Japan's Fatally Flawed Air Forces in World War II

Japan's Fatally Flawed Air Forces in World War II

Japan entered World War II with two well-trained air organizations, but no long-range plan on how to keep them flying.

By John W. Whitman

World War II in the Pacific was a fight to seize and defend airfields. The Japanese made gaining and maintaining control of the air as much a requirement in their basic war strategy as they did the destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. But as Commander Masatake Okumiya charged, "The Pacific War was started by men who did not understand the sea, and fought by men who did not understand the air." He might well have added that the war was planned by men who did not understand industry, manpower and logistics.

To say that the Japanese army and navy did not cooperate on aerial matters would be a serious understatement. "They hated each other," Lt. Cmdr. Masataka Chihaya recalled, "[they] almost fought. Exchange of secrets and experiences, the common use of airplanes and other instruments, could not even be thought of."

Japan, although seemingly advanced in aerial tactics, entered the war with a narrow aerial doctrine, insufficient numbers of aircraft and those of generally poor design (excluding the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, of course), too few aircrews and inadequate logistics for a war of attrition. Neither its army nor its naval air arm was prepared for the duration, violence or sophistication of the war to come. Even its short-lived lead in aerial tactics collapsed once the Guadalcanal campaign began.

Completely aside from having an industrial base able to produce enough aircraft, a nation's air force needs to be balanced between aircraft, combat and maintenance crews, and air bases. If Japan was to seize an empire, its airfield builders would have to accompany the fighting forces every step of the way. Absent such construction units, the air force would have to use captured bases.

Army air forces were doctrinally anachronistic. Air units were subordinate to ground force commanders, not independent entities on a footing equal to ground and naval commanders. Japan's army had developed its air forces for continental warfare with the Soviets. Naval air, on the other hand, was tied to operations of the Combined Fleet, with naval officers, rather than air officers, making major air decisions.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had given some thought to a land-based air war, stating in 1936 that naval operations in the next war would consist of capturing an island, building an airfield and using that base to gain control over the surrounding waters. His ideas, however, did not take hold. The Japanese studied and trained hard at aerial tactics, but they failed to develop the airfield construction techniques and equipment, as well as the units, necessary to build air bases, maintenance, supply and dispersal facilities.

Japan launched its December 1941 attacks from well-developed bases. During the southern advance, the navy's 22nd Air Flotilla supported the attack into Malaya from three airfields in and around Saigon. Units were at full strength in aircraft and crews. Plentiful quantities of fuel and spare parts were available. The aircraft received excellent maintenance. Zeroes, for example, underwent a thorough overhaul every 150 hours of flight. As Japanese forces moved south, air units occupied, repaired and exploited captured enemy bases. Real problems developed, however, when those units reached undeveloped territories. Getting fuel, food and materiel to those bases determined whether the aircraft flew. Whether a base had been captured or built, however, it was nearly useless if seaborne supplies could not reach it.

Historynet.com (HistoryNet » Japan’s Fatally Flawed Air Forces in World War II)

 

This is standard history fact. Nothing new or different. About all I could add is that the Japanese basically shared the same idealized mental pictures of a short conflict as did the Germans.

In Eastern Europe or backwards Asia it wasn't necessary to technologically overwhelm your enemy since almost no one was devoting money to raising standing military forces. No one had much more than a token self defense force militarilly speaking. Countries without resources had no justification to throw money at that and let their economies languish.

The Germans and the Japanese may have had some aircraft that were obsolescent by the beginning of WW II but we have to remember they had been developed much earlier with larger numbers in service than anybody else had in the 1930s. And again, they were quite able to perform the roles they were designed for.

In reality both the US and GB had an advantage because they had puny air forces in the 30s. They could start with a blank sheet as it were, and forge what they needed to counter the obvious threats. Until the production lines caught up the planes they had which were more obsolescent than their opponents whould somehow be made to fill the gap.

If we look at the Zero and the Bf 109 appearing first the Allies' designs would naturally eclipse them in many regards because they were far newer. The rate that aero engines were increaseing power output was literaly monthly. And other aspects of design thinking was already fast changing. It was The Japanese and Germans responses in round 2 that showed aviation warfare tech was rolling.

We must remember that both the Germans and the Japanese had not projected large scale hostilities with richer or technologically savvy neighbors Like GB or the US. At any rate the machines they came up with were ample in every sense. Fw 190s and N1K1s plus the many more too numerous to name, all Axis aircraft were following the natural trend of the war with larger more complex aircraft with heavier weaponry. If Japan had the industrial capabilities their designs and products would have been as good an anyones.

While we reville in the stories of the enemy being oafs and not being able to field weapons and aircraft due to lack of supplies it wasn't universally a logistics problem and it wasn't unique to the enemy. During most of 1942 the Americans had no guaranteed system of supply. Bases' personnel learned to make do and not expect the next shipment.

Supply is and has always been a primary target goal of opposing armies. We must note that while the Americans called for "unrestricted warfare" on Japanese shipping they Japs felt it was more important to attack warships and that it was beneath the "code" to shoot at unarmed transports. It wasn't sport in their logic.

So as when any supply line stretches far it has interdictions by opposing forces as did thos of Japan. There is no doubt that they were actively trying to supply their far flung bases. If they allegedly didn't plan for it we must wonder why they were the only nation to produce submarines specifically designed as transport vessels besdies the others.

The real reason why the Japs weren't getting stuff is because it was being interdicted by American forces. And while they may not have had a group like the Seabees somebody built servicable airfields on all those Japanese-held islands.

 

I think the Japanese Navy had better ideas for aircraft than the army did. The navy knew it needed very long range patrol planes and bombers and it produced them. The Betty and the Emily flyingboat had excellent range. The Betty did well as a bomber if no fighters were around, (but you could say that on any type of bomber). The Emily was the best flying boat produced by anyone during the war and if Japan built their other aircraft like it did the Emily it would have gotton better results.

Anouther factor was pilot training. The basic training for pilots was brutal ! Many died in training from beatings and mistreatment. Also if you made minor mistakes you would be downgraded to a mechinic or gunner or other type flight crew.

The aircraft were often overcrewed with a pilot, copilot, and an aircraft commander for just one airplane. The Germans and British usually just went with a pilot only 85% of the time.

On the defence of the Japanese, I can't think of any military in the world that the Navy and Army co-operated to any great amount of time.

 

I've read that one of the reasons the Japanese were so harsh on POWs was (aside from the code & general sentiment of), they had no provision for them.
Difficult as it was, they generally failed to do for themselves, and this exacerbated the issue?
Japan was a third world country when (they?) started the war. As was mentioned before & before, they planned for a short/aggressive war that would end in favorable compromises.

The best laid plans of mice & men....

 

war may be entered into by one or a small handful of foolish individuals but every country has its share of good men and the foolish ones depend on them. the best case-in-point would be iraq (in the purely military and economic sense.) the leaders knew fully well what they needed to win and what they couldn't get so they try to make up for it by strategy or, if even that is not feasible, they gamble outright.

one shouldn't confuse unavailability of needed resources for incompetence.

 

The same type of war that Hitler wanted and planned for. Neither country expected a long term war. They wanted to get it over with as fast as possible and believed that most that they attacked would be a push over and surrender or collapse quickly.

 

"About all I could add is that the Japanese basically shared the same idealized mental pictures of a short conflict as did the Germans." Yeah, datz wat I said!

 

Their air force certainly lacked in many areas. One thing that I still don't understand to this day was the Kamikaze attacks. Why not just train the young men to become great pilots? They could destroy many ships by using the same plane over and over again, providing they didn't get killed in battle. But instead men had to waste whatever aircraft Japan had in the Kamikaze attacks. Japan also lacked resources to mke the planes and they were losing planes faster than they could make them which was also not good.

 

It's something I've never understood. As far as I understand it they did not apply the practical viewpoint, as for them it was an honour to die for their Emperor.

 

Matthew- unfortunately the case was not in favor of the attack plane getting through and escaping. By late 1944 the rate of fire and weaponry on US Navy vessels had grown so accurate that most intruders were not successful in launching an attack.

The probability existed that even if a regular pilot made it through the defennsive fire screens he might miss with bomb or torpedo. The kamikaze tactic lessened the probability of failure. Remember that at Okinawa when the Kamikazes debuted the US Navy lost more personnel than ever in its history in a battle- 5,000.

Even though we may not undersatand or condone the tactic 64 years later we can still respect their courage and honor. It is impossible to relate to the rationale at work them because of time and cultural differences at the least.

 

IIRC the JAAF had trained only 1,700 pilots in 30 years; losses at Nomonhan crippled it. By December 1941, army flight schools graduating 750 pilots a year.