More of Adm Fletcher's miscue's...

In the January 2006 edition of World War II History magazine, there is an article about Captain Forrest "Tex" Baird and some of his duties in the Pacific during the war. In this article Capt. Baird details how he became assigned to Adm. Fletcher's staff prior to the Coral Sea battle. The captain was sent out to the Yorktown to head up the codework operations for the task forces in order to make timely use of any intercepts. As an outsider, Capt. Baird was already viewed by the admiral with some skepticism, however even this soon degenerated into an antagonistic relationship. On one day during lunch with his staff, Adm Fletcher asked Capt Baird to "tell me and my staff all about your communications intelligence organization and the codebreaking it does." As this was done not only in the presence of staff members who did not have a need to know the matters of codebreaking work or communications intelligence it was also done in the presence enlisted mess specialists who did not have a need to know. When Capt. Baird stated he was under orders not to discuss the nature of his work, Adm Fletcher flew into a rage and demanded that Baird tell him and his staff what he wanted to know. Baird again refused to comply. The result of this was that Fletcher ignored much of the valuable intelligence that Baird and his two radio intercept officers tried to offer. Most prominantly was on May 7, 1942 during the Coral Sea operation. On that day, Baird was aware through intercepts the carriers of the Japanese task force were close enough that their planes could reach the American force and tried to convince Fletcher of the opportunity to suprise the Japanese and win a decisive battle. When Fletcher responded "Young man, you don't understand. I am going to attack them tommorrow."
Granted the Lexington may still have been sunk even had Fletcher launched a more wide ranging search pattern. Why did Fletcher send Admiral Crace and his unit of three cruisers and two destroyers of to the west thus depriving his force of additional badly needed antiaircraft defenses? Could the Battle of the Coral Sea turned out more decisivly had Fletcher headed the advice of Capt Baird on the 7th of May? What would the Battle of Midway have been like had the US had the services of the USS Lexington along with a fully conditioned Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise?

 

I wonder how many lives that pompus rectum cost by his stupidity? It is a shame that this happens. I am sure this is not an isolated case.

The what ifs provide an interesting item. The Battle of Midway was won by the US fleet by providence. Had the circumstances changed very much than the battle may have gone the other way.

 

While Captain Biard certainly weaves an interesting tale, it is mostly based upon the bitterness of a very junior officer (remember he was only a Lieutenant (O-3) at the time) with an, apparently, over inflated sense of importance miffed over his admiral’s dismissal of his analysis.
Remember, you’ve only Biard’s word on this, everyone else is quite dead. I would spend a little time investigating the subject before swallowing his story hook line and sinker. Some of what he presents is not exactly the case. You might be surprised.

Rich

 

Baird, and other members of the Radio Intercept teams were sure of their possession of the War Breaking secret.

Others, unconvinced of its power were sceptical. And without a proven track record, it was treated with doubt. They didnt know of Enigma & Magic & SigInt was a closed shop except to the very few.

Once proven, SigInt became a most valuable weapon but in the early days of WW2 for the USA it would have been seen as witchcraft. Even then, Rommel through not following Radioed orders threw British plans into a turmoil because he didnt follow the orders they intercepted.

Also, Coral Sea was the first Carrier battle, what were the right tactics?

 

Biard wasn't in possession of any "War Breaking Secret". Biard was a linguist, he spoke, read, and wrote Japanese. He was not a code breaker, he was not involved with the code breaking effort. Biard graduated from USNA in '34 and was stationed in Tokyo from July 1938 to August 1941. Was assigned to Station HYPO as a linguist in November 1941. After his sojourn aboard Yorktown he went on to conduct, and eventually was in charge of, interrogation of Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen captured by USN/USMC forces. He retired in 1951 (which tells me a lot).

The RIU's on the carriers were not doing the same work as Rochefort's HYPO or Letweiler's FRUMEL. The carrier based units were merely listening in on Japanese short range communications, especially carrier to aircraft to carrier. This did not require the brute force effort that was being applied to reading the JN-25 code as the folks Biard and Co were listening to were not using JN-25 in their communications.

Biard tells his story but leaves out all the little inconvenient facts ... rather, he'd like to be the Lieutenant who could have won Coral Sea if only Fletcher had listened to him. Sour grapes.

There maybe a pompous ass in this story, but once you bother to acquaint yourself with all the facts it is painfully obvious the the P A was not Fletcher.

Rich

 

This account, regardless of its accuracy or lack thereof (I wouldn't know) could illuminate just a little of why Adm. Fletcher was "put out to pasture" in late 1942.... always been mysterious to me. Seems clear that interpersonal politics played some role in the course of Fletcher's career (Adm. King was never a fan, for whatever reason), and perhaps this sheds just a sliver of light on that?

Overall, his mistakes were no worse than Halsey's (if even as bad), and Halsey got a 5th star, while Fletcher was apparently less esteemed, and certainly less rewarded, by the people in charge at the time. Although it's fair to say that in terms of what he accomplished with what he had at his disposal, Fletcher was the most successful Admiral of the Pacific War, on any side.

 

http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/1992-06/frank-jack-fletcher-got-bum-rap-part-one
http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/1992-09/frank-jack-fletcher-got-bum-rap-part-two

Or read Lundstrom's book "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal"
https://books.google.com/books?id=-Tg4AAAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PT137&lpg=RA1-PT137&dq=admiral+fletcher+beached&source=bl&ots=_aqDZWpV5J&sig=VBWQmNyfGd5rBDTAav6zbLIZN74&hl=en&sa=X&ei=g_HfVMxjj4g2jMeCuA0&ved=0CDgQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

We don't know what the particulars were, but Fletcher earned a few chances from King, but eventually King decided that either
Fletcher just was not up to the job or that the younger officers were better

 

Coral Sea was not his best work, and his decision to leave Guadalcanal is debatable.