just done themselves......post France/Dunkerque.
     
  12. LRusso216

    LRusso216 Graybeard Staff Member

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    I think Keith and Terry have a good appreciation for what the Americans were going through. US forces were ill-prepared for combat in the early phases of the war in North Africa, so the attitude of the British was understandable. For a fuller examination of the problems of the American forces at Kasserine and other places, read Atkinson's An Army at Dawn.
     
  13. Terry D

    Terry D Well-Known Member

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    Yes. I don't care for Atkinson's pulpy style and I don't think he understands the British Army very well, but he pulls no punches when it comes to American mistakes and problems in Tunisia.
     
  14. Terry D

    Terry D Well-Known Member

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    The British should have realized this, yes. Some British officers did realize it--but too many of the top men in key positions (Montgomery, Alexander, Anderson) did not. This suggests to me that they were somewhat prejudiced from the beginning. This was almost certainly so in Montgomery's case; as I said, he did not understand or get along with foreigners anyway. (Or many of his fellow Britons, for that matter.)

    One must also remember, too, that all the top British commanders in WWII had served in WWI. The US had been in that war for only 18 months, and our army was heavily engaged against the Germans for little more than six months. In that conflict, the US Army also went through a painful and costly learning process, and that process was still incomplete when the war ended. To some British officers with long memories, then, it must have seemed in 1942-43 that substandard performance was a natural characteristic of the US Army. Many British officers would scarcely have encountered American troops in WWI, though, because all but a few American divisions fought on the right of the Allied line with the French. The British were concentrated on the Allied left, in Flanders and Artois.

    Finally, even the most experienced of American commanders in 1942 were far inferior even in WWI experience to their British contemporaries. Eisenhower never got into action at all in WWI and spent the whole war in a training assignment; he had never been in a real battle in his life. Clark, Truscott, and Patton had all been under fire in WWI, but none had acheived high command by the time of the armistice. Marshall had played a vital role on Pershing's staff, but he was never a line officer in WWI. By contrast, Montgomery began WWI as a platoon leader and by the end of it was a highly experienced and successful GSO 1 (Chief of Staff) of one of the best divisions in the British Army. Alexander was leading 4th Guards Brigade by 1918, and in 1919-1920 he commanded the Latvian Baltische Landeswehr (a force of nearly division size) against the Soviets. The only high ranking active officer we had with that level of experience was MacArthur, and he was in the Pacific. Moreover, many of our generals were quite old by British standards--one British officer described Patton as 'an old man of about sixty.' Brooke pushed the careers of younger men, and by 1942-43 the average age of British field commanders was considerably lower than it had been in 1940. To many British officers, the American high command looked both inexperienced and elderly.
     
  15. denny

    denny Member

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    I see.....
    That explains some "stuff".
    Thanks Again
     
  16. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    Similar attitudes were seen in the Pacific as well. US Admiral Thomas Hart was first ostracized and then forced out by Wavell, ABDA's first CinC and Helfrich, the DEI CinC. Then MacArthur returned the favor for the balance of the war after his appointment. Nor did US Pacific Fleet commanders think all that much of their British counterparts, doing as much as they could first to keep them out and then later to keep them marginalized. Given time attitudes began to evolve a bit, but far from full acceptance.

    This also extended to the rank and file of both nations. To American's the 'Brits' were always stopping for tea, lacked 'aggressiveness' and were obsessed with proper order. To the Tommy's the Yank's were reckless, unprofessional and 'johnny come lately's' (again!) . For some these simplistic opinions never changed all that much.

    When a member of one nations service tended to agree with some point made from the other nation, they would often be considered to have 'gone native' by their colleagues. A charge often labeled at Eisenhower by Patton and Bradley. Interestingly enough I heard similar comments made from members of the War Office towards some military attaches sent to Washington.
     
  17. Terry D

    Terry D Well-Known Member

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    It is possible to exaggerate the degree and extent of national prejudice between the Allies. Even at their worst, in 1942-45 the Western Allies worked together in far greater harmony at every level than the Germans and their allies.

    As a general rule, familiarity bred greater understanding. Much depended on the man or men at the top. There is no doubt that Eisenhower built a genuinely Allied-minded team at SHAEF. Some British commanders are on record as expressing great admiration for US troops; Brian Horrocks called the 82nd Airborne 'the finest division in the world today.' After taking over VI Corps at Anzio, Truscott went out of his way to establish good relations with the British. Under the lethargic Lucas Anglo-American relations in the bridgehead had been quite poor, but Truscott and Gerald Templer turned this around completely. Mark Clark and George Patton were terrible with the British but very good with the French; Alphonse Juin was one of the few senior officers of any nation who genuinely liked Clark.

    My impression also is that relations between Allied troops on the ground were often better than between the generals. The worst disputes between rankers of different nations happened in the rear areas; fighting side by side tended to erode prejudice. The troops of the 18th Australian Brigade thought little of the US 32nd Division at Buna, but relations between the men of 9th Australian Division and the US Army Special Engineer Brigade were excellent and the Australians came to be well respected by US troops generally. Both British and American troops respected the Moroccan Goums of the French Army. The US 987th Field Artillery Battalion was the only American unit to fight with British 2nd Army in Normandy, and these Ohio National Guard gunners earned glowing reviews from 50th Division and XXX Corps.
     
  18. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    All true Terry. As for the 32nd infantry, MacArthur used them badly at Buna (a mistake he didn't repeat) so they in part 'earned' a little grief from their allies.

    Unfortunately history tends to funnel things down to generic impressions over time. Writer after writer repeats stories told by those who spoke up, especially if they had a little 'meat' to them, while those that had no ax to grind often got lost in the shuffle.

    No question however the Anglo-American alliance was the best founded and most cordial considering the conflicting objectives and natural frictions.
     
  19. denny

    denny Member

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    From January of 1944 to wars end.......would you say Eisenhower was the glue there.....or that he WAS a good choice to head the alliance.?

    I have heard that he (Ike) and Tedder and Ramsay were on pretty level ground.
    I have also heard that Tedder was not a fan of General Montgomery.
    Thanks
     
  20. Terry D

    Terry D Well-Known Member

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    I think that by then Eisenhower was the only man for the job. I don't know much about Ramsay but Tedder did not really understand ground warfare at all, as he showed in both Malaya and in his silly dispute with Montgomery in Normandy. Owing to the fact that the US contributed the majority of the ground troops the supreme commander had to be an American anyway, and among American generals of sufficient rank and experience only Eisenhower had shown the ability to get along with the British. MacArthur was needed in the Pacific, Marshall was needed in Washington, Patton would have been hopeless in the job, Bradley had only just been promoted to army level. Yes, Ike had problems with Montgomery but he got good work out of him all the same and I don't think any other American officer could have done so.
     

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