In early 1942 when Japan made her excursion into the Indian Ocean, Japan's ambassador to Germany asked the Germans to twist Vichy arms and allow the occupation of Madagascar off the African coast. Now, historically, the British found out about this and promptly organized an invasion and took the island. But, what if the British didn't find out? Additionally, what if the Japanese did push the Kido Butai further into the IO along with an occupation convoy? What implications would having a Japanese occupation of Madagascar by say a division of Japanese troops along with some aircraft directly on the shipping lanes to the Middle East? If this did occur it would have been at a critical time in the Middle East when British fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Rommel would be moving into Egypt and with Allied shipping schedules disrupted this might have a serious effect, even if temporary, on events there.
While the Japanese could have landed a force on Madagascar the big problem would be geography. Resupply lines would run right under the noses of the British in India who could easily intercept them. Madagascar is a very big place but very underdeveloped. A division of Japanese could never hope to hold all the island or even all the strategic points. This would allow the Allies to land, probably unopposed, and gradually neutralise the Japanese outposts one by one. The threat to Allied shipping by Madagascar-based Japanese aircraft would be reduced quickly by besieging the few suitable airfileds on the island. The Japanese, being unable to be resupplied, might even run out of fuel before the siege took hold. Once their offensive capicity is removed the besieged Japanese would not be a major threat, they could be left to wither on the vine like many SWP outposts.
India would become the equivalent of a very, very large version of Malta. Japanese convoys would suffer greatly. So Madagascar would likely die on the vine.
The Madagascar scenario only makes sense to me in regards to Japan's optimistic vision in early 42 about invading India or installing/supporting an anti British government in India/Ceylon. Otherwise I do not see the feasability of the Japanese in supplying this forward base on Madagascar. Regards Kruska
The way I see it, Japan's only benefit in seizing Madagascar is for intercepting British trade routes in the Indian Ocean. But because there wasn't much planning and cooperation between the Germans and the Japanese, I really don't see the Japanese using their own already stretched navy to support the German attack in North Africa by attacking British convoys headed to and from Africa. There were plans for a submarine base in Madagascar but logistically speaking, it's suicide to supply an island so far away. Ceylon (Sri Lanka) or the Maldives would serve to be a more practical choice as a forward base to attacking shipping in the Indian Ocean if that plan was pursued due to the somewhat closer proximity. Madagascar is just too far away to be supplied effectively and the landmass is too great to be garrisoned by a single division and expected to hold off an inevitably larger invasion force. Should the base in Madagascar have been set up, it would only be beneficial temporarily, but quite limited. I just don't see Japan being able to spare the shipping, air/sea power, and supplies including fuel to be able to launch enough raids on British convoys to seriously affect the amount of shipping going on to supply the British forces in Africa. Even as a submarine base, there just aren't enough subs to be a serious threat and even more, the fuel to power the ships and planes will be in constant shortage. To the British, rather than Madagascar, the loss of Ceylon or the Maldives were serve as a more severe blow both militarily and in terms of morale. Even Winston Churchill said, "The most dangerous moment of the War, and the one which caused me the greatest alarm, was when the Japanese Fleet was heading for Ceylon and the naval base there. The capture of Ceylon, the consequent control of the Indian Ocean, and the possibility at the same time of a German conquest of Egypt would have closed the ring and the future would have been black." (April 5, 1942) Raid on Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). From a conversation at the British Embassy, Washington D.C.
I agree that Ceylon would be a more logical choice, but the Madegascar operation would have its benefits for the Japanese. The British Fleet in the Indian Ocean was certainly no match for the Japanese carrier force that sortied there in 1942. The Japanese could have destroyed the British fleet in a large fleet action that may have been a result of an invasion of Madegascar. As difficult as it might be for the Japanese to supply Madegascar, it wouldn't be any easier for the Allies to attack them either. While a port with an airfield on the island is easy to survive, the jungle and a landing beach require many more men and assets to maintain a force. If the Japanese are able to occupy the island it may force the British in 1942 to divert major naval and logistical support assets to deal with the situation. Something to bear in mind is that the Japanese would inherit from the Vichy French a workable port, airfield(s), defenses, naval defense weapons, fuel, food, (in some amount anyway) housing, etc. By stating the Allies could easily attack them doesn't make it so.
I agree with "Karma" here completely. Madagascar is not only too far away from Japan to be occupied and held, it is too close to the landmass of South Africa (Commonwealth/Dominion?) to not be immediately retaken. Ceylon is a differnt matter all together, that island might well have been an advantage for the Axis as far as controlling the Indian Ocean, or at least making Allied sea going traffic more difficult.
Yes, the Ceylon option would have made much more sense for the Japanese. It could have been turned into an unsinkable aircraft carrier and forward base for the invasion of India. Madagascar is just too far away to be useful at that stage of the war, and just much at the end of the Japanese's logistical rope to the south and west as Guadalcanal was to the south and east.
It seems the Allies thought Madegascar useful to the Japanese, considering the resources they applied in order to secure it. It's also interesting that the 8000 Vichy French forces held out until Oct. 1942. I'm sure the Japanese could have extracted a much higher toll and for a longer period of time than that. It would have been interesting and possibly more beneficial to Japan if Yammamoto had decided to try and annihilate the RN in the Indian Ocean via Madegascar invasion instead of the US at Midway (off topic perhaps).
Karma made some valid points Madagascar was to far from Japan to properly constantly supply. The Japanese navy was already stretched thin, theres hardly nothing eatable on that Island to sustain a large number of groups, which would of been scattered around the Island. Japan's only benefit in seizing Madagascar is for intercepting British trade routes in the Indian Ocean. The evidence shows this was in the Japanese plans for Madagascar. Plus not far from Mozambique Things to consider Churchill telegraphed to Roosevelt: "A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez [on the northern tip of Madagascar, halfway between Cape Town and Colombo] would paralyse our whole convoy route both to the Middle East and to the Far East...." Field Marshal Smuts cabled Churchill that Madagascar is "...the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean" and feared that the Japanese might use bases on the island in an advance against the African mainland in the same manner that they had recently used bases in Indo-China in their advance against Burma, Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. By 10 June, the local Allied naval commander ordered convoys and fast unescorted shipping to detour to the east of Madagascar to avoid the Mozambique channel. The only advice he could give to other shipping was to hug the shoreline. Shortly thereafter the Japanese submarines sailed to rendezvous with their supply ships southeast of Madagascar for refueling and replenishing. By the end of the month they were back in the channel and had resumed operations against Allied shipping: one vessel sunk on each of the last three days of the month, and three on the first day of July 1942. In mid-July the Japanese force, having damaged a British battleship and accounted for some 25 ships totaling over 120,000 tons, began withdrawing from African shores and returned to Penang in August. Admiral Ishizaki suffered no loss other than his midget sub at Diego Suarez. Second World War Books: History Page
I dont really see the Japanese using up resources for a target such as Madagascar. Could help access middle eastern oil? Also depends on what time in the war this invasion was.
