Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

Kusaka’s personal beliefs were not “Japanese” doctrine. For them to be some sort of “Japanese” doctrine, it would be a fact that if Kusaka were replaced by a staff officer from 2nd or 5th CAR DIV or Combined Fleet, these men would act identically, under the influence of this alleged Japanese doctrine. But that is not so – 2nd and 5th CAR DIV did not share Kusaka’s outlook and did not operate in the same fashion. Elements of Akagi’s own air command did not share Kusaka’s indecisive tendencies - Fuchida was highly alarmed the moment the mistake was made, hours before the fatal attack. You are continuing to think Kusaka’s overcontrolling personal habits were a Japanese doctrine.

It was not doctrine, but Nagumo's own inability to think clearly and act decisively that was the central problem. Earlier, I outlined how this traced back to promotional practice in the IJN whereby officers were transferred into commands where they had little expertise. This occured with Nagumo at a point in time where his intellectual capacities were diminishing. Unlike Fletcher, Nagumo never showed a capacity to grasp the mettle of his new command and adapt; he was incompetent. It was Nagumo’s character as a passive actor who rubber stamped the recommendations of his staff without the evolution of his own viewpoint or even understanding of the form of warfare he was immersed in that lost the battle.

I understand you seek a very narrow definition to the concept we are discussing; I don’t care. Doctrine is any form of fighting instructions, or guidelines, and therefore can be issued to recipient units in any number of manners including by direct order. Yamamoto, as CinC of the Combined Fleet, had full legal authority to issue doctrinal instructions to Nagumo’s command, and at Midway he did so in the form of specific guidelines on the maintenance of aerial reserves. Nimitz, for his part, also imposed doctrine on his carrier commanders. His instructions to carrier commanders on the principle of calculated risk. His instructions to Fletcher to maintain two separate task forces at Midway. It mattered not whether he delivered these commands verbally, by direct order, or by singing strip-o-gram. These instructions were binding guidelines, doctrine.

 

I would have expected the US to instead reinforce Espirto Santo and then use long range bombers to keep the airfield at Guadalcanal under attack from the air initially in this setting. B-17 or B-24 could have made the trip and kept the Japanese busy just trying to keep the runway in service. Without the kind of equipment the US had bombardment of a runway on Guadalcanal could have kept it largely out of serivce.

 

Extrapolating from American strategy prior to Midway, the USN would have remained on the defensive into the fall of 1942, seeking an opportunity to ambush Kido Butai during a Japanese offensive. US carriers would not have been committed to an American offensive or the defense of Darwin because the former implied the loss of the element of surprise and the latter was logistically infeasible and strategically incompetent. So yes, I think you are right that the US would rely on long range airpower to bomb new Japanese bases in the Solomons - with perhaps the occassional carrier raid thrown in.

 

Both Frank and Bergerud are writing from the actual historical perspective, NOT one in which Japan has chosen not to fight the Battle of Midway, but has taken the course of an invasion of the Australian continent. I am arguing from the same perspective as that of the A-H scenario where Japan's carriers are committed to supporting a major invasion and will be tied up for at least a month and probably considerably longer. So neither Frank's nor Bergerud's observations are necessarily operative.

As for Hiyo and Junyo, thanks for your opinion, but I'll defer to the more informed opinion of Anthony Tully when he writes;

"These two were originally building as ocean liners when they were taken over by the Navy and completed as carriers. Not particularly useful vessels because their machinery wasn't up to the grade; they never made better than 23 knots in wartime service. This meant that they really couldn't keep up with the big boys. "

Hiyo-class Escort Carrier | Nihon Kaigun

The Hiyo and Junyo were NOT fleet carriers in any sense of the term. and the Japanese did not use them with the fleet until after Midway, when they were desperate for any flight decks whatsoever.

Again, thanks for your opinion, but it is just speculation, and not particularly convincing speculation at that. If the Japanese carriers are committed for a month or more at Darwin, it would be perfectly possible for the Allies to seize Guadalcanal without carrier support. In fact, the historical seizure of Guadalcanal enjoyed exactly 1.5 days of carrier support, and Kido Butai didn't show up before Admiral Fletcher
pulled the carrier support. Once Henderson Field became active, The Japanese carriers kept their distance and could do little to destroy the field or wipe out the defenders. So it's a "red herring" to claim that Japanese carriers arriving a monh or two months after the seizure of Guadalcanal could effect the outcome.

The six Japanese fleet carriers were getting tired, and badly needed a refit after the Indian Ocean raid. Their air groups were badly depleted before Midway. If they are committed to an operation like the invasion of Darwin, they will absolutely have to return to Japan to refit, repair and replenish their severely diminished air groups. Thus it's very likely that the Marines will have a minimum of two to three months to consolidate their hold on Guadalcanal, should the Allies decide to seize the island.

Staring Bay was nothing more than a fleet anchorage with no repair or replenishment facilities whatsoever. It was at Staring Bay that the Kaga, in shifting it's berth, struck a coral reef and damaged it's hull badly enough to require almost a month and a half of yard time at Sasebo. The Kaga missed the Indian Ocean raid as a result of using Staring Bay as an anchorage.

The USN already had a submarine base at Perth/Fremantle and refueling facilities. It would have been a simple matter to bring in more repair ships and floating drydocks to temporarily support a larger fleet. Perth/Fremantle was a far better base to support fleet operations than the dangerous anchorage at Staring Bay.

Alternatively, the USN might opt to base the fleet at Brisbane on the East Coast and approach Darwin from the northeast via the Torres Straits. This would have the advantage of causing the IJN to have to guard against two different approach options.

 

The Japanese didn't even begin building the air base on Guadalcanal until early July. If they are intending to invade Darwin in the May/June time frame, it's very unlikely they will still be be thinking about building an air strip on Guadalcanal in July.

It's more likely that the Allies will seize Guadalcanal in an opportunistic move, while the Japanese are tied up with the invasion of Darwin, and build their own air strip from scratch. I would think that, if the Allies are properly prepared, and include Seabees or an aviation engineer battalion, equipped with heavy machinery, it should be possible to get an Allied air field into operation within a couple of weeks. It will then be immaterial what the Japanese carriers do.

 

Interesting point as usual DA but I have to side with TA Gardner on keeping the Japanese airstrip on Guadalcanal out of commission.
Anyway, after reading through this thread and reviewing the posts, I had to check a few things out.
Fact is, as rightfully mentioned several times in this thread, Japan would be stretched too thin in mounting an invasion of Australia.
Okay, for the sake of argument, let's say the Japanese did invade Australia. The one thing that comes to mind is: would such an action actually improve Japan's overall position?
I actually don't think so because even if Japan's naval assets (carriers and naval aviation) remained intact because the Midway battle didn't happen, the Japanese would then be forced into a battle of attrition in trying to support their troops that have landed in Australia.
The Allies would be able to make good their losses while the Japanese can't. And the resulting losses of valuable shipping would be detrimental to the Japanese.
In summary, I tend to think that the war in the Pacific would have ended earlier than it did historically if Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia.

 

Indeed wasn't one of the original reasons for siezeing Guadalcanal to help secure the route to Australia? In the case of an invasion of Australia this is even more important. Furthermore if the Japanese CVs are busy off Darwin the US CVs can participate in the assault vs the 'Canal with impunity. If they are headed for Asuatralia they can do it on the way.

 

Yes I was pointing out Guadalcanal's value as a flank guard back on 12/27/09 furthermore Catalina's using Tulagi would extend the US's recon assets range immensely. Furthermore it seems to me one doesn't really need to get into a war of attrition per the IJN's ships just wage that type of war per their airc rews. Ozawa's fleet at Phillipine Sea was larger in ships and had more aircraft then had Kido Butai at Pearl Harbor/Indian Ocean/Midway . Japan was able to replace the ships & aircraft just not the aircrew and still maintain the same high quality of airman .

 

ickysdad wrote:

Good point, the attrition in aircrews would be lessened in the Australian scenario vs the historical Guadalcanal scenario. If the historical Guadalcanal course of events occurs, exactly what you described did happen and will happen again.

Air Command and Staff College, Air University; Decisive halt 1942, Guadalcanal and Implications for American Military Strategy in the 21st Century: Major Christopher D. Cotts, USAF

As I stated in earlier posts, the trip down the slot and back at Guadalcanal caused huge attrition in Japanese aircraft and pilots. If the Japanese were operating close to their bases and primarily over land a great number of these losses would never have occurred. The trip from Rabaul to Tulagi is approximately 675 miles, one way. How many pilots experienced mechanical failure on the way down and ditched, never to be recovered. How many wounded pilots or aircraft damaged over Guadalcanal (and additional mechanical failures) failed to make the 675 miles back. Attrition in aircrews would be greatly reduced.

T. A. Gardner wrote:

I agree, in the alternative scenario this would be the most logical and tactically sound course of action.

I do have a couple of questions for you. The first is important in that it dictates what assets each side has. It was my understanding from the initial post that the scenario takes place in late May, early June, after Coral Sea but before and instead of Midway, Is this correct? If so, then Lexington is gone, Yorktown is in Pearl undergoing repairs, Saratoga was in Bremerton until 22May having torpedo damage fixed, Wasp was involved with the Malta Operation and rushed back after the Coral Sea operation and didn't leave the U.S. east coast for the Pacific until 6June. Japan has the CV's Shoho sunk and Shokaku damaged. Shokaku is unavailable until 27 June 1942.

In another post you stated:

When you say "basic infantry training" are you saying same/same as Infantry troops or the basic infantry training most support sooldiers get?

 

I'm not ruling out the possibility of T.A. Gardner's supposition. IF the Japanese do begin building an airstrip on Guadalcanal, but I think, given the Darwin invasion, that is a highly unlikely proposition. The more likely eventuality is that there would be no airstrip on Guadalcanal and the Allies would see the opportunity to build one, and steal a march on the Japanese while they are tied down in Darwin.

I agree. Given the situation in the Pacific war, the Japanese are going to be made to bleed profusely every time they confront the Allies. The proponents of the Darwin invasion point to the first six months of the war and assume, because there is no Midway battle, that the Japanese would retain the advantage of the initiative. This is a false assumption. The minute the Japanese are forced to defend a position, whether it be Guadalcanal, Rabaul, or Darwin, they lose the initiative. And along with it, the ability to concentrate their forces at the weakest point in the Allied defenses, as well as the advantage of being able to set the pace of operations.

Fundamentally, the Japanese are no longer attacking into what amounts to a military vacuum; the allies have both the will and the means to defend Australia and the free ride for the Japanese is over.

Agree again. The assumption that the Japanese could engage in a land/sea/air campaign in Australia without incurring severe attrition of their forces is groundless. The Allies would certainly pour in troops, aircraft, and ships to defend Australia, and on a scale which would absolutely surpass the historical events. Japan would either have to match the Allies or withdraw after a very short period, admitting that the invasion had been a huge mistake. Either way, they are substantially weakened.

Guadalcanal was originally the first step in the reduction of Rabaul as a threat to Australia. It wasn't basically a defensive move, but an offensive one. One of the ancillary benefits, however, of taking Guadalcanal was putting a stop to Japanese expansion into the southeastern Pacific, which eventually would have threatened the sea routes to Australia.

Historically, the Japanese CV's cannot, by themselves, seriously harm the Marines on Guadalcanal. Every time the Japanese pushed their carriers into battle near Guadalcanal, it was in support of another Japanese attempt to take back their airfield in a land offensive, assisted by naval units either by bombarding Henderson Field or thickening up air attacks with carrier based planes. The problem for the Japanese was that they were never able to sustain these attacks long enough to put the US airbase out of operation. As a result, the Japanese weren't able to bring the food, supplies and equipment that would have allowed their ground troops to be successful.

What you say is true; air power was the key in the SWPA, and what mattered most were the airfields and the planes (and trained pilots) to make them effective. But ships were necessary to keep those air fields supplied so attrition of ships helped in a very significant way.

At Philippine Sea Ozawa's carrier force consisted of the Taiho, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryuho, Hiyo and Junyo. The first three were true fleet carriers, essentially the equal of three Essex-class CV's. The last three were converted auxiliary carriers of dubious value and in no way equivalent to fleet carriers. At Pearl Harbor Kido Butai consisted of six fleet carriers, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. The number of planes actually embarked on Ozawa's carriers was less than those embarked on Nagumo's carriers at Pearl Harbor; the difference was at Philippine Sea, Ozawa was counting on large numbers of land-based aircraft to assist his attacks.

 

And I’ll stick with Junyo and Hiyo as being fleet carriers because they had large air wings and functioned as front line fleet units in three of the six carrier battles of the war.

Staring Bay functioned as the launching platform for major IJN carrier offensives, including (I think) the Indian Ocean Raid.

Interesting – what are your logistics calculations behind the statement that it would have been a ‘simple’ matter to establish a major US navy base at Perth by June 1942? No need to get more detailed than the carriers, battleships, cruisers and aux. vessels, plus raw estimates on shipping tonnage required (including all oil tankers in the supply loop), unloading times at site, and voyage/turnaround times.

No, I won't hold my breath waiting....:^)

 

I think all possible value from the differining viewpoints in the ‘doctrine’ exchange has been extracted. It’s as it was in my first sentence – Hara would be quite surprised at Coral Sea to have discovered that his overpowering desire to get in the first blow violated some non-existent 'Japanese' doctrine. You say that doctrine is this. I say that doctrine is that. At the end of the day, doctrine is guidelines, and Nagumo had guidelines on the conduct of the battle issued from an authority command, and he ignored those guidelines. At the end of the day, Nagumo had no manual or set of fighting instructions that said he must wait before attacking, but Nagumo chose to wait, and he got hammered. Nagumo lost the battle because he was a bad carrier commander.

There was no ‘book’ written on Japanese carrier doctrine, save for the Ryujo (Divison 4). Kusaka’s habits were not instilled into him from Japanese training methods because other IJN carrier officers were immersed in precisely these same day to day activities and came away with completely different methods and intentions with respect to first strike tactics than did Kusaka. Kusaka had his outlook because that was his personal opinion on the matter. His advice carried the day at Midway because Nagumo almost always rubber-stamped the opinions of his subordinates.

Then cite the Japanese doctrinal publication, issuing command, and quote the exact passage(s) that state it was acceptable to absorb enemy carrier strikes in order to launch a maximum strength strike. Here’s a hint – there is no publication because such a doctrine would obviously be stupid.

 

Inoue of the 4th Fleet naval command is going to ignore Guadalcanal because the IJA’s 25th Army invades Darwin?

I would guess that the situation of Leyte Gulf (October 1944) would be reached by about April of 1945 if the Japanese do not go for Midway but instead launch a diversion at Darwin. Since Saipan is in American hands by August 1945 in either case, I wouldn’t bet the farm that the war lasts any longer, despite the minor improvement in the Japanese position.

IJN carriers would be clear of Darwin by mid-June.

The threat that the IJN CV’s posed is that they would rampage behind the Marine outpost as they did in the Indian Ocean, such that Guadalcanal becomes blockaded and the USMC 1st Division would be forced to surrender. (Obviously, Lee cannot bring Washington into the Slot to win the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal if Lee was just sunk by Kido Butai 150 miles south of Rennell Island). In theory the US carriers could oppose such a move, but this implies that Nimitz would accept a major battle on uneven terms without the advantage of surprise.

 

The 4th Area Fleet was based in the Mandates and responsible for the defense of the of Marshalls and Gilberts. Vice Admiral Inoue had only three antique light cruisers, an under strength flotilla of destroyers and a few submarines plus a bunch of miscellaneous auxiliary ships, and a handful of planes scattered over thousands of square miles of ocean. His interest in the New Guinea, New Britain, Solomons area was as flank protection for Truk and and the islands under his command. If the the IJA invades Darwin, Inoue might think about seizing Tulagi in the Solomons, but he needs two things that aren't likely to be forthcoming from IGHQ in Tokyo; first serious reinforcements, and second authorization to operate in the New Guinea/Solomons area. Without these two things Inoue isn't going to be building any air strips on Guadalcanal. At best, he might be allowed to occupy Rabaul.

That would be a minority guess.

A Japanese defeat at Darwin might well change the whole axis of MacArthur's campaign and prevent him from getting bogged down in the mud-slogging campaign across northern New Guinea. He would be able to attack Through Timor, the Vogel Kopf, Biak, Celebes, Northern Borneo, and directly into Mindanao, or Leyte, completely by-passing and cutting off any Japanese forces in New Britain, New Guinea, or the Solomons. That could easily accelerate Mac's move into the Philippines by several months.

Maybe, but it is more likely that Timor would prove to be a lousy base for the IJAAF, and the IJN carriers could end up being committed to the support of the Darwin force for three or more months. In any case, after Darwin the IJN carriers are going to require at least of month of refit and repair, and replenishment and retraining of their air groups. The Japanese had really neglected the maintainence of their carriers; only Kaga had been in the yard since Pearl Harbor, and if Coral Sea had never been fought, the Shokaku and Zuikaku would also be in extreme need of yard time.

The IJN carriers can't "rampage" anywhere if they are committed to supporting the invasion of Darwin, and then require a month or more of yard time for refit and maintenance. besides that, they aren't going to do much damage south of Guadalcanal for the simple reason that area is covered pretty well by land-based air. Guadalcanal would be secured within the two-three months the IJN carriers were tied up at Darwin and in the yards. The USN pilots on the South Pacific weren't as green as the ones at Midway, so the Japanese carriers aren't likely to try to contest the area against land-based naval attack craft; if they do they get hurt pretty bad.

 

I am sure you are correct, if Australia is invaded the U.S. will shift additional naval assets to the Pacific. The problem is they aren't there to shift, except for some of the older battleships. If Japan invaded Australia in the last week to week and a half of May, all the Navy had to oppose them were two carriers and their supporting cruisers (Enterprise and Hornet). If Yorktown left Pearl Harbor with only temporary repairs as happened historically they'd have a third by the 4th or 5th of June. An additional carrier Saratoga around the 12th or 13th of June. With only two carriers Nimitz will hold them back to protect the lines of communication to Australia, probably steaming around in the vicinity of Fiji and New Caledonia. So the Japanese will have at least two weeks or more to execute their plans before the U.S. has sufficient strength to attempt hinder to them and even then at a strength disadvantage. Wasp was recalled from Malta when the news of the Coral Sea battle was recieved but had to stop in Norfolk for repairs and overhaul. Even if she went straight to the Pacific she couldn't have reached there in less than around 41 days. Average transit times for warships was 7 days from Britain to the east coast, east coast to the Panama Canal, Transiting the Canal and then to the Tonga's east of Fiji another 32 days. Additional days if ships stores/ammunition need replenishment or they sail to Pearl Harbor enroute. The BB USS Washington was also in the UK/Iceland area at this time. So if it left upon hearing of the Australia invasion it would be early July before they could reach the fight. North Carolina was trying to work out vibration problems and historically accompanied Wasp so I'd say her appearance would be around the historical timeframe. Of the other fast battleships South Dakota and Indiana historically went directly to the Pacific with the South Dakota departing immediately after her shakedown on 16 Aug '42. Indiana completed her shakedown in late Sept, the Mass. on 24 Oct and Alabama not until Feb. '43. The Essex's start arriving in May of '43. There was a window of opportunity for Japan, industrial might would eventually crush her but if she could get some good licks in before August she might drag out the war.

 

Well, there is a general consensus that if the Japanese were planning an invasion of Darwin, then the battle of the Coral Sea wouldn't have taken place; that certainly seems to be the basis on which the other proponent of the Darwin invasion, Glenn239, is posting with mention of an impossible number of Japanese fleet carriers. So there would be "eight Japanese Fleet carriers" opposed to just "two American Fleet carriers". Well it just doesn't work that way. First, the Japanese never had "eight fleet carriers". At best they had six. If coral Sea and Midway hadn't taken place, they would still only have six. The US would have five, Lexington, Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet, and possibly a sixth and seventh, the Wasp and Ranger. If Coral Sea had taken place, but not Midway, then the Japanese would still be minus a CVL and two CV's in early June, while the US would be minus Lexington, but would have had a month to repair Yorktown so it would something like four Japanese CV's to at least three and possibly four US CV's.

The reason that the USN might have moved the Wasp and Ranger from the Atlantic to the Pacific is it very likely would have had advanced intelligence of a major Japanese operation against Australia. United States and Australia, throughout the Spring of 1942, up until the end of May, was readily reading Japanese the main Japanese Navy codes and could hardly have missed hints of a major move against Australia. The historical reason the USN was slow to move major units to the Pacific in 1942 was that the IJN's offensive striking power have been virtually shattered at Midway. If this had no happened, those ships commissioned in the first half of 1942 would not have enjoyed such a leisurely shakedown period.

Essex, for example, commissioned on December 31, 1942, but did her shakedown in the Atlantic and didn't arrive at Pearl Harbor until May, 1943. She then participated in a series of what were virtually live fire training exercises against Marcus and Wake islands in late August and early October, 1943. It was nearly a year after her commissioning date that Essex first took part in serious combat operations in the Gilbert islands. If the Japanese carriers had been "rampaging" (gee, i Love that word!) through the Pacific, Essex would have had a mush shorter shakedown and training period.

Historically, there was indeed a "window of opportunity" for the Japanese in
the second half of 1942, but only because they were too weakened to take advantage of it, did the Allies let it remain open as long as it did.

You are making the common mistake of thinking that because one side changes it's behavior or situation due to an A-H scenario, the other side will not react with different decisions and actions. Let's keep this scenario realistic by allowing BOTH sides the same freedom of action.

 

Devilsadvocate,

I really don't want to be drawn into anymore circular arguments but,

Devilsadvocate wrote:

I have no control over what parameters Glenn239 uses to frame his discussion but I am basing mine on what T.A. Gardner originally posted, and these are the parameters I've consistently used for my posts.

T.A. Gardner wrote:

Devilsadvocate wrote:

No sir, no mistake. My assumptions are based upon the proposed timeline. Wasp was recalled upon news of the Coral Sea battle. I am working on the assumption she heads home on 08May the final day of Coral Sea. I have her skipping needed repairs, and replenishment, she historically got, in order to get to the Pacific sooner.
Washington I have heading home on 08May instead of the historical 14July.
Saratoga was being repaired and having her, AA fit upgraded. She rushed to the Pacific to be there for Midway but missed the battle arriving at Pearl Harbor on 6 June. If she could have reasonably gotten to the theater of operations quicker it is almost certain Nimitz would have made sure she did.
Yorktown was damaged at Coral Sea, it wouldn't change in the alternative timeline. She did hurry back to Pearl Harbor for emergency repairs arriving on 27 May and departing on 30May. The rapidity of the repairs is often described as "miraculous". I don't see getting her back any quicker than actually occurred.

Where have I not considered an expedited American response?

Like I said in an earlier post, I prefer information from .mil, .gov, .edu websites. The information I based my assumptions on was derived from the following U.S. Navy .mil sites.
The US Navy Aircraft Carriers

The US Navy Battleship List

Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships

 

Ok, fair enough, we'll ignore Glenn239's fantasies and simply reason based on the historical antecedents as of May 8, 1942.

The Japanese lost the CVL Shoho at Coral Sea, and suffered heavy damage to CV Shokaku, and loss of most of the Zuikaku's air group. The Shokaku and Zuikaku returned to Japan where Shokau remained in dockyard hands until late July, and the Zuikaku was replenishing and retraining it's air group until mid-August, 1942. This left Japan with only four CV's; Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.

The USN lost the Lexington at Coral Sea, and had the Yorktown receive heavy bomb damage. However, Yorktown didn't retire to Pearl Harbor until May, 11, 1942. When she arrived on May 27, 1942, it was estimated that she would require three months to be repaired and refitted. In the event, she was made battle worthy in 72 hours and was available for the Battle of Midway.

This left the US with Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown, and Hornet in the Pacific, in addition, the US could have, under the influence of intelligence of the Darwin invasion, transferred the Wasp and Ranger to the Pacific as soon as early May. Saratoga was being refitted and receiving a new air group at San Diego, but it would have been possible to accelerate that process, if necessary, due to intelligence of the Darwin invasion. That would have led to a six to four ratio of CV's is favor of the USN.

All of this assumes that the US has no inkling of the Japanese Darwin invasion plans; a highly unlikely assumption in early 1942. Yorktown, after being damaged at Coral Sea, did not "hurry back" to Pearl Harbor; she didn't leave the Coral Sea area until May 11th. to head for Pearl Harbor about 3600 miles away. At 18 knots (Yorktown was capable of at least 25 knots at this time), that is a 9-day trip. Yorktown took 16 days.

See above

 

Also why is everybody ignoring the fact that a Darwin operation allows the British Far Eastern Fleet to co-operate with the USN Pacific Fleet? I know it's just 4 old R class ,Warspite and maybe a couple of RN CV's plus some cruisers & DD's but it would still certainly pose a threat that wouldn't exist for the IJN if conducting an operation in the Solomons.