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Japan Was Already Beaten and Starving When We Dropped Nukes

Discussion in 'Atomic Bombs In the Pacific' started by Michael Timothy Griffith, Jan 29, 2022.

  1. Michael Timothy Griffith

    Michael Timothy Griffith Member

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    Okay, let’s deal with Takao’s false claim that the Japanese peace feelers in the months leading up to Hiroshima were all meaningless low-level approaches with no high-level support. This is a standard talking point among many A-bomb apologists. However, government records and plenty of scholarly studies soundly refute this claim. I will summarize some of the facts documented in those records and scholarship. These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail in John Toland’s award-winning book The Rising Sun, in Lester Brooks’s book Behind Japan’s Surrender, in Gar Alperovitz’s book The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, and in Noriko Kawamura’s book Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, to name just a few scholarly sources that document this information.

    -- Very few books on WWII mention the fact that in May 1945, Radio Tokyo’s English-language broadcast, which operated under tight government supervision, stated that if the Americans would drop their demand for unconditional surrender, Japan’s leaders might be willing to enter into negotiations to end the war (Marco Heinrichs and Galliccio, Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944-1945, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 15). This was an astounding statement to be aired on a radio station monitored by all the Allies and by much of Asia. However, Truman and his Japan-hating Secretary of State, James Byrnes ignored it.

    -- In April 1945, none other than Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan’s Foreign Minister at the time, approached the Swedish minister to Japan and asked if Sweden would be willing to mediate a surrender agreement with the U.S. Now, I would say that a peace feeler done by Japan’s Foreign Minister was both official and very high level.

    Shigemitsu’s effort did not succeed, but that was only because his successor, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, believed that a more powerful intermediary should be approached. Togo did not object to the approach on principle, but only to the proposed intermediary. Togo suggested that the Soviets be approached to mediate a surrender with the U.S.

    -- Another peace feeler was carried out in Berne, Switzerland, by Yoshiro Fujimura, the Japanese naval attache in Berne, and had the backing of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister, who was one of the members of the Supreme War Council; General Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of Operations; and Admiral Sokichi Takagi. Indeed, Takagi even offered to fly to Switzerland to open formal negotiations. On May 3, three months before Hiroshima, Dr. Heck, the German intermediary in the Berne approach, was informed by the office of Allen Dulles that the U.S. State Department had authorized direct negotiations with the Fujimura group. Allen Dulles was the head of the OSS office in Switzerland and had numerous high connections, including in the White House.

    Fujimura contacted the Navy Ministry and made them aware of his negotiations with the Dulles people. On May 23, the Navy Ministry sent Fujimura a reply, signed by the Navy Minister: the ministry advised him to be cautious but did not shut down the approach.

    Yonai then informed Foreign Minister Togo of the negotiations, and Togo authorized Yonai to have the Fujimura group explore the Dulles proposal more thoroughly.

    So the claim that the approach to Dulles was some meaningless low-level effort that had no backing in Tokyo is demonstrably false. The hardliners eventually succeeded in killing the Fujimura approach to Dulles, but it was not a meaningless effort with no high-level support. In addition, the militarists would not have been able to halt the peace feeler if Truman, or a high official at Truman’s direction, had simply advised the Japanese that we would not depose the emperor if they surrendered according to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

    We know that on June 4, two months before Hiroshima, Truman received a report on this peace feeler. The report stated that the Fujimura people “particularly stress” the need to maintain the emperor in any surrender in order “to avoid Communism and chaos.” The report added that Fujimura had emphasized the fact that Japan could no longer supply herself with “essential foodstuffs,” i.e., the people were beginning to starve.

    On June 22, Truman received another memo on the Fujimura-Dulles peace talks. The memo advised him that “Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained.”

    So Truman knew, long before Hiroshima, that the only real obstacle to surrender was his refusal to assure the Japanese that the emperor would not be deposed if they surrendered.

    -- The second peace feeler in Switzerland involved General Seigo Okamoto, the Japanese military attache in Berne, and two Japanese officials at the International Bank of Settlements in Basel, in July 1945. Not only was Okamoto a general and the head of the Japanese attache office in Berne, he was a close friend of General Yoshijiru Umezu’s, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, one of the members of the Supreme War Council. This feeler also involved Per Jacobsson, a Swiss bank director. This was not Jacobsson’s first involvement with back-door peace negotiations: he had persuaded De Valera to negotiate with the British in 1935.

    This approach was made to Gero Gaevernitz, Dulles’s second-in-command, and to Dulles himself. Gaevernitz was no stranger to back-door negotiations either: he had recently masterminded the surrender of all German forces in Italy.

    When Jacobsson met with Dulles and Gaevernitz, he told them that the Japanese moderates were doing their best to bring about a surrender but that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was greatly helping the hardliners. Jacobsson further told Dulles that the only real Japanese condition for surrender was that the emperor not be deposed. Following this meeting, Dulles placed a call to Potsdam.

    We also know that on July 13, nearly a month before Hiroshima, Dulles sent a message about his contact with Jacobsson to Potsdam in which he advised that it had been indicated to him that “the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family.”

    William Donovan, the head of the OSS, sent a follow-up message to Truman on July 16 about the Dulles-Jacobsson meeting and stated that Jacobsson advised that Japanese officials had stressed only two conditions for surrender, namely, that the emperor be retained and that there be the “possibility” of retaining the Meiji Constitution.

    -- Furthermore, Emperor Hirohito himself authorized the effort to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender with the U.S., and Truman was aware of this fact from Foreign Minister Togo’s July 12 cable. Hirohito even wanted to send Prince Konoye, a former prime minister, to Moscow as a special envoy to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender deal with the U.S. I’d say that a peace feeler pushed by the Foreign Minister and backed by Emperor Hirohito was about as substantial, official, and high ranking as you could get.

    Incidentally, the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian website includes an article on the Japanese peace feelers, and it documents that American high officials were aware of these efforts:

    The contents of certain of these papers [Japanese messages and memos about the peace feelers] were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries(New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i.e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i.e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).

    If Truman had been a true American statesman who was following traditional American values of justice and morality, he would have at least authorized back-channel negotiations with Tokyo after he became aware of the peace feelers. To his everlasting shame, he ignored them and nuked Japan, even though he knew that the only obstacle to surrender was the lack of an assurance about the emperor’s post-surrender status, and even though he knew that Russian entry into the war would “finish” (“finis”) Japan, as we learned in 1979 with the discovery of some of Truman’s journal notes.
     
    Last edited: Feb 27, 2022
  2. Half Track

    Half Track Well-Known Member

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    The bombs needed to be dropped to save additional American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines from death. That is all.
     
  3. Michael Timothy Griffith

    Michael Timothy Griffith Member

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    No, they did not. Are you aware that General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, General Lemay (oddly enough), Admiral Leahy, General Clarke, General Arnold, and General MacArthur, among others, said that nuking Japan was unnecessary? Are you aware that our own U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey said the same thing? Are you aware that in 1979 we learned from newly discovered Truman journal notes that Truman knew that Japan would be "finis" once the Soviets entered the war?
     
    Last edited: Feb 27, 2022
  4. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    I feel like I'm doing this, but here goes!

    [​IMG]

    From my earlier post: "What he doesn't seem to understand is that the hardliner faction was still not willing to accept surrender, even after Hroshima, the Soviet intervention and Nagasaki. It was Hirohito that decided it had to end. It was Hirohito that held an Imperial Conference late on 9-10 August. It was Hirohito that decided to accept terms. So, it only matters what caused Hirohito to make his decision. 1.) His lack of confidence that Ketsu Go was a viable plan, 2.) The effects of the atomic bombs and the firebombings, 3.) Fear of an internal revolt by Japanese citizens due to their privations, and starvation. This is what he stated contemporaneously.
    While the Soviets were a threat to China, Manchuria and Korea, they lacked the sealift to invade the home islands. Something the Japanese military understood because they had executed so many themselves."


    Hirohito made the decision to surrender-Hirohito stated his reasons contemporaneously-The Soviet Invasion was not one of the reasons-period end of story.

    The US, rightfully demanded unconditional surrender, even though, in the end, they did agree to the condition that the Emperor would be retained. A major concession.

    However, you also conveniently ignore all the other "conditions" Japan insisted on. Though some we dropped over the course of "extending peace feelers" these three additional conditions were demanded up until the time Hirohito made his decision to accept surrender during the Imperial Conference on 9-10 August.
    -Japan would disarm her own forces
    -Japan would conduct any war crimes trials of her own nationals
    -There would be no occupation of Japan
    If Japan's only condition had been the one that was eventually accepted (which is what you appear to be inferring in your post), and not the additional ones they demanded up until the end, then an earlier peace might have been negotiated. That is not Truman's fault, it is the fault of those that insisted on the additional terms.
     
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  5. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    MacAthur's ego was alm,ost as big as yours. He wanted to be next Caesar.
     
  6. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Col. Seeman advised the brass that we would have seven more bombs ready by October.
     
  7. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    LeMay wanted an independent Air Force and was afraid the bombs would make that either very limited or just moot.

    Leahy said "That bomb will never go off, and I'm expert in explosives!" Not those "explosives" evidently.

    "In response to a question at a news conference on this day in 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower upheld the use of battlefield nuclear weapons." Note that was after fallout issues were discovered.

    Chester W. Nimitz | Atomic Heritage Foundation
    http://www.atomicheritage.org › profile › chester-w-ni...


    Nimitz neither openly condemned nor supported the atomic bomb, but it is clear that he had certain misgivings about its use. His biographer E.B. Potter observed ...

    ""United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki", June 30, 1946"
     
  8. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

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    Mikey refuses to read the Magic intercepts because he knows those messages are just chock full of official pronouncements of surrender not being an option. These are especially noticeable in the back and forth between Sato and Togo in the Soviet negotiations farce.
     
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  9. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    It's funny but Michael Timothy Griffith has several times mentioned MacArthur's opposition to dropping the bombs on Japan but fails to mention that one of the things that led to his being relieved, 5 years later in Korea, was trying to get authorization to use nukes against the Chinese. After the North Koreans had been pushed out of South Korea, MacArthur Caeser decided he would pursue them to the Yalu River and reunite the Koreas. The Yalu was the border between Korea and Manchuria, and he was warned this might provoke Chinese intervention. Truman and the JCS authorized MacArthur Caeser's decision to pursue the NKPA past the 38th parallel only if it did not provoke Chinese or Russian intervention. Zhou Enlai warned the UN that China would intervene if they crossed north of the 38th parallel on 30 September. MacArthur Caeser didn't listen and developed plans to enter Manchuria to get at communist supply/support bases. despite China launching a first round of limited strikes against UN Forces. On 1 November, on the west side of the peninsula, the CCP struck the ROK's and 1st Cavalry Division at Unsan and delivered one of the worst defeats of the war. The UN forces abandoned most of their vehicles and equipment and fled back to the Ch'ongch'on River. Then on 2 November the CCP 124th Division attacked the 7th Marine Regiment at Sudong-Ni, the Chinese division was decimated, and the Marines retained possession of the battlefield. MacArthur Caeser's HQ in Tokyo was informed but they dismissed it as a few "Chinese volunteers and laundrymen". They were invited to inspect the thousands of enemy dead and captured, X Corps commander Gen. Almond did come out, but unwilling to go against MacArthur's HQ's pronouncement, chose to adopt their interpretation. The Chinese melted back into the hills having delivered their warning, but Mao and Zhou Enlai had failed to factor in MacArthur's ego.
    MacArthur Caeser ordered a renewed push to the Yalu and the US Army 8th Army and X Corps units were forced to comply (despite misgivings), the 1st Marine Division's Gen. O.P. Smith, however made a more cautious advance setting up strong points and stockpiling supplies along his route and having his engineers construct a couple of airstrips.
    Then a larger CCP force struck on the west on 25 November, virtually annihilating several ROK formations, and inflicting heavy losses on US units which made a pell-mell retreat back south of the 38th parallel. (The longest retreat in US history!) Then on November 27th the PVA struck and surrounded the 1st Marine Division and Task Force Faith near the Chosin Reservoir. Fortunately, due to General Smith's precautions they were able to fight off the Chinese attacks and made a fighting withdrawal to Hungnam where they were evacuated.
    At this point MacArthur Ceaser asked for permission to use nuclear weapons to "stabilize" the situation in Korea and to attack mainland China. Fortunately, MTG's villan, President Truman refused and relieved MacArthur.

    The End.
     
  10. USMCPrice

    USMCPrice Idiot at Large

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    Two pictures from the fight at Sudong-Ni, just a few Chinese laundrymen.

    [​IMG]

    [​IMG]
     
  11. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Timmy is crippled by the actual facts being so abundant and verifiable while lies don't stand up to and close scrutiny.
     
  12. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Nimitz said the nuking of Hiroshima was unnecessary???

    Let's see...A repost of my AHF response to you.
    Seems that Nimitz thought it necessary, but immediately necessary, and felt it quite necessary to drop a third one.

    I have previously made you aware of your lie, and I do so again.
     
  13. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Eisenhower,
    The magazine quotes

    In [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

    During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude….

    However, the notes Stimson's aide took during the meeting do not support Ike's recollection, nor does Stimson mention any such disagreement with Eisenhower on this matter. So, "Ike" either made his "grave misgivings" known in a far less forceful way then he makes it out, or his "grave misgivings" were mentioned in such a flippant way that they were not considered worth writing down.


    MacArthur,
    MacArthur is most enigmatic about the dropping of the Atomic bomb. When informed of it's impending use, he was seen as giving passing acceptance to it's use. For he was far to concerned with his plans for the impending invasion of Japan, to worry about a super-weapon that may or may not work.

    Assistant Secretary of War John McLoy,
    He was less concerned with whether or not to drop the Atomic bomb, than he was with properly warning the Japanese first. Not that Japan would have paid any attention to such a warning.

    Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard(the article spells his name wrong),
    To quote Bard's memo on the Atomic Bomb

    MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
    During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

    I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.

    Note the closing sentence: The only way to find out is to try it out. He seems quite certain, contrary to all other evidence, that the Japanese would surrender IF WARNED first. Please NOTE that the US warnings before B-29 raids also fell on deaf ears. No reason to see that such a warning of the Atomic Bomb would have anymore effect.

    Lemay,
    His "famous" quote is often trotted out in this regard. But, is he speaking out against the Atomic Bomb, OR, is he attempting to take credit for "winning" the war. After all, Lemay's forces burned down nearly all of the Japanese cities, and in many ways caused far greater destruction than the Atomic Bomb. So, it is simply impossible that the Japanese surrendered because of the Soviets or Atomic Bombs.

    So in a sense, Lemay can be grouped in with the others, such as,
    Vice Chairman of the U.S. Bombing Survey Paul Nitze, and Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias,

    Since all logically "thought" the war would have ended shortly thereafter, regardless of what happened. Except that the Japanese had not surrendered. The Japanese did not surrender when Saipan was taken and their inner defensive line was breached(it was at this point that the Japanese themselves knew the war was lost), they didn't surrender when our B-29s were burning down their cities, they didn't surrender when the US would announce raids on cities and the Japanese still could not defend these cities, they didn't surrender when US submarines an mines cut off Japan's supplies from abroad, they didn't surrender when their citizens were starving due to lack of food, the didn't surrender when American battleships were bombarding their shores, they didn't surrender when American carrier planes were bombing their citiesetc. So to simply say - Oh, the Japanese would have surrendered in a month or so, does not "cut the mustard."

    King,
    Was dead set on having the Navy "win the war", however, his "blockade" of Japan had been in place since mid-1944 and was proceeding as slowly as any siege campaign, given estimates were that Japan would survive until mid-1946 to mid-1947.

    Nimitz,
    the passage most associated to him advocating the use of the bombs is "This sounds fine, but this is only February. Can't we get one sooner." According to "No High Ground" by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey II, Nimitz also advocated dropping a third atomic bomb on Tokyo. This is from Nimitz's discussions with General Nathan Twining and General Carl Spaatz on August 9, 1945.
     
  14. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Let me know of he says anything correct.
     
  15. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Admiral Leahy was the only correct one. He was against the bomb's use from the beginning.
     
  16. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    That's why I included that quote. Man was out of his depth.
     
  17. Michael Timothy Griffith

    Michael Timothy Griffith Member

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    I have not dropped out of this discussion. I am busy with efforts to rally support for Ukraine while another Democratic president, Joe Biden, seems determined to let Russia take Ukraine. Biden refuses to take any meaningful action to actually stop Putin's brutal invasion. A modest flow of mostly light weapons is not going to do the job, and sanctions certainly will not stop Putin. Ukraine needs fighter jets, anti-ship missiles, and long-range artillery, but Biden is too afraid to give Ukraine these weapons. Is it something in the water that liberal Democrats drink that causes them to betray freedom, that causes them to shrink from helping a large young democracy that's being raped by Russia?

    Anyway, I will be back in this discussion full-time very soon. In the meantime, I offer the following article by American historians Jeremy Kuzmarov and Roger Peace titled "Was There a Diplomatic Alternative? The Atomic Bombing and Japan's Surrender," published in the prestigious Asia-Pacific Journal (October 2021):

    Was There a Diplomatic Alternative? The Atomic Bombing and Japan's Surrender | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (apjjf.org)
    EXCERPT: In fact, seven out of eight top U.S. military commanders believed that it was unnecessary to use atomic bombs against Japan from a military-strategic vantage point, including Admirals Chester Nimitz, Ernest King, William Halsey, and William Leahy, and Generals Henry Arnold and Douglas MacArthur.2 According to Air Force historian Daniel Haulman, even General Curtis LeMay, the architect of the air war against Japan, believed “the new weapons were unnecessary, because his bombers were already destroying the Japanese cities". . . .

    General MacArthur believed that Japan would have surrendered as early as May 1945 if the U.S. had not insisted upon “unconditional surrender.”9 MacArthur was appalled at the Potsdam Declaration, issued by the U.S., Britain, and China on July 26, which threatened “utter destruction” if Japan did not surrender unconditionally. . . .

    The diplomatic option was certainly the most humane and deserved priority. It was also the most realistic. The U.S. would seek the emperor’s blessings along with the cooperation of Japanese officials, agencies, and citizens in order to exercise the authority of the Allied Occupation over Japan in the aftermath of the war.
     
  18. OpanaPointer

    OpanaPointer I Point at Opana Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    "Anyway, I will be back in this discussion full-time very soon." We'll be loling.
     
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  19. Biak

    Biak Boy from Illinois Staff Member

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    I had intended to refrain from further comments until I read the first paragraph of mtg's latest nonsense. While not acknowledging his latest diatribe of WW2 non related bs.
    Knowing facts are irrelevant in this day and age it is still worth reiterating that yes Japan was beaten, starving, etc. Of more importance Japan was still fighting and killing and refusing to meet or accept the terms of surrender. Whether we dropped one bomb or 1000 bombs the war was going to continue. No one can or could say the war is going to stop because this may or may not happen. If you're God and reading this feel free to interject.
    As mentioned previously self preservation, control and dominance between the branches of the US military played a large part of the publicly released information before, during and after the War. As an example MacArthur wanted his place in History and fought tooth and nail to run the war as he saw fit not only to feed his ego but to overshadow his contemporaries of the Navy. Once the War ended there was going to be a lot people "out of work" not the least of which would be the businesses supplying the military. Congressmen and Senators would see their status and influence wane.
    So the question should be; Were those opposed to dropping the bomb against the bomb or were they saying they were against the bomb due to the fact they would return to mediocrite ?
     
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  20. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    <Begin Admin Rant>

    Thanks for you that did not take the bait and respond to the current political discussion offered up in post #177 above.

    You more learned members know where that type of forum poison is to be posted and I appreciate that you work to keep it there.


    <End Admin Rant>
     

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