More Guadalcanal

Am reading No bended knee - the battle for guadacanal. several fascinating factoids appear in this book that are relevant to the U.S. victory there. Here is one or 2.

500 extra machine guns brought in by mistake.Sept 18.

page 133; But best of all was a massive increase in firepower brought about by the cumulative effect of a fortuitous error in judgement made by some zombie back in headquarters Marine Corps. Our amphibian tractors(LVT's), at that time not even accorded a combat capability, had each been given an armament of 5 machine guns: one.50 caliber and 4 .30 caliber. there were 100 LVT's in the battalion. These 500 machine guns exeeded by many times the divisions entire normal allotement. Manna from heaven.

This single increment. I believe, was the decisive element in the unbroken success of our defense, even though we were invariably outnumbered by the Japanese at the point of contact, which was a point they had the option of selecting & attacking in overwhelming initial force. One Japanese officer who had apparently been around the bend a few times left us a note in his diary: Their position is like the hard shell of a giant tortoise, which emits fire and flame wherever it is touched.

 

Another interesting startegic factor was; while conducting a raid on sept 8. the marines attacked Kawaguchi's base at Tasimboko in full view of a large Japanese troop landing, who did nothing to assist their comrades. The marines detroyed the base which contained large quatities of artillery, rations, and stores large enough to suggest the presence of a considerable force.

This inaction of enemy troops had never been satisfactorily explained. One view is that of the enemy code of Japanese military honor precludes voluntary rendering of assistance to a neighboring unit. Assistance must be requested.

With more facts now available, it would appear that the paralysis of action was due to the fact that General Kawaguchi, the Japanese commander and conqueror of Borneo, had moved inland and could not be reached to secure assent for the commitement of the forces at Tasimboko. However, under any view, the incident was illustrative of the frequent lack of initiative by Japanese troop leaders at every level.

Tasimboko will stand as a classic example of the brilliant employment of hit & run tactics by a raider.

 

Later battles in Oct.

page 173. In these October battles we had defeated some of the finest forces in the Japanese military. Their plan was too elaborate. The three attacke were not coordinated. We were able to concentrate on these efforts one at a time, ( One of these 3 prongs was discovered thusly; Maruyama made his final bivouac at the big bend within a relatively short distance of Pullre's front and let his men make rice fires that Daniel Boone sighted sighted from afar, ( ruining surprise ). Puller would never have made that same mistake), Had all 3 struck us at the same time, we would have been in great difficulty.

I can only surmise that the root cause lay in the difficulties arising from inferior radio equipment or that interservice differences
prevented unity of action.

The odds wer 9 battalions,( 11 counting Kawaguchi's force ), to one against us when the fight began, but our firepower prevailed over their Bushido creed. In one captured diary the deceased had written, "The Imperial staff must reconsider the matter of firepower".

 

2 other things. #1 victory disease.

On Aug 21 a srong force of enemy infantrymen launched a sudden banzai attack at the mouth of the tenaru. Greatly outnumbered, the defenders took on , with deadly fire the charging enemy, who attacked with empty chambers & fixed bayonets in closely grouped formation. The enemy officers fell first, and the survivors broke up into leaderless small groups.

When it was over, the Japanese left 800 dead, 34 of our men were dead.

Jeery & I talked it over. The 1st marines had done well. But we were lucky. As so often was to happen, our success derived in part gross enemy mistakes. With ample knowledge of our position, Colonel Ichiki had elected to attack us at our point of greatest strength, the mouth of the Tenaru. Had he moved the point of attack upstream, his troops would have been slowed by the difficult jungle terrain, but the dense cover would have permitted an undetected approach.

given the history of the war to date, the Japanese considered themselves as utterly invincible on land regardless of the relative size of the forces engaged. There is no record that his ill timed attack was ever criticized by his superiors. They too suffered from victory disease.

One can't help but think how brave Banzai charges are, but also how, um shall I say, stupid?

 

#2. Example of U.S. interservice coordination.

page 110. The arrival of Marine aircraft on Aug 20 was the turning point of the operation. Without their continuous support our survival would have been impossible. During daylight hours they kept the Japanese Navy at a respectable dictance while covering our support & resupply vessels in the area. These planes also provided fast and effective evacuation of our wounded and a vital capability for emergency logistical support. Their deeds were legendary. they transformed our miserable little strip into an unsinkable aircraft carrier, and from it's flight deck the cactus airforce launched decisive counterattacks. During 1st marine division's stormy sojourn in the Solomons, our aviators-marine, navy, and army shot down 416 Japanese planes and sank 21 enemy ships in less than 4 months. We lost 78 planes in combat. The crews of about half were saved.

 

Last but not least were landing practice dry runs, some early practice runs were rather bad performances, but were quickly fixed.

page 52.As a rehearsal the Koro Island dry run was a complete fiasco. It was simply impossible to land over those coral beaches. The ares had been selected by navy planners in Washington. It was because of this lapse that Mckean & I were sent on reconnasance. Admiral Turner was shocked at the condition of the boats & the performance of the crews. His immediate and forceful steps to correct these deficiencies resulted in our D-day personnel landings on Guadalcanal being the smoothest I have ever seen.

These are the salient points of the book. A good one it is.

 

Yes,They were more occupied with the attempt to reach Australia & didn't consider the Americans much of a threat.The U.S. had broken the Japanese codes & had Navajo talkers on the Island.These were another couple of influential factors.

Twining said the Japanese would utter sounds intended to scare the Americans just before a banzai charge, which had quite the opposite effect. It gave warning of what was to come. This happened often on Guadalcanal & usually meant the Japanese were getting desperate & a U.S. victory was just around the corner.

 

No Bended Knee was a decent book. Have you read Richard Franks "Guadalcanal"? It is probably the most comprehensive single book on the operation that I have read. Eric Hammel's 3 books on the Guadalcanal operation are as good, except he breaks the campaign into books dealing with specific areas such as one book for each the sea battles, land battles and the air battles. As for the codes, the Japanese changed the version of the JN-25 code that we had broken to the point of knowing of the Coral Sea and Midway operations from the "c" version to a "d" version in the early days of August. (I have seen one book that claims the 1st of the month and others that say on the 6th, either way it changed right before the Guadacanal operation) In Rear Adm. Edwin Layton's book "And I Was There" (he was Nimitz's Fleet Intel Officer through the war) stated that it wasn't until about 4 months later that they were able to read it again at nearly the level they had prior to Midway. It has been spectulated that this may have been due to a reporter for the Chicago Tribune by the name of Stanley Johnson who had been shown a dispatch from Nimitz while onboard the cruiser Chester and returning to Pearl Harbor from the Coral Sea that detailed what ships were expected to be at Midway. His story about the battle of Midway appeared within days of the conclusion of the battle and while it didn't come right out and say that we had broken the Japanese code it did contain enough details in the story to imply that we had.

 

I will look for Franks book. Very interesting about codes. It seemed the intel data that Twining got while on guadalcanal was accurate regarding Japanese resupply attempts. If we break down the 3 sections of battle air, sea, & land, It would seem the land battle went our way, & the air battles at least according to the book went our way, but the sea battles were much closer. What's your take?

 

In regards to the coding issue, Layton's book contextually states that their ability to read the new version of the code on the level they were reading at prior to Midway took four months. I am sure that with some good analytical work they would be able to make out some bits and pieces prior to that which could account for the good intel that the marines were receiving regarding supply runs by the Japanese.
In regards to your statement that the land battles went our way is pretty accurate. In terms of the air battles we won them in the fact that after the airstrip became operational we for the most part came out on top although there were some problems early on in the operation. As for the sea battles, frankly my take is that we lost the battles but won the campaign in spite of this due to the inability of the Japanese to repair damage as quickly or replace what losses they were taking. The one only real shining spots, in terms of sea battles, was RADM Norman Scott's "crossing the T" at Cape Esperance on the night of Oct. 11. This battle marked the first time during the war that the Japanese were defeated in a nighttime naval engagement. And the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadacanal on the night of Nov 14-15 when RADM Willis Lee's force turned back a Japanese unit covering a landing force and which cost the Japanese a battleship and a destroyer as lost.

 

The Japanese did also lose one ship after it returned from the battle of Savo sound to a US sub. Agree with your conclusions. Have lived in Mt prospect & Des Plaines in the past.

 

True.....this was the heavy cruiser Kako sunk by the the s-class sunmarine S-44 just outside of Japanese base of Kaeving. This was one of only 3 Japanese warships sunk by an American S-class submarine during the war and also the largest, the others being the Japanese destroyer Natshusio off Makassar City on Feb 2, '42 by the S-37 and a minelayer Okinoshima off New Ireland by the S-41 on June 11, '42.

 

Well, Bill you know your stuff. The Yamato was almost sunk by 3 U.S. subs in an attempted ambush, but the Yamato detected the radar emissions & made a 180 degree turn & sped off. This from "Take her deep" about the Halibut.

 

If you don't mind my asking, who wrote this book? I don't think I recall ever seeing it. I know that I haven't read it as the only books specifically dealing with subs that I can remember reading with one called PigBoats (not sure who the author was, Clear the Bridge: The War Patrols of the Tang by Dick O'Kane, The Terrible Hours by Peter Maas and a book about the Wahoo ( agained not sure of the author on this one)

 

Well, I believe it was written by the Halibuts skipper. I'll have to find it & get back to you.