Most survivable tank

Not for the petrol engined ones. Like the Lee and most of the Shermans, Churchills, Matildas and early Valentines.

but you're right it seems to be a doctrine or methodology thing - I think the medical care/conditions afterwards may be the key - it is difficult to figure what the statistics actually are saying, because they probably mean the number of tank men who died eventually rather than the percentage who died in their tanks.

 

However the Shermans sent to the Soviets were mostly the diesel version I believe. See:
Sherman Medium Tank 1942-45 - Google Books
and
Lend-Lease Sherman tanks - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
in fact this site: History
suggest that all the LL Shermans the Soviets recieved were diesels.
Furthermore: M3 General Lee Medium Tank - BATTLEFIELD.RU - everything about the Great Patriotic War
indicates a fair number of the M3 sent to the Soviets were also diesel.

In that regard the most dangerous point for tankers seems to have been during and shortly after they bailed out.

 

I suspect that the record showing the number of tanker deaths would have been compiled at the aid stations and unit headquarters, and not from individual descriptions of how exactly they died. The record keeping was possibly accurate enough regarding total numbers, but not the exact methods of demise of all the tank personnel. I'm not sure it's a mystery we can solve - perhaps some first hand accounts from the German side detail the way they dealt with tank crews on both fronts in more detail - I'll do some searching and reading later.

 

You might note that the Matildas sent were diesel too. These were Mk IIA versions with a pair of AEC 87hp diesels.

 

That's interesting - didn't know that - I'm wondering if they also did a Diesel version of the Churchill too - haven't found any info on one, but maybe the Soviets even did a local mod themselves?

it seems also that all (or certainly almost all) of the Valentines sent for LL to Russia were diesel versions also.

 

In all this talk about diesel let's remember that diesel tanks burned too. It is flammable.

 

And in most cases of fire the ammo and other equipment burned rather than the fuel, and fuel fires if they did start, often started slower and vented themselves largely away from the crew compartments. Not in every case of course, but most tanks were designed that way.

 

Again I've seen studies that indicated that this was not the case. Certainly they wouldn't have info for all cases but if the body had to be removed from the tank that's a pretty clear indicator that the tanker died within the tank. If on the otherhand cause of death was small arms or shell fragments it's pretty clear that that was not the case.

 

I wonder if the Germans kept records in that detail related to Soviet casualties as well - otherwise there's possibly only info from when the Soviets were maintaining an advance.

 

It's certainly easier to get the gather the stats like that if you are advancing or the lines are static. I don't think I've seen stats like that however for either the Soviets or the Germans. The US and I think Britian did produce OR reports that used that data. Which of course leaves open the possiblity that the numbers were different on the Eastern Front or even in the West for the Germans. Given the responsiveness of US and British artillery fire though it may have been even more striking for the Germans in the West. Might want to ask this over on the AH forum as they've got a fair number of people that have looked at this sort of thing in detail and most of those here that have also seem to post over there at least on occasion.

 

Very interesting stuff MK. Seems to reinforce the idea that there was little real difference between different tanks - circumstances played a more important role in casualty numbers than tank type - it is interesting to note that light tanks suffered generally higher casualties although hard to tell from those docs if that was due to higher percentages of penetrations, more lethal penetration characteristics, harder egress, or a difference in the internal effects of the tanks fittings and equipment after being actually knocked out.

The fact that commanders suffered greater casualty rates due to external issues suggests that perhaps the quality of the vision devices in a cupola could have been a major deciding factor in the overall crew survival statistics for each tank type.

The issue of engagement ranges may be key - perhaps with the generally longer ranges on the Eastern front, especially while in the SU itself, there was a higher number of tanks hit by higher velocity AT rounds rather than panzerfausts etc. which may affect the statistics more than the actual tank design.

 

The light tank casualties make sense in the respect that during the course of the war they evolved very little while tank killing technolgy evolved quite a bit more. Factor the tendency for infantry to see any tank as a threat and employ the most leathal weapon they possess to kill it and the lifespan of a light tank does not look so good. Also in the case of allied light tanks, how they are employed would seem to be a factor. Used as forward scouts they would tend to trip enemy ambushes before the mediums or heavies.

 

I believe that up until recently Israeli doctrine stressed open hatch operations. They recognized the increase risk to the commander but the increased situational awareness that came in exchange for that decreased the risk to the tank and the rest of the crew enough that they thought it worth while. I believe US doctrine for at least some of the time post war was for open hatch operations as well. The quality of the current thermal sights has changed this or at least the frequency I believe.

 

The Israelis IIRC changed that policy after 1973 - they suffered such high commander casualty rates in the first few days of the war that the initially engaged armoured units suffered significantly. Urban operations may possibly have changed that back again in 1982. certainly British doctrine changed during the late '80s to an 'open hatch only in peacetime road moves' policy.

 

Still, from what I understand from Tank Net, many US tank units still fight open hatch in cities as matter of choice. There are some that does the opposite in urban in environments, to be sure. It was true for the 4th AD in WWII--Creighton Abrams allegedly threatened to cut the hatch off of a tank that belonged to a TC who refused to fight out of it.

 

When I was a driver I often thought of dropping the "escape" hatch below my seat when we got into a real shooting match. Then I could drop out real quick before the rest of the crew even missed me! Haha. But then my TC got wind of my plan and said that's why they issued him a sidearm, and he'd be sure to NOT miss me! But he'd likely be knocked senseless or decapitated first. Plus with my luck what would happen is I'd drive over a land mine riding around with no armour under my butt. Mmmm...those were good times.

 

This doesn't address the OP's Q, but, with all this talk of open hatch vs closed hatch operations, I thought this might be of interest:
All of our post-war exercises were 'open hatch' for the TCs.
My first tank commander was a veteran of 3AD(Spearhead) during Patton's march thru Germany. While all our other TCs would be riding along resting their elbows on the hatch combing, or even exposing themselves from the waist up, he had the curious habit of lowering his foot platform to where he could stand on it (he never sat down) and have his head exposed only to the point where he could gaze over the turret. Everything from his nose on down was below the hatch opening. Minimal exposure with optimal visibility.
BTW-- He eschewed the wearing of the standard tankers' 'football'-style helmet, preferring instead headphones and the steel pot of the infantryman. Old habits die hard-- He was a survivor!

 

Pardon this OT post but after reading this:

A budy of mine trained in M60's in the 80's. They had just spent the day doing evacuation and evasion training when the base newspaper showed up and wanted to get a "action shot" of an M-60. The holdovers who were conducting the training were happy to oblige. There was a large mud puddle near by and it was suggested that they run through it at some speed as that would likely result in an impessive splach and good picture. So they crew took the tank off a ways and got a good running start and hit the puddle which turned out to be a bit deeper than they had planed on and producea much more dramatic picture as a result. The splashes from the sides were as expected. The collum of mud and water exiting through the drivers hatch and topping out well over the TC's head were not but added considerably to the dramatic effect.

 

Good post. The 3rd Armored Division belonged to Hodge's First Army not Patton's Fourth, however. What was the age of your TC at that time again? He must've been ancient. ;-)