Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

ickysdad wrote,

I agree with everything you have written if Darwin is as far as Japan goes.
That's why, in my original post, I elaborated on what was necessary, in my opinion for a successful campaign.

Papua and Guadalcanal probably would not have occured. This scenario kicks off end of May/early June. Japan kicks off Papua in July 1942 with a landing at Buna. Not necessary if we follow the "what if alternate", Moresby is captuured so there is really no reason for either side to undertake major operations on the rest of the island.
Guadalcanal, kicks off in early August 1942, two plus months after the Darwin Invasion. The Japanese will not need to start an airfield there so the Americans will not need to invade. No reason for the battle it doesn't take place.

 

USMCPrice,
Well that's my whole opinon against this Darwin operation. The IJN felt they had to get the USN into a decisive battle to win a long war and that meant basically a Central Pacific Operation while the IJA basically had already killed the idea of an invasion of Australia which if I understand Wilmott correctly was they felt you had to conquer the eastern part of the continent which would require about 12 divisions if they could even find more then a few. The IJA flat out said the lgoistical assets just weren't there that far from Japan. I just don't see them as seeing a successful invasion of Australia going through Darwin and alongst those lines I don't see the Army going with just a seizure of Darwin with nothing further coming of it.

Now back to the IJN just how much could the IJN contribute if the Doolittle Raid occured as historical? I realise the Midway Operation was already in the pipeline by the time of the raid but IMHO the raid accentuated the need in the IJN's eyes to secure their eastern flank. Afterall what if the USN pulled it off again while the IJN was in the Darwin area? I know,I know highly unlikely but... The political can drive Japanese designs as much as they do the Allied. The IJN was already playing 2nd fiddle to the IJA anymore embarrasments like Dolittle's Raid could be disasterous for the IJN in getting the IJA's co-operation.

 

That in no way answers my question. It does not indicate what the diversion if for. Unless, of course, you are seriously going to argue that the objective of the Japanese was to incarcerate themselves in a self imposed prison camp and act as live targets for Allied training programs. Is that what you are suggesting?

I think you are confused; I never said that you had to look at a specific time frame except as imposed by the original poster's (who was NOT Glenn239) implication that it was around the time of the Midway battle which occurred in early June, 1942.

I don't think anyone is using US capabilities as they were in 1943. Everything I have referenced as being in Australia actually was there in mid-1942 (May/June/July).

Not really. Darwin was probably the worst possible place in Australia from which to threaten anything. It was isolated, far from anything of any importance in the country, completely surround by desert, nearly impossible to supply adequately. Saying it could threaten the East Coast of Australia is like saying if you capture Tacoma, you would be able to threaten Atlanta.

Which to me is an example of why it's not a good idea to invade Darwin.

New Guinea was strategically important only for two things; 1.) as a place to establish air bases to defend against flanking attacks on Rabaul, and 2.) to threaten attacks on Australia. If you already have a beachhead on Australian soil you don't need to capture the miserable little, difficult to supply, Port Moresby. It actually becomes irrelevant in that case.

Weren't you the one who claimed to have read every book available on the Guadalcanal campaign?

If so, you should know that campaign only started in August, 1942, well after the what-if scenario in question, and while the Allies may have been ill-equipped to undertake the campaign, they did so only after they had crushed Japanese offensive power at Midway. And they won decisively. If this scenario takes place it is unlikely that there will be much fighting over New Guinea or the Solomons.

You are aware that there were other factors involved in choosing the First Marines than just their proximity to Australia?

In the March/April/ May time frame, three US divisions were in, or very near (New Caledonia), Australia. These were the Americal (TF 6814) March, 1942, 41st. Division, April, 1942, and the 32nd. Division, May, 1942. All of these divisions were trained and for the most part fully equipped. The 32nd division later fought in New Guinea, and elements of the Americal Division later fought on Guadalcanal. In addition, the Australians had the battle hardened 6th. and 7th. Divisions, plus about 80,000 militia troops, some fully trained, some not (it was these militia troops who delayed the Japanese on the Kokoda Trail long enough for them to be defeated in their drive on Port Moresby).

The USAAF had the following units in Australia before June, 1942;

3rd. Bombardment Group operating A-24's, B-25's
19th. Bombardment Group operating B-17's
22nd. Bombardment Group operating B-26's
38th. Bombardment Group operating B-25's
43rd. Bombardment Group operating B-17's

8th. Fighter Group operating P-39's, P-38's
35th. Fighter Group operating P-39's. P-38's
49th. Fighter Group operating P-40's

Most of these groups were stationed in North Australia, some at bases around Cairns in N.E. Queensland, and others at a string of five airbases from 100 to 200 miles directly south of Darwin, including the Daly Waters air base.

Probably not. The scenario takes place in May/June, the First Battle of EL Alamein wasn't fought until July, 1942. The US would already be reinforcing the Australians with US troops by that time.

The 16th and 17th. Brigades of the 6th Australian Division were used to garrison Ceylon for a short period, but by prior agreement, were on call for the Australian government to use as it saw fit. In fact, these brigades relieved the Australian militia in July, 1942 on the Kokoda Trail. Elements of the 7th Division were diverted to Java, and fought bravely alongside Dutch forces there, but were soon overwhelmed. The bulk of the division went straight to Australia. The 18th. Brigade of the 7th. Australian Division along with a US Engineer regiment, subsequently fought and for the first time in the war, defeated a Japanese landing at Milne Bay in New Guinea in August, 1942. So in May/June, 1942, it seems there were plenty of Battle hardened Australian troops in Australia to oppose the 2+ allegedly "battle hardened" Japanese divisions struggling ashore at Darwin.

The battle of the Atlantic? You're joking, of course?

In June, 1942, the Battle of the Atlantic was pretty much in hiatus. Donitz had transferred most of his U-boats to the US East Coast and Caribbean from the mid-Atlantic. They were still, in June, concentrating on US East Coast shipping routes, but their successes had peaked and were declining.

According to Clay Blair, in "Hitler's U-boat War", Vol 1, Page 697; In the months of May, June, and July, 1942, U-boats sank a total of 365 ships, for a total of 1,283,547 G.R. tons. During that same time period, American ship yards launched 195 ships for a total of 1,444,000 G.R. tons. Even though fewer ships were launched than were sunk, they were larger and more modern, and actually represented an increase of 160,453 G.R. tons available to the Allies. Note that this was production from American yards only; Canadian and British yards produced an additional 7,100,000 G.R. tons of new shipping in 1942.

It's incorrect to state that little merchant shipping could be spared from the Atlantic for tasks in the Pacific. Transport tonnage controlled by the US Army, and committed to the Pacific, actually exceeded that committed to the Atlantic;

"During 1942 shipping in the service of the Army had grown from 871,368 dead-weight tons (31 December 1941) to 3,940,791 dead-weight tons (31 December 1942)--an increase of over 350 percent.36 The distribution of shipping between the Atlantic and the Pacific during 1942 showed how great an effort it was to move, establish, and support forces in the South and Southwest Pacific....Through mid-1942 the total troop and cargo tonnage tinder Army control engaged in the Pacific area (including Alaska) had each month actually exceeded total troop and cargo tonnage for the Atlantic (including the Caribbean). Beginning With July, monthly dead-weight cargo tonnage engaged in the Atlantic exceeded that engaged ire the Pacific, reversing the trend of the previous half year. Until December 1942 troop tonnage in Army service in the Pacific (with the exception of February and July) continued to exceed troop tonnage in the Atlantic for each month of that year."


HyperWar: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42 [Chapter 16]

Note that this included the period during which a great deal of Army controlled shipping in the Atlantic was busy supporting the Torch Landings. If the Army could successfully support the troop landings in North Africa with less tonnage than they had available in the Pacific, it would appear that they would have adequate logistical shipping in the Pacific to support three divisions already in place in Australia.

The alleged "range advantage" the Japanese carrier aircraft supposedly enjoyed over American carrier aircraft was more hypothetical than real. It was never a significant factor in the carrier vs. carrier battles in 1942. Nagumo, at Midway was prepared to forfeit any such advantage vs. the island of Midway's air power, as his original plan was to strike from 50 miles offshore. The only time that the Japanese really attempted to make use of their "range advantage" (at Philippine Sea) it turned out to be useless.

Yet none were decisive, at least in favor of the Japanese; The truly decisive carrier battles were fought at Midway and Philippine Sea, both in the open ocean of the central Pacific. Why would a decisive naval battle be any more likely in the defense of Australia?

The REAL reason the Japanese didn't get their decisive naval battle is because no such battle was possible. Even if the American fleet were completely wiped out, the US would simply rebuild come back with an even bigger more powerful fleet. The Japanese may not have realized it, but Pearl Harbor had made a "decisive battle", or negotiations, a complete impossibility.

Not true. Over the entire Solomons campaign the losses in warships, support vessels, and logistical shipping was pretty even. The Japanese did have a slight edge in warship losses, but lost far more logistical shipping. Moreover, when one considers how difficult it was for the Japanese to replace these losses, and how relatively easy it was for the US, The Solomons campaign literally bled the IJN white, while leaving the USN numerically stronger than ever, and with a considerable amount of combat experience under it's belt.

A truly amazing statement with no basis in logic or reality. First it depends on where the naval battles take place, and who remains in control of the sea and air in that area. There is no guarantee that the Japanese will do so, and no way of predicting how USN units will retire. The Japanese will have no air supremacy at all, except possibly in the immediate area of Darwin. And even that is questionable. What you are forgetting is that Australia is the Allied base;it controls the air over the northern territories and east coast by virtue of the many air bases it already had established there. It also will devastate Japanese air bases in the Darwin area before they can even be activated. Don't forget, the Allies had at least five air bases 100 to 200 mies due south of Darwin with which they could pound the Japanese forces from day one. Any Allied naval units will be operating under land-based air cover anywhere near the Australian coast. The only two areas the Allies have to worry about as far as Japanese air power is concerned is around Timor and in the locale of Darwin (that is if any Japanese planes survive at Darwin).

Only in so far as the initial landing is concerned. Once ashore the Japanese lose the initiative because 2+ divisions are not enough to do anything more than occupy Darwin and the immediate area. They can't move from Darwin unless on foot across the desert which would be militarily suicidal. Once they dig in at Darwin, it will be the Allies who have the initiative and the Japanese who will be trying to react.

Probably true, because Japan wouldn't have the shipping or aircraft, to support a New Guinea campaign in addition to a major invasion of Australia. But the Allied attrition you mention is wishful thinking. Port Moresby, if occupied by the Japanese would be bombed into oblivion. It's only 447 miles from Port Moresby to Cairns, not a particulary long trip for allied bombers, and fighters from the Iron Range air base (233 miles to Port Moresby) could escort them. Japan will in any case have a very difficult time logistically supporting any operations from Port Moresby, the sea routes will be under constant Allied air patrol.

Also probably true. The Allies will probably be able to walk ashore in the Solomons with minor forces. The Japanese will not be able to support any kind of resistance in this area.

Despite the superiority of Japanese torpedoes (which was less marked when comparing submarine torpedoes), Japanese submarines had little overall impact in the war. It doesn't matter where they are based, since most had outstanding range basing them in Rabaul, Darwin or Port Moresby (why in God's Name there?), Fuel oil, torpedoes, spare parts, still have to be shipped in for them and the Japanese just didn't have the logistical shipping to make that a logical choice.

LOL, very true! In fact the Germans did control part of England, the Channel Islands. The Japanese controlling Darwin would be just as advantageous to the Japanese as the control of the Channel Islands was to the Germans.

Of course, probably few in Australia would even be aware of the invasion of Darwin. My wife used to be an Australian citizen and said Australians during WW II never knew about the bombing of Darwin as the news was suppressed by the government; hardly anyone learned of it until after the war. That's how isolated Darwin was during the war.

Well, it might even accelerate the war and cause it to end more quickly if the Japanese get involved in a battle of attrition like in the Solomons campaign. It might also mean that MacArthur's campaign goes faster and the Philippines are liberated say, in the Spring of 1944. The Central Pacific campaign could then be accelerated to seize the Marianas earlier and subject Japan to aerial bombardment earlier. One thing is pretty clear, Japanese occupation of Darwin isn't likely to slow the war down.

 

Of course you are, poor Lad.

It completely demolishes your theory. The point is it wasn't completely alien to both sides; but it was the US side that utilized, and as a result won the battle.

Ask yourself this; what would had happened had Fletcher and Spruance said, "To heck with the doctrine of the first strike, our boys deserve to sleep in this morning, and Noon is soon enough to thrash the bloody Nips!" Does the USN still manage to sink three Japanese carriers? Or do the Japanese launch their full, coordinated strikes and hit the US carrier while they are spotting their planes?

Nothing else in the battle really mattered as much as that first strike, and no amount of moaning about "real events" can change that.

 

Diverted from what? A Japanese invasion of Australia simply concentrates the Japanese into an area where it is easier for the Allies to destroy them, while leaving gaps in the Japanese defensive perimeter. The Allies will not only contain the Japanese incursion in Australia, but will walk through those gaps and attack the inner defensive line that much quicker. It's a Zero sum game; the Japanese can only pressure the Allies so much and by mid-1942, they had reached that limit. From that point on, the Allies not only were able to meet every new initiative by the Japanese, but were able to launch their own offensives, moreover they were able to achieve an operational pace that left the Japanese in the dust.

They did?

Let's see, the US first built an airbase on Adak island and started bombing the hell out of the Japanese on Kiska. Then, about eight months after the Japanese landing, the USN blockaded Japanese supply lines with a small cruiser/destroyer force that defeated a Japanese naval force twice it's size. Then, eleven months after the Japanese invasion, the US forces landed on Attu and killed all the Japanese there in about 19 days. After that the remaining Japanese on Kiska folded their tents and went home. Doesn't sound like the Americans reacted all that strongly or quickly. Also doesn't soud encouraging for Japanese prospects in Australia.

Maybe. For sure MacArthur will put on his cape and issue press releases by the ton. But the JCS isn't stupid, they might see it as an opportunity to put MacArthur on ice, so to speak, and let Nimitz have the lead in the Pacific. What it will most certainly not do is allow the Japanese to attract "disproportionate" forces to contain them at Darwin. The Allies will continue their offensive in other places in the Pacific; the Central Pacific offensive may kick off even earlier. The Solomons/New Guinea campaigns certainly slowed the US down in the South Pacific, but if those don't happen or if the Japanese cannot fight them as tenaciously as they did because of the support drained off by the Darwin invasion, it might even be advantageous to the Allied schedule, who can say?

 

Good, finally.

Who says the IJA is willing to go into Australia? That wasn't in the original what-if and no one has introduced any reason to believe anything has changed to make it so. It's still absurd to think the IJA is going to release a couple of divisions for something as dumb as painting themselves into a corner in Darwin.

I suppose you can cite a source that says the USN flatly refused to operate carriers in that area? The USN would operate carriers wherever the IJN operated carriers, simple as that. The US Army received command in that area because no one anticipated a major naval battle in that area. Besides that command boundaries could be changed at the convenience of the JCS, as witnessed by the change of command boundaries to accommodate the Guadalcanal operation.

Translation; I have no answer to this issue, so I will attempt to take the moral high ground, and criticize the poster for bringing it up. LOL!

 

I have a simple question for everybody.. I know the IJN had the Midway plans in the pipeline before the Doolittle Raid but didn't that raid only reinforce the IJN's desire to capture Midway? I assume the IJN's main idea behind any operation is to bring the USN to the decisive battle and I also assume they want the whole Combined Fleet to secure that decisive battle right? I also understand that the Midway Operation took a huge % of Japan's oil reserves now wouldn't this operation take an even larger share of Japan's scarce oil reserves being even farther away from the Home Islands then Midway?

 

Oh?

Just how do you define a "full-strength Japanese major base"?

I guess Kwajalein, Maloelap, Wotje, Jaluit, Mili, Makin, Rabaul, Wake, Marcus, Honshu, Lae , or Salamaua don't qualify because in early1942 US carriers came close enough to raid every one of those places, And none of the carriers were so much as scratched. I guess you think the Japanese are going to establish a base like Truk or Kure somewhere in the area?

Are you sure it wasn't you who graduated from good old CBMA?

Nope. Sixteen Betty bombers were shot down before they ever got within launch range.

"When these attackers reached Brown at 1542, the Admiral had already decided to break off his attack. Now, his fighters led by radar intercepted the Japanese. Lieutenant Butch O’Hare shot down five of the attackers, others took down another ten; no hit was scored on Lexington, and O’Hare was awarded the Medal of Honor. Not by a fair margin was this mission a Japanese success: Rabaul, at least in the South Pacific, was the most powerful base, and if Rabaul could not defend itself, little could be expected from other bases. The Bettys, shields of the defensive strategies against the American fleet, had been shot down with all too great ease."

The Early Carrier Raids: February and March 1942

Spruance didn't want to go within range of Wake because he had no idea what the Japanese had there at that time. Besides that, he knew he might run into Japanese battleships waiting for him under Wake's air cover. He'd just blown four Japanese carriers to Kingdom Come and there was no sense in risking his carriers, especially with depleted air groups.

 

Pretty much yes, to all your questions.

The IJN had already gotten approval from the IGHQ staff for the Midway operation about a week before the Doolittle raid. But what the raid did do was get everybody behind the idea that the US carriers had to be taken out. That, if successful, would have been considered a "decisive battle" by the Japanese. Any invasion of Australia would have used far more oil than the Midway operation because it would have involved a very large portion of the Combined Fleet and would have lasted far longer than the approximately two weeks spent at Midway.

Of course, all the IJN has to do, according to the advocates of the Australian invasion, is nip over to the NEI and say "Fill 'er Up!".

 

Well, that was exactly what Nagumo did; he could have launched a reduced, but still powerful strike, as soon as he became aware of the presence of American carriers at 0745. This option would have produced a strike by about 64 attack planes (opposed to a nominal strike of 79 planes later). There is no guarantee an early strike would have prevented the launch of the American strikes (it conceivably could have), but at least it would have given the Japanese a chance to destroy the three American carriers before they could sink all four Japanese carriers. The score would then be three sunk carriers on each side with the Japanese retaining air superiority by virtue of the planes remaining on the Hiryu.

Instead Nagumo choose to wait until he could launch a full strength coordinated strike. Unfortunately for him, the American SBD's arrived before that opportunity.

No, he didn't. Spruance launched as soon as he was within reasonable strike range.

Well, if you really want to argue about "lucky this," and "unlucky that" there is a whole range of events which one way or the other for each side; why don't you start a thread on them so the people who don't like the way the battle turned out can have a go at them?

Bringing Hara and Yamaguchi into the argument is simply B/S aimed at confusing the issue, and you know it. Neither were in command at Midway, and you only dragged them into the discussion because there was no way you could respond to my arguments straight up.

I've read it, it's Ok, but no better than "Shattered Sword". But if you want to quote Lundstrom, why don't you? See if Lundstrom thinks Hara or Yamaguchi was making the decisions at Midway, LOL!

Well, you've stated that, but haven't given any reason Nagumo couldn't have launched an anti-shipping strike earlier than he did. Hey, why don't you quote Lundstrom on that? Just why did Nagumo have no chance to get in a first strike? Fact is, he never even considered trying, but for the US commanders that was the prime consideration.

 

But if the USN isn't going to be there what are you diverting from critical areas elsewhere? The US is still going to be in the Solomon's as they were viewed as necessary for maintaining the supply line to Australia which is even more important in this scenario. There's already plenty of troops in Australia. I guess the US will be sending more planes. The British may also be sending more help but that's diverting things from Europe to the Pacific. Not exactly in Japan's best interest.

In the mean time Japan has to commit their carriers there for at least a while where they may well be subject to attack from land based air and subs. Furthermore they are committing their insufficient transport fleet to a long term campaign where it will be subject to even greater attrition than the historical case.

Looks to me like this is a plan for the Japanese providing a self diversion.

 

It's my understanding that the Midway Operation was the IJ Army's proposal. The Navy proposed Australia, the Army didn't like it, was worried about Russia and was possibly looking to invade Siberia. They countered with a proposal to invade Midway and the powers that be signed off on it. The rest is history.

"I assume the IJN's main idea behind any operation is to bring the USN to the decisive battle and I also assume they want the whole Combined Fleet to secure that decisive battle right? I also understand that the Midway Operation took a huge % of Japan's oil reserves now wouldn't this operation take an even larger share of Japan's scarce oil reserves being even farther away from the Home Islands then Midway?"
That is the understanding I have also.

 

There is a very good discussion of this in Shattered Sword

 

Cool, thanks for the heads up. I'll put it on my reading list. What's their take on it?

 

They deal with it mostly from the IJN perspective and as a run up to Midway. There were a number of plans broached even within the navy as I recall (my copy has dissapeared). Defintily worht reading for a number of reasons particularly if you are interested in the battle of MIdway as it is perhaps the defintitive account at this point.

 

The Midway operation was most definitely NOT the IJA's option; The IJA wanted nothing to do with naval operations in the Pacific, either at Midway or in Australia. In fact, very few senior officers on the IGHQ staff wanted the Midway operation to proceed; even most of the senior IJN officers opposed it.

Midway was strictly Admiral Yamamoto's baby. When he proposed it, only his Combined Fleet Staff (and not all of them) were enthusiastic about it. The naval officers at IGHQ opposed it, and delivered a very cogent set of reasons why it was a bad idea. Yamamoto had to threaten to resign again, as he did to get the Pearl Harbor attack approved, in order to keep the idea alive. Navy Chief Of Staff Admiral Nagano finally caved in and approved the Midway operation on, or about, April 12. The Doolittle Raid on April 18, 1942, had the effect of converting more senior Japanese officers to believers in Yamamoto's plans because the Midway operation was planned to eliminate the US carriers.

That was why almost the entire Combined Fleet was included in the operation. Some American naval officers, when the intel about Midway was presented to them, thought it was phony because they couldn't believe the IJN would commit so many warships just to capture a tiny, insignificant atoll like Midway.

When you read about Japanese war planning and strategy in mid-1942, it seems every one and his brother had his own idea about how to prosecute the war. There was no overall direction or set of objectives; the IGHQ, especially the Navy side, was floundering around trying to figure out what to do. Australia, India, the Central Pacific, the South Pacific were all floated as areas in which to concentrate operations, but no one really had any idea what a war-winning strategy looked like. The IJA was fully occupied with China and the Soviets in Manchuria and didn't want to be bothered with the Pacific area, which it considered the Navy's responsibility. It only got involved there finally because the Navy seemed to be botching the defense around Guadalcanal.

 

Some great discussion guys, keep the information coming.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Yes I am aware that Glenn239 is not the original poster. He brought it to my attention yesterday and I corrected myself.

Posted by USMCPrice 17Dec 8:39 pm

Stuff happens. In fact every statement you attribute to me in this post was by someone else.

All were by Glenn239, yesterday, 6:59 pm #90.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Yes, I made the statement. In response to you advising me that I needed to,

I am well aware that the Guadalcanal landings occured on 07 August 1942. It is a date that they pound into your head at Marine Corps Boot Camp. I have also mentioned it in this thread in at least two seperate posts.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Once again, something I have stated in this thread a number of times.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

It is neither alleged or hypothetical. It is a fact. Now, that is not to say that in some cases, circumstances prevented the Japanese from utilizing this capability, but it was there. It could be utilized if opportunity presented itself.
An analogy would be if I had a rifle with an effective range of 500 yds but visibility only allowed me to engage targets out to 300 yards. The rifle still retains the capability of being effective out to 500 yards, not allegedly, not hypothetically. If visibility improves I can utilize it's full potential and engage out to 500 yards.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

I would hope so since I wrote that they were on the east coast of the U.S. training Army divisions for the Torch Landings. BTW, 1st Marines is a regiment, the unit we are discussing is the 1st Marine Division. 1st Marines is actually a component of the 1st Marine Division along with 5th and 7th and 11th Marines.

 

If the US carriers are going to contest Darwin with Port Moresby in Japanese hands, then the US carriers will have to do it from the west coast of Australia, perhaps at Perth. If the US carriers are on the west coast of Australia, they are not at Samoa or Fiji, or any other place that the Japanese may then choose to invade. Nor can they get there anytime soon. Hence, the carriers must remain in the Hawaii-Samoa area, for fear that the Japanese will exploit the absence of US strength to cut the supply line to Australia.

The Allies can only invade in the Lae-Solomons area if supported by carrier based air power; there are no airfields that are within effective tactical land based air range to cover the invasion fleet or provide adequate support to ground units. Since the Japanese have carrier superiority (8 fleet carriers and 2 light vs. 5 fleet carriers) and the Japanese possess all of the land bases in the landing area, the Allies cannot invade either Lae or the Solomons because the Japanese have about 870 aircraft to the US carrier's 400 aircraft. If 5 IJN and 5 USN carriers are sunk, then the Japanese have about 550 aircraft to the Allies having none.

This state of affairs would remain in effect until the Japanese no longer had carrier superiority.

The crappy thing about Darwin is that it’s a couple thousand miles from there to anywhere. The good thing about Darwin (beyond the logistic issues already discussed) is that, assuming the Japanese maintain strong base forces on the flanks in Timor and the Solomons, it is secure from significant naval or aerial interference.

 

To recap. You had stated that an Australian campaign would cause losses greater than in the Solomons. You did not respond effectively when another poster questioned this assumption; how can the IJA lose 8,000 aircraft when they will never have in Australia the air base network necessary for such a scale of losses? Good point, but you never answered. When I responded, I indicted the IJA and IJN delineated their theatre commands in 1942/1943. The IJN did not provide large scale air support for IJA theatres after landings were completed. A reasonable working assumption is that the IJN would take charge of aerial security for the Solomons, Lae and Port Moresby and the IJA would do so in Australia. If the IJN is not fighting in Australia, the IJN obviously cannot lose 5,000 or 6,000 aircraft there.

Instead of addressing this point you responded with an irrelevant statement; that the IJA could not navigate over water to 450 miles as would be required to go to Darwin. This is a destructive argument for several reasons. First, because I wonder if even you suspected it wasn’t true as you typed it. Second, because you knew a detailed sideshow about IJA ferrying practices would be distracting and prolonged. Third, because if the discussion did turn to everyone digging downwards in scale to look at these things, then you would have succeeded in avoiding the discussion about IJN/IJA delineation of theatres…which was your real purpose in the first place.