Invasion in Denmark...

Since the early days of my interest in WW2 history, I have wondered why Allied Command did not seriously contemplate landings on the Jutland Peninsula, either as a main invasion target or as a secondary measure in the effort to speed up advances into German heartland after the Normandy invasion (rather than embarking on the risky, and eventually ill-fated, Operation Market Garden). However, according to the sources I have been able to find, only Churchill himself ever advocated the idea of an invasion in Denmark (in a memorandum of December 18th 1941).

In the 1976 book “Invasion in Denmark”, by Arne Bonvig Christensen, COSSAC Lieutenant-general Sir Frederic E. Morgan, head planner of the D-Day landing sites, is even quoted stating; “There was then the Jutland Peninsula to be looked at which seemed to present a combination of almost every disadvantage”. No explanation is offered as to the nature of these disadvantages, and – looking at the geography - you are inevitably left with the impression that maybe the good general or his intelligence officers did not enjoy all the necessary data or maybe there were other (political?) reasons for their brief and definite verdict.

The North Sea is known to be deceitful, true enough, but Danish fishermen have challenged it successfully in tiny vessels for generations. The Jutland coast itself is free of steep cliffs and for the most part consists of flat beaches and low dunes. There were a proportionally large number of coastal batteries present, but most batteries were at that time entombed in concrete, limiting arc of fire to 120°. Long stretches between the batteries thus had only a minimum of defenses, with little depth in defense and there were virtually no heavy tanks or mobile reserves available.

The average coastal battery counted some 300 troops and officers, and the defensive forces encountered would for a large part be young boys, elderly gents and convalescents - not exactly crack troops. German soldiers were known to refer to duty in Denmark as serving at “the whipped cream front” - and for a good reason. It seems pretty clear that a decisive, coordinated airborne assault would be able to take out the necessary number of batteries to allow unhindered approach of landing crafts.

A few miles inland, landing forces would have encountered an excellent infrastructure (for its time) with roads going straight to Berlin, only some 700 km away. There would be no major rivers to cross and no Siegfried Line to negotiate. German forces in Norway could have been cut off, occupation forces in Holland isolated, facing a two-front war and Peenemünde, von Braun and his V2’s would have been within immediate grasp. Tertiary landings could take place on the unprotected German Baltic coast, once internal Danish waters were under Allied control.

So, given all these advantages, why was Denmark ruled out so seemingly casual? When the subject is discussed on this side of the pond, the main reason given always point to the lack of air cover due to the modest range of the Spitfires and Hurricanes. Well, could that problem not have been solved by drop-tank fitted P51 Mustangs, sporting three times the range?

Hitler himself apparently feared an invasion here, stating in his Directive 51 that; “A large-scale attack on Denmark is also not out of the question. From a naval point of view such an attack would be more difficult to deliver, nor could it be as effectively supported by air, but if successful, its political and operational repercussions would be very great.”

Although grateful that my country did not have to face a major stand-off, the question won’t leave my mind. I remain confident that there were good reasons for Sir Morgan’s decision, I just don’t understand them. Can anyone on the forum shed some light on this, perhaps through sources unavailable over here? Any hint will be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Dan, aka wartourist

 

I believe the number one reason was the distance to deliver the invasion force and the supplies afterwards. Second reason, the topology was not appealing. Denmark is like Italy, a peninsula. Therefore, a bottleneck and we can see how long it took for the allies to take all of Italy. Finally, there were too many forces in that area. The Kriegsmarine surface fleet was there and could be a problem along with ground and air forces that could attack from behind from Norway.

France was the obvious and more plausible route.

 

I'll have to second all of PzJgr's comments, and would like to add the consideration of air support. The Allied close air support system was dependent on aircraft being based close enough to the fight to allow them extended on-station time, and the ability to carry heavier payloads instead of external fuel. While extensive use of CAS wasn't prevalent on D-Day due to the weather, in the days that followed the landing and during the subsequent drive towards Berlin it was at times crucial.

 

Thank you guys, and sorry for the late acknowledgement of replies. I've been away for a while...
Dan