Japans biggest mistakes?

Who is "they"?

The Navy High Command? The Army High Command? The general public? the front line soldiers? certain enlightened generals and admirals?

 

Bob,

Yes, I realize that many sources credit the Doolittle raid on April 18, with deciding, in Japanese minds, the issue of whether the Midway operation should proceed. And I certainly wasn't questioning your integrity in asserting that.

As you correctly point out history books can be in error just like anybody else. I based my comments on Professor Dull's "Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy". Dull used mostly Japanese sources for his book and I believe these are more accurate when discussing the Japanese operational planning process. Actually, H. P. Willmott in his book, "The Barrier And The Javelin" identifies April 5th. as the day the Japanese decidied the issue, but I think Willmott is referring to the day when Admiral Nagano conceded the argument to Yamamoto, and Dull references the day, April 12th., that the Naval General Staff officially issued orders approving the Midway Operation. In any case, there seems to be room for different opinons in the matter.

 

I think it is fair to assume that he is referring to the Japanese Supreme War Council and the IGHQ, respectively.

The Supreme War Council was the body of the Japanese government that made political decisions related to the conduct of the war, and the IGHQ was the military staff that formulated operational plans and directed the day to day conduct of the war.

But your question is important because the policy decisions which guided the Japanese during WW II were the product of a very narrow group of people who were nevertheless divided by factional disputes and differing opinions as to desirable strategical direction. In reality, the Japanese Army dominated the decision making process, such as it was, and the interplay of the militarists in both the Army and Navy gave rise to a rather random series of strategies, none of which had a practical, or for that matter, realistic, objective.

 

I know.

I'm new to history and I'm having trouble with all the contradictions that I am coming across.

I do think these contradictions could be prevented if authors weren't rushed to get their books to market which I'm sure they are.

Following is a post I recently made in another forum. After reading it, I think you will fully understand my frustration.

I just finished reading and studying “ The First Heroes” by Craig Nelson. On the surface, this seems like an excellent book on the Doolittle Raid; however, at this point, I have my doubts and regret the time spent in committing so much of this book to memory. I may add that this was not an easy task for me!
Several times during my read, I wondered about the accuracy regarding what Craig Nelson was claiming but decided that I am such a neophyte of World War II history that I just let it pass. However, subsequent to reading this book, I read “Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo” by Captain Ted Lawson who was one of the Doolittle raiders. Considering the credibility of the author and the fact that this book was written circa 1943 and continues to be printed to this day, I am judging this book to be a definitive and very reliable source regarding Captain Lawson’s experiences.
I am going to discuss an event which has lead me to this conclusion about “The First Heroes”. This event is not something insignificant but is one that Craig Nelsen gave quite a bit of coverage to.
Apparently, the compasses of the B-25’s were effected by the Hornet and the part of the world in which the Doolittle Raid occurred. The pilots needed to align their magnetic compasses immediately after takeoff and the method chosen was for each plane to immediately make a run parallel to the Hornet and have a crewmember of the Hornet flash a poster to the pilot stating what the ships current course was. The pilot would then adjust his compass accordingly.
Craig Nelson made quite an issue of the fact that, probably due to the excitement of the whole enterprise, none of the pilots made this parallel run but simply headed off to Japan without the compasses being reset.
According to Captain Lawson, this was not the case and the pilots made the parallel run in order to set their compasses. I also noted that this was done in the movie version of this book starring Van Johnson which is supposed to be a rather good rendition of the raid.
OK. So perhaps Craig Nelson somehow received erroneous information on this incident. I do not buy this as a reason for this mistake because the book “Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo” is so readily available and such a quick and easy read that it was incumbent upon Craig Nelson to read this book as a source for “The First Heroes”. Apparently he didn’t and this, in and of itself, is troubling!
It also troubles me in that, in my opinion, Craig Nelson's portrayal of this issue reflects negatively on the flyers. If these brave men made mistakes, I have no problems with revealing these mistakes but when negative revelations regarding their professionalism are not true, I have big problems.
I am new to history and I am somewhat shocked by the contradictions regarding facts that are in the literature. Maybe I’m being overly sensitive to this, but this is something that I am not used to in my everyday life and in my profession: please note that this does occur now and then but not to the same degree as in history books.

Bob

 

i didn't say it would take only one sortie to destroy all of pearl's facilities. the failure was in drawing up objectives. i think pearl should have been fully neutralized (destruction of ship and plane launching and servicing for at least 6 months.) the japanese had a second carrier force that was to support the attack on clark and sangley point in the philippines but that was scrapped when they discovered their zeros could stretch their ranges so that they can take off from formosa. at the very least a second sortie to disrupt repairs and build-up (how exactly i still don't know.)

for all the mistakes they made at midway, i think they would have won with a change in plans. poor intelligence and communication is not that impressive since you're planning a battle to really draw the enemy out, not catch them fully unawares. yamamoto's strategy was basicaly the same as halsey's strategy 2 years later: to destroy the remnant of the enemy's surface force through a decisive line engagement. but halsey was planning it off a group of islands where the enemy has few options for approach. yamamoto wanted a mid-ocean engagement and that boggles the mind. better to use carriers. therefore, they should have used a decoy fleet not at the aleutians but right at midway itself. kondo's second fleet with two battleships and at least two escort carriers and several cruisers and destroyers would have been enough. this decoy would draw attack from fletcher and b-17s based at midway. the main force, consisting of yamamoto's BBs and nagumo's carriers should have lurked farher back in ambush. midway's air power wouldn't have been that hard to neutralize. intermittent harassing fire from subs at night, and a mad dash by a few cruisers and destroyers would have pulverized the place. i would have attempted that, even if i knew nimitz could base 15 B-17s and a squadron of wildcats. meanwhile, fletcher's force would ultimately be spotted and be counter-ambushed by nagumo's carriers.

 

It's interesting to note that Yamamoto wanted Nagumo to launch another strike on Pearl Harbor and was somewhat disgusted that he didn't. Yamamoto could have ordered him to do so but chose not to. Apparently, Yamamoto felt that if he ordered Nagumo to do this, Nagumo would not be at his best which could be very problematic.

Bob Guercio

 

To a certain extent, that's true. No targets were designated for any follow up attacks after the first two attack waves. But that is really immaterial. The Japanese carrier force was never capable of doing anything more than raiding enemy bases; it never had the ability to permanently, or even semi-permanently, neutralize an enemy base, especially one the size of Pearl Harbor.

The historic Pearl Harbor attack force utilized all six of Japan's fleet carriers; there were only four remaining carriers available, the Ryujo, which, at that time, was only operating a mixed bag of about 30 second-line aircraft, the Zuiho, a light fleet carrier operating about 32 second-line aircraft, the Taiyo, essentially an escort carrier being used as an aircraft ferry, and the Hosho, relegated to a training carrier status. Hosho and Zuiho were with the main body of battleships to provide some air cover, and the Ryujo was slated for operations in the southern Philippines to prevent the US Asiatic fleet from concentrating there. That left only the little Taiyo which would hardly have significantly enhanced the striking power of the Japanese main carrier fleet. Basically, to be able to neutralize Pearl harbor for any length of time would have required a land-based heavy bomber force; obviously no such thing was available.

Well, of course, anything is possible.

But I doubt, given the almost complete intelligence picture Nimitz had, that anything Yamamoto or Nagumo could have done would have made much difference. The fact that Nimitz had the OOB and the plans of Yamamoto's entire force would have made any "decoy" force worthless; Nimitz knew the key to the battle was the destruction of Nagumo's carriers and wasn't going to allow his carriers to go kiting off to pursue a decoy. Harassing fire from subs would have been worthless; a sub did fire on Midway during the night but had to quickly withdraw out of range when Midway's shore batteries found the range after only three salvos.

Again, since Nimitz had all of Yamamoto's plans, he could have just waited and gone after the Japanese carriers when they showed up. sending a battleship/cruiser force in close to Midway before it's air power was neutralized was recognized as the height of folly, even by Yamamoto's staff. Yamamoto's real error was in sending a raiding force to undertake too many contradictory objectives, thereby dooming it to defeat.

But ultimately, the Japanese Naval General Staff was correct, even if Yamamoto had won at Midway and occupied the island, it would not have been a strategic asset, but simply a defensive liability. The Japanese could only hold Midway if it kept a significant portion of the Combined fleet in the vicinity. That was something the IJN simply could not afford.

 

Japans attack in the Aleutians was a separate offensive action that had nothing to do with Midway, other than it happened at the same time.

And it was to protect Japans northern flank, not protect the Midway invasion force.

 

Parsells and others come to another conclusion using multiple Japanese sources (and Japanese experts themselves) and simple logic.

How else do you explain how operations separated by a more than two or three thousand miles or more of ocean intend to be mutually supporting?

And dont tell me you believe everything the Japanese officers said postwar, even when proven to be liars at the minimum.

 

How does your conclusions account for the fact that the battles were intended to start at the same time? You think the US fleet is going to steam past Midway and ignore the Japanese attacking the atoll and continue steaming northward to Alaska?

 

you know what makes midway so frustrating? even with a shaky plan, the japanese should have won the carrier fight. consider pilot skill: task force 16 and 17 sent three sorties (2 torpedo and one dive) against nagumo and they all got chopped. the b-17s didn't do anything useful. it took a fourth sortie of dive bombers to knock out three of four. the hiryu, on the other hand, sent two sorties and scored hits with both.

the real measure of midway's success was to reduce the US navy into a 1-carrier fleet for the next six months. that would have allowed punitive naval offensives against port moresby in new guinea, northern australia, and possibly a second pearl harbor attack.

 

Don't Forget they were trying to take over the whole Asia.

 

In my humble opinion. Japan's biggest mistake was not modernising their Navy before the outbreak of war. Aye they had the best in Naval Aviation at the time, However this is but a small part of your entire Navy. The Japanese seemed to have fallen for the Mehan idea of a large fleet battle with large warships. However Japan being an island nation should have noticed the importance of absolute control of the sea lanes since the nation was very dependant on sea carried resources and goods. Unfortunately it's precious resources were spent on building large surface ships which are next to useless by WWII. The airplane and the submarine have made large Dreadnaughts and battleships obsolete, and used up vital resources that Japan simply could not afford. The Japanese should have been at the forefront of Submarine technology as well as anti submarine warfare due since control of the Pacific waters were so very vital. Especially as the threat of U.S. Fleet submarines grew higher and higher, becomming very efficiant at sinking their commercial shipping, robbing Japan of her precious resources. But alas they proved to be one of the most backward in Naval Technology. with the exceptions of their carriers. Their surface and submarine fleet were very lacking.

The Japanese should have known that it would be island hopping, Having the Americans have virtually carte blanc, Especially with their submarine force. Was a very costly blunder. The lack of radar, very few advancements in Anti-Submarine warfare and the low number of small and fast ships ideal for convoy duty to protect those vital supply lines that the Japanese needed for her war effort and economy. Virtually ignoring this proved to be a fatal blunder as they would learn at Guadalcanal, but by then it was too late.

 

Storm, perhaps Japans biggest mistake was not listening to what the Germans were telling them regarding tactics and strategies that worked against the Brits (and by default, the Americans).

But youre right, they were so focused on a surface fleet battle, they didnt notice the havoc their subs could have produced as part of a commerce hunting strategy.

As for radar, they were so backwards on that, they should have begged the Germans for the latest designs.