MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS: History, Technical details + Action "Capsules".

Good Evening...

This piece is devoted to a look at the "Little Ships" of World War Two.

Following a similar but more detailed format than "Lone Wolves", I will present a brief history, some technical details from each of the principal nations before moving on to some action "Capsule" descriptions, to give you a taste of what combat in these vessels involved. Finally, we will move on to an assessment of the achievements of the small craft when seen against the wider picture of World War 2 as a whole.

So, sit back and enjoy....


MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS: :tinysmile_classes_tWAR IN THE SHALLOW SEAS.........


OVERVIEW
The most bitter naval encounters of World War 2 were those of the "little ships", the highly maneuverable motor torpedo boats. Small enough to slip unseen over moonlit water, pentrating minefields and coastal defenses to take the war to an enemy's home seas, and fast enough to fire thrie torpedoes and speed away before enemy guns could be brought to bear, they were deadly weapons in shallow waters.

Too small and numerous to be given the dignity of names, they were known by numbers.
To the British as MTBs.
To the Americans as PT boats.
To the Germans as "S" boats, or ("Schnellboote").
The Italians knew them as MAS boats.

They saw action in every major theater of the war; in the English Channel and North Sea, among the dreamy islands of the Aegean and along the coasts of Italy and North Africa. In Burma and Malaya, in the South China Sea, and across the Pacific to the final liberation of the Phillipines.

Night was the time of their hunting.
By day, because weight had been sacrificed to speed, they were vulnerable. Rapid maneuverability, a low silhouette and smokescreens were their primary means of protection. Guns were mounted, but these could only be really effective against craft of their own size. At rest, the boats were squat and ugly. But at speed they were things of beauty, planing over the water at 40 knots or more, with bows lifted, slicing great waves from either side and leaving foaming wakes far behind. Battles when of opposing sides met were fought at close quarters and higher speeds than any other naval action.
The main purpose of the motor boats was to strike enemy shipping. But they were used in numerous other ways. Apart from escorting their own coastal merchant shipping, they took part in combined operations raids, transporting troops and giving covering fire. They raided enemy harbours, dropped intelligence agaents on lonely enemy shores, boarded and captured enemy merchant ships in a manner reminiscent of buccaneers. They acted as naval scouts, seeking enemy ships and hidden bases. They rescued downed pilots from the waves and attacked enemy submarines. They laid mines in shallow waters, sweeping safe lanes along freindly coasts.
Their only limitations were range, due to high fuel consumption of powerful engines, and their inability to take punishment in heavy seas.

In three main areas of conflict the MTBs played a significant role; and in broad terms, their operations reached a peak at three distinct stages of the war.
First, there was the fight for dominance in the "narrow seas", off the east and south coasts of the United Kingdom which, with Germany's occupation of the coastline of Western Europe, was as grim and desperate as the great air battles raging in the skies overhead. This was their greatest theater of operations. Not only were motor torpedo boats of Britain and Germany used for attacking each other's merchant convoys by mine and torpedo, but there was continual direct confrontation as they strove to defend as well as attack. Here, the little boats were in their element, weaving among mines and shallows where submarines and capital ships feared to go. Included among the Coastal Forces of the Dominions and European Allies and, at a later date, from the United States.
It was not until early 1943 that the Allies began to reach equality in terms of both numbers and quality with the OKM Schnellboote, perhaps the most successful of all motor torpedo boat designs. The fight grew in intensity in 1943 as the Allies carried the battle to enemy waters and again in 1944 with the Normandy landings; it continued until the very end of the war when German boats, although greatly outnumbered, were still harrying Allied coastal shipping.

In the second area of conflict, the Mediterranean, the naval war followed the progress of the land battles from North Africa to Sicily, then Italy and the Balkans.
Here also the small ships attacked as well as defended convoys, as both sides sought to keep open lines of supply to their land forces. Malta figured prominently in this bitter struggle, both as a base for Allied MTBs and as a target for MAS and S boats.
But, the whole canvas of the Meditteranean was on a larger scale and gave greater scope for the lone role that suited the individualistic temperaments of those who served on small boats. Either singly or in small formations, the craft would set out from their bases for days at a time to strike at enemy convoys, take part in Commando raids, or cooperate with partisans or agents behind enemy lines by night and hiding amongst the numerous islands by day. As in English home waters, Coastal Forces included Dominion and American crews and boats. For a while, an american PT squadron was the sole representative of the US Navy in these waters.
In the early stages, the large numbers of Italian boats dominated the sea lanes; Italy had given more attention to the military application of such craft before the war than had other powers, which tended to concentrate on the development of the bigger vessels to the neglect of the smaller ones. In early 1943, after a passage through the inland French waterways, German S boats reached the "warm sea". For the next two years, these would contest the Mediterranean.

The third and last area to come into prominemce was the Pacific and Far East.
Although British Coastal Forces were employed to a limited extent off the coasts of Malaya and Burma, this was primarily an American theater of operations in which the use of PT boats during the island hopping strategy was, perhaps, the most spectacular and successful of all. Striking coastal supply routes, PT boats also took part in some of the great 'fleet' battles of the Pacific war and proved effective against Japanese warships up to the size of a heavy cruiser. In the initial stages of the war, trapped by the rapid Japanese advance, the British MTBs and American PTs were sunk by aircraft or scuttled by their crews. However, with determination and skill, the surviving crew members formed the core of the crews that went on to eventual victory.
The Japanese did less than any other of the major powers in the development of motor torpedo boats. Their sole contribution to the progress of small boat operations was the SHINYO, the marine equivalent of the "Divine Wind".

Boats of all major powers depended on the development by private companies of motorboats for sport and leisure.

Gentleman such as Sir Malcolm Campell and Henry Seagrave, with their recordbreaking achievements over water, provided valuable knowledge for research into speedboat design. Because most of the major navies of the world paid so little attention to the possibilities of motor boats, even though they had been used dramatically and sucessfully during the First World War (especially by the Italians in the Austrian coastal region), there had been much interchange of ideas between nations which were to find themselves on opposing sides of the conflict. Too, the smaller countries, unable to afford the larger vessels and unable to contest the deep-sea commerce lanes, were eager to explore the potential of the coastal craft.
Thus, firms like Vosper, Elco and Thornycraft built motor launches for many of the foreign navies. At the beginning of the war, the British MTBs that were in service were powered by the fine Italian Isotta Fraschini engines - which immediately became unavailable.
The German Schnellboote was based on an American design of a motor launch built privately by the Lurssen yard for an American sportsman. Thornycraft boats built for the Jugoslavian Navy were captured by the Italians and used against the allies. An MTB design by the British Power Boat Company was used as the basis for the first American PT boat; the American Packard engine was to be the main power unit for all British boats, a Thornycraft design was captured by Japan to become the basis for most of the boats built for the Imperial Japanese Navy.

There were similarities, too, in the manning of the small craft. Most of the crews, officers and ratings alike, were civilian volunteers, often from the ranks of pre-war yachtsmen and power boat enthusiasts. To a great extent they were regarded with scepticism by those of the regular navies. This attitude was modified after the small boats had proved their worth, but the tactics involved in fighting in such craft had to be developed by the volunteers themselves through trial and error. The similarities in temperament between these men and the airmen of the First World War are striking. Daring, individualistic, quick-witted with superior reflexes, honourable, and with great respect for their opponents who fought in similar craft; they had often known the enemy personally, from international competition and correspondance before the war. These sailors fought a war apart. The small boats and small crews were, despite their differences, an elite brotherhood - and viewed themselves as such.

Diverse as they were, what all small boat operations proved - and this has been true for every war of the 20th century - is the vital importance of coastal waters. It is not solely that through such waters every merchant ship carrying supplies from the overseas must pass, but often, coastal convoys are the only practical manner of transferring materials from one part of the country to another. These ships must be protected, while equally, there is a vital need to attack those of the enemy. Equally, from the military point of view, coastal waters are a crucial factor in mounting any expeditionary raid or invasion. This applies to defense as well as an assault, whenever it involves the transporting of a large body of troops by sea. Thus, the domination of a nation's sea space is as vital to modern strategy as the domination of it's air space.


PRE WW2 DEVELOPMENT: :twisted:

As with so many modern weapons, the motor torpedo boat was first developed and used in the First World War. Mine warfare in this war was the realization of a real threat that this weapon posed to large fleets in which the power of maritime nations lay. The mine was regarded as a "barbaric" invention and certainly not one that a traditional naval power like Britain was going to help develop. This attitude to mines (and torpedoes) was still held by many naval leaders before the First World War, and was even evident at the beginning of the second. This was partly the reason why the major naval powers tended to neglect the development of motor torpedo boats between the wars, while they proved so popular with smaller nations.

The invention of the torpedo by English engineer, Robert Whitehead in 1877 dovetailed with some of the first steam driven "launches", devised by such firms as Yarrow. This sparked off a minor arms "race" to build the fastest torpedo-carrying craft. Alfred Yarrow himself suggested as much to the Admiralty of the British Royal Navy after watching a deomnstration in France in 1892. The Royal Navy, concerned at the alarming growth in numbers of such craft could threaten the large but relatively slower ships, readily agreed. The torpedo "gun-boat" had already been developed as a means of countering the torpedo-boat, but proved too slow. What Yarrow did was to put the same machinery as in a 500 ton torpedo gunboat into a 250 ton torpedo boat. This ship, the "HORNET", was the first of a new class that was to become known throughout the world as the Destroyer. The original function of the Destroyer was to fight motor torpedo boats. The race before World War One developed between German torpedo boats and British and American Destroyers, which rapidly became larger. The increasing size of the Destroyer created new problems, not only because they were easier targets, but also their vulnerability to mines.
There was still a need, even though it was only appreciated after WW1 had started, for small, torpedo carrying craft of the kind originally intended....

For a MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT, in fact.

The most successful were developed by the Italians. Known as MAS boats (Motoscafo Armato SVAN, after the yard in Venice which built them, and later, MOTOSCAFO ANTI-SOMERGIBILE or "motor anti submarine boats"), these were between 50 and 70 feet long, and carried 2 or 4 torpedoes at a top speed of 33 knots. A number came into service in 1916 and were used very effectively against Austrian naval units and shipping in Adriatic harbors. Their most notable successes were the sinking of the light cruiser WEIN at Trieste (9 December, 1917), and the dreadnaught SZENT ISTVAN in the straights of Otranto (June 8, 1918).

In Britain, with the major shipyards concentrating on the building of the bigger ships and destroyers, it was left to the firm of John I. Thornycraft to carry out the work of designing and building motor torpedo boats, based on a 40 foot motor boat which had been built some years before WW1. Britain had entered the war with little conception of the extent to which the Germans would use mines and submarines. The Royal Navy still thought in terms of big warships, and it came as something of a shock to find how vulnerable they were against these new weapons - even though the weapons were hardly new, as their earlier history shows. In WW1, the Germans had, in fact, laid no less than 10,000 mines in British home waters alone. The Grand Fleet, itself was lucky to escape tangling with the first minefield to be laid, in the southwold area, by steaming northwards to Scapa Flow only days before. Something had to be found to deal with the menace when it became clear that German policy was to fight the war at sea with mine and torpedo, instead of big ships in the "traditional" manner. Much of the answer was found in the Auxilliary Patrol, a force which began modestly with a few coverted trawlers and yachts pressed into service to clear minefields and which grew by the end of the war to total 5,000 yachts, patrol gunboats, trawlers, whalers, motor launches, drifters, motor boats, paddle or screw minesweepers and boom-defense vessels.These vessels were manned almost entirely by volunteers, including members of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. They also were responsible for sinking submarines.
There was also another type of boat, known as the Coastal Motor boat (CMB), which was the fore-runner of the WW2 MTBs. Thornycraft built, these boats were capable of 33.5 knots, originally 40ft in length, but later increased to 55ft. 66 of them were in commission at the end of the war. These and the MLs (motor launches) carried out many daring raids in the latter stages of the Great War, particularly Zeebrugge and Ostend. Their most spectacular success was a post-war raid on the Russian base of Kronstadt in 1919, sinking the cruiser OLEG and damaged or disabled two capital ships and two destroyers for the loss of only one CMB.
The MLs were literally the "maids of all work", just as they were to be in WW2. They were 75 foot motor launches designed and built for the Royal Navy by the Electric boat company (ELCO) in Connecticut and shipped across the Atlantic. Powered by 2x250hp petrol engines which gave a speed of 20kts and armed with "quick-firing" guns, 50 were initially purchased, followed by 500 of the 80 foot version. Used as submarine "chasers", shipping escorts, minefield duties (Exploring, sweep, destruction), laying smokescreens and pilot rescue. They had only two days endurance at sea, at most, and though seaworthy in bad weather, they could not carry torpedoes in such weather as well.
America lagged behind in research and development during the Great War. Despite building MLs for Britain, the US Navy saw little use for the small craft, with a coastline well away from the main action. At the instigation of Franklin D. Roosevelt, plans were tentatively drawn up for 115ft and 150ft motor torpedo boat designs, but they were not built. The US Navy, like the Germans, concentrated mainly on seagoing torpedo boats and destroyers.
British officials interest in motor torpedo boats lapsed, despite their success with CMBs and MLs. Lack of funding, coupled with a lapse into euphoric pacifism, tended to leave the Admiralty with the view to chanelling funding once more into big ships at the expence of smaller craft. Lessons so painfully learnt about mine and torpedo warfare were forgotten.

Therefore, it was Italy which carried out the most development work on the motor torpedo boats between the wars, so that when the Second World War started, the Italian fleet had a larger number of these craft than any other nation.


WORLD WAR TWO...

ITALY:
Two Italian boatyards, (SVAN in Venice and Baglietto in Varazze), designed all but a few of the hundred or so motor torpedo boats in service with the Regia Marina when Italy entered the war in 1940. The Italian boats were smaller than those built by Britain, America and Germany, having been designed for use in the calmer waters of the Mediterranean and Adriatic rather than the North Sea. They ranged from 48ft displacing 12 tons, to 60ft displacing 26 tons. Their superb Isotta Frascini engines produced speeds of up tp 45kts, faster than any other boats in service at the time.
Most Italian boats were built by Baglietto, but the SVAN yard was first in the field with the 48ft MAS 423, commisioned in 1929. This 12 &3/4 ton boat was powered by Isotta Fraschini engines of 1,500hp (speed, 40kts) and was armed with 2x6.5mm machine guns and 2x17.7 inch torpedoes. Speed was later increased by more powerful motors, with depth charges later carried as standard.
The Baglietto type was built in 1936 was MAS 502 was larger - 55 feet, 21 tons, Isotta Fraschini engines giving over 42 knots and armed with one 13,2mm MG, 2x17 inch torpedoes and six depth charges. This remained the basis for the MAS 513, MAS 526 and MAS 536 series that were built until 1939 and formed the bulk of the Italian motor torpedo boat fleet at the start of the war, although the size increased to 60 feet and 26 tons. Fast and effective as they were in shallow waters, all these craft were severly limited in their capacity to withstand heavy seas. It was to answer the need to operate further afield that the MS (Motosilurante) boats were developed and built in 1941 by the CRDA, Montafalcone yards on the pattern of the German Scnellboote and resulted from the capture by the Italian Navy in April 1941 of six Yugoslavian boats built in Germany by Lurssen. The first series of 18 boats, MS 11 - MS 36, were 90 feet, 63 tons, powered by three Isotta Fraschini's of 3,450hp at a top speed of 34 knots, and armed with two or four20mm/65 MGs, 2x21 inch torpeodoes in tubes, and 12 to 20 depth charges.
The Second series of 18 boats built 1942 by CRDA, MS 51 - MS 76 were basically the same design but carried two additional 17.7 inch torpedoes. Plans had been drawn up by the CRDA yard for further MS series of 105 ton and 120 ton craft, but were cancelled after Italian surrender in 1943.
Another type of motor torpedo gunboat was developed and built by the Baglietto yard after Italy's entry into the war for the specific purpose of submarine hunting. Known as the VAS (Vedette Anti-Sommergibilie) boats the first series of thirty came into service in 1942, comprising VAS 201-VAS 230. They were 90ft overall, displaced 68 tons, powered by two Fiat engines and an auxiliary Carraro engine, with an approximate speed of 19 knots. Armed with 2x20mm/65 machine guns, 4x8mm sub machine guns, 2x17.7 inch torpedoes and 30 depth charges and carrying a crew of 26 people.
Eighteen boats (comprising VAS 231 - VAS 248) of a second series came into service in 1943 with similar armament, but powered by one Isotta Fraschini and two Carraro engines, giving approximately the same speed of 19 knots, armed with two 20mm/65 MGs, four 8mm submachine guns, two 17.7 inch torpedoes and 30 depth charges with a crew of 26
A third series of 90 ton boats were captured by the Germans while still being constructed in 1943, and later commissioned by the Kreigsmarine as motor launches and minesweepers.

BRITAIN
Having scrapped or sold most of the WW1 CMBs, it was not until 1935 that the British Admiralty placed it's first orders for MTBs, as they were now called, with Scott-Paine's British Power Boat Company. Built to Scott-Paine's design for a 60 foot craft with a hard-chine, planing hull (as distinct from a round-bilge displacement hull). The planing hull was more or less mandatory in order to achieve high speed with the shorter boat, but although it gave inherent lateral stability, it did severely restrict speed in rough weather because of slamming of the flat bottom, and a high plume of water created astern which could be seen from miles away at night.
The first BPB boats were powered by three 500hp Napier petrol engines (up to 33 knt speed), and armed with 2x18 inch torpedoes and .303 machine guns fore and aft. Six were purchaced to begin with, and sent to Malta in 1937 (1st MTB Flotilla). Orders for 12 more followed, with six shipped to Hong Kong (2nd MTB Flotilla). The other six were to go to Singapore, but their deployment under their own power reached the Mediterranean in summer 1939, and with gathering war clouds they were added to 1st Flotilla, Malta.
With further Admiralty interest shown, two MTBs were built as private ventures, a 68 foot craft by Cdr. Du Paine's VOSPER company, and a larger 70 foot craft a SCOTT-PAINE boat, powered by Rolls-Royce engines. This informal competion was decided in favout of Vosper, whose designs became the basis of most of the short MTBs used by the RN during WW2, as distinct from the long MTBs which were over 100 feet.
Some 200 Vosper boats were built and Commissioned. Orders for foreign customers were taken over, as were Thornycraft designs for destined for overseas navies. Vosper itself could not keep up, so other British yards, as well as American yards, filled the bill.
Modifications in design and detail were constant, but three basic series of Vosper craft emerged.
The first came from an experimental craft of 1937, and chosen after extensive trials in 1938. 70 feet long, 36 tons, powered by three Isotta Fraschini engines giving 3,600 bhp with a top speed of just on 40 knots. Armed with two twin .5 inch guns and 2x21 inch torpedoes, carrying a crew of ten. The first were built in 1939, and came into service in 1940. With no suitable British power plant available, Vosper was forced to use the Italian motors. Being petrol driven, they had a tendency to explode or catch fire in combat. They also gave excellent performance, otherwise, and immediately became unavailable when Italy entered the war. Supercharged Hall Scott motors were used for a time, until Packard motors could be supplied from the United States, starting in 1941. Thereafter, Packard motors powered all British boats, as they did for American designs.
Vosper's second series began to come into service in 1942. 72 and 1/2 feet overall, 47 tons, three Packard engines giving 4,050 bhp, with a top speed of 40 knots. Armed with twin .5 inch and 2x .303 machine guns, which were later exchanged for 1x20mm gun, with a 6 pounder added still later. Two 21 inch torpedoes, and with a crew of 12 men (later 13), silencers were fitted to the noisy motors after complaints in early 1943. The unsilenced boats of 1942, however, were fitted with two Ford V8s in addition to their main engines which could be clutched to the outer shafts to drive the boat silently at 6 knots. This process was labourious, and reversing it in order to make a fast exit could be a hair raising experience under fire.
The third and last series came into service in 1944; powered by the same Packard engines with similar speeds to series two, but were 73 feet overall and armed with one twin 20mm, one twin .5, two twin .303 MGs and four 18 inch torpedoes, with a crew of 13 men.
These Vosper craft formed the basis for the LIGHT COASTAL FORCES, comprising 20 Thornycraft (taken from other navies), 32 JS White craft (73 feet, Sterling engines) 38 boats from America (29 Elcos, 5 Higgins, 4 experimental craft). These boats saw most of the offensive action until the larger boats came into operation in mid 1942.
Within this class of short boat (under 100 feet) was the MGB, equipped with heavier guns in place of torps, and developed for the specific purpose of fighting German motor torpedo boats threatening British coastal convoys.
The British Power Boat Company had also begun to build MA/SBs (motor anti-submarine boats) in 1938-39. These boats were twin screw versions of Scott-Paine's 60ft design, and sacrificed speed and torpedoes in favour of anti-submarine weapons and Asdic. Powered by two Napier engines of 1,000bhp (top speed 25 knots), their only armament were .303 MGs, one twin on some craft, and four twins on others. 6 of these craft were in service when the war broke out, with another sixteen 70 footers under construction. It soon became apparent that air-patrols were sufficient to keep most submarines away from coastal waters. In any case, their sub-hunting capabilities were not up to scratch. 22 of these craft were converted to MGBs, with the rest under construction converted as well.
The urgent need for MGBs resulted in the British Power Boat company designing a new model, first coming into service in 1943. 71 and 1/2 feet overall, 47 tons, three Packard engines of 4,050 bhp giving top speeds of 40 knots, armed with 1x two pounder, one twin 20mm, and two twin .303MGs. Crewed by 2 officers and ten men. 78 built in 1942. A further 41 Elcos and Higgins types of 70-80 feet and built in America were transferred to the RN during 1940-42 and were used as MGBs.
For the first three years of the war, Coastal forces were composed mainly of short MTBs and MGBs built of hard-chine, double skin mahogany hulls. But there were also several other types of craft, primarily the ML (motor launch) and HDML (harbor defense motor launch).
The round-bilge HDML was Admiralty designed. 72 feet overall, 54 tons, double-skinned diagonal mahogany hull, and powered by twin diesals of 15ohp each, giving a top speed of 11.5 knots. Armament consisted of one 2 pounder, two twin .303 MGs. Used for patrol work in harbors, esturies and coastal water. Their simple construction enabled them to be easily built in yards abroad, and they saw service in many differing ways in all theaters. 600 of this type were eventually built during 1940-44, including a number for India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and 26 transferred to the French Navy in 1944.
The MLs were even more versatile.
The first was called Fairmile "A". 110 feet, 57 tons, three Hall-Scott 600hp petrol engines, that gave 25 knots. Armed with one 3 pounder, and two single .303MGs, with a crew of 16. Twelve were built in 1940 by ten different firms, with the design by Norman Hart. Of prefabricated, hard-chine construction, they were used for many purposes, including patrol and escort. In 1942, these boats were converted to minelayers.
The Fairmile Company had, in 1940, produced (in cooperation with the Admiralty), a round bilge design it called the Fairmile "B". 112 feet overall, 65 or 73 tons, two Scott-Hall Defender petrol engines of 600hp giving up to 20 knots, armament was similar to the "A" series. 650 of these craft were built, employed as troop carriers for commando raids, patrol and escort, air-sea rescue, minesweeping and mine laying, ambulance launches, and as navigation leaders for the Normandy invasion.
The proven seaworthiness of the "B" series lead to modification of the Fairmile "A" for use as motor-gun boats in 1941. Known as the Fairmile "C", they were 110 feet overall, 72 tons, three Scott-Hall petrol engines of 2,700bhp, supercharged to give greater speed of up to 27 knots. Armament consisted of 2x2 pounders, twin .5 and 2xtwin .303MGs, with a crew of 16. 24 were built in 1941. They were the first of the "long" MGBs (over 100 feet).
By 1942, it was felt that there was also a demand for a long MGB, which could operate further afield and in heavy weather, and also carry more powerful armament. At the same time, operations with the smaller craft had shown that MGBs often missed opportunities by not carrying torpedoes. This amounted to a requirement for a combined MGB/MTB. So, the Fairmile "D" began to come into service in 1942. It was these craft that bore the brunt of operations during the latter stages of the war, rather than the shorter "Dog Boats", as they were called. Over 220 Fairmile "Ds" were built during 1942-44. Of similar prefabricated double skin diagonal mahogany construction, they were 115 feet overall and powered by no less than four Packard supercharged engines of 1,250hp each. As MGBs/MTBs they displaced 105 tons, and had a top speed of 29 knots. As MGBs they were 90 tons and as MTBs they were 95 tons, with speeds of up to 31 knots. They paid a great penalty in size and speed over the shorter boats for their greater sea-keeping qualities and heavier armament, making it hard for them to close an enemy unseen. Different displacements resulted from differing armaments, which varied considerably, and crews also varied from 14 for a single purpose craft to 30 for the dual purpose . As MGBs they first carried one 2 pounder, one twin Oerlikon 20mm, two twin.5 and two twin .303 MGs, 2 depth charges, and one Holman illuminant projector. The MTBs carried the same armament plus 2x21 inch torpedoes.
Eventually, the combined MGB/MTBs carried a formidable armament of two 6 pounders, one twin 20mm, two twon .5 and two twin .303MGs, and 4x18 inch torpedoes. They were the most heavily armed boats of their kind in the world.
In mid-1942, the first of the Denny Type steam gunboats (SGBs) came into service. The largest of the Coastal Force craft, they were 145.5 feet, 165 tons, powered by two geared turbines of 8,000hp which gave up to 35 knots. Armed with one twin 2 pounder, two twin .5 MGs, and 2x21 inch torpedoes, they had a crew of 27. Early operations showed their steam machinery to be quite vulnerable to machine-gun fire. Extensive modifictions had to be carried our to fit heavier armour plating, and at the same time their armament was increased to one 3 inch gun, two 6 pounders, three twin 20mm and 2x21 inch torpedoes. A larger complement of 34 men and a larger displacement of 260 tons resulted in a drop in speed to 30 knots. This, coupled with their size, made them easy to hit, and they were not judged to be a great success. Of the 60 originally planned, only 7 were actually built. Their length classified them as 'ships', which entitled them to be known by names instead of numbers. And so, they became Grey Goose, Grey Wolf, Grey Seal, Grey Fox, Grey Shark and Grey Owl, the only operational motor boats to achieve such a distinction
Also in 1942, 8 Camper & Nicholson craft were built, intended for the Turkish Navy but taken over by the RN. The first 3 were completed as MGBs and the remainder as merchantile blockade runners, named 'Hopewell', 'Nonsuch', 'Gay Viking', 'Gay Corsair', and 'Master Standfast'. 117 feet, 95 tons, powered by three Davey Paxman diesels of 3,000 bhp which gave 30 knots. Armed with one 2 pounder, two twin .5 and two twin .303MGs, 2x21 inch torpedoes. A second series of 8 craft were built in 1944.
Finally in 1943, there were two experimental boats which came too late to be developed before the end of the war. Vosper built a 100 foot craft of 75 tons, powered by four Packards giving 35 knots. armed with one 6 pounder, one twin 20mm and two twin .303 MGs, and 2x18 inch torpedoes. This was completed as an MGB. Fairmile also produced one "F" type craft which had four Bristol engines totalling 7,000hp giving a speed of 36 knots. This "F" type was one of the most powerful petrol engined boats ever built.

From a modest beginning of only 18 MTBs and 6 MA/SBs at the start of the war, Coastal Forces grew into a "private navy" of over 1,700 craft, including 641 MTBs and MGBs, with a peak manpower of 3,000 officers (mostly RNVR) and 22,000 men. In nearly 800 separate actions fought in all theaters, but primarily in home waters and the Mediterranean, they sank more than 500 enemy vessels at a cost of 178 craft. Many of the actions were fought against other motor torpedo boats, and in thus defending allied coastal convoys they were responsible for saving hundreds of merchant vessels. Coastal Force minelayers carried out twice as many minelaying operations as all other minelayers put together.


GERMANY :|
After the First World War, the Reichsmarine was left with only 32 Destoryers and torpedo boats out of the large fleet it had built up; of the remainder, 80 had been destroyed in action, 143 were given up to the allied powers, and 117 were broken up. The Versailles Treaty restricted not only the size of the destroyers that Germany could build, but also the number of them. In the mid-1920s, when Germany began to recinstruct her fleet, they were limited to torpedo boats of not more than 900 tons. Soon after, partly as a result of British and Italian success in the Great War, but primarily because of the restrictions, they turned their attention to the possibilities of motor torpedo boats for the first time.
In 1928, the Reichsmarine obtained from the Lurssen shipyard in Vegesack the plans for a luxury motor cruiser being built for an american customer. Powered by three Maybach engines, and with a top speed of 30 knots, it became the basis for the design of the SCNELLBOOTE (fast motor torpedo boat). Because of Versailles, it was called a "submarine chaser". Torpedo tubes on the forecastle could be rapicly set up or removed, and grooves in the hull which made it possible for the launched torpedoes to clear the hull were made to look like streamlining.
Germany's great advantage was the development of the first class Daimler-Benz diesel engine. Deisels were used in the first "S" boats and proved far less hazardous during war operations than the highly inflammable petrol engines of the British, american and Italian craft.
S-1 was completed in 1930, a hard chine boat of 81 feet, 39 tons, and powered by three 1,000 bhp engines with a top speed of 37 knots, and armed with 2x21 inch torpedoes and a light machine gun. 5 of these craft were built up to 1932, but proved to have limited seaworthiness. Newly developed 1,320hp engines required larger space in the hull, so size was increased to 106 feet., 80 tons, and with a round bilge design of two or three skins of teak wood on a light metal. The wheelhouse was enclosed, a 20mm AA gun replaced the MG and the crew now numbered 21. 8 of these were built in 1934. Then their size was increased to 114 feet, 85 tons, in order to take the three even more powerful diesels totaling 6,150hp. The top speed was 38 knots in 1938 and by 1939, 40 knots. With only slight modifications, 12 of these craft were delivered between 1938-9. With a range of 700 miles and a crew of 21, they were armed with 2x21 inch torpedoes and 2x20mm AA guns.
These 24 craft (S1 had been scrapped) were the only motor torpedo boats in service when the war began, and the first five were by then obselete. However, plans had been drawn up by the Lurssen yard which were to be the template for all "S" boats built during the war. The most notable alteration was that the two forward 20 inch torpedo tubes were enclosed by a partially raised forecastle, with flanges that opened when the torpedoes were released. This gave the S-boats their distinctive low and lean shape, and contributed greatly to their seaworthiness and speed.
The first of these boats, S-26, came into service early in 1940. Of similar performance, and with the same armament and crew, it was now 100 tons.
A further 93 were built over the next three years, with only slight modifciations, and mostly by the Lurssen yard. A number were also built by the Schlichting yard at Travemunde.
16 boats of a smaller 108 foot version were built in 1941, in which a top speed of 36 knots and five fewer crew were the features. But the operating range was also increased to 800 miles. An even smaller craftf of 92 feet was built in 1943, and 8 completed by the Werf Gusto yard for the Royal Netherlands Navy.
Also in 1943, a 40mm cannon was added to the larger version in place of one of the 20mm guns, it's crew increased to 23, and three new diesel engines installed that gave it 7,500bhp and pushed the top speed to 42 knots. Craft size was increased to 115 feet overall, displacing 105 tons, and in this form, 75 were brought into service in 1943-44. The later boats carried two 30mm guns in place of former armament, and speed was further increased to 45 knots with the introduction of 3,000bhp engines. They also carried either two spare torpedoes or six to eight mines.
From 1944 onwards, the gun armament of the larger boats was either one 40mm or three 20mm, or one 37mm and five 20mm.
26 boats were completed in 1945, including 9 which sported 4x20 inch torpedo tubes, and three twin 30mm guns. A large number of others were in various stages of completion, but were scrapped when the war ended.

Germany also developed another type of coastal craft called the R-boat (Raumboote), which was similar to the British ML and used for coastal convoy protection, minelaying, minesweeping and air-sea rescue. The first of these craft was built by Lurssen in 1934. Those used during the war were between 116 and 134.5 feet overall, displacing 110 to 175 tons. Two or three shaft diesels gave speeds of 20-24 knots, and armed variously with 37mm and 20mm AA guns.
325 R-boats were brought into service with crews between 34 and 38.



........................................................CONTINUED BELOW............................................................................................

 

.....................................MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS CONTINUED........................................................................................


THE UNITED STATES: :laugh:
The lack of interest shown in motor torpedo boats by the US Navy during the First World War continued in the post war period, and the only development that took place was in 1920 when the Navy bought two Thornycraft CMB designs for experimental purposes. It was not until 1937 that Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy and one of the few to appreciate the value of these craft sponsored an appropriation of $15 million for development, partly due to the interest shown by other countries.

At the same time, Americans who were familiar with the possibilities began to use a number of Thornycraft ex-CMBs on a private basis to smuggle liquor from Canada along the East Coast during the Prohibition era. This 'rum-trade' led to smugglers carrying out extensive experiments to improve performance, including adapting the Liberty engine for maritime use; these experiments proved of considerable value during World War Two.
In 1938, Roosevelt's money bill caused the US Navy to offer prizes to private designers, including 54 foot and 70 foot MTBs. The result was the company of Higgens Industry awarded a contract in May 1939 to build two PT (Patrol Torpedo) boats, numbers 5 and 6, based on the winning 70 foot design of Sparkman and Stephens, the Naval architects, but scaled up to 81 feet. The US Navy also began to experiment with their own designs.
But all these designs became obselete when later in 1939, the English designer who had failed to secure the Royal Navy's contract for MTBs in competition with Vosper, took his British Power Boat Company's 70 foot craft across the Atlantic and sold it to the US Navy. This boat was the ancestor of the US Navy's motor torpedo boats. After trials, supervised by Scott-Paine himself, it was arranged for the Electric Boat company (ELCO) to build the craft under licence. In December, 1939, Elco was given an order for 11 (PTs 10-20), as well as 12 motor boat submarine chasers based on the same design. The only major modification was the substitution of the 1,200hp Packard engines for the original Rolls-Royce engines. Scott-Paine's craft had to be used for taking measurements, and it was not until June 17th, 1940 that it was finally delivered to the US Navy for operational use as PT-9....the first American PT Boat.
The experimental PTs 1-8 were still being built. PT-9 and the Elco boats proved to be unsatisfactory. Then Higgens carried out modifications to the original 81 foot design and their new 78 foot craft was delivered in Febraury 1941 and recieved with much enthusiasm. Many, in fact, thought it superior to the Scott-Paine design. The Navy called for modifications to the Elcos to make them bigger, in order to carry 4x21 inch torpedo tubes. PT-20 and the 29 boats that were to follow were 77 foot craft. Most of the earlier boats were tranferred to the Royal Navy, and used on operations in the Mediterranean.
By now, other American boat builders wanted to compete for contracts, and in the summer of 1941 the US Navy held what was called the "Plywood Derby" to test all the various types of craft against each other. Elco were the winners, with Higgens second, and from this time on those two companies were responsible for building most American PTs. Third in the race was the Huckins Yacht company; ten Huckins designs were later built but not used in combat.
Further modifications resulted in a two standard designs. The Elco 80-footer (38 tons), and the Higgens 78-footer (35 tons). Both were powered by three 12 cylinder Packard marine engines, burning 100 octane gasoline, originally rated at 1,200hp but, as the boats increased in weight with heavier armament, modified to 1,350hp and finally 1,500hp. Both boats owed much to the original Scott-Paine design, maintaining the hard-chine stepless bottom hull and the outward 'flare' at the sides. Elco eventually built 320 of these boats and Higgens 205, including some for lend-lease.
Both boats were designed for top speeds of at least 40 knots with a full load and a cruising range of 500 miles. While following similar basic design, each had it's own distinctive below deck arrangement of engine-room, fresh water tanks, feul tanks to carry 3,000 gallons of gasoline, chart room and living quarters. The Elco was slightly faster, but the Higgens was more maneuverable.
The first boats carried four torpedo tubes, (18 inch then 21 inch), and two .5 inch machine guns. Then 20mm cannon were added, a dual purpose weapon. Automatic 37mm guns, mounted in the bow, became standard in 1943, and were then replaced by two 40mm cannons. Towards the end of the war, experiments with 75mm guns, 4.5 inch barrage rocket projectors, and 5 inch spin stabilized rockets were all tried.
The increase in weight of gun armament was made possible by a reduction in the weight of torpedoes. The original four Mk-VIIIs fitted were heavy, slow, and given to erratic runs, especially at shallow depth settings, and also had to be launched through tubes to avoid tumbling the gyro, which added to the weight. The Mk-XIII torpedo, when introduced, avoided many of these drawbacks. It was not only faster (45 knots), more powerful and reliable, but it's non-tumbling gyro made it possible for it to be launched on each side of the boat instead of through heavy tubes.


JAPAN:
Japanese interest in motor torpedo boats was the least of the great naval powers, concentrating as they did on building the bigger warships, previously denied to them by the Washington Naval treaties of 1929 and 1935. Most small boats built were landing craft, primarily intended for use during the invasion of China in 1937.
In 1938, however, the Imperial Japanese Navy captured a Thornycraft CMB at Canton, and from this the Tsurami yard developed an experimental craft. This led to the T-1 Type, seven of which were built in 1941. 59 feet, powered by two petrol engines of 1,800bhp which gave 38.5 knots, and armed with two 7.7mm guns and 2x18 inch torpedoes or 6 depth charges.
Later types of this boat were built of wood or steel in 1942 and 1943 and were simplified so they could be constructed quickly in small boatyards, resulting in speed reductions to between 17 and 27 knots. Generally armed with either one 13mm or one 25mm AA gun and two 18 inch torpedoes.
During this period, a much bigger craft was also built, the T-51 Type; 104.33 feet, 75 tons, powered by four Type-6 or two Vulcan engines which gave 29 or 30 knots, and armed with two or three 25mm AA guns, two or four 18 inch torpedo tubes and 8 depth charges.
In 1944, a new Type-14 was designed, smaller than the others but with better performance; 49.25 feet, one Type-91 petrol engine giving 35 knots and armed with one 13mm or one 25mm AA gun and 2x18 inch torpedoes.
Throughout the war, the Japanese suffered from a lack of engines, and many hulls were not completed as a consequence, still on the stocks when they surrendered. Of the more than 250 boats that were completed, a number developed engine troubles and were used only for harbour duties. 49 were lost during the war, the remainder surrendered or scrapped after 1946.
As a result of aquiring a former Italian MAS boat in 1940, the Imperial Navy developed from this several types of motor gunboat powered by aircraft engines, giving between 17.5 and 34 knots, of which more than 100 were built by the Navy and small private yards during the war. Most were 59 feet, armed with two 20mm AA and two 7.7mm guns or three 25mm AA guns, All carried two to four depth charges. They were originally intended to escort MTBs on their missions, but the Imperial Navy left the development of their coastal craft too late for them to make much contribution.
As a last resort during the closing months of the war, the Japanese introduced the one-man Shinyo type suicide motorboat. They were 16 to 18 feet, powered by one or two automobile engines with speeds of up to 30 knots and loaded with a charge of over 4,000lbs of TNT in their bows which was armed by the pilot when on collision course to the enemy vessel. Over 6,000 were built, most of them for use during the Okinawa campaign, where they were hidden in coves and inlets until they could be launched from their trolleys on a one way journey for both man and boat. But, American PTs successfully located most of their hiding places before they could be used. There is no record of any Allied ship being seriously damaged by one of these craft.


ACTION "CAPSULES": :tinysmile_classes_t
There is an Allied bias to these descriptions. German and Italian records are incomplete or hard to find, the majority of their paperwork swallowed up by the surrender and subsequent destruction of much material. Allied accounts are far more complete and available, and so form the bulk of the action.

STRAITS OF DOVER-First Blood
On the night of 9 May, 1940, four boats (S-30, S-31, S-32, S-33) of Kapitanleutnant Rudolph Petersen's 2nd Schnellboote Flotilla were in position in the English Channel - the first German patrol of the war in English home waters - to lend naval support to the invasion of Holland, Belgium and France. At 2200 hours, silhouettes were sighted on the horizon. Lt Kosky (S-32) peered into the gloom, studying the outlines of the ships. He thought they were British destroyers. Peterson's group had, in fact, run into a force of cruisers and destroyers of the Home fleet that had been searching for enemy minelayers. German shipping had been cleared from the area so Peterson ordered an attack. Quietly, on single engines, Peterson's force circled eastwards. They hoped they had not been seen, but a light suddenly signaled from one of the destroyers. Peterson was unable to reply with the correct code. Seconds later, the destroyers began firing. Splashing near misses around him, Peterson ordered all engines full ahead and turned hard to port. Low on fuel, Kosky and Peterson were compelled to turn for home. But S-31 under Kptlt Opdenhoff lost contact with the other three craft, and, finding one of the destroyers dead ahead, fired 2 torpedoes at 800 yards. Because of gunfire from other ships, Opdenhoff could not linger to check his results. Destroyer HMS 'Kelly' (Lord Louis Mountbatten in command) sustained severe damage, but made it home after an epic 91 hour tow to the Tyne for extensive repairs.

DUNKIRK- Stars on both Sides.
Operation "Dynamo" was a testing time for the Coastal forces, which included 7 MTBs, 3 MA/SBs, one ML and 1 old CMB. Evacuating forces included commanders who where to become legendary -Christopher Dreyer, Bill Everitt, Hilary Gamble, "Harpy" Lloyd. James Cameron's 40 foot MTB was the last boat to leave Dunkirk, and one of the smallest taking part in the operation. But, they didn't just evacuate. Patrolling the Eastern flank, they held off attacks by marauding S-boats for two days. But the pressure was too much, as S-boats penetrated the screen to sink the British destroyers 'Wakeful' and 'Grafton'. One of these was sunk by S-25, commanded by Siegfried Wuppermann, who was to become one of the best known German 'ace' commanders in the Mediterranean.

BLANC NEZ- Coastal Force Bites Back
After months of frustration, Dover command recieved RDF reports of a German convoy running the straits on 8 September, 1941. Only three boats of the polygot 6th MTB flotilla were operational. But Lt Cdr Pumphrey did not hesitate to order them out to intercept. At 2332 hours, the British, composed of Pumphrey (MTB 35), Lt C.E. "Chuck" Bonnel RCNVR (MTB 218) and Lt. Per Danielson (MTB 54), RN Norway, engaged the enemy screen. As the German ships loomed out the darkness, they were seen to be two large merchant vessels escorted by two armed trawlers and a gaggle of at least 8 S-boats. Pumphreys force managed to penetrate the screen and sink one of the merchants with a well placed pair of torpedoes dead amidships almost before the German escorts were aware of his presence. Pumphrey drew back. But, drawn by the gunfire, 2 MGBs of Ramsgate's Flotilla (Lt Stewert Gould) joined in, fighting a running gun battle with the S-boats, and managing to sink the second merchant and one of the armed trawlers. British craft sustained only light damage. German ascendancy in the Channel was broken.

BJOKKA FJORD- Nowegian Mission
During the Autumn of 1941, the Royal Navy attempted more and more to carry the fight into enemy controlled waters. New methods were tested, and one of these was to tow an MTB to increase it's operational range. On the 1st of October, the Norwegian destroyer 'Draug' left the Scapa Flow anchorage with Lt. Per Danielson's MTB-56 in tow, headed for Bjokka Fjord in Norway. Thirty miles from the coast the small boat slipped from the destroyer and moved quietly into Bjokka, south of Bergen. Danielson was lucky....he came upon a fully laden tanker, escorted and southward bound. In a quick action, he sank the tanker and one of the escorting S-boats, before a high speed dash back to the rendevous with 'Draug'. It had been a brilliantly executed fight, and both Allied vessels returned home without damage.


BINANGA BAY- Squadron 3 Strikes the IJN
At the beginning of the Pacific war, only six American PTs were available for the coming four month struggle with the IJN. These six were of PT Squadron 3, under command of Lt. John Bulkeley. Despite their lack of numbers, the PTs used every opportunity to harrass Japanese naval movements. On January 18, Bulkeley recieved orders to make a night attack on four enemy vessels, possibly including a destroyer, that had been sighted. PT-34 and PT-31 set off, but PT-31 failed to make the rendevous, so Bulkeley decided to attack alone. Shortly before midnight, Bulkeley was challenged by a two-masted freighter. He replied by firing two torpedoes. One hit the ship and exploded, but the other stuck in the tube whilst still running. The metal was becoming white hot without water resistence to slow the motor of the torpedo down. Under fire now from shore batteries, PT-34 decided to run for the harbor entrance. After disabling the torpedo, it now hung out of the tube, the wash of the water threatening to arm it. Chief torpedoman John Martino was forced to clamber out along the 'fish' itself, and, by stuffing a wad of toilet paper into it's mechanism, disarm it. The Army reported the loss of a 5,000 ton Japanese frieghter. But the American celebrations were short lived. PT 31 had broken down with 'waxy' fuel in it's carburettors ( a familiar problem). Drifting helplessly, it ran aground. It's crew were rescued by Philipino Army forces and Lt. De Long, it's skipper, had to scuttle it by chopping holes in the petrol tank and setting it on fire.

CRETE- Italy Strikes
Nowhere was the fight for the shallow seas more bitterly fought than the Mediterranean. Control of sea lanes was vital to both side's operations in North Africa, and the Islands of the Aegean. Early successes in small boats were, not surprisingly, with the Italians, with their great emphasis on individual effort suited to small boat operations. The Italian national character was particularly handy for these small boats, making a number of attacks on Malta bound convoys from the Island of Pantellaria, off Sicily. On June 20, they sank the British submarine "Union" as well, but perhaps their greatest success occurred on March 12, 1942 when four MAS boats (516, 520, 526, 536) managed to place four torpedoes into the RN cruiser HMS York, which was on patrol off Crete, turning her over and sinking her with many survivors washed ashore. Details are sketchy, for records of Italian MAS boats were destroyed after surrender in 1943.

BAIE DE SEINE - A New Beginning
In the summer of 1942, a new generation of coastal craft, with correspondingly different tactical approaches, entered service. SGBs, with steel hulls and larger armaments, were thought to be the answer to German ascendance in this field. Only 7 were built and one was lost in the very first action by these craft. On the evening of Jun 18, three British boats (SGBs 6,7 & 8) of the newly formed 1st SGB Flotilla set out in company with the 'Hunt' class destroyer "Albrighton". Their first mission was to intercept two German merchants plotted by RDF and known to have departed Le Harve with an escort of S-boats. Shortly after 0230, "Albrighton" made RDF contact with a force 2.5 miles ahead. Firing a starshell, "Albrighton" led the attack, but it's torpedo missed and she drew back to allow the SGBs some freedom of movement. Lt.J.D. Ritchie on SGB-8 (flotilla commander), attacked astern in conjunction with Lt. R.L. Barnet's SGB-7 (SGB-6 had returned to Portsmouth after engine failure). SGB-8 fired the first torpedo and it was seen to hit. Then, SGB-7 joined the attack, firing 2 torpedoes that hit with a loud explosion. A large column of water spouted into the air, and a dull orange glow spread along the stricken ship. By this time, SGB-8 was in a fierce running battle with escorting S-boats. When Lt. Ritchie next had an opportunity to look around, both the target frieghter and SGB-7 had dissappeared. SGB-7s crew were mostly taken prisoner, including her skipper, Lt. Barnet. This new tactic of combining MTBs with a destroyer was proved successful, but lack of destroyers generally precluded similar operations of this type from being mounted with any great regularity.


ST NAZAIRE - Greatest Raid of All
The Atlantic convoy route was getting very "hot" for merchant ships from German submarine attacks. The destruction of the battleship "Bismark" did not end the threat from German surface ships, either. These ships drydocked and repaired at the French harbor of St. Nazaire, a facility and haven for German capital ships plying their North Atlantic "trade". After many attempts to wreck it's port facilities by air-raid, (Allied bomber crews called it "Flak-City"), Mountbatten's Combined Operations Command decided to stage a Commando attack to knock out the drydock caissons, pump-house, and winding stations of the largest drydock on the European Atlantic shoreline (originally built to service the liner "Normandie"), and the only drydock that could house the immense German battleship "Tirpitz". The decision was made to use an old four stacker lend-lease destroyer as a ram with explosive charges, to physically hit the southern cassion and destroy it. HMS "Campeltown" was coverted to resemble a "Mowe" class German destroyer. Sixteen MLs, one MTB and one MGB (and "Campeltown" herself) were tasked with depositing 630 commandoes and trained explosives handlers to finsh the job with the rest of the drydock's facilities. On the night of March 27, 1942, after an air-raid by Bomber Command that only served to wake the extensive harbor defenses, the flotilla entered the inner harbor area, flashing signals to fool the German defenses and buy time for "Campetown's" ram operation. At 0234, the German defenses, not fooled anymore, opened up in earnest. "Campeltown" and her motor torpedo boat escorts burst through the curtain of very heavy German fire, with "Campeltown" sticking fast to the south caisson as planned. The commmando groups, some of which did not land, gathered their wits and managed to blow one carefully rehearsed target after another. By morning, however, the north caisson was still intact, despite three attempts to blow it. German defenders congratulated themselves on throwing the assault back.....but "Campeltown"s charges went off later that morning with a huge roar that wiped out over 300 soldiers and officers gathered around the vessel, and destroyed the south caisson. Fully a third of the commando force was captured, however, and only 3 motorboats made the long journey back to English waters, loaded with dead and wounded, but their desperate mission judged a success. The drydock was not used again during the course of the war.

CAP DE LA HAGUE - A Black eye for the Kreigsmarine
In the fall of 1942, the Coastal Forces were finally allocated sufficient ships and boats to base strong forces of MTBs, MGBs and "Hunt" class destroyers at Dartmouth, Plymouth and Portsmouth, in an attempt to close the Channel to shipping entirely. Over the next two years this force carried out many sorties amongst the Channel Islands and between Cherbourg and Ushant. One such operation took place on the night of October 13/14, 1942, when the Germans tried to bring the important, 5,000 ton disguised merchant raider "KOMET" through the channel to Cherbourg, before she would set out to attack Atlantic shipping and convoys. Five destroyers and eight MTBs were despatched to intercept. The Destroyers finally made contact after fruitless 'sweeps', and succeeded in setting the 'Komet' on fire. MTB 236 (2nd/Lt R.Q. Drayson RNVR) arrived on the scene, drawn by the fire. The destroyers had been forced to turn their attention to the escorting S-boats, damaging every one of them in the resulting crossfire. 'Komet', however, was still making 15 knots. Creeping ahead, Drayson waited for "Komet" to close, and at a range of 500 yards delivered the coup-de-grace with two torpedoes. "Komet" blew up with an explosion heard 60 miles away. Drayson was awarded the DSC for this action.

SKJAERGARRD FJORD - More Norwegian Success
With the approach of winter weather, operations for the smaller craft were reduced by their continued inability to handle the rough sea conditions. But in 1942, the larger Fairmile "D"s came into service. Their better seakeeping qualities enabled longer range operations to be mounted. With this in mind, the 30th MTB Flotilla was activated, equipped with the new craft and manned by officers and men of the Royal Norwegian Navy, and under the command of Lt. Cdr. R.A.Tamber, and based in the Shetland Islands. Their first success came on the morning of 27 November. Under a brilliant moon, two boats managed to enter Skjaergarrd fijord undetected. Avoiding patrolling S-boats, they torpedoed and sank two large merchant vessels each of 7,000 tons, to the complete surprise of the German forces. Returning to the Shetlands, they had to endure a full blown gale, something these larger craft handled quite well.

KUMUSI RIVER - Christmas Present
The first six PT-boats arrived in the southwest Pacific area in mid-December 1942, formed into 'Division 17' (Commander Lt. Daniel S. Baughman), at Milne Bay, Papua. In one of their first actions on Christmas Eve, while on Patrol from a PT base set up on the Isle of Tufi, Ensign Robert F. Lynch, commanding PT-122, sighted a surfaced submarine at the mouth of the Kumusi river. Beyond it was a dark object, which Baughman thought was another submarine. Closing slowly, Lynch fired two torpedoes....they seemed to hit, but did not sink the enemy sub. Closing now, two forward torpedoes were fired, and this time their were two loud explosions, a sheet of flame, and the Japanese submarine I-22 (2,180 tons), broke in half and sank. PT-122 had to deftly maneuver a torpedo track streaking toward it, as the second enemy sub had submerged to fire. Stepping on the gas, PT-122 sped away to an uproarious reception back at base.

OFF NORTH AFRICA - A Helping Hand for Rommel
May of 1942 saw an S-boat Flotilla moved to Derna, North Africa, 35 miles west of the garrison at Tobruk. It's task was to assist in the ferrying of Rommel's supplys, in preparation for the German "Gazala" offensive. On the following month during the night of June 14, they scored their first big success. A large British convoy was spotted by German aircraft, setting out from Alexandria, heavily escorted. KptLt. Wupperman and 5 S-boats were ordered to intercept and attack. His first attempt, shortly before midnight, was beaten off by the destroyer escorts, and by the time his force had regrouped, he had lost contact. That might have been the end of it, but several hours later, hearing of the Italian battlefleet's departure from Taranto to intercept, the British convoy reversed it's course, in the hope of throwing the Italians off the scent. This brought them right back on track with Wuppermann's force. S-56 suddenly found itself in the middle of a group of British destroyers and a cruiser. During the confused engagement which followed, Wuppermann's S-boat torpedoed and seriously damaged the 9,000 ton Southampton class cruiser "Newcastle", and another of the S-boats damaged one of the destroyers so badly it had to be sunk by it's own escort. The convoy returned to Alexandria, throwing Allied shipping and supply timetables temporarily into chaos.

TRIPOLI HARBOR - Malta Force First Blood
Early in 1943, MTBs based at Malta achieved their first major success. Four boats left the island at midday on 19 January on patrol towards Tripoli. Approaching the harbor at ten knots with engines geared to silent running, three boats made landfall and chanced upon a stationary Italian submarine, the "Santorre Santorosa", which was actually grounded on shoals outside the harbor. Engaged by cannon fire, the MTBs maneuvered to place their 'tin fish', but were driven off by a German destroyer, which had emerged from the harbor. A hasty withdrawl was followed by another silent approach. They picked up the submarine again at 02:20. MTB 260 fired her starboard 'fish' at 400 yards, hitting squarely aft of the conning tower. As the shore batteries opened up again, smokescreens were laid to cover a fast withdrawl. Tripoli was captured three days later, and the "Santorre Santorrosa" found to have been abandoned with severe torpedo damage.

STRAITS OF MESSINA -Dogfight of the Little Ships
With the invasion of Sicily, it now became vital for Allied forces to secure control of the Messina Straits, to prevent Italo/German forces from resupplying, reinforcing and eventually evacuating the survivors to the mainland. This task fell to British MTBs, based at Malta initially, then at Syracuse. On 14 July 1943, three boats (MTB 77, 81 & 84) of the 24th flotilla from Malta were lying in mid-channel with engines silent when two surfaced U-boats suddenly came bearing down on them. A torpedo, fired from backpedalling MTBs (the torpedoes needed a minimum range to 'arm' properly) struck at a range of 100 yards and sank the hapless U-561, but the other sub crash-dived. As the MTBs were searching for survivors, a group of S-boats passed by at high speed. The British gave chase, radioing ahead to a southern group of boats on patrol at the opposite end of the strait. The southern patrol (MTBs 655, 656, 633) recieved the message. These three engaged the German craft (S47, 57, 59, 63) at 2340 hrs, approximately an hour and a half after the loss of the U-boat. Shortly after, seven MAS boats (543, 549, 553, 554, 555, 568, 587) and the Northern British patrol arrived to join the fray. What followed was the largest 'dogfight' of the war, as further reinforcements joined over the course of the next two hours. Despite the shells expended in liberal quantities, only 2 S-boats were lost whilst the Italians utilized superior speed to make a fast exit. Allied craft all returned to port, many with heavy damage and casualties on board, but none lost entirely.

SILBA ISLAND - The Allies Bite Hard
Allied coastal operatios were extended into the Adriatic following the Italy landings. The original intention had been to attack enemy shipping along the east coast of Italy, but this was soon found not be feasable and the Dalmatian coast thus proved a more lucrative hunting ground. On 21 December, 1943, MTBs achieved their greatest single victory in the area. It had been reported that the ex-Jugoslavian cruiser "Dalmatia", renamed by the Germans "Niobe", was aground off Silba Island. Two MTBs (298 & 226)of the 20th Flotilla were dispatched from Hvar. Sighting the cruiser at 0100hrs, the British boats approached silently and fired four torpedoes. A series of violent explosions wracked the "Niobe". Avoiding the fire of the German patrol craft, the MTBs returned to base at dawn.

HARWICH - German Resurgance
With the new generation of S-boats, German commanders showed less reluctance to engage in direct confrontation. The time inevitably came on the night of 14 February 1944 when they sought out a group of British boats. A flock of S-boats (121, 122, 123, 127, 133, 134) had been spotted and the corvettes "Mallard" and "Shearwater" dispatched to drive them off. Meanwhile, these boats of the 16th Schnellboote Flotilla were informed of the course of a group of MTBs (439, 441, 444, 459) returning from a raid off Iijmuiden. Briefly losing the corvettes, the S-boats intercepted the British and preceded to maul them. Only the arrival of the Corvettes saved the British boats from complete disaster; as it was, four MTBs were heavily damaged. The German craft slipped away.

SLAPTON SANDS - Invasion Rehearsal Fiasco
German intelligence knew a buildup of forces across the English Channel signaled INVASION, but they did not know where or when. Carrying out what countermeasures they could, large numbers of S-boats were out every night, laying mines and patrolling- doing all they could to hamper Allied preparations. Their biggest success came early in the morning of 28 April, 1944, when 9 Cherbourg based S-boats attacked a convoy of American landing craft taking part in invasion rehearsals off Slapton Sands Beach in Lyme Bay. Landing craft were sunk and others damaged. Controversy still rages over this action, suppressed as it was by Allied Intelligence, so Allied casualties are hard to pin down. However, the S-boats got two bites in in two seperate attacks, with an undisclosed number of armoured vehicles sinking, and friendly fire contributing to the mess and causing more casualties still. American losses are said to be well over 700 men.

BAIE-DE-SEINE -1944 Version
The Allied Naval command had reason to be satisfied with their efforts to neutralize the S-boat threat. By all appearances, Allied destroyers and torpedo boats had successfully sealed the harbors of Cherbourg and Le Havre. But on June 11, German craft slipped through the blockade with ease. In the Baie De-Seine, boats from Le Havre (S 137, 151, 156, 157) encountered HMS "Halstead" escorting three merchant ships. Attacking, the S-boats isolated the frigate from the convoy. Before Allied reinforcements could arrive, the "Halstead" and one merchant vessel were torpedoed and left sinking.

LE HAVRE - Climax in the Channel
As the battle for Normandy reached it's culmination, Allied efforts concentrated on maintaining a close blockade of Le Havre as the Germans tried to move supplies and reinforcements in, and, at the same time, evacuate shipping from the harbor. Typical of this period were the actions 25/26 August. A trio of S-boats (137, 142, 143) slipped from Le Havre to act as a diversionary force to draw off MTBs from a convoy forming outside Fecamp, consisting of five merchantman and two Raumbooten (R-35 & 39). With their slight advantage in speed and the cover of darkness, the S-boats shook off their pursuers and joined the convoy to act as the escorts. The scattered Allied forces now concentrated on the convoy. At 0230, the frigate "Thornborough" engaged the convoy, and was soon joined by three British MTBs (473, 519, 523). Meanwhile, under cover of this action, the French destroyer "La Combattante" crept up on the convoy unobserved. In a battle lasting nearly an hour, one S-boat and one minesweeper were lost. No vessels managed to reach Le Havre that night


.........................................................CONTINUED BELOW....................................................................................

 

.......................................MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS..............................................................................................
..................................ACTION CAPSULES CONTINUED........................................................................................

STRAIT OF SURIGAO- Last Gasp for the IJN
With their inner defenses breached by the Leyte landings, the Japanese High command was prepared to force a naval engagement to regain the initiative. One of four Japanese task forces, composed of cruisers, battleships and destroyers, entered the Surigao Strait, divided into two fleets under the command of vice. Admiral Shoji Nishimura and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Nishimura's force was defeated in a heated action with US Navy capital ships on 20 October, 1944. The destroyer "Shigure" was the only ship of Nishimura's force to survive the battle. Retreating down the strait, it was engaged by three American PT boats (152, 493, 137). During this action, PT 137 fired a torpedo at the "Shigure". It missed. But at that moment, Shima's force entered the area and the torpedo ploughed on to strike a cruiser, the "Abukuma", so damaging it that it was forced to drop out of formation. Shima's destroyers scattered the PTs, sinking two. But the crippled "Abukuma" threw Shima's timetable into total confusion. Showing a timidity common to Japanese Admirals in World War Two, Shima chose to withdraw.

SCHELDT ESTUARY -Final Clash of the "Dogboats"
Within a period of one week in April, 1945, in a series of fierce encounters between S-boats and MTBs that were made possible by the close cooperation that now existed between Allied air patrols and surface vessels, the German craft were finally defeated. The patrolling frigate "Elkins" and two MTBs intercepted a group of S-boats on their way to lay mines, and severely damaged one. German boats returned to base without accomplishing their mission. This action on the 12th of April was their last hurrah.

CAORLE LIGHT - The Med Swansong
The last successful action by Allied naval forces in the "Med" came on April 13th, 1945 when two boats of the 57th MTB Flotilla attacked TB-45, a German heavy torpedo boat (seized from the Italians in '43) attempting to reach Venice. Despite heavy fire from the "Spica", the MTBs sank it with gunfire. Unfortunately, on the run home, in an area which was supposed to have been cleared of mines by Tito's partisan "Pirate Fleet", MTB 697 struck a mine and broke in two, both halves burning furiously. It's crewmen were never found

LINGAYAN GULF - Naval "Divine Wind"
It was soon after the landings in the Lingayan Gulf that a new threat to Allied shipping became apparent. The Japanese suicide boats, in the manner of the Kamikaze, were to reverse the Allied offensive momentum. With virtually no navy left, it was this kind of warfare that Japan was reduced to in the final months of their despairing struggle. One of the main tasks of the PT boats in 1945 was to counter these suicide craft. Thus, on 13 May, after reports of "Shinyo" boats had brought PTs 338 and 423 into the area, and as three large American supply ships suddenly presented an irresistable target, six "Shinyo" craft issued from concealment on the Luzon coast and streaked towards the merchant ships. In a quick fight, the PTs managed to intercept the "Shinyos", sinking all six in the melee.

KOKKAWA ON THE BAWLE RIVER - Riverine Action in Asia
During the third Arakan campaign to liberate Burma, Japanese troops utilized the myriad inner waterways of the coastal region to reinforce and evacuate troops. To halt this, the Royal Navy assigned the arduous task of closing this route to the 39th, 37th, 49th and 55th ML Flotillas, equiped with Fairmile "B" craft, suited for the shallow draft river operations. Patrols began in October 1944, as soon as the monsoon ended. But by May 1945, the British were still struggling for control of the waterways. A typical operation: 15 May three British boats (MGB 367, 391, 437), concealed themselves on the banks of the Bawle River. Alerted by natives of the approach of three Japanese launches (MG 78, 131, 141), they waited until the last moment, bursting from cover to engage. Despite casualties, the British pressed home their attack. Within 15 minutes, all three Japanese launches were in flames. Natives, equipped with spears, hunted down the Japanese wounded and survivors the next day.


TACTICS :tinysmile_classes_t
Attacks by all forces in the early period of the Second World War revealed only too clearly a lack of training and understanding in the kind of tactics required. An example of this was the abortive attack on a German destroyer on July 27th, 1941 by 5 MBTs of the 11th Flotilla from Dover. Two of the boats narrowly escaped collision when crossing each others bows at top speed, less than ten feet apart. The torpedoes were fired at too great a distance from the destroyer to have any chance of scoring a hit. One torpedo narrowly missed hitting another MTB. And one of the craft fired at British aircraft flying overhead at that moment. It was a chapter of classic mistakes, with only luck preventing serious casualties. It was no wonder that Coastal Force operations were often summed up officially as amateur and second rate, with their attacks not pressed home hard enough.
But, the crews were gradually learning from such mistakes. They found, for instance that while approaching a target from behind had the advantage that the enemy usually kept a poorer lookout in that direction, it required high speed and considerable judgement on the part of the controlling Senior officer to be successful.

The ideal firing position was in fact from an angle on the enemy's bow from where the torpedo could hit at 90 degrees to his track. With the whole length of the target exposed there was the maximum margin for error and the enemy had the greatest distance to turn if he wished to take evasive action - to "comb the tracks". The actual angle of firing had a number of factors to take into account, including speeds of the torpedo and the target and the distance the "fish" had to travel, so that invariably from this position it would be aimed some distance ahead of the target.

Firing from the quarter was the worst position of all....

The target was narrow and the 'deflection' angle made it narrower still. The time of flight was long and allowed the enemy to take avoiding action, which could be achieved by only a small alteration of course. And if the torpedo did hit, the angle was so fine that the torpedo could cannon off without exploding, which did happen on occasion.

Only slightly better was firing from the bow since the deflection angle and the time of flight was shorter. But it was still a chancy method of attack. All torpedo tactics had to be devised to place the boats as near as possible to the ideal "angle on the bow".
Getting into this ideal firing position was another matter, of course. If a motor boat came up at full speed, she would be detected from some distance off, either from the noise of her engines or the foaming wake created at such high speeds. The target merchant ships would turn away while the escorts intervened and engaged the MTBs in a gun fight, which, before new types began to arrive, they were ill-equipped.
Far more successful was the slow "creep", quietly on auxiliary engines, preferably from the dark horizon so that the moon, if there was one, would light the enemy path. In this way a boat could often get to within a few hundred yards unseen, torpedoes would be fired, then the main engines crash-started to enable the boat to disengage at top speed, possibly laying smoke as additional cover.

The silent approach came to be the most effective technique in MTB operations. As there was always a dangerous moment as the auxiliary engines were de-clutched and the main engines started, with later types of craft having silencers fitted to the main engines themselves. In this way, a silent approach could be made by idling in on just the centre engine. When speed was required, this could be accelerated and the wing engines atrted in much less time than it had taken to change over from auxiliaries.
Another favoured technique was to divide the attacking force into two seperate units. One would approach from the opposite direction without any attempt at concealment and thus draw the enemy firee, while the second unit crept in quietly to make the actual torpedo attack. If the second unit was sighted, then the positions would be reversed according to a pre-arranged plan; the second unit would increase speed and engage the enemy with guns in order to create as much confusion as possible while the first would revert to a silent approach.

Yet another method was to wait with engines cut in the expected path of the convoy until the target ships came up into range. The danger here was that the waiting boats might find themselves stationary targets in the middle of a group of escorts, unable to start their engines and get away in time. It also meant that they had to have a good idea of the location of the approaching convoy. It was not easy to make contact with the enemy, especially on nights where visability was poor. Patrols would go out night after night for months on end in a fruitless search for targets. boats could pass unseen within a few hundred yards of one another at night.

In this respect, however, Britain possessed a great advantage as radar became better and better, particularly centimetric radar. The southern commands in particular came to build up a highly efficient system of RDF (Radio Direction Finding) in the English Channel, so that enemy convoys could be located as they tried to make a run through the Dover Strait. American PTs operating in the Mediterranean were all radar equiped, acting as "scope spotters", and directing the more heavily armed British boats in for the "kill".

While cruising, the boats usually maintained a V formation.
Station could be kept in line ahead, but this meant that the boats had to keep some distance between each other in order to avoid the wake of the boat ahead, which was often turbulent enough to make the craft uncontrollable. This induced a concertina effect with the boats surging forward and then falling back in an effort to maintian the correct distance. The longer the line, the worse the effect.
It was much easier for two following boats to be on either side of the boat in front, just ahead of the wake in undisturbed water. The distance apart could then be greatly reduced and there was no danger of overriding. However, the V formation was not practical in action. A sudden alteration in course meant that a boat would have to cut across the bows of the next astern. Boats were liable to be screened from the enemy by others in the same unit, an important factor in gunboat fighting when it was desirable to bring as many guns to bear as possible on the target. When action was imminent, therefore, the boats usually formed up astern, or in single line of bearing, or were split up to operate individually, depending on the tactics decided upon by the Senior officer.
As more was learned about fighting in small boats, the need to cover the widest possible area in search of the enemy became apparent. If the original search on silent, auxiliary engines failed, then the main engines would be opened up in the hope that the enemy would hear them, open fire, and thus give away his own position. The MTBs would then revert to a silent approach.

In the early days, cautious commanders fired their torpedoes at ranges of up to 4,000 yards, with virtually no chance of success. It was found that by using silent approach, a well handled boat could creep up unseen to within several hundred yards of the target, even under condidtions of nearly full moonlight and good visability. In fact, to be successful, it became prime necessity to get up close to the enemy, whether to fire "tin fish" or open up with the guns.

Other points learned the hard way included discretion in the use of smoke, so as not to provide more screen for the enemy than for oneself and hamper other craft that may be coming in to attack. Also, the vital need to report enemy sightings quickly in order that other boats could be sent into the area.
But, the biggest handicaps during this period were the boats themselves. Although a large scale building program was under way, especially of the larger 'Fairmiles', these did not become available until toward the end of 1941. For the time being, the only boats in operation were those built to pre-war designs, which were never intended for use in rough seas.

Co-operation between the services was also relatively poor, with Coastal Command aircraft playing only a small role in interception, until the entire system was revamped before operation "Overlord"



CONCLUSIONS :tinysmile_classes_t.....

It is impossible to accurately assess the results achieved by motor torpedo boats and their contribution to the course of the Second World War....

For one thing, the actions invariably took place at night, when visibility was poor and were fought at such high speeds that it was often difficult for the crews involved to know exactly what had happened.
Claims were made in all good faith which cannot be confirmed by later examination of enemy records.
Many an MTB or PT or Schnellboote came limping home, heavily damaged and crewed by wounded men, hours or days overdue, after having been cliamed as sunk by the opposing side. Such craft showed a remarkable ability to survive even heavy damage.
Nor were the action reports reliable guides to losses of enemy merchants; even from these, an inaccurate, incomplete picture develops.
Many of the vessels sunk by MTBs in the Mediterranean, for instance, were caiques and fishing craft, used by the Axis for a variety of purposes and too small to be listed as major merchant shipping losses. With the exception of major warships losses, such as cruisers and destroyers of which there can be no doubt, no such figures can be regarded as entirely accurate. When it comes to losses of minor warships of 100 tons or less (such as motor torpedo boats) and small merchant ships, barges or tugs, it is often impossible for the researcher to verify what caused their destruction.

Although the American PT boats played such an important role in the Pacific campaigns, they were seldom directly opposed by similar craft and there is little basis for comparison here between the performance of these boats of the American and Japanese navies.

It is in the North Sea, English Channel and Mediteranean that the major confrontations took place between craft designed for specific purposes of torpedo attack - the British MTBs and German S-boats - and it is on the record of their performance that the most realistic assessment can be made.....

The strength of Commonwealth and coastal craft at the end of the war totalled 1383 craft, (MTBs 422, including 48 still being used as MGBs, SGBs 6, MA/SBs 15, ML/HDMLs 940)
Losses during the war totalled 222 boats - 115 MTBs, 28 MGBs, 79 MLs & HDMLs, 1 SGB.
Confirmed German and Italian warship losses totalled 70 ships of 34,554 tons, including one cruiser, 5 minelayers, one armed merchant raider, and one submarine.
Merchant shipping sunk by coastal forces in home waters totalled 40 ships of 59,650 tons, and in the Mediterranean, some 100 vessels of about 70,000 tons.

Including those built before the war, Germany brought into operational service 244 S boats and 326 R boats.
Losses totalled 146 S boats and 163 R boats.
Of the 41 MAS boats seized by Germany after Italian surrender, 24 were destroyed. Of the remaining 103 Italian MAS boats commissioned, 50 were destroyed in combat, 20 were scuttled, and the rest fell into Allied hands.
British warships lost and credited to S boats total some 40 ships of approximately 25,000 tons, including 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers.
Allied merchant shipping losses to small boats totalled 99 ships of 229,676 tons.
With the exception of major warship losses, such as cruisers and destroyers of which there is no doubt, none of these figures can be regarded as entirely accurate.

When it came to losses of minor warships of 100 tons or so, such as motor torpedo boats, and small merchant ships and barges, it was sometimes impossible for either side to know for sure whether it was a torpedo or mine that had caused the destruction.
Even in the number of British coastal craft actually built during the war there are discrepancies in the totals listed by various official sources.
The "Coastal Forces Periodical" gives 1,568 craft (1,251 built in U.K, 143 in U.S, 174 in British Empire).
The Admiralty's "Nominal List of Ships, by Types, Built for the Royal Navy" gives a total of 1,551 craft.
The "Statistical Digest of the War", published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office in 1951, gives 1,604.
The"Coastal Forces Monograph", written in 1952, gives 1,689.
The figures given here earlier of the strength of coastal forces at the end of the war, added to the losses suffered, come to a total of 1,606.
When account is also taken of the boats which had been paid off by 1945, it would appear that something approaching 1,700 craft is the most accurate figure.

What emerges is that German boats were, overall, more successful against Allied shipping than MTBs, while the MTBs achieved a greater degree of success against their enemy opposite numbers. But this should be viewed against the number of targets available to each side. British coastal convoys comprised about 40 ships usually, up to ten miles in length and often escorted by no more than two destroyers and a few MLs. The German convoys, on the other hand, usually had no more than half a dozen merchants, heavily escorted.
Had the situation and strategies been reversed, the totals would have been reversed.
The greatest successes of the S boats against Allied shipping resulted from their minelaying operations, just as many of the greatest enemy losses at sea were caused by the RAFs air minelaying campaign ( although it was some time before it was appreciated that mines were far more successful than bombs). Since mines were also laid by other types of German craft, as well as aircraft, it is impossible to credit any number of losses to S boats. But some idea of the proportions can be gathered from the figures in home waters during the last 5 months of the war, when, with few aircraft in the air, nearly all German mines were laid by S and R boats. Compared with 6 Allied ships totalling 12,972 sunk by these craft by torpedo, the mines they laid caused a direct loss of 25 Allied ships of 75,999 tons.
It may well be therefore that in achieving their greatest degree of success against S and R boats, thus reducing the number of craft the Germans had available for minelaying, it was here that coastal forces made their most important contribution to the war, even though it must be said that many of these enemy craft were also sunk by destroyers or destroyed at their bases by Allied aircraft.


Assessed against the records of the war at sea as a whole, motor torpedo boats played a relatively minor role.
For example, the direct successes by torpedo attack of the German S-boats accounted for only 1.1% of the total Allied merchant ship losses of 21,570,720 tons, (and mines laid by all German forces caused only 6.5% of losses), as against 68.1% by submarines.

But the story does not end there.
It was as the Allies turned increasingly to a policy of amphibious warfare by combined operations that the small boats came increasingly into their own, when command of enemy coastal waters became vitally important - indeed as vital as the defense of those at home.
Such raids by small boats as the Raid on St.Nazaire were not only strategically successful in their own right, they led directly to tactics employed in the larger invasions in North Africa, Sicily, the Pacific islands, Italy and finally to the greatest of all....Normandy.
The somewhat reluctant acceptance of the need for coastal forces, then it's rapid expansion as this need became fully appreciated, was one of the factors which resulted from Britain basing her overall war strategy on maritime power - hardly a new concept in the light of history, but one which in the 20th century has seemed curiously unacceptable to Britain's leaders and repeatedly has to be learned all over again.

After the war, the small boats suffered much the same fate as they had in 1918. These boats that had given such strenuous service were broken up or sold....Some to take up new privateering careers as gun-runners or smugglers, others to end in a more gentle manner as pleasure craft, where only an ex-volunteer on holiday might chance upon one suddenly, and wistfully recognize her for what she had been.

For now, only the memories remain of the glory and grimness, the triumphs and tragedies, of the war in the shallow seas.


Sources

Cooper, Bryan, "The Battle of the Torpedo Boats", 1970, Macdonald & Co Publishers, Ltd., London.....The best of sources from the leading expert in this field. In fact, I have a sneaking suspicision he is one of the few researchers that actually studied this aspect of WW2 in any great detail.
Cooper, Bryan, "The Buccaneers", Purnell Weapons Book No.13, Purnells History of the Second World War, 1970, Purnell Publishing, Macdonald & Co. Limited....The blurb for this book describes Mr. Cooper thus, "Bryan Cooper is the author of "The Ironclads of Cambrai", and, with Dr. T.F. Gaskell, "North Sea Oil-The Great Gamble". He has worked as a film, radio and television script writer and public relations representative, and was publicity advisor for Donald Campell's 1960 attempt on the world land speed record."

AND...."The General" magazine's editor Rex A. Martin published whole tracts of Mr. Coopers fine research for his article "War in the Shallow Seas" (Vol 23, No.3)...this was the feature article of that issue, and not once did Rex acknowledge his source as Bryan Cooper's fine research. Rex's article quotes whole passages from "The Battle of the Torpedo Boats", as I do, but without once mentioning Mr. Cooper. SHAME on you Rex Martin!


So there you have it. Some great research by Bryan Cooper, obviously he has a love for the subject, as his association with the late great Sir Donald Campell demonstrates, killed as he was in a fast craft trying to break speed records on Scotland's Loch Ness.

Thats all for now....hope you enjoyed this piece!!

MORO (Cheers!)O0

B5N2Kate

 

This is my own essay which was originally written for WW2DB. I hope it will add just a little bit more to B2N2Kate's excellent appraisal:


Whilst the 49-ton Vosper Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) were quite adequate against unarmed or lightly armed enemy merchant shipping the Admiralty soon felt that something bigger and more heavily armed would be needed to take on a stronger opponent such as the powerful German S-boats. Fortunately, in 1939 the Admiralty had already considered such a vessel, to employ a revolutionary hull consisting of a flat after section to facilitate high speed planing but with a rounded form forward to allow for pitching without severe slamming. The pitching itself being further reduced by a significant increase in length to 110 feet (33.53 m) which resulted in a sharply inclining chine.

Fairmile, a new company, were given the task of preparing the design. From this, actual construction was entrusted largely to many minor shipyards which hitherto had only built pleasure craft. This was done by supplying prefabricated kits from Fairmile. In all some 250 such kits being eventually supplied.

The Fairmile D boats were powered by four 4,800 hp Packard engine, without the wartime luxury of a gearbox, driving the shallow-draft vessel through four shafts with small diameter propellers. The boats were generally fitted out either as 90-ton Motor Gun Boats (MGB) or combined (105-ton) Motor Torpedo and Gun Boats (MTB/MGB). Some later builds would eventually grow to a displacement of 120 tons.

The first units were commissioned in 1942 and proved to be highly weather-able, operating equally well in cold Norwegian coastal waters or the warmer temperatures along the North African coastline. With Royal Navy Regular Officers and Seamen needed to man the Navy's larger vessels, crews for these boats would come from RNVR reservists. Many of their keen young officers were extremely proud to have been entrusted with a Command of their own (no matter how small)and were soon creating some of the bravest and efficient crews imaginable.

Perhaps one of the most famous incidents in which a Motor Gun Boat was involved, was that of MGB-314 (actually a Fairmile C type boat), Commanded by Lt. Dunstan Curtis, during the famous Commando raid on the Normandie Dock at St. Nazaire during the night of March 28, 1942. MGB-314 was earmarked as the Command boat for the operation and carried aboard both Colonel Charles Newman and Commander Robert Ryder (the respective Land and naval force commanders). During this action Able Seaman William Savage, who was manning the forward two-pounder pom-pom would, despite being mortally wounded steadfastly man his gun until ultimately succumbing to his wounds. A dedication that would earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross.

Sources:
Warships of World War II (Collins/Janes, 1996)
Janes Fighting ships of World War II (Studio, 1989)
Hand Of Steel (Rupert Butler, Hamlyn, 1980)
The War at Sea (John Winton, Book club Associates/Hutchinson Publishing, 1974)