Invasion of Southern France

http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/36division/archives/caval/invasion.htm







THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE


The under-belly blow to Nazi-dominated Europe, long contemplated in the minds of the Allied Command, was first proposed in December, 1943. The plan, a coordinated double jab at both Northern and Southern France during May of 1944, had to be modified when the gruelling Italian campaign lingered. Postponement of the attack in the south became necessary.

By late July in Normandy the breakout at St. Lo was developing and the onrushing drive toward Paris would follow. In Southern France, German forces in defense of the coastal areas were being reduced to meet the serious breaches in the north. Our intelligence determined that the German Nineteenth Army, soon to oppose the Allied invasion, had been streamlined from 13 to 9 divisions—still, however, an effective force if it could be concentrated. With the Luftwaffe weakened and the German Navy, never top-notch, practically eliminated, our forces, strong in these departments, entered the operation with confidence.

As Lieutenant General (then Major General) Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Army and the VI Corps assault team—the veteran 3rd, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions—prepared for D-Day, concentrations of Allied might lay daringly in Mediterranean ports, principally Naples. That this was the prelude to an invasion obviously was implied to the Germans. Furthermore, Southern France was a very logical target. But if the enemy sensed what was coming, he did not know at what specific points our troops would strike.

The plan finally adopted was to have the 141st Infantry assault Green Beach with two battalions and Blue with one at H-Hour, 0800, to secure these beaches, capture Agay and protect the Division right. The 143rd Infantry was to follow immediately behind the 141st and then drive to the west to seize the heights overlooking San Raphael and Red Beach, thus assisting the 142nd. This regiment was to land six hours later, assault Red Beach, and, together with the 143rd, capture San Raphael, the airfield and Frejus. From the beaches troops were to press inland to a depth of 12 miles, block any enemy attacks from the Cannes area on the right, and push up the Argens River Valley on the left to contact a paratroop force dropped near Le Muy. The capture of Frejus and the small port of San Raphael were "Must" jobs that had to be accomplished immediately.

The invasion convoy sailed from Naples August 13 at noon, passed through the Sardinia-Corsica Straits and arrived offshore of the Riviera beaches at dawn of the 15th. While landing craft lowered and the first waves of tight-lipped infantrymen edged toward the beaches, huge naval guns and bombers pounded the coastline.
At 0800 as a crisp sun melted the haziness of the morning, Colonel John W. Harmony’s 141st began its assault. On Green Beach the 2nd Battalion struck to the right, the 3rd to the left.

Taken by surprise, the Germans did not bring their machineguns into action until the fourth wave had landed and then it was too late. By 1000 hours Drammont and Cape Drammont, surrounding Green Beach, were reported clear. Casualties had been extremely light. Pushing north through Agay, the 2nd Battalion encountered resistance round-about the defenses of Yellow Beach. The 3rd Battalion seized the high ground directly north of Green Beach.

The enemy offered heavier resistance on Blue Beach where several anti-tank guns opened up on incoming landing craft of the 1st Battalion, 141st. This resistance was rapidly overcome and the battalion pushed in to drive the Germans from craggy dominating heights, 1,200 Germans surrendering to the invaders. The 1st Battalion won a Presidential Unit Citation for this action.

Immediately following the 141st, Colonel Paul Adams’ 143rd Infantry landed in a column of battalions on Green Beach; the 1st at 0945, the 2nd at 1000, the 3rd at 1035. "Grand Defend," the high ground to the northwest, was immediately seized by the 1st Battalion. The 143rd then began to drive west, paralleling the shoreline, for San Raphael.

Meanwhile, at 1100 hours the 142nd Infantry loaded into assault boats and headed for Red Beach which it was to strike at 1400. From early morning enemy defenses here defiantly rebuked all efforts to soften them up. Naval craft nearing the beach for mine-detection were fired upon and sunk, and from San Raphael and the hills beyond Frejus, the beaches remained covered by flanking enemy fires.

Another air and naval bombardment preceded the assault on Red Beach. Then specially-designed robot demolition boats, sent in just prior to the first wave, fouled on the beaches. The Naval Commander, with Green Beach open, ordered the 142nd Infantry turned to Green Beach. Here a delicate situation prevailed: The Division Commander had gone ashore at 1000 and the Assistant Division Commander was on his way in. Communication between the Admiral and the Division Commander was not working. Rear Admiral Spencer Lewis, in command of the Task Force carrying the 36th Division, made the decision to change the point of assault of the 142nd Infantry on his own responsibility. His courageous and timely action probably saved hundreds of men from death.

Landing of the 142nd began on Green Beach at 1530 in accordance with an alternate plan which had been previously prepared. Colonel G. E. Lynch’s regiment swung in an arc north and west over the mountains between the 143rd and the 141st to attack Frejus from the rear. The 143rd was ordered to clear Red Beach from the rear after it had seized San Raphael.

There was no let-up during the night as plodding infantrymen strained inland to broaden the beachhead and win, assigned objectives. Both Frejus and San Raphael were cleared in a flurry of fighting in the early morning by the 142nd and the 143rd. Red Beach was secured. On the right in the more frequented resort country of the Riviera the 141st surprised Germans six miles inland driving with glaring headlights along the Cannes-Frejus highway and placed blocks on all roads to Cannes near La Napoule. The only serious setback was the sinking of an ammunition and artillery-laden LST by a single low-flying plane in the channel off Green Beach at dusk of D-Day.

On the night of the 16th the 142nd broke the last German block before Le Muy in the Argens valley. Next day the paratroopers, who had jumped nearby, were contacted and Draguignan was entered.

With landings consolidated along the entire Seventh Army front, the 36th began a blitzkrieg that nullified German plans for defense or even an orderly withdrawal. Early on the morning of the 18th a specially created Task Force, consisting of Lt. Col. Charles Denholm’s 2nd Battalion, 143rd Infantry, elements of the 636th TD Battalion, 753rd Tank Battalion, and 111th Medical Battalion, along with engineer, ordnance, and reconnaissance units, and commanded by Brigadier General Frederick Butler, at that time Deputy Corps Commander, speeded northward into the Alpine country.

The 36th extended its lines 100 miles in a single day while racing to outrun the German Nineteenth Army still in the Marseilles-Toulon area. Grenoble, famed French mountain resort 200 miles from the beaches, fell to the 143rd on August 22, one week after the landing. French Forces of the Interior, well-organized patriots harassing the enemy from the rear and controlling vast stretches of territory, greatly contributed to the success of the Allied in vasion of Southern France.

 

And also . . .

The only USN F6F the only action over Europe transpired during the invasion of southern France in August 1944. USS Tulagi with VOF-1 (Lieut. Comdr. WF Bringle, USN) and USS Kasaan Bay embarking VF-74 (Lieut. Comdr. HB Bass, USN), both squadrons, operating F6F-5s, provided coverage for the landings. VF-74 also operated a 7-plane F6F-3N night fighter detachment from Ajaccio on the island of Corsica. On the day of the invasion, 15 August, VF-74 flew 60 sorties, VOF-1, 40 sorties, all ground support missions.

On the morning of 19 August, a four-plane division of VOF-1 pilots spotted the first German aircraft, three He-111’s. The Americans were too short on fuel and could not attack. Two of the Americans were forced to land on HMS Emperor due to their fuel state. Later that day, two He-111's were spotted by another VOF-1 division and were promptly shot down, this occurring near the village of Vienne. Lieut. Poucel and Ens. Wood teamed up to bring down one and Ens. Robinson brought down the second. Soon thereafter, in the same vicinity, a third He-111 was shot down by Ens. Wood. That same morning, a division of VF-74 pilots led by Lieut. Comdr. Bass brought down a Ju-88 and in the afternoon another division attacked a Do-217 with split credits to going to Lieut. (j.g.) Castanedo and Ens. Hullard.

On 21 August, pilots from VOF-1 shot down three Ju-52 transports north of Marseille. Two were credited to Lieut. (j.g.) Olszewski; one went to Ens. Yenter. Operating for two weeks in support of the invasion, these two squadrons were credited with destroying 825 trucks and vehicles, damaging 334 more and destroying or otherwise immobilizing 84 locomotives. German aircraft shot down: VOF-1: 6, VF-74: 2.

Although the two navy squadrons lost 17 aircraft combined, 13 were lost to ground fire, the remainder were operational accidents. None were shot down by German aircraft. Among the 7 pilots lost (2 from VOF-1 and 5 from VF-74) was the CO of VF-74, Lieut. Comdr. H. Brinkley Bass, awarded 2 Navy Crosses from early actions in the Pacific and previously Blackburn’s Executive Officer in VGF-29 during Operation Torch, killed by antiaircraft fire while strafing near Chamelet on 20 August.

Regards,

Rich

 

Rich there were no Luftwaffe day fighter air fields stationed in southern France in August so that is the reason the US a/c were not engaged. As all Allied a/c were intercepted in the area of Normandie. Everything was sent north and then into Germany after the French bases were blown away by Allied dive bombers

~E

 

Interesting story though. I have never vested much interest in Operation Dragon, but as it went on somewhat unopposed, did the Germans make serious plans to counter a (possible) invasion of southern France? I know they had some divisions on thecoast there, but did they amount to anything.

I have an account from Cruz Navarrez, a medic with 33th(?) Div. about the fighting there.

 

Very interesting I never knew that much about the invasion of Southern France, other than it happened.

Greg

 

"...there were no Luftwaffe day fighter air fields stationed in southern France in August so that is the reason the US a/c were not engaged."

Ah, never meant to indicate that there was any Luftwaffe fighter opposition. Though I've never seen it an any of my sources, I always suspected the the Luftwaffe fighters were fairly snf seriously busy someplace else when the invasion occurred. Thanks for the confirmation.

Rich

 

Personally I think this invasion was needed and it definitely shortened the war. Kph

 

It was logical but controversial. The original concept was for landings simultaneous with Normandy - opposed by Churchill as a diversion from Italy and by Alanbrooke as a diversion of force. In retrospect it was a logical move. It added an extra two armies to the main effort in France and a major port of Marseilles served by a largely intact railway to central France.

 

If the Allies had had sufficient amphibious shipping to do both operations simultaneously - nine divisions and numerous supporting units - then by definition they would have enough to do one or the other a few months earlier, which would probably have been a better way to shorten the war.

These were also expected to be the last major landings in the European theater. Doing them simultaneously would mean assembling a greater concentration of shipping and using it only once. It wasn't like the Pacific where they would move on to another landing a few months later, then another.... For Europe, a more manageable number of ships doing double duty made sense.

One option would be conduct the invasion of southern France first, perhaps in lieu of Anzio. While the Med can produce winter storms, Anzio showed that landings were feasible, whereas a cross-Channel operation could only be done in late spring-summer. The Italian capitulation in September 1943 had handed Corsica and Sardinia to the Allies, but it was not immediately apparent what if anything the Allies might use them for. The Germans had only occupied southern France in November 1942, whereas they had held the Channel coast since June 1940 and been building fortifications, especially around ports, ever since.

Churchill and the British were obsessed with the supposed opportunities of the Italian campaign and ultimately advancing into the Balkans. That might have put the western allies in a better postwar position, but it wouldn't contribute much to the immediate defeat of Germany. It would also show Stalin that his "allies" were just as interested in forestalling him as in beating the common enemy. The Balkans were poorly suited for mechanized warfare, and the Communist partisans might even oppose western troops; Tito for example had insisted that the British withdraw a small base they established on the Adriatic coast.

The Americans recognized correctly that the decisive operation was the landing(s) in France and advance into Germany. Extended campaigning in Italy or the Balkans would only detract from this. The Allies would have looked remarkably foolish if gaining a foothold in Yugoslavia allowed Stalin to advance deeper into Germany.

 

I recall Reading that some Allied top officers suggested going through Switzerland. I doubt one of the louder speakers was Patton. Maybe I am wrong anybody read about this possibility more? Kph

 

My feeling is that had "Dragoon" happened close to D-Day then it could have had a major impact on the campaign. Then, the Dragoon forces could have either cut off, or threatened to cut off, the German forces in Normandy, forcing an earlier retreat. As it was, the battle in NW Europe had already been decided. Blaskowitz's and his subordinates' handling of the 19th Armee Gruppe wasn't exactly the apogee of German military skill but in their defense, much of their units were second or third rate and they also had to contend with a major effort by the FFI.

 

Was it Das Reich that started its convoy travel to Normandy? Could have been stuck in combat in the south.

 

Yes, they were based in south-central France. Also the 9th Panzer Division (regular army) was in the south, not far from the invasion beaches. These, and other divisions, had suffered devastating losses in Russia and were sent to France to absorb replacement troops and equipment and prepare for the anticipated cross-Channel landing in summer 1944.

As noted earlier, May-June 1944 was not just when weather in the Channel permitted an invasion, it was also the first time the Allies had sufficient amphibious shipping to conduct an operation on the scale of Overlord. An earlier Dragoon would have to have been earlier enough that assault craft and gunfire support ships could be shifted to England for Overlord - the reverse of what happened historically - hence my thought that it would basically take the place of the Anzio landing. This would have the incidental benefit that units like Das Reich and 9th Panzer would have less time to recuperate and build up strength.

A Dragoon before Overlord might meet more resistance than it did historically, but the Germans would still anticipate and have to prepare for a cross-Channel invasion. Historically Allied deception operations had them expecting a second landing at the Pas de Calais even after Normandy. So they would face a dilemma in trying to respond to the landing in southern France while still preparing to defend the Channel coast.

Eisenhower's and Marshall's insistence on Dragoon was largely for logistic reasons; Marseilles and other southern ports eventually received about half of all troops and supplies shipped from America to France for the rest of the war. If they could be secured and in operation prior to the Normandy invasion, it would significantly ease the supply problems that so hampered the Allied advance towards Germany.

 

I had read in the past that Stalin suggested flanking the Siegfried Line by hooking around through Switzerland. Not sure how all that would've worked out. Besides, not much of Switzerland was conducive to mobile warfare.

 

I had no clue that U.S Naval Hellcat's were ever deployed to the ETO. I know that RN Hellcat's saw action in the Atlantic, but I thought that was all for the Hellcat's involvement in Europe.

 

AFAIK Dragoon was the only deployment of USN F6Fs there. Dragoon was actually conducted by the MTO; forces "chopped" to SHAEF/ETO once established ashore.

This was also the only example I know of of F6Fs operating from Casablanca class CVEs. The USN usually equipped that class with F4Fs/FMs and reserved F6Fs for the larger Sangamon and Commencement Bay types.

 

FYI, the F4F Wildcats production was continued throughout the war due to their smaller size. Their "footprint" in the hanger bays of the smaller jeep carriers necessitated continued use.

Grumman F4F Wildcat - Wikipedia

 

And there was another USN squadron on the scene. VCS-8, which operated P-51’s, though not from a carrier.

For the invasion of European coast lines it was presumed by the US Navy that aerial naval gunfire spotters would be of value, but that their standard aircraft, the OS2U and the SOC would be too vulnerable to roving German fighters. To remedy that situation, it was decided to train the USN flyers to perform their spotting missions from high performance fighters.

Four naval aviators from USS Brooklyn’s VCS-8 detachment (Lieut DA Liane, USN) reported to Berteaux, Algeria, on 15 January 1944 to begin transition to the P-40. They were joined about a month later by aviators from the VCS-8 detachment from USS Philadelphia. Training continued through spring, and in April the entire group transitioned to P-51's.

On 21 April, the navy flyers were formally attached to the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and flying F-6A's and they began to fly missions as they qualified in type. In July, the VCS-8 pilots received 10 new P-51C's which they flew during the invasion of southern France. VCS-8 pilots were assigned to the “Camel” sector, which stretched roughly from Ponte de la Calle, just to the south of St. Aygulf, from there north and east to a point just east of Les Beaumettes and west of Cagnes-sur-mer on the Baie des Anges. This included the area surrounding Cannes and was in support of operations conducted by the 36th Infantry Division (USA). Each spotting mission consisted of two fighters, one to spot and the other to "weave" astern. The spotter reported the fall of shot and the weaver reported presence of anti-aircraft fire and hostile aircraft. This second pilot was prepared to take over the spotting duty in case the spotter suffered casualty or communication failure. By August 30, with the land operations outside the range of naval gunfire support, the pilots turned their P-51's over to 111 TRS and returned to their ships.

 

"Wildcat" production continued, not F4F production. Production of "wildcats" left the hands of Grumman and went to to the Eastern Aircraft Division of General Motors. Eastern started production of the FM-1 as Grumman halted production of the F4F. The first 10 FM-1s were exact copies of the F4F-4, but after that the changes started creeping in and were eventually enough (making a long story short) to require the need for a new designation, the FM-2. At the end of the war, Eastern was poised to begin production of the F3M-1, their version of the Grumman F8F, but the contract was cancelled.

I've always found it interesting that as the USN compiled its combat statistics it did not differentiate between F4F-3s or F4F-4s, nor between F6F-3s and F6F-5s, but one finds they carefully list the FM-1s and FM-2s (and since FM-1s in USN service, while present in combat zones had next to no combat action, all the aerial combat for the series was in FM-2s) as a separate type. Over my mis-spent youth and middle ages, I had numerous opportunities to speak with naval aviators who had flown the F4F-3 and F4F-4 in combat and, to a man they preferred the F4F-3. When adding Eastern production to the mix, I can't recall a whole lot of comments about the FM-1s, but there was enthusiasm for the FM-2 and the impression that it was considered a totally different breed of cat from the F4F series. The FM-2 had the best credit to loss record of all US fighters, Army or Navy, and this we know because the USN counted them separately from the F4Fs. Some might want to lump the two together, but I tend to follow the lead of the practitioners of the period . . . I figure they knew about that which they wrote. Had they lumped them together, no angst here, but they did not and I've no angst over that either.

The game changer was to be the F8F. Originally proposed as a fighter for stationing on CVEs, BuAer quickly set about making it the point defense fighter for CVs and CVLs, to be stabled with a strike fighter, the F4U. Had the war gone on, F6Fs on CVs and CVLs, now replaced by F8Fs, would have shifted to CVEs and the Wildcat, in the shape of the FM-2, would have seen its deployment service end. Had things dragged out even longer, even the F6Fs on CVEs would eventually have been replaced with F8Fs, or in the MCVGs, F4Us.