Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

The primary advantage to a Japanese possession of Port Moresby is that this means the Allies do not have it. Without it or Guadalcanal, there is no Solomons campaign. As an offensive base vs. Australia, Port Moresby was next to useless, partly for the fact that Australia had plenty more air bases, partly because there was nothing of importance to attack, and partly for the exposed nature of the supply route to it.

The United States never operated fleet carriers in that area nor ever gave control of fleet carriers to MacArthur. Nor did Nimitz ever express the slightest interest in a strategy of doing battle just for battle’s sake; the US would operate carriers where its security required them, and that zone was along the Hawaii-Samoa axis.

60 Zero fighters, 60 Betty bombers, and 60 misc. types. Airfield and ground support available to throw them all at a carrier battle group at once. Two major IJN complexes were in play in the area by the summer of 1942 – one complex at Rabaul and one at Timor.

You have guessed correctly. Nimitz decided on a raid on the first four only after USN intelligence had determined that the 4th Fleet had sent the bulk of the bombers at the Marshalls to the South Pacific (only 9 remained). Mili and Makin I don’t know why you even bothered mentioning. Rabaul was tackled in February 1942 before it was a major base, and while Lex was not hit and the Japanese were defeated, the determination of the Japanese in that action shook deeply enough that no encore performance was ever attempted in 1942. Honshu’s capabilities were so feared that the US carriers took twin engine bombers so that they could launch from far out to sea; they did not dare to approach closer, leave alone the 300 mile madness you propose. Wake was held by the American Marines as Saratoga moved in, so Fletcher probably had a good idea that 180 IJN aircraft weren’t there. Marcus was weakly garrisoned with only a few planes. Lae and the Solomons occurred just as the Japanese were landing. Last time I checked, landing ships on a beach probably don’t have 60 Betty torpedo bombers warming up on a giant floating runway.

See Lundstrom’s First Team, where this action is covered in great detail. From memory. The Japanese raid occurred in two segments, one of 9 bombers and then one of 8. The first raid was heavily handled, so that only 4 bombers actually dropped on the Lexington, and none were close. The second raid also lost 4 bombers inbound, and the other four dropped on the Lex – much closer this time.

But Spruance is going to go up against a Timor with ten or fifteen times the force at Wake because he doesn’t know what’s there either?

 

No, he didn't. Spruance's choice was based on his assessment of complex tactical circumstances, just as Nagumo's was,

“…Spruance’s plan was to launch his strike force at a time calculated to hit Nagumo’s carriers while the planes that had returned form Midway were being rearmed and refuelled. The decision making process in his command center that led to the exact launch time was, however, fraught with anxieties. When Spruance received the PBY report at 0603 sighting elements of the Japanese carrier force, calculated to be 175 miles away, his first inclination was to delay his launch until he ahd steamed closer to the Mobile Force, to give his short legged Wildcat fighters and Devastator torpedo bombers a better chance of returning to their carriers. But he soon began to worry that his task force might be discovered by the Japanese (and ‘bogeys’ were being picked up on his radar screen) and that the Japanese Midway strike force might then be diverted to attack his carriers before he could complete his launch.

To forstall this possibility he contemplated an immediate launch. But the problems with this option were that the reported position of the Japanese carrier force was beyond the combat radius of his torpedo bombers and also that his strike force might reach the Mobile Force before its Midway strike force had returned to the carriers. In the end, Spruance resisted the temptation for an immediate launch and took a calculated risk: gambling that cloud cover would prevent his task force from being spotted by Japanese search planes until all of Nagumo’s strike force had reached Midway, he scheduled his launch to begin around 0700…This…would enable his strike force to reach the projected location of the Mobile Force at around 0920. This could be expected to catch the second wave of Nagumo’s strike force…just after it had returned and landed, but well before the first wave…could be rearmed and launched.”

Isom, Midway Inquest, 150.

Spruance’s calculation on 4 June 1942 was far more complicated than just hitting first. As I said, these men’s decisions (on both sides) were guided by complex tactical considerations, not some simple ruled carved in stone and brought forth from the mountain.

Yes, of course. What part of the fact that luck decided the Battle of Midway was it that you were having a hard time understanding? Oh wait – you’re having a hard time accepting it.

The issue is that you want “Nagumo” to mean “Japanese doctrine”. But “Japanese” doctrine means Hara’s doctrine and Yamaguchi’s doctrine too. Sorry, it just ain’t the case that Hara and Yamaguchi were oblivious to the advantages of first strike. Nagumo did not understand carrier warfare that well (he was appointed to a position over his head, a failing more common in the Japanese military and an issue I think is more pertinent to the Midway disaster), and had a staff officer that with a meticulous personality, whose advice won out over Yamaguchi’s due to the circumstances in being at the time.

Except Nagumo was not aware of American carriers at 0745. He radioed his scout at 0747 to ascertain the ship types of the “ten surface ships” it had just reported, after alerting his command at 0745 to prepare for an immediate attack on the ships just spotted. At 0758 Nagumo was told the contact was 5 destroyers and 5 cruisers. His staff was in a quandary; attack the ships that might not include a carrier, or attack Midway that definitely did have striking power? Yamaguchi chimed in; hit the ships now with everything available, and he apparently even started spotting the strike on CAR DIV 2. (Yamaguchi probably regreted it later that he just didn't go ahead and launch anyway). At 0820 the Midway strike returned and needed to recover. Then, at 0830 the scout finally reported that it “appeared” a carrier was present. Says Lundstrom,

“The risk of losing many of the Midway first attackers to the sea evidently was the overriding factor in the decision to delay the second strike.”

“Nagumo and his advisors perceived the situation as sufficiently favourable not to force them to commit an unbalanced attack. The second strike could wait until everything was ready to go. The methodical Kusaka distrusted precipitous actions, preferring, “a concentrated single stroke after sufficient study and minute planning…Nagumo’s decision to stand temporarily on the defensive and accept attack resembled the one that Spruance himself would make two years later on 19 June 1944 at the Battle of the Philippine Sea.”

Spruance didn’t forget some US doctrine in 1944; he reacted to circumstance. So too Nagumo. Lundstrom’s conclusion is that his decision came from (1) the need to recover the Midway strikers and (2) the methodical personality of his most influential staff member. “Doctrine” in this case means the operational habits of Nagumo’s chief staff officer, and not some navy-wide policy. Lundstrom opinions,

“In retrospect Amari’s failure to develop his contacts deeply harmed the Japanese cause. Had he come through promptly and clearly with word of US carriers, Nagumo might have attacked them using whatever planes were at hand.”

Luck here again – it was probably heavy cloud cover that prevented Amari from seeing the carrier for so long.

Lundstrom thinks Nagumo had Zeros for escort at 0830 and that later protests were excuses. Maybe, but Isom disagrees,

“Thus, it can be seen that at 0830, when Nagumo had to make a decision to launch the dive bombers immediately or postpone his attack, there were no Zeros available to escort the dive bombers…Senshi Sosho gives as the main reasons Nagumo decided against an immediate attack; that he did not think that an attack with dive bombers alone would inflict sufficient damage to justify the pilot losses and that he thought he had time to organize a coordinated attack that would do far more damage with fewer pilots losses…Senshi Sosho states that the most crucial piece of information that influenced Nagumo to postpone was <an erroneous sighting report that placed the US carriers outside the Wildcat’s strike range>.”

Isom 160-170.

So yes, the practice of balanced strikes was preferred in the IJN, all things being equal. (All authors acknowledge the IJN practice of balanced, coordinated strikes, and that this instinct influenced Nagumo’s choice to delay). But few outside Shattered Sword thought doctrine triumphed over circumstances as the decisive factor guiding Nagumo’s decisions.

 

Sorry, I apologize for the confusion. It's almost unavoidable when so many people are posting contradictory opinions all on the same topic

So are we agreed that the Japanese probably won't attempt to defend Guadalcanal in August, if they are already established at Darwin in June?

I fully concede that Japanese carrier aircraft generally had longer ranges that US carrier aircraft, but the advantage (not the fact of the range) that supposedly endowed them with was largely hypothetical. It was never once utilized by the Japanese in 1942 to achieve any decisive edge over US carrier forces, and when they did try to use that advantage, it turned out it was meaningless.

I wouldn't give much credence to your analogy: using a rifle, and using carrier strike aircraft aircraft involve such dissimilar conditions as to render any such comparison meaningless.

Yes, I understand the nomenclature of Marine units; it was a typo, I meant to write First Marine Division and typed Marines instead of Division. So if you already knew the First Marine Division was chosen because of other factors rather than being in close proximity to the South Pacific, why did you even raise the issue?

It seemed to me that you were trying to imply (falsely) that there were no US ground units anywhere in the South Pacific.

 

Glenn,
I fail to see how luck really intervened much at Midway. The thing luck is sometimes the one thing that favors the bold especially if they're near equal strength. Now Spurance in 1944 had such an advantage that he could be passive his fleet was more then strong enough to both cover the operations & protect the Marianas Invasion ,Nagumo's at Midway wasn't . Doctrine played a far larger part in Midway then is beknownst for one things like each US CV carrying it's own organic scouing t outfit while the IJN relied on cruiser aircraft that were exposed to the elements all the time. Another is the IJN CV's having to warm their engines on deck versus in the hangar then you have the IJN habit of each carrier squadron more or less having to act in concert versus the USN's flexibility in that each CV can launch it's strike when it's ready not having to wait on it's sister's . There are others...

 

Here is a copy of an article I found on the web...

NWCR Summer 2001: Parshall, Dickson, and TullyPress
homepage|Review|Books|Newport Papers|Reader services

SET AND DRIFT



DOCTRINE MATTERS WHY THE JAPANESE LOST AT MIDWAY
Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, and Anthony P. Tully

Dallas Isom’s article “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” [Naval War
College Review, Summer 2000, pp. 60–100] is laudable for its use of Japanese
sources and for the interesting points it raises. In particular, we applaud
Isom’s interviews with Japanese survivors, which contribute new and useful
information regarding Japanese aircraft rearmament procedures. This new data is
crucial to building an accurate account of the events that transpired aboard the
Japanese carriers on the morning of 4 June 1942. However, in our opinion,
Professor Isom’s arguments appear to rely too much on a rather rigid (and highly
debatable) interpretation of Japanese communications: namely, exactly when did
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo received transmissions from scout plane 4, launched
by the cruiser Tone. In addition, while Isom’s rearmament information (which he
puts forward as central to Nagumo’s inability to launch his anticarrier strike
before being fatally attacked) is clearly important to understanding the
Japanese side of the battle, we feel that he did not carry his operational
analysis far enough. As a result, we cannot accept his conclusions.
At the time of Isom’s writing, we were engaged in a reappraisal and rewriting of
the Japanese account of Midway as a result of our own work in identifying
wreckage from the carrier Kaga.1 A key part of our approach was to build an
accurate model of the operations of the Japanese carrier striking force. As we
will show, the disaster that befell the Japanese carrier force hinged neither on
whether Nagumo received Tone 4’s message at 0740 or at 0800, nor on how quickly
the armorers in the Japanese hangars could do their work. Rather, the fate of
the Japanese Mobile Striking Force (Kido Butai) revolved around what was
happening on its flight decks. Armed with a knowledge of Japanese carrier
doctrine, as well as the operational information from the battle, one can reach
an accurate assessment of the state of readiness of Nagumo’s force at the time
of the climactic American attack without resorting to Isom’s indirect method.
A major error in the Isom article is that it repeatedly misstates what aircraft
actually were on the Japanese flight decks. In several places, Isom presumes
that the Japanese antiship strike force was on the flight decks when it is
demonstrable that those aircraft were still in their hangars. This presumption
carries forward the (mistaken) conventional view that the Japanese had spotted
their antiship strike force on the flight decks shortly after the initial Midway
attack force had taken off and had only briefly moved these antiship strike
aircraft below for the purposes of rearming them or recovering the first-strike
wave. As will be shown, this is the root of the fundamental misunderstanding of
circumstances at the time the carriers were struck.
In fact, both Japanese doctrine and the operations of the Japanese combat air
patrol (CAP) fighters would have kept the reserve strike planes securely below
in their hangars until they were definitely needed. Not only that, but because
of Japanese hangar design, the window of time necessary to lift, spot, and
launch the aircraft was substantially longer than has been previously
understood. As a result, given the frenetic nature of Japanese CAP operations
after about 0800 (particularly aboard Akagi and Kaga), it is unlikely that many
of these second-wave aircraft were ever spotted on the flight decks before the
fatal American dive-bomber attack commenced at 1020.
This point cannot be overemphasized, because from the conventional belief of
what was on the flight decks flow nearly all Western interpretations of the
battle. To put the matter succinctly, at the time Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu were
struck, their flight decks were more empty than occupied. This is almost the
reverse of the standard view, which has the Japanese flight decks packed with
strike aircraft awaiting takeoff. There were aircraft on deck, but most were CAP
fighters, not attack aircraft. There were also fewer aircraft on deck than is
generally supposed. Though potentially startling, this is less a “revision” than
a correction and careful restating of the existing historical record. We will
show that official Japanese sources on the battle have been aware of this for
some thirty years.
These errors in both the conventional Western interpretation and Isom’s article
cannot be addressed without first developing a sense of how the Japanese
conducted carrier operations. Unfortunately, standard English-language histories
of the battle of Midway have not well understood Japanese carrier operations.
From the common misperception that Japanese naval aviation was derivative of
Western (primarily British) practice, Western writers typically believe that the
Japanese carriers of World War II behaved much like their Western counterparts.
In fact, they did not. Japanese carrier operations contained elements of both
U.S. Navy and Royal Navy practices. However, as a result of differences in
physical design and operational doctrine, by the late 1930s Japanese carriers
fought in a fashion all their own. Without understanding these points of
divergence, understanding Nagumo’s actions is likewise impossible.
Before the days of modern angled flight decks, a carrier flight deck could be
doing only one of three things: spotting aircraft, launching aircraft, or
recovering aircraft. To this list most American writers would be quick to add
“parking aircraft” and “servicing aircraft.” However, it is important to
understand that the Japanese avoided performing these activities on the flight
deck. Japanese carriers did not use permanent deck parks in the fashion of the
U.S. Navy. While temporary deck parks were established forward of crash barriers
during recovery operations, they acted only as transitional “overflow”
mechanisms until returning aircraft could be moved below decks.2 Furthermore,
while the Japanese could service aircraft on the flight deck (Japanese carriers
were equipped with refueling points around the deck edge, for instance), most
fueling occurred in the hangars. Likewise, except for arming dive-bomber
aircraft, the Japanese serviced planes in the hangar as well.3
Japanese carrier design is also notable for its use of enclosed hangar decks. In
contrast to U.S. carriers, whose hangars could be opened to the elements by
rolling up metal screens along their sides, Japanese hangars were fully enclosed
by storerooms, workshops, and crew spaces, with no natural ventilation. This
meant that aircraft engines were never warmed up below.4 This is in direct
contrast to American practice, where aircraft commonly were warmed up in the
hangars, brought to deck, and immediately launched. These factors had important
ramifications during the battle of Midway and imposed severe restrictions on
Japanese operational tempos.
In order to spot a strike force on the flight deck and launch it against the
Americans (assuming it was already armed), Nagumo’s ships had to perform a
complex series of operations. Some tasks could be done in parallel, some only
sequentially, and each entailed fixed or variable time costs. These included:
Bringing the aircraft up to the flight deck (sequential: approximately one
minute per plane).5
Spotting the aircraft, unfolding its wings, and chocking wheels (conducted
mostly in parallel with elevator movements, but five sequential minutes are
added to account for these movements).6
Warming up engines (sequential: fifteen minutes minimum for the entire
force).7
In the case of dive-bombers, arming the aircraft (largely concurrent with
engine warmup, but could take as long as twenty minutes).8
Delivering final briefings to the pilots (again, mostly in parallel with
elevator movements, five sequential minutes minimum for the entire force).9
Moving crew to planes and performing final preflight checks (five minutes).10
Launching the strike (sequential: fifteen to thirty seconds per plane).11
Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one-plane strike for
launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes
would be required for the launch.12 If the deck spot contained dive-bombers, the
spotting time would be perhaps five to ten minutes longer, because these planes
had to be armed during engine warm up. This timing is directly confirmed in
official Japanese sources.13 The need to warm up engines on the flight deck,
dictated by Japanese hangar design, reveals itself as a major hindrance to
Japanese operational tempos. Unfortunately, warm-up could not be
shortened—aircraft casualties were the inevitable outcome of slighting this
activity, and needless losses had to be avoided at all costs.14 Thus, if Nagumo
was to attack the American strike force, he needed to find an unbroken
forty-five-minute window of opportunity on all four flight decks during which to
spot and then launch his strike.15
The final piece of the puzzle is found in the activities of the Japanese combat
air patrol that morning. An examination of Akagi’s flight operations reveals the
basic point:
0430—launch Midway attack force
0445—launch initial combat air patrol (three fighters)
0543—launch CAP (three fighters)
0655—launch CAP (three fighters)
0659—recover CAP (three fighters)
0710—launch CAP (five fighters)
0720—recover CAP (one fighter)
0726—recover CAP (one fighter)
0736—recover CAP (three fighters)
0750—recover CAP (two fighters)
0808—launch CAP (three fighters)
0832—launch CAP (four fighters)
0837–0900—recover Midway attack force plus three CAP fighters
0910—recover CAP (one fighter)
0932—launch CAP (five fighters)
0945—launch CAP (three fighters)
0951—recover CAP (two fighters)
1010—recover CAP (three fighters).16
The other carriers were involved in similar activities, albeit at different
times.17 The important point is that recovery operations absolutely required a
clear flight deck aft. Aircraft could not be spotted aft while aircraft were
landing, nor would they usually be spotted aft during fighter takeoff
operations.18
This information enables us to appreciate several things. First, it is clear
that Akagi was very busy on the morning of the fourth. The constant American air
attacks from 0700 onward necessitated a continuous cycling of the Japanese CAP
fighters above Nagumo’s formation. It was very difficult to find a spot to
squeeze in forty minutes of uninterrupted deck time to spot a strike, let alone
launch it.19 This is a crucial realization in determining what was possible
aboard the Japanese carriers and in analyzing Nagumo’s decision-making process.
Second, upon closer examination it is apparent that Akagi’s 1010 CAP recovery
dictates that there cannot have been many strike planes on its deck when it was
fatally bombed at 1025. Fifteen minutes would not have been sufficient time to
bring its twenty-plane strike to the flight deck, let alone spot them, brief the
pilots, and warm up engines.20 Thus, the common belief that the American
dive-bomber attack found the Japanese flight decks practically chock-a-block
with strike planes revved up and waiting to take off is clearly untrue. The
aircraft on deck were primarily CAP fighters.
As it turns out, this latter observation, while perhaps shocking to an American
audience steeped in the popular lore of this battle, is directly supported by
official Japanese sources. In Japan, a clearer picture of Japanese Midway
operations began emerging in the 1970s, with the publication of the official
Japanese war histories (known as Senshi Sosho) and other substantive works.
Unfortunately, it is only very recently that some of these works have been
translated into English. Senshi Sosho explicitly states that at the time of the
attack, every Japanese carrier had its attack aircraft in the hangars; the only
aircraft on deck were either CAP fighters or, in the case of Soryu, strike force
escort fighters that were being launched to augment the CAP.21
Third, this operational information casts doubt on whether Nagumo’s reserve
strike force was ever on deck in the first place. The conventional wisdom has
always been that when Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga’s Midway attack force was
launched, the reserve antiship strike force was immediately brought up to the
flight decks and spotted. In fact, this would be contrary to typical Japanese
operational patterns, which would have preferred to keep the strike in the
hangars until needed. It is absolutely certain that this force was not on deck
during the 0800–0820 time frame, when Nagumo was making some of his most crucial
decisions. Attacking B-17s photographed the Japanese formation during this
period, and their pictures of Soryu, Hiryu, and Akagi show no strike planes on
deck, only a handful of fighters. This is corroborated by Japanese records that
show the force launching additional CAP fighters during this time.
With this information in hand, we now turn to several of the assertions in
Isom’s article. For instance, regarding Nagumo’s supposedly tardy receipt of
Tone 4’s message and its dire implications for subsequent Japanese preparations,
Isom states (p. 75), “It should thus be apparent that if the rearming operation
was reversed at this point—at 0745—it would not have taken much time to restore
the torpedoes on half the planes from which they had been removed and respot all
the planes on the flight decks of the two carriers, perhaps only about thirty
minutes.” In light of the need for forty minutes just to respot the strike, not
to mention the time needed to rearm, this gives a grossly optimistic impression
of Nagumo’s chances of launching a strike before Tomonaga’s returning force
would begin to occupy the flight decks at 0837.
Isom later states (p. 77), “Thus, at about 0920 operations to respot the
second-wave strike force on the flight decks could have begun, had the torpedo
planes been rearmed with torpedoes. Had the countermand order been given at
0745, as the standard scenario holds, the torpedoes almost certainly would have
been restored by 0920.” The ability of the Japanese carriers to begin a respot
at 0920, had they been rearmed or not, is highly questionable given the high
tempo of CAP operations and their monopolization of the flight decks. At this
point in the battle, Japanese records clearly show, the Japanese were alert to a
constant stream of incoming American strikes. Until the coast was reasonably
clear and his CAP well stocked with fresh fighters to last through the spotting
process, Nagumo cannot have been expected to spot his strike. Akagi’s air
officer (hikocho) in charge of flight operations, Commander Shogo Masuda, as
well as the other experienced air officers around Nagumo (such as Mitsuo Fuchida
and Minoru Genda) could not have helped impressing this point upon the admiral.
Even more questionable is Isom’s subsequent statement (p. 78) regarding the
state of Carrier Division 1 at 1000. When the attack was over at 1000, “about
ten minutes of work still remained to rearm the last division of Akagi’s torpedo
planes, and even more time was needed for Kaga’s. The torpedo planes that had
been rearmed were brought up to the flight decks, beginning around 0920, but at
least a third remained in the hangar decks at 1000. By 1015, the rearming had
probably been completed on Akagi, and the last torpedo planes were being brought
up and spotted on its flight deck. Had the whole strike force been ready to go
at 1000, it, along with Zero escorts, could have been launched during this
fifteen-minute window between attacks on the Mobile Force.”
This is wrong on several counts. First, we know that Akagi landed a CAP fighter
at 0910 and two more at 0951, meaning that even if there had been strike
aircraft on deck at 0920 (which we think highly unlikely in any case), they had
to have been moved back down into the hangar by 0951. Also, Isom clearly does
not factor in the immutable time costs associated with spotting and engine
warm-up—a “fifteen-minute window between attacks” simply does not suffice. In
fact, in this case Isom also ignores Nagumo’s own estimate that the strike force
would be ready at 1100, although a 1030 takeoff was hoped for, if things went
well. Launching at 1000, though, for all the reasons cited above, was never even
remotely in the cards, and Nagumo knew it.
Furthermore, the assertion that two-thirds of Akagi’s torpedo planes were on
deck at 1000 is clearly wrong. Akagi had landed CAP nine minutes earlier, at
0951, and would do so again at 1010. Isom’s assertion is also directly
contradicted by Senshi Sosho, which states that at the time of the 1025 attack
all of Akagi’s strike aircraft were in the hangar. This is further corroborated
by Richard Best, lead dive-bomber pilot against Akagi, who states that when he
dove for his attack, the only aircraft on deck were Zeros.22
Isom makes a different error regarding rearmament activities aboard Carrier
Division 2 (Hiru and Soryu). He writes (p. 79), “[the strike aircraft] could be
rearmed on the flight deck as well as in the hangar deck. (It appears that only
half of each squadron was lowered to the hangar deck after the 0715 rearming
order, thus saving elevator time.)” Furthermore, he states (p. 80), “Most, if
not all, of those [strike aircraft] had probably been changed back to
armor-piercing bombs by very soon after 0830; at least half of each squadron on
Hiryu and Soryu was already on the flight decks at 0830.”
Again, his statement is at odds with the photographic evidence obtained between
0800 and 0815, which shows no strike planes whatsoever on either carrier’s
flight deck. In addition, it is known that Soryu launched CAP at 0710, and
recovered CAP at 0730. Hiryu recovered CAP at 0700 and 0740, launched CAP at
0825, and was recovering CAP again at 0840. Thus even if strike planes had begun
to be promptly brought up on Hiryu after the American B-17s departed at 0815,
they would have had to be stowed below again by 0840—the window of opportunity
was not long enough to have performed warm-up and launch.
Isom repeats this error later when he states (p. 81), “At 0830, when Nagumo had
to make a decision whether to launch an attack on the American force or postpone
it, we have seen that he had ready no torpedo planes and no Zeros for escort.
But he did have dive-bombers on Hiryu and Soryu available. They could have been
launched fairly quickly.” Again, this is incorrect, as the B-17 photographs and
other evidence incontrovertibly demonstrate. The Japanese dive-bombers were all
in their hangars at the time and would have taken another forty minutes to put
into action, even if they had been rearmed.
Isom’s concluding point, and his central thesis (p. 89), “considering how close
[Nagumo] came to launching his attack before being bombed at 1025, every minute
saved could have made a significant difference in the outcome of the battle,” is
shown to be incorrect by the cumulative weight of the evidence at hand. It was
not the inefficiency of Japanese communications (which is debatable) that doomed
Japanese hopes in the battle but the inefficiency of Japanese flight operations.
Nagumo was nowhere near ready to launch by 1025; in fact, he had probably barely
begun preparations to do so. Even assuming Akagi had begun lifting its strike
aircraft to the flight deck immediately after its CAP was recovered at 1010,
Akagi would not have been ready to launch its strike for forty minutes more
(1050) and could not have gotten it completely airborne before 1100. Kaga was in
a slightly better state, having last launched six CAP fighters at 1000, but it
was hampered because of its larger torpedo bomber wing (twenty-seven aircraft)
to lift and spot.
It is no coincidence that after the devastating American attack on the other
three Japanese carriers, Hiryu’s actual operational tempo corresponds very
closely with the hypothetical earlier timetable for Carrier Division 1 we have
just put forth. The flagship of the aggressive Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi can
be presumed to have launched its own strike as quickly as possible after the
1022–1027 debacle.
The picture that emerges from this analysis is of a rather conservative
admiral operating within the constraints of 1942 Japanese carrier
doctrine. In contrast to the standard American accounts that have the
Japanese observing the feeble American attacks (poorly executed and
delivered piecemeal) with a measure of contempt, the operational tempo of
Nagumo’s CAP reveals something rather different. Regardless of whether
they accorded the American attackers much respect in terms of technique,
the Japanese command was certainly concerned about the aerial assault,
both for its disruption of the force’s timetable and for the overt danger
posed by the attacks themselves. Upon close reading of the Nagumo report
and other Japanese sources, there is no question that Nagumo and his staff
knew the peril they were in. One good hit on any of the carriers could
have disastrous consequences, and each of the carriers had survived
near-misses during the morning.
Considering this, Nagumo probably thought he was playing it safe—keeping
the strike aircraft in the hangars until the worst of the danger was past,
keeping the flight decks clear to support constant CAP operations, and
repelling American attacks with the best weapon available, his fighters.
When the attacks abated, he expected to spot a
U.S. Air Force Photo Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942 Japanese aircraft
carrier Hiryu under attack by USAAF B-17s on 4 June 1942

coordinated combined-arms strike force on the decks of his two carrier
divisions and then deliver a crushing blow to his opponent. Unfortunately for
the Japanese, their desire to launch an integrated attack force from all four
flight decks deprived them of flexibility in the face of the enemy.
Because of the remarkably small cannon-magazine capacities of the Zero fighter,
defensive CAP operations necessitated frequent landing, rearming, and launching
of engaged fighters. Nagumo clearly appreciated the danger in which he would
place his ships during deck spotting of strike force aircraft, in that it
created a window of time during which no additional CAP could be cycled. As a
consequence, his options were more constrained than has been previously
understood—spotting an offensive strike meant hanging his CAP out to dry for
nearly an hour at a time when American attacks were constant. As it was,
Nagumo’s defensive approach very nearly paid off, as only the final American
attack delivered telling damage. Indeed, it can be argued that had Nagumo played
it a little safer, by putting additional CAP aloft, he might have saved Akagi,
Kaga, or Soryu from the American dive-bomber attack.23
Japanese carrier doctrine of the time did not specify what to do when suddenly
faced with an enemy force within the enemy’s striking range while one’s own
armed and fueled aircraft were still in their hangars.24 This was a doctrinal
failing—although in fairness, both the Japanese and Americans were grappling
with this issue. Later in the war, it would have been considered imperative upon
detection of an enemy force to immediately launch as many aircraft as possible
(whatever their armament) against it. If nothing else, this would get the
aircraft out of the hangars, where they presented a dire threat to the carrier
itself. Indeed, by 1944 the Japanese Combined Fleet developed just such a
command for the signal books in the event of a sudden enemy detection.25
In conclusion, we applaud Professor Isom for his efforts in bringing Japanese
sources to the fore of the Midway discussion, as well as his presentation of
valuable information regarding Japanese rearming procedures. It is also
important to bear in mind that he was laboring under the conventional belief
that the second-wave strike was spotted and ready to launch on the flight decks,
rather than below in the hangars. However, his interpretation of Japanese
operations focuses almost exclusively on what it took to arm an airplane and
fails to account for the fundamentals of how the Japanese got that plane spotted
on the flight deck and then into the air. The article also overlooks the
relationship between defensive CAP activities and the inability to mount offense
strikes. Its view of carrier operations is therefore both limited and at odds
with a great deal of what we know to be true about how Japanese carriers
actually fought. Without an adequate appreciation of these factors, a proper
assessment of Nagumo’s command options and performance cannot be constructed.
Editor’s note: Professor Isom responds in the "In My View" Department.



NOTES
1. The authors assisted Nauticos Corporation in identifying a large section of
wreckage from the Kaga, discovered at a depth of seventeen thousand feet in
September 1999. As a result of this project, the authors are currently working
on a forthcoming book that will examine in detail the operations of the four
Japanese carriers at Midway, bringing new Japanese sources to light in the
process.
2. The Japanese referred to this process as “continuous stowage” (renzoku
shuyo) and practiced it from the 1930s onward. From an unpublished manuscript by
Mark Peattie, tentatively entitled “Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air
Power, 1909–1941,” used by permission of the author; Air Technical Intelligence
Group [hereafter ATIG], Report 2, Bureau of Aeronautics, 1946, p. 2.
3. It should be noted that our comments pertain to early-war Japanese carrier
design and doctrine. As such, some of our remarks may, at first glance, appear
to be at variance with such sources as U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan
[hereafter NavTech] Report A-11 (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1946),
which discusses Japanese naval aviation equipment and carrier design. However,
it must be remembered that the goal of the NavTech reports was to gather
information after the war to improve the U.S. Navy’s own practices. As such, its
primary area of interest was documenting late-war Japanese doctrine and
equipment, rather than chronicling the development of that doctrine per se. For
instance, carriers such as the late-war Unryu-class (which was a derivative of
the original Hiryu design) did indeed have the ability to perform more
operations on the flight deck than their predecessors, and by 1944 Japanese
doctrine had evolved to view the flight deck in a different light. However, it
must be remembered that these doctrinal changes were the direct result of battle
experience (much of it negative) gained early in the war at places such as
Midway. As a result, the way Japanese carriers operated in 1942 was different in
certain respects from the way they operated in 1944.
4. ATIG Report 2, p. 3, and ATIG Report 5, p. 3. This was due to the inability
of the forced-air ventilation systems used in the hangars to cope with the
exhaust from multiple aircraft. NavTech Report A-11, p. 9.
5. Aircraft were usually brought to the flight deck via a single elevator for
several reasons. Japanese aircraft were segregated by type and stowed in
specific portions of both the upper and lower hangars. Fighters were typically
stowed forward, dive-bombers amidship, and torpedo bombers aft. Fighter
aircraft, requiring shorter runoffs, were sensibly stored forward, where they
were also more immediately accessible. Spotting Akagi’s antiship strike
therefore would have required lifting the torpedo aircraft using the aft
elevator, and the Zeros from the fore. Elevator cycles varied depending on raw
elevator speed and whether the aircraft was being delivered from the upper or
lower hangar. Akagi and Kaga’s elevators were older, slower models requiring
cycles longer than one minute to the lower hangar, and they therefore took
longer to perform their evolutions than the newer ships of Carrier Division 2.
This was particularly unfortunate in light of Kaga’s large torpedo plane
squadron.
6. Spotting sometimes required relatively long lateral deck pushes, though the
spotting of one aircraft could occur as another was being brought to deck.
Nevertheless, a certain amount of “jockeying” was required during such
operations.
7. Initial engine start-up was accomplished by a crewman, while air crew were
receiving briefings. Detailed information on Japanese takeoff procedures was
provided by Mr. Nisohachi Hyodo, an expert on Japanese aircraft ordnance, in a
letter to Jon Parshall dated 7 February 2001.
8. Hyodo states that Japanese aircraft carriers were equipped with enough bomb
carts to rearm one-third of the carrier’s complement of dive-bombers at a time.
Rearmament occurred on the flight deck, immediately prior to engine warm-up.
Both the Japanese 242 kg high-explosive bomb and the 250 kg semiarmor-piercing
bomb used the same mounting hardware, speeding the process of switching between
these weapons considerably. Even so, five to six minutes per plane would be
required and would have to be repeated three times to arm the entire force, for
a total of about twenty minutes. To this must be added the time required to load
and move the ordnance across the flight deck. Hyodo to Parshall, 7 February and
10 February 2001.
9. This was conducted on the flight deck near blackboards attached to the side
of the island.
10. This included an assistant air officer (sho-hikocho) visiting each aircraft
in the strike force to ensure that it was running properly. Hyodo to Parshall, 7
February 2001.
11. The fastest Japanese combat launching on record to this point in the war had
been for Pearl Harbor, when the carriers launched aircraft at the rate of one
every twenty-eight seconds. Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: Viking
Press, 1991), p. 490. ATIG Reports 2, p. 2, and 5, p. 3, cite optimal takeoff
intervals as being ten seconds.
12. As corroboration of this estimate, one need only look at the operational
tempo of the Pearl Harbor Striking Force six months earlier. During that attack,
the Japanese were able to spot the second wave attack force of 171 aircraft for
launch in fifty-five minutes from when the first attack wave and the formation’s
CAP fighters were finished launching at 0620. In this attack, the six Japanese
carriers were spotting an average of twenty- eight aircraft per ship, as opposed
to the average twenty-one planes Nagumo’s Midway force would have spotted. Using
the model we have developed, and adding an additional seven to ten minutes for
extra elevator cycles, as well as a longer warm-up time in the early morning
air, the figure of fifty-five minutes agrees well with our estimate. Prange, pp.
490–2.
13. Japan’s official war history series, Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshibu
(originally Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, and often referred to in its
abbreviated form Senshi sosho [war history]), was published by Asagumo
Shimbunsha. The Midway volume, Midowei kaisen [Battle of Midway], published in
1971, states on page 289, “Provided that the strike forces were fully equipped,
it would have taken no less than 40 minutes to get them out of the hangar to the
deck and then finish preparation for launch.” We are grateful to Nisohachi Hyodo
and Takashi Koganemura for their assistance in these matters.
14. Takeoff from a carrier required using full military power. Radial aircraft
engines were (and still are) built with very thin cylinder walls to extremely
tight tolerances, and they required uniform distribution of heat and lubricant
to maintain efficient operation. If not properly warmed up, a radial engine was
likely to blow up outright under full power. We are grateful to Eric Bergerud
and Clint Bauer for their insights on this crucial issue.
15. It must be remembered that the Japanese operated the aircraft of their
carrier groups in a much more integrated fashion than Western navies could at
this point in the war. Japanese carrier divisions were trained to combine
like-type squadrons into divisional strike teams. Thus, during the initial
strike against Midway, the Type 99 dive bombers from Akagi and Kaga formed a
single attack unit, likewise the Type 97 attack bombers from Soryu and Hiryu.
Consequently, the time requirements of rearming procedures, and certainly
deck-spotting activities, were likely to be similar among the carriers of a
division, meaning that information concerning a particular carrier can give us
clues as to the state of its divisional counterpart as well.
16. Reconstructed from “Mobile Force’s Detailed Battle Report 6,” translated and
published in 1947 by the Office of Naval Intelligence as “The Japanese Story of
the Battle of Midway, OPNAV P32-100” (often referred to simply as the “Nagumo
Report”), pp. 13–20, as well as “Battle Report of Battle of Midway” (extract
translation from document 160985B— MC 397.901, U.S. Naval Historical Center,
Operational Archives Branch, Washington, D.C.). All times are given in local
(Midway) time. We are grateful to both John Lundstrom and Mark Horan for their
expertise and assistance in developing a highly detailed and accurate picture of
Japanese CAP activities.
17. Ibid. Kaga, as the other big flight deck in Nagumo’s force, carried an
equally large CAP burden.
18. Any strike force spotted aft would likely have contained a fighter escort of
some sort, requiring Zeros to be brought up from the forward section of the
hangars via the forward elevators, thereby obstructing the flight deck for
takeoffs in any case.
19. The Japanese Type 0 fighter was not constrained by range or fuel capacity
but rather by its cannon ammunition. Each Zero carried only sixty rounds for
each of its two 20 mm cannons, which constituted the main offensive armament
necessary to bring down the large American attack aircraft. As a result,
Japanese fighters had a tendency to “shoot their bolt” quickly during combat.
The importance of cannon ammunition cannot be overestimated—Mark Horan,
contributor to A Glorious Page in Our History (Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial
Histories, 1990), has pointed out to us that casualties among the attacking
American squadrons are strongly correlated with whether the Japanese fighters
they encountered carried fresh loads of cannon ammunition. Japanese doctrine
normally called for two-hour fighter patrols (ATIG Report 2, p. 2). During the
morning’s air battles, at least seventeen CAP fighters ended their missions
after an hour or less, some after as little as twenty-six minutes in the air.
This evidence indicates that the Japanese were cycling their fighters frequently
in order to keep them fully munitioned.
20. Akagi’s strike force was to consist of eighteen Type 97 (Kate) torpedo
bombers and three Zero fighters. Kaga’s contribution was to be twenty-six Kates
and three Zeros, Soryu’s eighteen Type 99 (Val) dive-bombers plus three Zeros,
and Hiryu’s eighteen Vals plus three Zeros.
21. Senshi sosho, Midowei kaisen, pp. 372–8.
22. Best, in an interview with John Lundstrom, April 2000. Best stated that
during the time of his attack, six to seven aircraft were on the flight deck,
and they were clearly Zeros. Furthermore, Best commented that the Zeros were
using most of the flight deck for run-off room. As he was attacking, a Zero was
in the process of taking off.
23. Commander Aircraft Battle Force, “Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S.
Fleet Aircraft, vol. 1, Carrier Aircraft,” ser. USF-74, rev., 20 April 1941.
24. Given the enclosed nature of Japanese hangars (which amplified explosive
effects upon the ship’s structure of internal bomb hits), Japanese carriers with
planes in the hangar were in an even more dangerous position than if they had
planes on the flight deck. Having no planes aboard when struck was, of course,
optimal.
25. Japanese “Mobile Fleet Doctrine,” promulgated 28 March 1944, under “Air
Combat,” paragraph 9, states: “When enemy aircraft carriers are discovered at
close range the command ‘Send up ‘Q’ ’’ will be given. At this time every ship
will quickly send up the airplanes standing ready on deck. The hikokitai
[carrier air group] will assemble in the air and will fly off to the attack
organized in the fixed hikokitai [i.e., standing Table of Organization].”
Translations of these doctrinal works, recovered from the sunken cruiser Nachi
in Manila Bay in 1944, are in the personal collection of David Dickson.

 

Your reasoning is flawed.

Historically, by mid-1942, the Japanese Navy was stretched so thin in the Pacific that it could not afford to mount more than one large operation at a time, and was beginning to slow the tempo of it's operations as well due to it's ships being in need of refit and repair. The IGHQ, for example had to delay the planned Fiji/Samoa operation because Admiral Yamamoto insisted that the Midway operation take place immediately; the IJN could not launch both simultaneously.

Therefore, if the Japanese choose to launch an invasion of Australia involving 2+ divisions, they will not have the capability of initiating major operations anywhere else in the Pacific. Conversely, if the US decides to temporarily abandon the Europe First policy, it would be able to send enough reinforcements to the Pacific to take advantage of the situation, and seize the initiative from the Japanese in areas like Solomons-New Guinea, and advance in those areas while the Japanese navy is occupied near Darwin. It will be the IJN which is at a disadvantage because the balance of power in the Pacific was already beginning to tip in favor of the Allies, and that trend would be accelerated if the Japanese attempted a major invasion, stretching their already over-extended forces even further.

Not entirely true.

In fact, the historical Marine invasion of Guadalcanal enjoyed barely 36 hours of carrier aviation support from 0630 on August 7th., when the invasion began, to 1837 on August 8th., when Admiral Fletcher, commanding the carriers, began his precipitous withdrawal. After that the Marines on Guadalcanal had no air cover except bombers flying out of Espiritu Santo and recon patrol planes flying out of Santa Cruz, until August 20th., when the first Marine aircraft arrived at Henderson Field.

An invasion of Guadalcanal, sans carrier air cover, would have been entirely possible with a little better planning. Fighter cover would have been possible out of Santa Cruz utilizing long range drop tanks. Historically, this detail was overlooked, but the tanks could have been provided out of stocks already in New Zealand, if no carriers were available. Moreover, if it was realized that no carriers would be available, the Marines could have been provided with engineer elements, and cold have made it a priority to unload heavy engineering equipment first, allowing the air field to be completed in about half the time it took historically, so that instead of 12 days without air cover the Marines on Guadalcanal would have been constantly covered from Santa Cruz for the six days it took to complete the air field.

It's unlikely, in any event, that the Japanese, pre-occupied with the Darwin operation, would be able to allocate many planes to an attack on the Marines ashore at Guadalcanal.

As for the IJN carriers, they did not have 8 fleet carriers, but only 6, and two of those (Hiryu and Soryu) were considered light fleet carriers. The other four Japanese carriers were either converted auxiliary carriers or small carriers of the Shoho class. Historically, the Japanese did not operate these smaller and auxiliary carriers as anything but aircraft ferries, prior to their massive loss of carriers at Midway. These small Japanese carriers were much like the USN's Long Island. The Long Island, in fact, was used to deliver aircraft to the Marines on Guadalcanal.

So, in any carrier confrontation, it would most likely be five (or possibly six) US fleet carriers versus six Japanese fleet carriers. And there is no reason to believe that the Japanese would be any more effective against the US carriers than they were at Midway.

You are correct about Darwin being in the middle of nowhere, but incorrect about it being secure from air or naval attack.

First, Timor is the only Japanese air base, outside of Darwin itself, close enough to provide any air cover and the distance would make it very difficult for Japanese planes to provide cover on even a 12-hour daylight basis. There were no Japanese air bases in the Solomons in June, 1942, and with the Japanese decision to launch an invasion of Australia, there are't likely to be in this A-H. It's far more likely that the Allies will send a force ashore to occupy the place and build their own airstrip.

There were also a string of five Allied air bases directly south of Darwin within about 200 -300 miles. These were supplied by rail to Alice Springs, and trucks from there, and would be used to launch immediate air attacks on Darwin. Of course, more would be promptly built and built much faster than the Japanese could hope to build air bases at Darwin. Naval attacks would be launched from US carriers coming up the west coast of Australia, and could be supplemented by night time raids by cruiser/destroyer forces. Light naval forces transiting the Torres Straits could also be used to attack Japanese vessels operating in the Darwin area.

The Japanese in Darwin may be secure from heavy ground attack, although that is not guaranteed, but they will be heavily attacked by air and their supply lines will be interdicted by both naval and air units.

 

Wrong, you are attempting to put words in my mouth to make your case stronger.

I said it was entirely conceivable that the Japanese could lose just as many aircraft in an invasion of Darwin as they did in the Solomons-New Guinea campaign.

That would not necessarily follow in the case of an invasion of Darwin because of the lack of air bases that the IJA could use; Those in and near Darwin would e under heavy Allied aerial attack. Those in Timor could not be used by the IJA because Army pilots were not trained to navigate over open water (this was the point that you failed to respond to). Therefore, the only possible effective air cover that could be provided to the Japanese troops in Darwin would be IJN pilots, either flying off carriers or from bases on Timor.

See above; either the IJN will be providing planes and pilots to protect Darwin, or the invasion will do without air cover.

First the supposed IJN/IJA "delineation" of responsibility is a red herring, and not something that would necessarily apply to any invasion of Australia. such division of responsibility was arrived at through what the Japanese called a "central agreement" and each agreement was specific to an operation. If the IJN wants the IJA to supply the troops for an invasion the IJA will be able to demand that air cover and support from the IJN and they are in this specific scenario, very likely to do that. Your insistence that such a delineation of responsibility is a hard and fast rule is false and I suspect you knew that, as well.

Second, it is true that Japanese Army pilots were not trained to navigate over open water. Eric Bergerud so states in "Fire In The Sky", to the effect that IJA pilots were almost completely ineffective for this reason when they were deployed in New Guinea. If you want, I'll get a copy and look up the exact quotation.

You call my arguments "destructive" and so they are; destructive of your false claims and reasoning. You want to avoid these "sideshows" as you call them, because you can't effectively counter them. As for IJA ferrying practices, I never mentioned anything about that topic, but thanks for the hint, I'll certainly look into that issue.

 

So we finally arrive at the conclusion that Port Moresby, if the Japanese are ashore at Darwin, is irrelevant to that campaign. Port Moresby is also too far away from the lower Solomons to have any effect on that Campaign, as well. Whether the Japanese will want to waste troops, aircraft, and considerable logistical resources, simply to deny the Allies a forward staging base is, in my opinion, highly questionable. But what the Hell, they never passed up an opportunity to further over-extend themselves.

The USN never operated carriers in that region because there was never a good reason to do so. This scenario could easily provide them with that reason. Nimitz's attitude toward doing battle is irrelevant here; it would be the JCS giving the orders through King, not Nimitz. And yes, the USN would operate it's carriers where Roosevelt and the JCS felt there was a need to operate them. If the determination was made by Roosevelt, King, and the JCS, then they will operate off the west coast of Australia. During the war the US carriers operated far beyond the Hawaii-Samoa line at various times, and if the IJN carriers are operating in support of a Darwin invasion, there will be no significant threat to the route between Hawaii and Samoa, so the US carriers will go where they are directed to go.

There was nothing really that needed to be defended between Hawaii and Samoa; The IJN carriers could do nothing more than raid the bases on that line anyway. Pearl Harbor, in mid-1942, wasn't going to be attacked by Japanese carriers; too much land-based air power there. And the only possible threat between Hawaii and Samoa was the possibility of a landing on one of the intervening islands. That can be ruled out because the Japanese can't pull off two invasions simultaneously, so that area is completely secure. Well, maybe not completely secure, The Japanese could have one of their subs shell some of the lagoons in the area, but I think the USN can accept that risk.

So it appears the planes and pilots based on Timor were IJN after all; although according to you they would be replaced by Army pilots to support the Darwin invasion. And I suppose the IJA pilots received anti-shipping training and were fearsome opponents for naval pilots? You can't have it both ways; either the Timor based planes and pilots are IJN or they are IJA. Which is it going to be?

At Rabaul, no, but in April, Honshu was attacked by a carrier force that got clean away. Yes they utilized B-25's, but there's no law that says the same thing couldn't be done at Darwin. Besides that, the Timor planes can't attack until the US carrier are found; they could pull a Pearl Harbor-style approach, launch their strikes then withdraw before Timor-based planes could find them.

Excellent point. I might point out that a Japanese invasion of Darwin would find itself in exactly the same position. Any invasion of Darwin could be countered by a carrier force striking the transports as they were unloading into the landing craft; not a good recipe for a successful landing. In any event, land based planes from the Allied air bases south of Darwin most certainly would hit the invasion force during the amphibious phase of the operation, before the Japanese could get any air strips at Darwin in operation. If they could coordinate the carrier strike and the land-based air attacks the Japanese could be in serious trouble and might even end up being pushed back into the sea within a day or two.

Well, it might be Halsey. And they would probably have a pretty good idea of what was there. Even if it was 60 fighters, 60 bombers, and miscellaneous planes, surprise strikes by two or three carriers air groups could very well take the sting out of Timor. In any case, the Allies also have the land-based air units near Darwin to supplement the carrier forces, so it's not going to be a sure thing for the Timor-based planes, either, whether they are Army or Navy.

 

Sure it was, there are always a lot of considerations in something as complex as carrier warfare. But the fundamental principle that motivated both Spruance and Fletcher was the crucial importance of placing one's strike aircraft over the enemy's carriers before he could do the same thing to you. And the Decisions that both made at Midway accomplished that fundamental objective. I never said anything was carved in stone for either Spruance or Fletcher, they were free to act as they felt best, but both commanders conducted the battle so that they could accomplish what they saw as the applicable doctrine. And it worked for the most part.

No, luck has a way of canceling itself out in large battles like Midway; for every "good" or "bad" stroke of luck on one side, there is something that happened to the other side that more or less compensates. You just don't want to admit that US commanders could possibly make a correct decision that profoundly affected the battle in their favor.

You're putting words in my mouth again. I never even mentioned Hara or Yamaguchi; you brought them up. I never said either were oblivious to the advantages of a first strike, nor do I deny that they could interpret Japanese doctrine any way they liked. They are in fact, as you surely realize, completely irrelevant to any decision that Nagumo made at Midway.

If you say so, it's neither here nor there as far as I'm concerned. Regardless, it was Nagumo who made the decision to hold back his anti-shipping strike until his Midway strike could be recovered, thus allowing, in accord with then current Japanese doctrine, a full strength, coordinated strike. Now you may not like that, but the facts are indisputable

Yes, I worded that badly; my intention was to say "as soon as he became aware of the possibility of the presence of US carriers. Some of Nagumo's staff realized there was no point in the US ships being there if they weren't accompanying a carrier.

Yep, pretty much what I've been saying. Nagumo had a choice; launch an anti-shipping strike now, even though it would be reduced in strength and coordination, and even though that included the risk of losing some of the returning Midway strike aircraft, or wait, recover the Midway strike, and launch a full strength coordinated attack later, even though THAT option carried the risk of being attacked first. Yes, Nagumo almost certainly got bad advice from his staff, and probably didn't realize the full implication of his decision, but he was following Japanese navy carrier doctrine (and I don't give a damn what Hara or Yamaguchi said about it), and it was HIS decision, no one else's.

I never said Spruance did forget US Doctrine in 1944. What does 1944 have to do with Midway? I'm fully cognizant that doctrine is just a set guidelines for fighting a battle; it is not mandatory, and the same commander can act according to doctrine in one instance and contrary to it in another. I really don't care why Lundstrom thinks Nagumo made the decision he made; I'm fully aware that Nagumo was under pressure and had lots of considerations to juggle. All I'm contending is that Nagumo did make the decision to wait and that decision was in accordance with Japanese doctrine at the time. Nagumo could have launched his anti-shipping strike earlier, but that was not the choice, after due consideration of all the issues, he made.

Probably? I thought you were certain that clouds got in his eyes? Maybe he was just hung-over from too much sake at the pre-victory party the night before?

Well, I guess either way is a possibility; there was a lot of CYA going on on the Japanese side after the battle. Whatever, that may have been one of the factors in Nagumo's decision, but it doesn't change the fact that he made the decision he did.

Well, the fact that Nagumo decided to wait proves that he thought that waiting was the best option. What factors that went into that decision really don't matter. Doctrine was to wait, and whether Nagumo even thought of the doctrinal imperative, or whether it never even passed through his mind, his decision still was in accordance with what doctrine said. Same with Spruance and Fletcher; regardless of why they decided as they did, it was in accordance with US carrier doctrine. I don't deny that there were circumstances that influenced the commanders on both sides, but both sides, in the end, went with established doctrine. I don't think that should be too surprising considering carrier warfare was brand new; the technology was changing fast and nobody had more than one carrier battle's worth of experience. I think it is always the case that naval commanders in battle end up struggling with several different factors before deciding to go with doctrine or try something different.

 

Fair enough, and you are correct it is hard to keep everything straight.
I misattributed Glenn239 with being the poster that set the initial time frame for the scenario when it was actually T.A.Gardner. Glenn239 brought it to my attention and I aplogized and corrected myself. However, you felt it necessary call me on it a day after I had corrected the error. It came across as a poor attempt at a cheap shot. If that was your intent I have much better things to do than engage in a pizzing contest. If you would like to engage in a reasoned debate, I'd like nothing better. We might both learn something.

Once again not me, the quotes are from another poster. No harm, no foul. Just correcting for those following the thread, and once again you were correct in stating it is hard keeping who said what straight.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Probably not, for many reasons. I don't have time go into it right now as I've got to go to Atlanta and pick up a son coming home from 29 Palms on Christmas/pre-Afghanistan deployment leave. I won't have much time for a few days, but I think this would be a good topic for another thread. If you'd like to start it I'll join in. If not I'll do so in the next week.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

If Japan had invaded Australia I don't think Japan or the Allies would have conducted operations in the Solomons in 1942 if ever. The exception to this is Japanese bases already in the works in the Northern Solomons (i.e. Bougainville, Shortland etc.)

Fair enough, things happen. The confusion in designations is also a common error made by many historians writing on campaigns conducted by the Marines in WWII. It really detracts from their works and occasionally leads to misinterpretation of the actual events.

Not so. It was simply meant to illustrate the problems the US had in 1942 with lack of assets and how crucial the powers that be, thought the defense of Australia was. I am sure you are aware of many of these factors but to spell out for those that may not be:
1.) The US had adopted a Europe first policy. European operations got first call on available US assets (historically I think it was about a 70/30 split).
2.) The 1st Marine Division was slated to take part in the Torch Operations (North Africa) and as one of the only two amphibiously trained US divisions (1st and 2nd Marine Divisions). It was on the US east coast training Army divisions in amphibious warfare when the threat posed to Australia's lifeline by a Japanes airbase under construction on Guadalcanal caused them to be pulled. (Because they were trained in aphibious warfare) They were only at 2/3rds strength because one of their regiments was defending Samoa. The 2d MarDiv was not used because 2/3rds of it's regiments were similarly occupied.
3.) The 1st MarDivs third regiment the 7th Marines couldn't be used because there were no troops available to replace them. They could have pulled one of the units from the Army divisions in theater, to replace them, but those units considered sufficiently trained were occupied in defending other important points. (New Caledonia, etc.)
4.) What they did was took the 2d Marines the remaining unused regiment of the 2d MarDiv and attached it to the 1stMarDiv for the operation.
5.) The distances in the Pacific are huge and ships are slow. It takes considerable lead time to make any adjustment to forces at the far end of the logistic chain so reaction times are exagerated. That is why a huge staging area like Australia is so critical to US Pacific operations.
6.) Guadalcanal was invaded on 07 Aug 1942. 7th Marines didn't get to Guadalcanal until 18 Sept 1942, it took that long to get an adequately trained unit, ship them to Samoa to replace them and then transport them to the island.

 

Sorry again. It was not an attempt at a cheap shot, I just didn't see the correction by Glenn until after I posted my message.

Sorry, I apologize. This time it was due to the limitations imposed on me by having to use Chrome to post whereas I normally use Firefox. In order to keep the quotations separate from my response, I use copy and paste of the QUOTE function codes. For some reason Chrome keeps switching the identifiers which I have copied and pasted back between you and Glenn. I almost misattributed several items posted by you to Glenn but caught the error in time.

 

That's great! having your son home for the Holidays should be quite a treat.

Historically, under much greater threat of air attack than the Japanese would be able to pose under this A-H scenario due to a commitment of aircraft to the Darwin invasion, in the entire 13 days between the commencement of the landing on August 7th., and the arrival of American aircraft on August 20th., the Marines enjoyed just 36 hours of actual air cover from Fletcher's carriers. From 0630 on the morning of the 7th. to 1837 on the evening of the 8th. when Fletcher got cold feet and headed his carriers away from Guadalcanal.

In actual fact, the marines reported Henderson Field ready for use, at least by fighters, on August 12th. when there was 3,500 feet of usable runway and 440 drums of avgas available. Due to poor planning, however, no Marine or Navy planes or pilots were available for deployment to Guadalcanal. With better planning the Guadalcanal invasion could have been pulled off with only five days of risk without air cover instead of the historical 11.5 days.

Moreover, as I've pointed out, air cover could have been arranged for Guadalcanal by utilizing drop tanks and land bases. The drop tanks were in the Pacific, they just weren't available where they should have been. Again, better planning would have solved this problem.

 

In early July, 1942, there were no operational Japanese air bases in the Solomons. Rabaul was the only large Japanese base in the area. There was a very small pre-war grass airstrip near Buin at the northern end of Bougainville, but it was used by the Japanese only as an emergency landing strip. It was not until 1943 that the Japanese had built a military airstrip at nearby Buka. By that time, Guadalcanal had been secured by the Ailies and they were building air bases, and advancing up the Solomons chain. The IJN was working on the air strip at Guadalcanal, but it was far from being operational. And it's unlikely to have even been started if the Japanese were to launch an invasion of Darwin in June. The Allies, even considering the A-H scenario, could have landed unopposed on Guadalcanal at anytime after an invasion of Darwin and quickly (probably within a week) built an airstrip, thus securing the area against Japanese incursion.

I am quite aware that the Pacific is vast and it takes plenty of resources and time to move large ground units around. The same would apply to the Japanese, and it is unlikely that they would be able to keep large scale plans, such as a 2+ division invasion of Darwin, entirely secret from Allied intelligence. Thus the Allies would have time to react with their own redisposition of ground, air and naval units. Besides that, there were already two US divisions in Australia (the 32nd. Infantry Div., and the 41st. Infantry Div.) and elements of the Americal Division in both Australia and nearby New Caledonia. So movement by sea by these units, as well as the Australian divisions, could for the most part be avoided. Three US divisions plus at least two Australian divisions should be sufficient to at least contain 2+ Japanese divisions in Darwin until reinforcing units could arrive by sea.

The US "Europe First" policy was fairly flexible in order to be able to react to unforeseen circumstances which might arise. There were, in fact, more troops sent to the Pacific in 1942, than were sent to the European theater that year. In light of a Japanese invasion of Australia, it would be politically expedient for both the US and Britain to temporarily suspend the policy, and it is almost certain that would be done, in practice, if not officially. Thus the PTO would receive more, and better, aircraft and naval units, plus the necessary logistical support required to meet any Japanese threat to Australia. Britain itself, would be forced to send at least token ground and air forces (highly publicized, of course) unless Churchill were willing to accept the risk of accelerating Australia's drift towards the American sphere. By mid-1942, with the Torch landings looming in the Fall, the British should be able to scrape up perhaps a Division, a fighter group and maybe a bomber group to ship out to the South Pacific.

The more I think about this scenario, the more I believe it would be a foolish thing for the Japanese to do. Instead of being able to spread out the numerically superior Allied numbers by dispersing small numbers of troops and aircraft over huge areas of New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons, The Japanese would concentrate 2+ divisions, plus aircraft support in a small area of Australia, and open them to attack by superior numbers of Allied troops and aircraft. In the end, of course, they would be forced to either write off, or evacuate the, surviving troops for no gain whatsoever. (not even, necessarily, time).

 

The airfield on Guadalcanal was nearing completion when taken by the Americans.

The concept of a Guadalcanal campaign arose in the aftermath of Midway, when the Allies were seeking ways to exploit the destruction of the Japanese mobile carrier force. No Midway means no Guadalcanal. You later write,

Whether the Japanese will want to waste troops, aircraft, and considerable logistical resources, simply to deny the Allies a forward staging base <at Moresby> is, in my opinion, highly questionable.

That is not a sound conclusion. Moresby and Guadalcanal anchor the Japanese possession of the Solomons. Backed by Rabaul and the threat of 8 fleet carriers, the Allied offensive could never get underway there,

"...Tokyo bungled badly by not taking Moresby in early 1942 when the operation would have been so easy. Without Moresby - particularly if Japanese moves into the South Pacific had forced reinforcement shipping far to the south - it is likely that Marshall and his supporters would have simply closed down the Southwest Pacific Theater completely."

Fire in the Sky, pp42

I think there was a reasonable chance that MacArthur assumes the lead in the Pacific war running the Australian campaign, there is no Solomons campaign, and Nimitz bides his time until the Essex class carriers arrive. In 1942, the US navy secures and protects the supply lines to Australia and conducts hit and run raids.

 

Earlier we had talked a bit about destructive arguments, of which this is a good example. A general discussion on strategy should not de-evolve into a massive sprawling mess ranging down into levels of detail, such as this. Your original intention was to evade the observation about the delineation of theatres between the IJN and IJA; you were being sneaky. That matter is settled; we have reason to believe that the army would provide air cover in Australia and the navy would not be involved past the original landings, but like all hypothetical questions, we don’t know for certain.

Now, you again insist on the point that the IJA could not navigate over open water. Yet I suspect that when I point out to you that IJA units in Indochina and Formosa operated across 300 miles of open water to attack targets in the Philippines and Malaya in December 1941, you will reflexively complain that you were somehow misunderstood in your meaning.

 

The Allies had a chain of minor bases – Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Palmyra, that could not withstand large scale Japanese carrier attacks, and so required fleet carriers in their defense. Nimitz was not so foolish as to believe that Hawaii was secure from any repeat carrier attack, or that land based airpower alone would suffice in its defense, or that his current SIGNET advantage would hold in the future. It had only been only 6 months previous that Kido Butai had crushed Oahu’s land based airpower. Only 3 months previous, Kido Butai had run wild against stronger British defenses than anything in the Fiji-Samoa area. Nimitz could not rule out the Japanese making two invasion simultaneously, because they had done just that six months ago in Malaya and the Philippines.

US carriers would remain in the Hawaii-Somoa area. Any IJA Darwin operation would not encounter significant US naval resistance, for these reasons and for the fact that it was about 5,000 miles from Hawaii to Perth – 3,000 miles more than US 1942 carrier logistics could comfortably handle.

 

Luck was the decisive element at the Battle of Midway. The fact of luck is not to be confused with US commanders not making some good decisions, just as the fact of luck is not to be confused with Nagumo and Yamamoto making some bad decisions.

For example, a bad decision by Nimitz was his failure to have his carriers run a more circuitous route to Midway from Hawaii. In fact, if you look at their chart, both Spruance and Fletcher ran a line straight through the IJN’s intended submarine picket line – very sloppy USN planning that could have led to disaster. However, the submarines weren’t in place due to the incompetence of the Japanese submarine commander (again, the type of over-their-heads promotion rampant in the Imperial Navy that you think is "neither here nor there”).

Nimitz got lucky with his bad decision about the sailing route to Midway. Nagumo got unlucky with the incompetence of the submarine arrangements.

Of course you don’t want to talk about Japanese carrier admirals whose operational practices wreck your theory of some mysterious “Japanese” doctrine that Hara and Yamaguchi were apparently oblivious to. You’d rather insist that Nagumo’s personal command style and personal decisions at Midway were the reflection of some universal “Japanese” failing. You write about the weakness of Nagumo and the system that placed an incompetent at the head of such an important naval asset,


If you say so, it's neither here nor there as far as I'm concerned.

Whether this is “here or there” as far is you are concerned is irrelevant. The fact that Nagumo was an inferior carrier commander in comparison to Hara, Yamaguchi, Ozawa, Fletcher, Halsey or Spruance was crucial in his command style at Midway.

The Japanese doctrine you assume did not in fact exist; what you are mistaking for a universal Japanese doctrine was in fact Nagumo’s own personal command style. Japanese doctrine did say that no more than 10% of a command’s carrier aircraft (usually B5N2’s) were to be used for scouting. If Nagumo had been following Japanese doctrine then, he’d have used up to 22 Kates (10% of his carrier strength) in searches. He didn’t; his personal style was to use only 1% of his carrier strength. Japanese doctrine, as laid down to Nagumo by Yamamoto himself, was to treat the threat of carrier flank attack very seriously. Nagumo’s command style was to dismiss this doctrine (Nagumo despised Yamamoto) and instead assume that no such threat existed. Japanese doctrine, again as ordered by Yamamoto himself, was that a reserve of torpedo bombers was to be maintained to guard against carrier counterattack. Nagumo’s personal command style was to ignore that doctrinal order, and instead use these planes as bombers against Midway.

No, it is not at all what you are saying. Lundstrom/Isom state that Nagumo’s decision to wait was the result of operational complications; a lack of escort fighters, doubts that unescorted Vals would be effective, the perception that US carriers were further away. This was filtered through the methodical personality of his chief staff officer, Kusaka. Lundstrom isn’t talking about universal elements to Japanese doctrine, he’s talking about Kusaka’s individual style, his personal taste. Other Japanese carrier admirals (Hara, Yamaguchi) had no such command style and no such doctrine.

This Japanese doctrinal list of instructions you assume in fact did not exist. You are confusing two definitions of doctrine; (1) a set of fighting instructions written in a manual and distributed as orders through the fleet; operational practice. (2) The methods of operating as evolved in the field over the course of time, usually not written down but passed on through training and verbal instruction. When Shattered Sword talks of Japanese doctrine, they mean (2), not (1). And they mean Kusaka and Nagumo's habits, not Yamaguchi or Ozawa, or any other Japanese carrier admiral.

Nagumo’s decision to wait was not in keeping with Japanese doctrine at the time. First because no such doctrine existed in the form of written instructions or verbal orders from an issuing authority to which he was responsible. Second, because the decisions he took ignored the orders (orders are doctrine) that were given to him directly from his commanding officer, ignored doctrine that allowed him to use 10 times the number of fixed wing aircraft for scouting than he actually did. Third, because other Japanese carrier commanders, operating with their own set of practices, would not have made the same decision as he. Fourth, because tactical (and perhaps political) factors were decisive in his decision to wait. Nagumo had no escorting fighters to send and thought the US carriers were out of range.

 

Yet, that is exactly what you are doing. In any case, lucky and unlucky breaks in a battle as large and complex as Midway tend to cancel each other out. If luck was all that governed a battle, or was the arbiter of the outcome, there would be no need for intelligent commanders, just lucky ones. I'm afraid we are just going to have to agree to disagree on this as I do not find your arguments in the least compelling.

There is no need to talk about other Japanese commanders because they were not making the decisions regarding Japanese carrier operations at Midway. Your dragging them into the discussion is obviously an attempt to blur the details of how and why Nagumo arrived at his command decisions, and I refuse to be dragged into an argument over other, irrelevant executive decision making.

Probably. Doesn't change the fact that he was the Japanese commander in command at Midway, nor that he made the decision to wait to launch his strike planes.

This passage clearly indicates you do not understand what "doctrine" is. As I have already stated, doctrine is not a mandatory set of instructions; it is a set of general guidelines to which commanders may adhere, or not, as their intelligence and experience informs them is appropriate. Further, a commander may reject doctrine in one area, such as how to employ scouting assets, and adhere to it in another area, such as how and when to launch air strikes, and that may occur all in the same battle. Nagumo's staff, in this case, advised him to use his cruiser planes for scouting and to save his strike assets for a later full strength strike and that is what he decided to do. This was fully in compliance with Japanese carrier doctrine.

From "Shattered Sword", Parshall and Tully, page 86;

"Japanese doctrine prescribed attacking targets with groups of aircraft containing elements of all three disciplines -- fighters, dive-bombers, and carrier-attack planes (acting either in either a torpedo- or level-bombing capacity) In multidivision [carrier divisions] attacks, an entire carrier division would contribute matched air groups to the overall effort, launching both of it's dive-bomber units (for instance), while a second division would launch it's two carrier attack bomber units.These four squadrons -- Seventy or more combat aircraft -- would be escorted by fighters contributed by all four carriers. On follow-up strikes, the air group compositions would be reversed, with the first division sending up it's torpedo bombers, and the second contributing the dive-bombers. The result was that Japanese carriers could launch large, well balanced strikes against their enemies."

Tully and Parshall, who incidentally did quite a bit of research into Japanese carrier practices, obviously think the Japanese had a doctrine of launching large, well coordinated, and balanced air strikes. To make this concept work in battle the Japanese clearly had to constantly practice these evolutions in heir exercises, and as the saying goes, you train the way you intend to fight. That is another way of saying, when in doubt, follow your training, That is the essence of doctrine.

While it may, or may not have been good advice, it was NOT standard carrier doctrine. In fact, Yamamoto issued these instructions as verbal orders to Nagumo on the occasion of the war games testing the Midway plans. "Orders" are not "doctrine", they are mandatory instructions to carry out a certain act, or achieve a certain goal. As I have pointed out many times, doctrine is NOT mandatory, it is merely a set of guidelines which, a commander may choose to ignore or adhere to, as he sees fit.

Oh, but it is, you just aren't accepting it. It doesn't matter what conditions caused Nagumo to reach the conclusion he did, nor what staff personalities or advice affected his decision, the fact is he made the decision to wait and that decision was in compliance with the Japanese carrier doctrine (as outlined in the quotation above) of launching large, well coordinated air strikes. Nagumo was under severe pressure, didn't have a clue as to what to do to escape the dilemma he was in, and had to make a quick decision; those are precisely the conditions under which commanders tend to fall back on their training (which, by definition, reflects doctrine).

I have never said Japanese carrier doctrine was written in a manual (although the doctrine in question probably was). The doctrine I am referring to was derived from the way the Japanese carriers practiced launching air strikes in exercises. Whatever Nagumo's, Hara's, or Yamaguchi's "habits" were, they all complied with the doctrine in exercises, (the exercises would obviously become a bloody shambles otherwise) and that was the doctrine that Nagumo fell back on when forced into making a quick decision under extreme pressure. When Hara or Yamaguchi were on their own, as Yamaguchi was later in the day when Nagumo's decision proved incorrect, they were free to make whatever decisions in regards to doctrine that they felt appropriate. But that has nothing to do with Nagumo's decision to comply with Japanese doctrine on launching air strikes.

This statement betrays your lack of understanding about the meaning of doctrine. Orders are NOT doctrine. Again, orders are mandatory instructions to carry out a specific set of instructions, achieve a specific goal, or in a negative sense, refrain from a specific course of action. Doctrine is a set of guidelines, based on experience, training, and weapons capability, for conducting combat operations under a general set of conditions. A commander is free to fight according to doctrine, as he sees fit in any specific circumstances. A commander may decide to adhere to elements of doctrine, or reject doctrine completely in one battle and act in some other way in another battle, or even the same battle.