Macarthur and the Australians

Clearing the Air Part Four,

MacArthur and Island Hopping

I don't accept the story that he 'invented' Island Hopping as a strategy. Neither do I accept he stole the idea, rather that both he and Nimitz reached the same conclusion at nearly the same time. It would not surprise me to learn that some cross pollination occured between both command staffs at lower levels.

Island Hopping was the obvious solution to a difficult challenge presented to both commander's. I can't say one did it better than the other as each had different topography, conditions and resources to work with. This does'nt make MacArthur better or worse than Nimitz in this area, just another commander doing the best he could with what he had.

Its unfortunate that both his need and the desire of his supports to claim otherwise obsure's the fact that he used the same strategy as Nimitz and deserve equal credit with Nimitz for employing the war winning strategy.

 

Yes both employed the strategy, but neither invented it, nor was it as you stated;

The difference is that Nimitz never claimed to have originated the idea.

"The war plan of 1911, which was drafted under Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers, included an island-hopping strategy for approaching Japan."

"....in 1921, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis of the U.S. Marine Corps drafted "Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia," a plan for war against Japan which updated War Plan Orange by incorporating modern military technology (submarines, aircraft, etc.) and which again included an island-hopping strategy."

"a British-American reporter on naval affairs, Hector C. Bywater, publicized the prospect of a Japanese-American war in his books Seapower in the Pacific (1923) and The Great Pacific War (1925), which detailed an island-hopping strategy. The books were read not only by Americans but by senior officers of the Japanese Imperial Navy, who used "island-hopping" in their successful southeast Asia offensives in 1941 and 1942."

Now it should be obvious from this that MacArthur did not invent it. The next point is that, one of the prime examples that is given for his employment of the strategy was Operation Cartwheel, the isolation of Rabaul. The thing about this is that it is also untrue. He wanted to invade Rabaul and Kavieng.

"The conviction of the Japanese leaders, that Rabaul would have to be taken, was shared in Brisbane, but not so freely accepted in Noumea, Pearl Harbor, or Washington. What ComSoPac, CinCPac, and JCS planners envisioned instead was the possibility thatRabaul could be bypassed and its strength neutralized by an aerial blockade mounted from bases within fighter range. Although General MacArthur opposed this concept, it won acceptance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference in August and became a part of Allied strategy.

"The decision to bypass Kavieng in favor of Emirau, like the earlier decision to bypass Rabaul, was made in Washington. In both cases, the consensus of JCS opinion, reinforced by the recommendations of Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, overweighed General MacArthur's belief that the major enemy bases constituted such a threat that they would have to be taken. By using Marines and ships that were ready to take part in the Kavieng operation, Admiral Halsey was able to effect a swift and bloodless occupation of Emirau."

MacArthur was a much better self promoter than he ever was a General.

 

It was Tarawa that helped convince the chiefs that it was not a good idea to attack strongly held bases unless essential for its value. The main advantage Mac had in New Guinea is that there were plenty of bases to take and Japan could not hold them all.

 

Actually they were of this opinion prior to Tarawa. That is why one of the initial objectives of the Gilberts operation, Nauru, was bypassed.

 

Thats why I said helped. Its one thing to think, but with the evidence of Tarawa it became obvious.

 

Was just on youtibe and came across video of Mac, and amongthe responses they were talking about Korea and I was shocked to see that many actually supported him in his dessire to drop 50+ nukes along the Chinese/N. Korean border and on Manchurian/Chinese air ports/bases and Cities.

They all seemed to believe that doing so would not lead to WW3? Seeing as this thread is based around Mac was wondering if we could talk about this little part that ended his careeer?

Cheers.

 

no cuz it always leads to the same old arguments.......and them JBers that think he was a god....................
........and if he was why didn't he sell it all politically..........if he was such a "politician"? simply he did wrong and got fired.

 

Hi. New to this forum. Hope it is not dead.

As to MacArthur, I am not a fan. The so called 'low casualty rate' he had in the Philippines was deceptive. The numbers lost were not far from those at Okinawa, yet they were spread over a much longer period and he failed to clear the island by the end of the war. Not so distinguished a record.

As to the issue of the Australians, when you only have a limited manpower source you cannot be expected to furnish multiple armies: they did exceptionally well with what they could provide. Although the Japanese did not have long term plans to take Australia, the Aussies had no way of knowing that and thus HAD to be prepared for that possibility. Their operations in New Guinea had a definite impact on the SWOPA area. The Australian victories did 2 things: they pinned down forces that could have been sent to Guadalcanal and destroyed the First Marine Division. Marine pride aside, there was NO way that we could have held it if any portion of the 100,000 plus Japs would have been sent to the Solomons. The Australian victories also brought an end to the concept of Japanese invincibility. MacArthur NEVER followed his orders to use Australians on his staff (Roosevelt ORDERED him to use Australians to fill 50% of his staff due to their much greater experience). He went so far as firing several Australian brigade and division commanders, blaming them for everything from 'advancing too slowly' to 'being defeatist'. He NEVER went to the front to actually see the conditions that the Diggers fought in. IN SPITE of MacArthur's poor leadership the Aussies managed to destroy a 100,000 man army (the equivalent to a Stalingrad to the Japanese). His beloved 32d Infantry division performed poorly for the first 6 months they were there (due to poor training as well as inadequate support from higher headquarters). AND HE DID NOTHING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES!

 

Yeah, don't worry about waking up a 2012 thread. We have had a lot older threads than this one raised from the dead.