Kursk (by popular demand!)

Good for you! We all make mistakes, but not everyone here has been willing to honestly acknowledge it as you have.

This discussion also brought forth a lot of good information.

 

I think you are downplaying a lot the casualty ratio between Germany and the USSR. In fact, one of the arguments from John Mosier I like so much is the fact that before WW2, the USSR only doubled the population of Germany, and after Operation Barbarossa, not even that. The Red army may have duplicated and eventually triplicated that of Germany, but since the casualty ratio was so extremely favorable towards the Germans, Germany was actually winning the war of attrition. Simply put, the Soviets were losing more soldiers than their numerical advantage allowed them to. Time was against the Soviets, not the Germans. If the casualty ratio could be maintained, then it was just a matter of time that the USSR would run out of cannon fodder before the Germans did. Obviously I'm aware that argument is overtly simplistic, and the Soviets still won the war despite their horrible losses, I just said I like it.

Maybe you are only counting KIA’s? If we count KIA’s, MIA’s and WIA’s the loss ration changes entirely. Isn't the actual casualty ratio more like 5:1 inf avor of the Germans?

I don’t know if you’ve heard of Nigel Askey, but he wrote an essay in 2017 responding to a historian (whose name I honestly don’t know) who in his YouTube channel called “TIK” made a video claiming the German/Soviet casualty ratio was “just 2:1” in favor of the Germans, and so the Wehrmacht’s tactical superiority over the Soviets was/is just a myth. Nigel Askey wrote the essay to disprove this claim. I’ll upload the essay if you want to read it, but I’ll transcribe here the competent part:

“[speaking about a chart presented by the TIK channel] The chart only focuses on irrecoverable losses as this totally suits the Soviet/Russian side’s apparent agenda. Surely, if you want to compare the true relative combat performance (tactical or operational) then all types of casualties must be included, especially those wounded in combat. This is because: wounded are the direct result of enemy action (ordnance), the result of the enemy attempting to inflict the maximum possible casualties (their so called ‘casualty inflicting efficiency’), and often 3-5 times higher than their irrecoverable losses (especially, and often, in an attacking force)… How can wounded possibly be ignored in any discourse on this subject? The answer is that they can’t.

To really hammer home this point, consider the following data from one of the most respected and reputable WWII historians in the world, namely Niklas Zetterling. Mr Zetterling is foremost in his meticulous research in the German archives (and widely acknowledged as such). He has a far more formidable reputation than Overmans, and, in terms of archival research in the German archives, is comparable to Glantz’s research into the Russian archives. In this case casualties include, killed, wounded, missing, POW, sick and unfit for service.”

Year/German Casualties/Soviet Casualties/Casualty Ratio

1941/831,050/6,127,447*/7.37-1

1942/1,080,950/7,369,278/6.82-1

1943/1,601,445/7,857,503/4.91-1

1944/1,947,106/6,878,641/3.53-1

Total/5,460,501/28,232,869/

* Corrected by adding the additional 1,653,627 irrecoverable losses proven to have occurred in the Price of Victory study (i.e. the corrected Krivosheev figure). This data is as published in Normandy 1944, Niklas Zetterling 2000, with full footnote references (on page 91). The Soviet figures are from Krivosheev (with 1941’s obvious errors corrected with the Price of Victory data), and the German figures are compiled from the Bundesarchiv records (eg, BA-MA RW 6/v. 552, BA-MA RW6/v. 553, BA/MA RH 2/1343, etc. and several other specified OKH and OKW reports). These German sources have far more credibility than Overmans study, and are essentially confirmed by many other very reputable authors and institutions; including Liedtke (who uses similar archival sources for his book) and the German Research Institute for Military History at Potsdam (in their definitive published Germany and the Second World War series).

Like all statistics, these need some qualification (unlike some, I qualify the statistics used if required, because they are statistics after all!).

Firstly, the German figures are for Army (Heer) only and exclude Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Waffen SS casualties. For example, as quoted in the presentation, Liedtke (page 169) quotes 1,094,251 casualties in 1941, which is 263,201 above the above figure. This includes additional casualties in other branches of service, including the Waffen SS which sustained around 43,000 casualties (ref Vol IIB of my own work, page 348). Liedtke’s figures comprise 167, 354 killed, 34,514 missing/POW (i.e. 201,868 irrecoverable losses), 600,584 wounded and 291,799 sick (i.e. 892,383 recoverable losses, of which around two thirds returned to military service). Overall, the reader should therefore add around 980,000 German casualties over the course of the period above to correct for this.

Secondly, the Soviet figures are not corrected for NKVD casualties (as these were not administratively under the Red Army; similar to the Waffen SS and OKH) in the NKVD combat units. Soviet figures are also not corrected for the additional losses shown in the recent Price of Victory study (as per the table in the presentation, page 133). The reader should therefore add around 1,846,000 Soviet casualties over the course of the period above to correct for this (ca. 300,000 NKVD and, 683,884 in 1942, 612,571 in 1943, 249,709 in 1944).”

According to Glantz and House in "When Titans Clashed" page 68, the Axis had 3.933.000 personnel in 9 July 1943. Obviously they are including Germany's allies.

 

Thanks!

 

I am not talking about the casualty ratio, but rather the difference in combat effectiveness - the casualty ratio you would expect versus the casualty ratio actually achieved.

Yes. His commendium on the BARBAROSSA forces in general is quite good.

They are not counting the Ostheer, but all German Wehrmacht and German-allied forces in the "east". Without digging into it too closely, I suspect they are counting a;; the Hungarian and Romania armed forces, as well as Armee Norwegan. The problem with that is that they then compare it to Red Army strengths, which is not as inclusive.

 

Further to the Ostfront strength, the figure of 3,138,000 includes all Heer, Waffen-SS, and Luftwaffe, the Luftwaffe figures being for "Einheiten in Erdkampf" units engaged in ground combat, i.e., Luftwaffe Flak attached to the Heer, and Luftwaffe Feld and Fallschirmjaeger divisions. The figure is quoted in numerous sources, including NARA, T78, R411, F6379644; TSAMO, Fonds 6598, Liste 12450, Akte 305, Bl. 12, Bl. 14, Bl. 19, Bl. 23; and MI14/442-27 „Entwicklung der Iststärke des Ostheeres“, OrgAbt 18941/44, 7.9.44. The figure for the Heer only, is given as 2,939,000.

The higher figure quoted by Glantz and House probably includes Luftwaffe flying and ground units, Kriegsmarine units, and security units not technically part of the Ostheer.

 

Combat effectiveness and casualty exchange ratios are extremely related to one another, since most of the casualties of an army come from combat (KIA's, WIA's, MIA's and POW's). There are other variables involved as well, of course, but the casualty exchange ratio reveals with a very good deal of accuracy the combat effectiveness of the sides involved. The wehrmacht combat effectiveness is much higher than just 2.2.:1. It's close to 5:1.

 

Indeed, something I know rather well from working for Trevor Dupuy and then the Dupuy Institute for 21 years.

 

Can you please help me?

Sean Mcmeekin claims that as of June 1943:

"At least twenty-five German divisions were deployed in northern France, Belgium, and Holland—guarding the Channel against possible US-British attacks—a number that would double over the next year. There were twenty German divisions in Norway and Finland, guarding Hitler’s Scandinavian iron ore and nickel supplies against US-British encroachment, and thirty stationed in Germany and Central Europe, mostly Luftwaffe divisions defending the homeland against US-British bombing raids. Another twenty one German divisions guarded the Balkans after Hitler had reinforced Yugoslavia and Greece after the Axis debacle at Tunis."

He doesn't mention if Germany had any divisions in Italy at all, despite they were just expelled from North Africa and thus the situation was critical. Am I to believe there were none? I guess that Hitler couldn't just station inside Italy lots of troops as it was an allied independent country and thus would seem like an occupation force. Or am I mistaken? How many German divisions were send to Italy? I mean before operation Citadel.

 

Sure.

This is where I have issues with guys like McMeekin. They very evidently do not understand what it is they are talking about. "...mostly Luftwaffe divisions defending the homeland against US-British bombing raids" makes no sense in context, because those Luftwaffe "divisions" were Flak divisions, rather than ground maneuver formations. Flak "divisions" were actually a headquarters without troops - a "Stab" or staff element - to which Flak regiments (which were a headquarters Stab and two battalions that rarely served together) and battalions were attached for operations. They had no set organization or strength. For example, as of 1 November 1943, 1. Flak-Division stationed at Berlin consisted of 5 Flak-Regiment Stab, one of which was a searchlight regiment, with 22 Flak battalions, 8 searchlight battalions, and 41 separate batteries, some partially manned by part-time volunteers, male and female, some of which were teenagers in school.

The actual ground force deployment of the Wehrmacht as of June 1943 was:

59 West Front (incl. 9 Pz/PzGD/SS PzGD and 2 Mot ID)
180 East Front (incl. 22 Pz/SS PzGD and 7 Mot ID)
7 Finland
10 Balkans (incl. 1 Pz)
14 Norway (incl. 1 Pz)
2 Crete/Greece
2 Germany
1 Poland
275 Total (incl. 33 Pz/SS PzGD and 9 Mot ID)

There were two Panzergrenadier and one Panzer division in Italy, along with one Luftwaffe Fallschirmjaeger division.
There were two SS-Panzergreandier and one SS-Grenadier division organizing in France and Belgium.
There were three Panzer divisions reforming in Belgium and France.
There was on Reserve-Panzer division in Denmark training replacements.
There were two Infantrie divisions in Denmark, four in Holland, and twenty-five in France and Belgium, including two motorized - not Panzergrenadier - divisions.
There were ten Reserve-Infanterie divisions in France training replacements.
There were two Luftwaffe-Fallschirmjaeger divisions organizing in France.
There were three Luftwaffe-Feld divisions in France.

 

Thanks for all the information!

So, 4 divisions in Italy. What are your sources?

There are many discrepances between the location of divisions according to you and Mcmeekin, though you both reach almost the same overall quantity: 275 active divisions according to him, and 279 according to you (you seem to total 275 as well, yet you don't mention Italy in your list, only later (unless you are including it in "West Front"?

According to you, 99 in the West and 180 in the East. According to him, 96 in the West and 179 in the East.

The wide discrepances are in Germany/Central Europe (thirty according to Mcmeekin, which according to you are not divisions at all vs. just 3 according to you) and in France/Belgium/Holland where he places 25 and you 59.

 

Georg Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945, which has been mostly digitally transcribed at Lexikon der Wehrmacht Lexikon der Wehrmacht

Given I have no idea what sources McMeekin used I cannot comment accurately as to where he went wrong.

Yes, "Italy", actually Ob.Sued (later Suedwest), was - I just noticed, three divisions, not four. The divisions were Panzergrenadier-Division-Sizilian (later 15. Panzergrenadier-Division), HG Panzer-Division, 16. Panzer-Division. 1. and 2. Fallschirmjaeger were both in France. So 58 in the west and 274 total.

No, 58 in the West and 36 in other than the Ostfront. I miscounted an extra Fallschirmjaeger-Division, but 3. was not formed until October 1943.

Since I have no idea what he considers "Central Europe" and that was not a categorization used by the Germans, I have no idea where he goes wrong,other than by counting Flak divisions? I suspect his "25" is just for Infanterie divisions, so he ignored the SS divisions forming there, the Reserve-Infantry, any divisions in Holland and Denmark, and so on. It is either deliberate selective counting or he does not know what he is talking about. I suspect it is the latter.

 

BTW, WRT the Luftwaffe Flak-Division-Stab:

1. was Berlin
2. was HG-Nord
3. was Hamburg
4. was the Ruhr
5. was Romania
6. was HG-Nord
7. was central Rhein
8. was Bremen
9. was destroyed at Stalingrad and reforming in the Crimea
10. was HG-Mitte
11. was Bordeaux
12. was HG-Mitte
13. was Brittany-Normandy
14. was Saxony
15. was HG-Süd
16. was Belgium
17. was HG-Süd
18. was HG-Mitte
19. surrendered in Tunisia and was reformed in November in Greece
20. surrendered in Tunisia and was reformed in October in Yugoslavia
21. was Rhein-Main
22. was north Rhein

So of the 20 existing in June 1943, only 8 were in Germany, so I still have no idea where McMeekin's 30 come from.